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Abstract 
 
Reading Mutant Narratives explores how narratives of environmental and personal 
transformation in contemporary ecological science fiction can develop more-than-
human modes of embodied experience. More specifically, it attends to the conflicted 
yet potentially transformative experientiality of mutant narratives. Mutant narratives 
are viewed as uneasy hybrids of human-centered and posthumanist science fiction 
that contain potential for ecological understanding. Drawing on narrative studies and 
empirical reading studies, the dissertation begins from the premise that in suitable 
conditions, reading fiction may give rise to experiential change. The study traces and 
describes experiential changes that take place while reading works of science fiction. 
The bodily, subjective and historical conditions of reading are considered alongside 
the generic contexts and narrative features of the fictional works studied. 
As exemplary cases of mutant narratives, the study foregrounds the work of 
three American science fiction authors known for their critiques of anthropocentrism 
and for their articulations of more-than-human ecologies: Greg Bear, Paolo Bacigalupi, 
and Jeff VanderMeer. While much of contemporary fiction naturalizes embodied 
experience and hides their own narrative strategies, mutant narratives have the 
potential to defamiliarize readers’ notions of bodies and environments while also 
estranging their embodied experience of reading fiction. As a theoretical contribution 
to science fiction studies, the study considers such a readerly dynamic in terms of 
embodied estrangement. 
Building on theoretical and practical work done in both embodied cognitive and 
posthumanist approaches to literature, the study shows how engagements with 
fictional narratives can, for their part, shape readers’ habitual patterns of feeling and 
perception. These approaches are synthesized into a method of close reading, 
performative enactivism, that helps to articulate bodily, environmental, and more-than-
human aspects of readerly engagement. Attending to such experiential aspects 
integrates ecological science fiction more deeply into the contemporary experiential 
situation of living with radical environmental transformation. 
Tiivistelmä 
 
Reading Mutant Narratives keskittyy ekologista kriisiä käsitteleviin mutantti-
kertomuksiin ja niille tyypilliseen kokemuksellisuuteen. Mutanttikertomukset ovat tie-
teisfiktiivisiä kertomuksia, joissa ihmiskeskeiset ja posthumanistiset piirteet yhdistyvät 
ja antavat lukijalle mahdollisuuksia ekologiseen ymmärrykseen. Esimerkkeinä mu-
tanttikertomuksista tutkimus nostaa esiin kolmen yhdysvaltalaisen tieteiskirjailijan, 
Greg Bearin, Paolo Bacigalupin ja Jeff VanderMeerin, teoksia. Nämä teokset asettavat 
ihmisen osaksi ekologisia, evolutiivisia ja teknologisia vuorovaikutussuhteita, joissa 
myös ihmisruumiit ja ruumiillinen kokemus muuttavat muotoaan. Väitöskirja tutkii siis, 
kuinka tieteisfiktiiviset kertomukset ympäristöllisestä ja kokemuksellisesta muutok-
sesta voivat kehittää ruumiillista kokemusta.  
Kertomuksentutkimukseen ja empiiriseen lukijatutkimukseen tukeutuen tutki-
mus lähtee oletuksesta, että sopivissa olosuhteissa kirjallisuuden lukeminen voi edes-
auttaa kokemuksellisia muutoksia. Tutkimus tarkastelee tieteisfiktion lukemista eletyn 
ruumiillisen kokemuksen tasolla. Lukukokemuksen analyysissa otetaan huomioon 
sekä lukijan ruumiillinen, subjektiivinen ja historiallinen tilanne että luettujen teosten 
kytkeytyminen romaanikerronnan ja tieteisfiktion lajityypin perinteisiin. Suuri osa 
nykykirjallisuudesta esittää ruumiillisen kokemuksen luonnollisena ja kätkee oman 
kerronnallisen vaikutusvaltansa, mutta mutanttikertomusten kerronnalliset keinot saat-
tavat outouttaa lukijoiden ruumiillista kokemusta suhteessa sekä elettyyn ympäristöön 
että kirjallisuuteen itseensä. Tieteisfiktion tutkimuksen käsitteistöä uudistaen väitös-
kirja kutsuu tällaista lukemisen dynamiikkaa ruumiilliseksi vieraannuttamiseksi.  
Lukukokemuksen analyysien avulla tutkimus esittää, kuinka kirjallisuuden luke-
minen ohjaa osaltaan lukijoiden tunne- ja havaintotottumusten muotoutumista. Se tuo 
yhteen ruumiillis-kognitiivisia ja posthumanistisia lähestymistapoja kirjallisuuden-
tutkimukseen ja muotoilee performatiivis-enaktiivisen lähilukemisen metodin, joka 
auttaa sanallistamaan lukukokemuksen ruumiillisia, ympäristöllisiä ja ei-inhimilliseen 
kurovia puolia. Ruumiillisen kokemuksellisuuden syventäminen tämän metodin avulla 
tuo ekologisen tieteisfiktion tiiviimmin osaksi globaalin ympäristömuutoksen 
kokemuksellista tilannetta. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In Ecocriticism at the Edge: The Anthropocene as a Threshold Concept (2015), 
literary critic Timothy Clark severely questions the power of literature and literary 
criticism to reimagine environmental relations. Clark argues that the current state 
of environmental destruction – climate change, mass extinctions, wide-scale 
exploitative land-use, all collectively signified by the concept of the Anthropocene1 
– is not the doing of individual humans or even societies, but of the emergent, 
destructive agency of the human species as a whole. Sympathizing with the anti-
humanist stance of Claire Colebrook, he sees destructiveness as an inherent 
feature of the species, evolved along with the utilization of tools and fire. He quotes 
Colebrook: 
Let us accept that humanity is and must be parasitic: it lives only on its robbing 
and destruction of life that is not its own. Our current predicament of climate 
change, whereby we have consumed and ingested blindly – bloating and glutting 
our body politic through the constant destruction of resources without 
recompense – would not be a late accident, nor a misjudgment of a post-
industrial age. To be a body is to be a consuming body, to be in relation of 
destructive consumption with what is effected as other, as resource, through 
consumption. Climate change would be the condition of human organicism in 
general. (Colebrook 2014, 178, quoted in Clark 2015, 153.) 
If literary critics cannot think on the scale of destructive human organicism, Clark 
argues, but restrict themselves to analyses on the smaller scales in which 
intentionality and rationality still play some part, they latently contribute to the 
status quo and thus also to the destruction. The ecocritical aim of rethinking 
“environmental imaginations” (Buell 1995) in order to foster cultural change is in 
the danger of becoming a “diversionary side-show, blind to its relative 
insignificance” (Clark 2015, 21). The nonconscious, noncultural entity that is the 
                                                 
1 Anthropocene denotes a geological epoch that follows the Holocene, an epoch that is 
marked by the fact that human activity and agency have made a geologically significant 
trace on the Earth’s crust. The term is also widely adopted by scholars in the humanities 
and social sciences, as well as by artists and journalists, to denote the unprecedented 
impact humanity has made on the natural world in the industrial age (see e.g. Chakrabarty 
2009, Ghosh 2016). In criticism, the term has been accused of rendering invisible both 
the differences within and between human populations (see Palsson et al. 2013, Toivanen 
& Pelttari 2017) and the nonhuman agency (see Alaimo 2016, 143–168). 
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human species is not impressed or transformed by the ideas of literary writers or 
critics. 
Clark is not alone in his critique of liberal humanist values. Long before the 
introduction of the term Anthropocene, developments in 20th century Western 
science and philosophy gave rise to a deep crisis of humanist thinking. Evolutionary 
theory and cognitive science have made it more and more difficult to figure the 
human according to Enlightenment ideals of autonomy, rationality, and human 
exceptionalism, that is, the idea that humans are, by their nature or by divine will, 
allotted a privileged position among other inhabitants of the Earth. As Cary Wolfe 
(2010, xv) notes, “‘the human’ is achieved by escaping or repressing not just its 
animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by 
transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether.” Giving up 
these escapist traditions and moving into systems thinking has been a difficult task 
that has continued in the 21st century.2 
As Clark’s critique demonstrates, this challenge is made more urgent by the 
practical need for ecologically sustainable ways of organizing our lives and 
societies. In the context of the current ecological crisis, natural scientists have also 
called for a change in the ways humans perceive their role in wider ecological and 
geophysical systems, and have stated that it is in the humanities, arts, and social 
sciences where this transitory work has to be initiated (e.g. Barnosky & Hadly 2015, 
Hansen et al. 2016, see also Palsson et al. 2013). This call for action is also a call 
for transversal thinking informed by several systems of knowledge. It is my belief 
that contemporary humanities research can be both flexible and rigorous enough 
to respond with just such transversality, and that literary studies in particular can 
                                                 
2 The crisis of humanism is the driving force behind many contemporary philosophical 
approaches such as the different critiques of classical humanism (see Soper 1985, 
Sheehan 2003) and interdisciplinary work in fields, such as ecocriticism, posthumanism 
(see Wolfe 2010, Nayar 2014), cognitive literary studies (see Zunshine 2006, Cave 2016, 
Kukkonen 2019), Darwinist literary studies (see Carroll 2004, Boyd 2009), human animal 
studies (see Wolfe 2010), and feminist philosophy of science (see Haraway 1991, Åsberg 
et al. 2011). Lately, much of the conversation has revolved around the concept of the 
Anthropocene, delineating the crisis of humanism as inseparable from the global 
ecological crisis (see e.g. Trexler 2015, Clark 2015, Weik von Mossner 2016, LeMenager 
2017). For a discussion specifically on the complex relations of Enlightenment, humanism, 
and posthumanism, see Wolfe (2010, xii–xxxiv). 
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begin to explain how storytelling “can help us to imaginatively experience the 
impact of that geophysical force that is the human” (Weik von Mossner 2016, 84, 
emphasis original). 
 
Literary Studies in the Anthropocene 
 
A humanist response to the Anthropocene cannot be an easy one, as rethinking 
humans and humanity from a systemic perspective requires humanist scholars to 
question some of their basic assumptions. Clark, for one, is particularly suspicious 
of critical appeals to subjective experience, such as David Abram’s 
phenomenological approach to animist perception or Ursula Heise’s work on 
spatial and local experience. He sees this kind of work as inherently bound by 
“terrestriality,” defined as “that ‘normal’ prereflective sense of scale inherent to 
embodied human life on the Earth’s surface, [which] forms a kind of transcendental, 
one that both underlies and exceeds any view that it is merely our social context 
that determines our understanding of ourselves” (Clark 2015, 33).3 For Clark, if 
we are to take the Anthropocene seriously, we can no longer trust everyday 
experience as the basis of ethical decisions – yet we are bound by it, due to our 
embodied condition. 
Why does this discussion concern literature and literary studies? Because 
literature provides us with experiences, and this dissertation is a study of those 
experiences. People turn to literature to experience new places and new people, 
new ways of thinking and feeling – but also to revisit and rehearse worlds and 
values they are already familiar with. The experiential structures literature provides 
are, as Clark shows, shaped by cultural values and traditions. In fact, this is where 
he focuses his argument about the Anthropocene as a “threshold concept” – by 
revealing the ways in which collective action shapes our physical world, the 
                                                 
3 In another context, Clark (2015, 148) also refers to the phenomenon of terrestriality as 
“the phantasm of normality.” Terrestriality is thus bound not only to the condition of human 
embodiment, but also to the naturalized conceptions of such a condition. 
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Anthropocene forces rethinking of what is historically significant and culturally 
valuable. The Anthropocene 
casts into new relief developments that many regard as human advances, 
including social changes such as the rise of the liberal values of individualism, 
and personal freedom, for these cannot now be disengaged from such 
environmentally degrading impacts as increased consumption, individual 
property rights, growing markets and expanded resource use. (Clark 2015, 52) 
Clark’s strategy for defamiliarizing notions of individualism and personal freedom is 
to read literary works on several scales, resulting in a series of conflicting 
interpretations of the text: what appears, on the individual and social scale, to be 
a realist, sympathetic portrayal of an altruistic man caring for his family (Raymond 
Carver’s “Elephant,” 1988) is, on a global scale, turned into an alienated narrative 
of the scale effects of humanity as a geological agent. Clark’s reading 
demonstrates the radical difference between personal meaning (work as caring) 
and environmental implications on a global scale (work as a driving force of climate 
change), and thus supports the argument that literary studies in the Anthropocene 
cannot limit their focus to naturalized subjective experience alone. Instead, Clark 
presents a reading strategy for dehumanizing literary characters into “mere 
physical entities” that act as part of the global collective agent that he considers 
as material and nonhuman (Clark 2015, 100–103). Clark emphasizes that this 
effect of his readings does not make the individual level obsolete – just highly 
unuseful for interpretations on a global scale. 
I am sympathetic to the way in which Clark’s approach defamiliarizes 
naturalized notions of individualism and personal freedom, but do not fully agree 
with his conclusion that readings focusing on subjective experience have become 
unuseful to environmental modes of criticism. Erin James’ The Storyworld Accord: 
Econarratology and Postcolonial Narratives, another book-length challenge to 
ecocriticism published in 2015, illustrates how such readings can still make a 
difference. 
James builds on the cognitive narratological notion of “storyworld” (Herman 
2002) in order to argue that narratives (both fictional and nonfictional) provide 
readers with “highly subjective understandings of what it is like to live in, 
conceptualize, and experience a given space and time” (James 2015, xii). Thus 
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they can “reveal perceptual points of difference, clarify the interests of those who 
imagine and inhabit an environment in a specific way, and expose readers to 
different or opposing points of view” (James 2015, 208). In an impressively wide 
arc that spans narratological close reading and cultural criticism, James suggests 
that the cognitive process of inhabiting storyworlds has political potential: 
narratives can “open channels of communication about the way that people 
perceive and inhabit their environments and encourage an environmental 
awareness that may help to craft more equitable, just, and nonpartisan 
environmental policies” (James 2015, 208). 
I see James’s focus on the cognitive force of literature as a convincing and 
pragmatic response to the problem of the human scale. While Clark’s strategy is 
to introduce in his readings a wider scale frame from which to discuss the relentless 
material destruction brought on by humanity at large, James’s strategy is to stick 
to human experience, as bound by local environmental and cultural contexts. While 
James does not discuss the human species or its evolutionary tendencies, her 
focus on human experience as necessarily limited gives rise to a multiperspectival 
view of environmental knowledge and action. 
Thinking through the relationship between environment, representation, and 
subjectivity via imaginative and perhaps strange depictions of the physical world 
illustrates that, just as there is no standard ‘environment’ in which people live, 
there is no standard way of conceiving of and interacting with the material world. 
While a view of the Atlantic Ocean from a mountaintop may be a sublime sight 
for an American or British nature writer, the very same sight may evoke painful 
memories of transplantation, exploitation, and death for a Caribbean descendant 
of an African slave. These two differing perceptions of the ocean view may also 
lead to drastically different literary representations and narrative strategies: the 
nature writer may wish to depict the view as realistically as possible as a means 
of preserving its beauty, while the Caribbean writer may look to collapse time in 
a phantasmagoric representation of the same view to highlight the horrors of 
slavery and its continuing legacy. (James 2015, 27) 
Through readings of postcolonial narratives, James demonstrates that there can 
be no single, unitary understanding of humanity as an actor, like there can be no 
single understanding of environment or climate. Instead, there is negotiation 
between radically different perspectives. In this way, James’s approach 
demonstrates a complexity of interpretation that Clark’s scale thinking does not 
reach. As James explains, reading or literary studies alone cannot make much of 
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an impact on environmental issues – that is, it is crucial to see engagements with 
literature as part of a wider range of environmental action. Avoiding universalization 
and abstraction, the cognitive or subjective effects attributed to reading fiction 
must be discussed in their particular material-cultural contexts, and 
environmentally oriented criticism in particular cannot be effective if it limits itself 
to discussions within the safe spaces of university departments and disciplines. 
It is apparent that James is a humanist, putting her trust in the good 
intentions and communicative skills of humans; but Clark’s challenge about 
considering the limits of intentionality should still haunt us. Maybe we do not know 
as much as we think we do, and maybe conscious thought and communication 
just cannot override nonconscious patterns of response and action, on neither the 
subpersonal nor the collective level. As Clark’s critique makes abundantly clear, 
cognitive critiques of humanism have not yet found a stable foothold in ecocriticism 
(but see Easterlin 2012, Lehtimäki 2013, Weik von Mossner 2017a). While I view 
ecocriticism as an important broad discussion of the environmental questions 
relevant my study, the need for deeper engagement with the questions of 
embodiment and cognition leads me to turn to other approaches, mainly 
posthumanism and enactivism. 
Posthumanist approaches to cultural imaginaries, science fiction included, 
have in recent years began to reconfigure the human-centered assumptions that 
give shape to our current theoretical understanding of human cultures. While 
posthumanism (if we can imagine such an entity) is a formidable tangle of friction-
inducing threads of thought, most of those threads discuss “the embodiment and 
the embeddedness of the human being in not just its biological but also its 
technological world” and the potential new modes of thought that can be 
developed after the realization of this “prosthetic coevolution” (Wolfe 2010, xv, see 
also Foucault 1984, Braidotti 2013, Nayar 2014). Posthumanist feminist and new 
materialist approaches in particular emphasize that cultural imaginaries operate on 
material and bodily levels, and thus they also develop methodologies that can 
attend to such materiality (see e.g. Neimanis 2017). 
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The embodied cognitive approach, and particularly the enactivist 
perspective on literature and cognition, is a similarly recent and potent challenge 
to conventional notions of mind, matter, and bodily action, as it insists that cognition 
is not the property of brains, but of entire embodied organisms (see e.g. Varela et 
al. 1992, Gallagher and Zahavi 2007, Noë 2015, Kukkonen 2019). In light of 
Wolfe’s (2010) definition above, the cases in which the embodied cognitive 
approach proposes new modes of thought could even be called posthumanist (e.g. 
Clark 2004, Varela et al. 1992).4 
The shared interests of these two approaches, especially the 
complementary notions of material agency and embodied cognition, give rise to 
the theoretical discussions as well as the practical method in this study. Building 
on enactivist and posthumanist approaches to literature, this study assumes an 
exploratory and speculative attitude to readerly experience. By asking what 
happens to readerly experience when reading is assumed to be both embodied 
and environmental, it attends to the ways in which literature evokes bodily feelings, 
impressions, and experiential changes. In the study, the two approaches are 
synthesized into a method of reading, performative enactivism, that trains such 
environmental and more-than-human aspects of readerly engagement. The study 
argues that repeated engagements with literature can shape readers’ habitual 
patterns of feeling and perception. Ecological science fiction thus emerges as a 
useful aid when living with radical environmental change. 
 
Science Fictional Explorations of Environments and Coevolution 
 
While science fiction is not necessarily environmentalist, it is profoundly interested 
in environments and environmental knowledge. In Trillion Year Spree, Brian Aldiss 
and David Wingrove (2001, 4) characterize science fiction as a literature of 
epistemology, “the search for a definition of mankind and his status in the universe 
                                                 
4 While both posthumanism and enactivism are relatively recent movements in themselves, 
they draw on the long histories of feminist, phenomenological, and systems-theoretical 
inquiry, among others (see 1.2, 2.1, 2.2). 
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which will stand in our advanced but confused state of knowledge (science).” They 
further argue that science fiction has potential value as environmental literature 
because ‘[t]he greatest successes of science fiction are those which deal with man 
in relation to his changing surroundings and abilities: what might loosely be called 
environmental fiction” (Aldiss and Wingrove 2001, 8, emphasis in original). 
Examples of this kind of loosely environmental science fiction range from classics 
such as H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds (1898), Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris (1961), 
Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965) to contemporary fiction such as Margaret Atwood’s 
Oryx and Crake (2003), Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy (1992–1995) and 
Science in the Capital trilogy (2004–2007), Nnedi Okorafor’s Lagoon (2014) and 
N. K. Jemisin’s The Broken Earth trilogy (2015–2017). 
As Chris Pak (2016, 6) notes, Aldiss’ and Wingrove’s emphasis on 
environmentality highlights how science fiction “explores two major themes that 
are essential to the mode: our relationship to the environment, and the way our 
abilities – our technologies – allow alteration of both the environment and the range 
of environments made available to us.” As such, the mode of science fiction is 
interested in human action at a species level, as both environmental and 
technological, as well as our perceptual and physical access to new environments 
(implied by Pak’s phrase “the range of environments made available to us”). Pak’s 
own treatise on the theme of terraforming (geoengineering human-habitable 
planets), Terraforming: Ecopolitical Transformations and Environmentalism in 
Science Fiction (2016) demonstrates this interest, as do such recent volumes as 
Ursula Heise’s The Sense of Space and the Sense of Planet (2008), Eric Otto’s 
Green Speculations (2012), Green Planets (2014, edited by Gerry Canavan and 
Kim Stanley Robinson) and Tom Idema’s Stages of Transmutations (2019). The 
rapid proliferation of such research in recent years and the limited scope of this 
study prevent me from doing an extensive survey, but even on this limited basis we 
can infer that science fiction provides ample sources for studies of environmental 
imaginations. 
Science fictional imaginations also develop and discuss visions of humanity 
and human nature. The entanglements of humans and technology have always 
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formed a central theme for science fiction, and technologization has been both 
celebrated and contested in genre fiction. Some strains of science fiction present 
technology, and the extensive resource use required by the manufacture and 
development of high technology, as inherent in human nature. Take, for example, 
the trope of the galactic empire. Developed in the so-called Golden Age science 
fiction of the post-WWII years and since popularized by Star Wars and Star Trek, 
galactic empire stories imagine humanity extending beyond the Earth and the solar 
system to inhabit and exploit outer space. The humanity presented in these fictions 
can be seen as the inherently destructive and consuming human portrayed by 
Colebrook (2014) and Clark (2015). However, in the grand scheme of galactic 
empire stories, the ruination of Earth is typically presented as a sad but inevitable 
minor step on the way to the galactic age. These stories thus perpetuate imperialist 
notions of Western civilization and expansion, often revolving around conflicts in 
war, trade, and politics, which, as Iain M. Banks’ extensive post-scarcity Culture 
series demonstrates, often unfold into complete fictional universes. In the mature 
genre of today, postcolonial critique has reached the galactic empire, with works 
such as Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (2016) and Altered Carbon (Richard K. 
Morgan 2002, Netflix adaptation 2018) focusing on the exploited underclasses and 
ecological devastation produced by imperialist and colonialist projects. 
The analyses in this study focus on a selection Anglo-American ecological 
science fiction that stay on Earth: Greg Bear’s novel Darwin’s Children (2003); 
Paolo Bacigalupi’s short stories “The Fluted Girl” (2003) and “The People of Sand 
and Slag” (2004) as well as his novel The Windup Girl (2009); and Jeff 
VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach novel trilogy (Annihilation, Authority, and 
Acceptance, all published in 2014). These science fiction narratives are profoundly 
different from galactic empire stories, but the backdrop of the galactic empire 
imaginary is a necessary context for them. This is mostly due to their origin and 
publication in the context of American science fiction. 
The narratives studied imagine specific places such as The United States 
of America in the near future (in Darwin’s Children), Bangkok in the 23rd century (in 
The Windup Girl), and a remote area off the coast of the Gulf of Mexico (The 
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Southern Reach), and they engage with the environmental crises relevant to their 
imagined worlds. The narratives also portray humanity in a drastically different way 
from the galactic empire stories, presenting situations in which human societies 
and individuals are influenced, infected, and transformed by nonhuman forces. If 
there is, at times, mastery over nature, it is presented as partial and as particular 
to systemic conditions. Contrary to the galactic empire imaginary, in these works 
humanity does not appear as a unified agent with a specific internal nature. Rather, 
these narratives destabilize and reconfigure humanist ideas of human agency and 
exceptionality. 
In each of the selected works of fiction, the conception of what it is to be 
human is permeated by science-based articulations of biological and ecological 
life, especially the notions of coevolution (e.g. Nuismer 2017) and mutual 
specification of organism and environment (Lewontin 1983, Varela et al 1992, 198–
202). Coevolution refers to biological dynamics in which more than one species 
reciprocally affect each other's evolution, but the latter term also accounts for 
organismic change in relation to other features in their environments such as soil 
or the atmosphere conditions, and the way the actions of the organisms also shape 
those other organisms and environments. Well-known examples of coevolution 
include the development of flowering plants and pollinating insects, and the shared 
evolutionary history of cows, humans, and the humans’ gut flora (Nuismer 2017).5 
Mutual specification of organism and environment, on the other hand, takes on the 
question how perception, such as bees’ sensitivity to ultraviolet reflectance, is 
made possible through bodily engagement with the environment, such as flowers 
that reflect ultraviolet light (Varela et al. 1992, 201). This view of perception is at 
the core of the enactivist approach to cognition, and it will be introduced in more 
detail in section 1.2. 
Not only does ecological science fiction draw on natural scientific ideas and 
models, such as coevolution and mutual specification, it can also develop them 
further by considering how they would pan out in speculative scenarios, or by 
                                                 
5 For other examples, and discussion on the philosophical implications of coevolutive 
relations, see Gilbert 2017 and McFall-Ngai 2017. 
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asking how certain scientific findings might bear on human lives and societies. 
Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children, continuing the storyline of the multiple-award-
winning Darwin’s Radio (1999), speculates on a planet-wide evolutionary leap in 
humans, caused by the stress that overpopulation puts on the planetary ecosystem. 
Bear’s novel thus fleshes out the idea of mutual specification on the level of 
populations and genetics, asking how environmental changes effected by human 
action might affect the biological make-up of the human species. As a hard science 
fiction novel that purposefully discusses scientific developments by means of 
fictional narrative, Darwin’s Children also explicitly builds on the evolutionary-
theoretical notions of symbiogenesis (Margulis and Sagan 2002) and punctuated 
equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972). 
In Paolo Bacigalupi’s short stories and novel The Windup Girl, the notion of 
coevolution is an integral part of worldbuilding, but Bacigalupi takes it beyond 
biology to the reciprocity between humans, their domesticated species, and 
technology. Bacigalupi’s work critically explores exploitative and instrumental 
relations to nonhuman nature, constructing fictional worlds in which biological life 
is largely shaped by human design. In Bacigalupi’s highly stylized “if-this-goes-on” 
narratives, human societies, groups, and individuals also act according to the logic 
of instrumentalization, thus modeling the notion of coevolution on the level of 
sociotechnological systems. The Windup Girl, in particular, has been connected to 
real-life political struggles with transnational agribusiness companies such as 
Bayer and Monsanto. The story is commonly interpreted as a warning against the 
capitalist appropriation of biological life, figuring fully instrumentalized ecosystems 
as extremely impoverished and destructive to human and nonhuman life alike (see 
e.g. Selisker 2015). Bacigalupi also builds on contemporary climate change 
scenarios, fleshing out futures in which sea levels have risen, weather patterns are 
highly irregular, and mass extinctions have wiped out the majority of nonhuman 
species. 
By introducing a strangely transformative natural area, Jeff VanderMeer’s 
The Southern Reach speculates on the implications of ecosystemic events that are 
inherently unknowable. The trilogy brings together environmental change and 
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embodied experience, thus fleshing out how mutual spefication unfolds on the level 
of embodied cognition. VanderMeer’s style emphasizes the affectivity and 
subjectivity of environmental relations, using the narrative strategies of Weird and 
horror fiction to challenge scientistic and rationalist notions of environmental 
knowledge. As such, The Southern Reach engages with notions of embodied and 
enactive cognition (e.g. Varela et al. 1992, Noë 2004), as well as with cognitive 
science of perception more generally (e.g. Metzinger 2003). 
Despite the scientific influences, the characterization and focalization in 
these works are couched in humanist traditions of depicting human minds and 
bodies. What emerges, in each work, is an uneasy, internally conflicted hybrid of 
coevolutionary and humanist conceptions of human and nonhuman life. Focusing 
on this conflict in reading experience, as it unfolds, is a central tactic for unraveling 
the themes of posthumanist subjectivity. In this study, mutant narrative is a 
conceptual shorthand that loosely holds the confusing and effective hybridity that 
drives such works. 
A great part of the destabilization and reconfiguration entailed in reading 
mutant narratives is due to the ways they figure human embodiment in more-than-
human environments by shifting and blurring the conventional boundaries between 
the human and the nonhuman, the individual and the environment. Mutant 
narratives unfold in environments that are transformed: post-epidemic, post-
industrial, post-catastrophical spaces. Such spaces are inhabited by transforming 
bodies: hybrids, mutants, diseased and contaminated plants and animals. 
Moreover, they arise from environmental relations that are technological on a 
systemic level: the mutant generation of Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children springs 
from conditions brought on by modern overpopulation and planet-wide stress on 
ecosystems; Paolo Bacigalupi’s characters tend to be either bioengineered or 
otherwise enmeshed in capitalist systems of production; and the characters of Jeff 
VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach find themselves in a situation where their very 
perceptions are shaped both by systemic powers and by the superior mind-
invasive technology of a nonhuman alien presence. Thus, and crucially for the 
posthumanist ethos developed in this study, they do not figure nature as separate 
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from human action or culture. Instead, they give rise to environmental imaginations 
that include human activity on a systemic level, and thus also foster conceptions 
of human agency as more-than-human. 
 
1.1 Argument: Mutant Narratives as Responses to the 
Crisis of Humanism 
 
This study begins from the realization, brought about by evolutionary theory and 
cognitive science, that human minds and human culture are thoroughly entangled 
in material and ecological systems of interdependences. In the previous section, I 
introduced this situation as “the crisis of humanism.” My research analyzes science 
fictional responses to this crisis, especially those I termed “mutant narratives.” 
Moreover, it asks what implications the realization of such entanglements holds for 
the literary critical practice. 
Science fiction is caught between scientific ideas and humanist form, which 
lends it a generative tension. It generally adopts a systemic view of the human, but 
as popular literature, it tends to conform to the traditions of “realist” expressive 
strategies. While the realist and naturalist movement of the late 19th century was 
remarkable particularly in its aim for “objective” and “scientific” ways of 
representing reality, contemporary Western mainstream literature has also been 
shaped by modernist and postmodernist cultural currents that seek to narrate the 
“inner” experience of the subject and the epistemological ruptures brought on by 
the limited human condition. The contemporary, broadly realist style – the style 
generally experienced as “natural” and unmediated – tends to present human 
experience as distinctly opposite to nonhuman life, as bound by individual bodies 
and persons, and narratable through coherent, rational subjects. This 
unquestioned baggage of the realist tradition is, I claim, at the core of the now-
dominant form of human subjectivity, naturalized to the extent that we experience 
it as self-evident – like the air we breathe (see also Rossi 2012, Kukkonen 2019). 
Clark (2015) and James (2015), neither of whom study science fiction, also 
make this claim. Clark’s analysis of Raymond Carver’s “Elephant” (1988) 
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demonstrates that while the realist style has become naturalized as a mode that 
performs more fidelity to actual reality than other modes, criticism can denaturalize 
it and argue why other modes, such as the Nigerian magical realism of Ben Okri, 
can present equally relevant representations of reality through a different kind of 
ontological and experiential perspective (Clark 2015, 106–107). James argues 
that the antimimetic features of Okri’s stories, such as the use of a narrator with a 
magical ability to transgress the boundary of life and death, are actually “reflective 
of a real sociohistorical and environmental setting . . . [and of] the way that [the 
city of Lagos] intermeshes modern and nonmodern worlds in one site” (James 
2015, 171). James suggests reading such stories “not as non- or antirealist but as 
illustrating an alternative realism that subscribes to non-Western ontologies” 
(James 2015, xv). James’ postcolonial critique of realism is a reminder of the vast 
variety of subjective realities, and of the limits literary traditions set for plausible 
accounts of those realities. 
James reads postcolonial narratives written by authors who explicitly claim 
to encode their actual experience into literature: Sam Selvon, V. S. Naipaul, Ben 
Okri, and Ken Saro-Wiwa. While the narratives she discusses are nonrealist in form, 
James bases her claims about their cognitive power on the fact that they are 
grounded in particular places and times, such as Trinidad in the 1940s or southern 
Nigeria in the late 1960s. In the context of this study, I query whether James’ 
hypothesis about subjective understandings also extends to narratives that do not 
claim to be grounded on such referents and do not attempt to model any existing 
subjective position or place – that is, speculative fiction. When reading narratives 
focalized through a bioengineered woman in a far future, post-apocalyptic Bangkok, 
or a hallucinating scientist in an extraterrestrial landscape, what do the readers 
learn about environments and environmental experience? What are the benefits of 
reading such fictions as (allegorical or warped) “encodings” of actual 
environmental experience – and what other reading strategies could we consider? 
There are cognitive gains to be made in the jarring confrontations with 
naturalized experience that nonrealist modes of literature offer. I suggest reading 
science fictional narratives not as more or less truthful mirrors of reality but as 
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systems to think and feel with. Every science fictional narrative invites the reader 
to adopt what Donna Haraway calls a “generous but suspicious” receptive posture: 
a willingness to accept the existence, internal logic, and affective appeal of the 
fictional world, and an awareness of its fictionality, in the best cases laced with a 
curiousness about the construction and ideological weight of the world (Haraway 
1992, 326). As such, science fictional narratives promise to develop the 
metanarrative skills of the reader, making it easier to question the sincerity or 
naturality of any kind of story, be it framed as fictional, journalistic, scientific, or 
political. 
Science fiction is an established arena for testing the boundaries of the 
realistically depicted human subject. The genre has been producing mutations of 
humanist forms – robots, androids, mutants, hybrids – since its beginning in the 
late 19th century. As such, it has always been attuned to the crisis of humanism. 
In the mature genre of today, the best works of science fiction make use of this 
tradition in self-reflective modes that have the potential to turn the readers’ 
attention to the ways in which reading shapes thought and experience. Ecological 
science fiction in particular produces hybrid figures and hybrid narratives that 
negotiate the contradiction between systemic view and humanist form. I have 
already referred to these deeply conflicted science fictional works with the term 
mutant narratives. By mutant narrative, I denote the kind of uneasy hybrid of 
human-centered and posthumanist narratives that contains potential for ecological 
understanding. At the heart of such narratives, we find mutant figures – fictional 
bodies that resemble humans, but are made strange through the introduction of 
biological mutation or other environmental adaptations, or by the explicit use of 
narrative techniques such as typified characterization. 
Mutant narratives tackle the problem of human-centered thinking and the 
exploitation of natural environments, but they do so in ways that are deeply 
troublesome and disturbing. They reach for a new ecological understanding, for 
“ecology after Nature” (Morton 2010), but they are also constrained by the human-
centered conventions of both the science fiction genre and late modernity more 
generally. Thus, they participate in cultural transformation by being uneasy hybrids, 
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hardly viable, first adaptations to radically changed environments. Mutants always 
carry both the risk of failure and the chance of success. 
Having mentioned “potential” so many times already, the question remains: 
what can readers actually do with mutant narratives? What happens in the process 
of reading them, with or without the historical perspective I have provided above? 
My claim is that even without a historical perspective, reading mutant narratives 
can estrange one’s embodied experience of self and world and facilitate alternative 
modes of experience. Studies of science fiction have often claimed that science 
fiction effects cognitive estrangement – that is, it can defamiliarize and reconfigure 
naturalized notions about everyday environments, and open up space for new 
kinds of thought and experience (Suvin 1979, McHale 2010, Haraway 2016).6 
However, mutant narratives do not provide a blueprint for the New Human, 
and reading them will not automatically upgrade your subjectivity into posthuman 
modes.7 As has been noted in the ongoing posthumanist debate, the dream of 
replacing the troublesome Human with another, improved model (the posthuman) 
is an inherently modern and humanist one, tied to the logic of progress and 
individuation (e.g. Hayles 1999, 2006, Callus et al. 2014, Raipola 2014, Haraway 
2016). This dream, prominent in both speculative fiction and transhumanist 
literature, often involves either the hope of humanity transcending its biological 
limits (e.g. Kurzweil 2005, see Wolfe 2010, xv) or humanity blending with the 
nonhuman in harmonious modes of cohabitation (e.g. Abram 1996). Like the 
human, the notion of the posthuman should be regarded as “a historically specific 
and contingent term rather than a stable ontology” (Hayles 2006, 160), while also 
                                                 
6  Throughout the study, defamiliarization is used to denote narrative techniques and 
estrangement to denote experiential change (see also 3.1, 5.1). 
7 Experimental mutant identities or mutant subjectivities are a matter of their own. There 
are several individuals and groups of people who deliberately expose themselves to 
nuclear radiation with the aim of altering their subjectivity. I have no knowledge of whether 
mutant narratives are involved in such experiments. See, for example, “The Woman who 
Ate Chernobyl’s Apples” (https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-woman-who-ate-
chernobyl-s-apples/), Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-
Cold War New Mexico, Princeton University Press, 2006, and Stawkowski, “‘I am a 
radioactive mutant’: Emergent biological subjectivities at Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk 
Nuclear Test Site” in American Ethnologist, Vol. 43/1, pp. 144-157, 2016. I thank Alison 
Sperling for bringing these sources to my attention. 
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recognizing the fact that the term is constantly being rethought and redefined in 
both academic and artistic conversations. 
Whereas the ‘human’ has since the Enlightenment been associated with 
rationality, free will, autonomy and a celebration of consciousness as the seat of 
identity, the posthuman in its more nefarious forms is construed as an 
informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a biological substrate. 
There are, however, more benign forms of the posthuman that can serve as 
effective counterbalances to the liberal humanist subject, transforming 
untrammelled free will into a recognition that agency is always relational and 
distributed, and correcting an over-emphasis on consciousness to a more 
accurate view of cognition as embodied throughout human flesh and extended 
into the social and technological environment. (Hayles 2006, 160–161) 
Ivan Callus, Stefan Herbrechter and Manuela Rossini (2014, 107) have noted that 
in this search for meaning, “criticism needs to determine the posthumanist value 
of any instantiation of the posthuman and the various constructions that are made 
of its coming, origins and ends.” My exploration of particular science fictional 
narratives aims to do just that: to determine what these narratives contribute to 
posthumanist modes of cultural transformation, and more specifically to the 
reconfigurations of agency and cognition suggested by Hayles above. It does not 
claim that mutant narratives will give rise to new kinds of posthuman subjects or 
open up new posthuman worlds of meaning. However, it does claim that they can 
help readers in learning to experience the current world in richer and more 
nuanced ways, and encourage them to stay with the troubling feelings of comfort-
seeking denial, overwhelming pain brought on by ecological knowledge, and utter 
confusion with the strangeness of the more-than-human world. I propose, and 
hope to demonstrate throughout the study, that such experiential learning requires 
special attention to the bodily aspects of experience, as well as to the narrative 
strategies and techniques at play in the formation of such experience. 
The term mutant carries its Latin present tense (from Latin mutantem 
(nominative mutans), “changing;” present participle of mutare, “to change”) from 
grammar to cultural and experiential significance. Not only are these narratives in 
the on-going process of change, but they can also afford change. Through outlining 
the humanist values and meanings at play in mutant narratives, this study presents 
a series of posthumanist critiques: a posthumanist critique of experientiality (in 
chapter 2); a posthumanist critique of character (in chapters 3 and 4); and a 
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posthumanist critique of reading8 (in chapters 5 and 6). Similar critiques have been 
made before (see e.g. Grosz 1994, Hayles 1999, Vint 2005, Morton 2007, 
Neimanis 2017, Varis 2019b), but bringing them together in the context of mutant 
narratives grounds them in the practice of reading contemporary science fiction. 
The strategy of this study is somewhat different from both Clark’s scale 
framing and James’ econarratology. It asks whether it is possible to develop one’s 
reading skills in such ways that some of the effects of the Anthropocene would 
become accessible to experience, to be felt rather than deduced. That is, it asks 
whether conscious engagement with posthumanist imaginaries (both fictional and 
theoretical) can give rise to more-than-human modes of experience. In short, the 
study tests the malleability of readerly experience, stretching its limits and opening 
it up to more-than-human influences. This strategy can be characterized as 
speculative: it begins by accepting a potential state of things (reading can be both 
embodied and more-than-human), and proceeds by enacting that state as 
carefully as possible. The whole operation can be seen as analogous to science 
fictional world-building that considers fictional worlds as “laboratories” for fleshing 
out ideas and theories. The aim is to provide an alternative to the detached, liberal 
humanist mode of reading that currently dominates literary studies. My aim is not 
to prove the detached mode as untrue or wrong: rather, the aim is to argue that it 
is not other modes are equally possible, and that both human cognition and literary 
theory are far more flexible than they are usually presented to be. 
In this strategic and experimental operation, the corpus of science fictional 
narratives is considered in terms of dynamic programs rather than as inert objects. 
Drawing from the systems-theoretical work of N. Katherine Hayles (1999, 2018), 
the reader and the narratives are considered to form cognitive assemblages, 
temporary collective systems of cognizers and devices that give rise to thought, 
feeling, and action. Even as the analyses and discussions in the study are written 
using the first person singular (rather than first person plural, third person plural or 
the passive voice), this view of reading maintains that the cognition involved always 
                                                 
8 The capitalization in “Nature” serves to highlight the constructed and idealized aspects 
of the concept. 
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goes beyond the personal: it is constituted by a multitude of actors, some human 
and some nonhuman, some accessible to the consciousness of the human 
participant, some not. 
The particular constitution of experience would not be possible without the 
specific cognitive assemblage of text, reader, and context. For instance, feeling the 
exploitative force of capitalist biopower becomes possible through imaginatively 
enacting the puppet-like movements of the central figure in Paolo Bacigalupi’s The 
Windup Girl, and engagement with Jeff VanderMeer’s Annihilation reconfigures the 
plant and animal life in the environment as slightly too conscious for comfort. The 
locus of such experiences is a particular human body – yet, in both enactivist and 
posthumanist contexts, that body has to be thought of as entangled with and 
constituted by other bodies and patterns of meaning. 
 
1.2 Approach: Literary Studies in Enactivist and 
Posthumanist modes 
 
The theoretical approaches guiding my readings of contemporary science fiction 
are chosen for their potential to foster ecological and dynamic understandings of 
human cognition and subjectivity. Posthumanist theory guides me to consider 
subjectivity as part of more-than-human ecologies, while the enactivist approach 
enables me to focus on the embodied and environmental aspects of subjective 
experience. Both of these theoretical approaches are applied to the specific task 
of analyzing literature and reading. 
Contesting the tendency for detachment and universalization that prevails 
in most literary scholarship, the readings in this study consider reading as a 
practice that involves particular bodies, environments and contexts. I approach 
reading as a bodily practice, and propose that careful studies of particular 
experiences can inform narrative theory in ways that universalizing, more 
theoretically oriented strategies cannot. By broadening the narrative-theoretical 
focus from text-specific questions to questions that explore reading as a bodily 
practice, I aim to develop a more detailed understanding of the material and more-
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than-human aspects of narrative. Crucially, when operating within enactivist and 
posthumanist frameworks, neither the reading bodies nor their environments can 
be considered as stable: rather, they exist in continuous processes of change and 
interchange that unfold on the scales of individuals, social groups, species, and 
ecosystems alike. 
In the seminal work that first introduced the term enactive cognition, The 
Embodied Mind (1992), Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch 
discuss the Western realization of existential instability, brought on by 19th and 20th 
century developments in both evolutionary studies and cognitive science, and 
describe it as a sense of groundlessness.9 The authors point out that in Western 
thought, this realization has largely resulted in cognitivist nihilism, defined in 
Nietzschean terms as “the situation in which we know that our most cherished 
values are untenable, and yet we seem incapable of giving them up” (Varela et al. 
1992, 128). Despite the broadly accepted science-based view that locates 
individuals and species in the flow of developmental and evolutionary change and 
recognizes human cognition as a limited and somewhat unreliable way of making 
sense of the world, Western individuals still tend to experience themselves as 
stable, free agents navigating largely predictable worlds – that is, as “liberal 
humanist subjects” (see Hayles 2006, 160).10 
According to Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, the articulations of both 
science and poststructuralist philosophy have failed to produce a positive model of 
groundless experience – one that does not rely on either a pregiven world or a 
permanent self but accepts change as an ontological and experiential principle. 
The authors claim that this failure is due to the lack of experiential practices in 
                                                 
9  Groundlessness here derives, as does a great part of The Embodied Mind, from 
Buddhist philosophy, and denotes an ontological stance and experiential insight in which 
“all phenomena are free of any absolute ground” (Varela et al. 1992, 144). 
10 Since the publication of The Embodied Mind, however, this conviction has become 
harder and harder to hold on to: Europe and the United States have seen multiple societal 
and economic collapses (e.g. the collapse of The Soviet Union and the 2008 financial crisis) 
and the ecological devastation linked to climate change (e.g. heatwaves in Southern and 
Central Europe, Hurricane Katrina, the California wildfires, and loss of common bird and 
insect species), which severely undermine the notion of a stable environment, and, 
arguably, the notion of a stable self too. 
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Western traditions of thought. In response to the challenge posed by cognitivist 
nihilism, The Embodied Mind draws on both Western cognitive science and 
Buddhist traditions of mindfulness, and sketches a framework of enactive cognition. 
This framework will be introduced in later sections of the introduction. 
While the analysis of cognitivist nihilism by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch is 
still relevant in the 21st century, I would also like to point to the capacity of 
posthumanist ethics to develop alternatives to it. The Embodied Mind mentions the 
poststructuralist work on rethinking subjectivities, but does not discuss or criticize 
it at length. It advocates a broad view of selfless cognition and mutual enfoldment 
of self and world, and the “second generation” cognitive framework developed in 
the last twenty years tends to follow its lead. Life, mind, and experience are 
presented as organismic or human, but rarely as situated, particular, or more-than-
human. However, if we wish to develop models and practices that cultivate 
groundless modes of lived experience, it seems necessary to learn from 
approaches that work with situated, particular, and more-than-human experience. 
In developing the arguments of this thesis, I draw on recent approaches that 
counteract cognitivist nihilism with material and bodily action, that is, posthumanist 
feminisms and new materialisms. Intertwining the notions of material agency 
developed in these approaches with the enactivist notion of mutual enfoldment of 
selves and worlds results in rich combinations with which to think further. I hope to 
demonstrate how enactivism and posthumanism meet in their critiques of stable 
and coherent subjectivity. 
 
Posthumanist Ethics and Practice 
 
In previous research, science fictional presentations of embodiment that figure 
human bodies as necessarily enmeshed with nonhuman agents of technological, 
biological, and systemic kinds have often been discussed through the term 
posthuman (e.g. Graham 2002, Hayles 1999, Vint 2006). The need for a terms 
such as posthuman stems from a peculiar point in history: a point where there is a 
conscious struggle for a different kind of humanity, and where the questions of the 
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discussion are mostly posed in terms of an apparently natural-scientific worldview 
that nevertheless is constructed on humanist values of human exceptionalism and 
mastery. Posthumanist philosophers such as Elaine Graham (2002), Cary Wolfe 
(2010) and Rosi Braidotti (2013) argue that in order to develop a sustainable way 
of living, humanity needs to change – not only at the level of political and 
economical practices, but also at the level of subjective experience. The logic is 
that in order to act differently, we need to perceive of ourselves differently. In order 
to become posthuman, we should be able to imagine ourselves as posthuman. 
However, most theories of the posthuman tend to deconstruct the ideas of 
individual subjectivity, consciousness, and rationality – aspects that are 
(presumably) necessary in the construction of a relatable fictional character, and 
perhaps also to subjective experience as we know it. While such deconstructions 
are important exercises in more-than-human imagination and potentially 
transformative for the theoreticians themselves, engaging with the theoretical 
figurations of the posthuman requires such motivation and expertise that they 
cannot reach beyond academic discussion. Following Donna Haraway’s (2016) 
critique, I find that the term posthuman produces a deceptively easy break with the 
human (as the masterful subject of Enlightenment visions), and therefore choose 
to use other terms such as more-than-human (when referring to the material and 
experiential enmeshment with nonhuman actors and environments) and mutant 
(when referring to science fictional renditions of enmeshed subjectivity). That said, 
I find the discourse on the posthuman highly valuable for the discussion of 
embodiment. 
Critics have also noted that posthumanist and new materialist approaches, 
such as material ecocriticism, tend toward the erasure of all boundaries between 
mind and matter, human and nonhuman, thus making detailed analysis of their 
relations difficult (see e.g. Weik von Mossner 2017a, 10–11, Hayles 2018, 65–67, 
Faassen and Vermeulen 2019). Hayles (2018, 65–66) makes the further critique 
that new materialisms do not recognize or discuss cognitive processes or 
consciousness. The dismissal of cognition in new materialist theorization, Hayles 
(2018, 66) claims, weakens “the case for materiality” as it “erases the critical role 
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played by materiality in creating the structures and organizations from which 
cognition and consciousness emerge.” 
As conceptual work that crosses boundaries without erasing them and 
potentially also changes social practices, let me foreground certain ideas by Donna 
Haraway. While Haraway herself steers clear from the term posthuman, her work 
informs posthumanism, particularly the kind working with feminist “situated 
knowledges.” Throughout her career, Haraway has demanded materialist and 
practical approaches to more-than-human ethics, discussing the troubling 
entanglements between humans, nonhuman animals, and technology. She is also 
keen on creating calls for action, complete with catchy slogans. One of the latest 
slogans, introduced also as the title of a collection of essays, is “staying with the 
trouble.” 
In urgent times, many of us are tempted to address trouble in terms of making 
an imagined future safe, of stopping something from happening that looms in the 
future, of clearing away the present and the past in order to make futures for 
coming generations. Staying with the trouble does not require such a relationship 
to times called the future. In fact, staying with the trouble requires learning to be 
truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful or edenic pasts and 
apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as mortal critters entwined in myriad unfinished 
configurations of places, times, matters, meanings. (Haraway 2016, 1) 
“Staying with the trouble” marks the ethical and practical starting point as well as 
the ongoing process of this study. The present is a complex situation, and while 
escape to “awful or edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures” is tempting, 
beginning from the current situation can be judged as more responsible. In this 
study, choosing to engage critically with science fictional characters means not 
just staying with the trouble but also staying with the human – in all its artificiality 
and toxicity. 
Staying with the human involves attention to present dynamics of embodied 
experience – both with regard to readerly and scholarly subjectivity, and to the 
material-cultural networks that enable and constitute such subjectivity. The mode 
of this attention is phenomenological, as it focuses on the process of experience 
unfolding in living subjectivity. The more-than-human approach to phenomenology 
has been developed particularly by David Abram (1996) on the basis of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and anthropological research in 
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indigeneous experiences of environments.11 Abram argues for a conception of 
human experience and perception that coemerges with the nonhuman 
environment. Before its more recent posthumanist usages, more-than-human is a 
term coined by Abram to denote how experiential “lifeworlds” emerge in the 
interaction of humans and nonhumans. Abram focuses particularly on the more-
than-human aspects of language, arguing that nonhuman sounds are integral to 
the expressiveness of human language. 
If language is always, in its depths, physically and sensorially resonant, then it 
can never be definitively separated from the evident expressiveness of birdsong, 
or the evocative howl of a wolf late at night. The chorus of frogs gurgling in unison 
at the edge of a pond, the snarl of a wildcat as it springs upon its prey, or the 
distant honking of Canadian geese veeing south for the winter, all reverberate 
with affective, gestural significance, the same significance that vibrates through 
our own conversations and soliloquies, moving us at times to tears, or to anger, 
or to intellectual insights we could never have anticipated. Language as a bodily 
phenomenon accrues to all expressive bodies, not just to the human. Our own 
speaking, then, does not set us outside of the animate landscape but – whether 
or not we are aware of it – inscribes us more fully in its chattering, whispering, 
soundful depths. (Abram 1996, 80) 
Abram’s take on phenomenology includes a participatory view of perception that 
will be developed below in the context of enactivist theory. At this stage, I want to 
highlight that Abram’s more-than-human view of language opens up implications 
that he does not follow up on – namely, the role of technological and cultural 
participants, such as literature and media. More keen on discussing orality, Abram 
presents a highly skeptical view of the technology of writing, arguing that the 
consolidation of language to alphabetical signs has severed the living relation 
between human experience and nonhuman nature. Abram’s thinking, while 
insightful in its observations about perception, does not contribute much to 
posthumanist analyses of literature and reading. Another posthumanist application 
of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Astrida Neimanis’s (2017) posthuman feminist 
phenomenology, is more promising. In Neimanis’s phenomenological method, 
embodied experience is deliberately estranged by introducing nonhuman elements, 
such as water, weather, technological apparatuses, and stories, into it. Resisting 
                                                 
11 For other posthumanist applications of the later work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, see 
e.g. Coole 2010, Connolly 2010. 
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the detached stance of many traditional forms of phenomenological inquiry, 
Neimanis (2017, 1) clearly states that her aim is to “reimagine embodiment,” 
particularly as “bodies of water.” 
To rethink embodiment as watery stirs up considerable trouble for dominant 
Western and humanist understandings of embodiment, where bodies are figured 
as discrete and coherent individual subjects, and as fundamentally autonomous. 
Evidence of this dominant paradigm underpins many if not all of our social, 
political, economic and legal frameworks in the Western world. Despite small 
glimmers of innovation, regimes of human rights, citizenship, and property for the 
most part all depend upon individualized, stable and sovereign bodies – those 
‘Enlightenment figures of coherent and masterful subjectivity’ (Haraway 2004 
[1992]: 48) – as both a norm and a goal. But as bodies of water we leak and 
seethe, our borders always vulnerable to rupture and renegotiation. . . . Our wet 
matters are in constant process of intake, transformation, and exchange – 
drinking, peeing, sweating, sponging, weeping. Discrete individualism is a rather 
dry, if convenient, myth. (Neimanis 2017, 2) 
Neimanis’ work furthers the understanding of human bodies as material and more-
than-human, and figures out an experimental phenomenology for such 
embodiment. She readily admits that the “correctness” of posthuman 
phenomenology is not her primary concern: what matters more are the practical 
and experiential implications. “[W]hat might be activated by calling my practice a 
kind of phenomenology? What happens when we claim that dispersed embodiment 
is also lived embodiment?” (Neimanis 2017, 25–26, emphasis removed.) This 
experimental attitude, and its implications to the reading method advanced in this 
study, are further discussed in 2.1. 
Posthuman feminist phenomenology is a promising beginning for a 
posthumanist mode of studying embodied experience, and its methodological 
devices are a valuable contribution to my readings of science fiction. Neimanis’s 
approach has its limits, however, as it enables and describes instances of more-
than-human experience, but provides only a partial explanation for how conceptual 
and narrative influences play into the constitution of such experience. A worthwhile 
contribution to the study of literature and experience needs to draw on literary-
analytical sources as well. In this thesis, the role of cognitive literary studies is to 
enable nuanced articulations of the dynamics of reading fiction. The enactivist 
strain of cognitive literary studies, in particular, considers reading as a bodily skill. 
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The Enactivist Approach to Embodied Minds12 
 
The embodied mind is a concept that travels over disciplinary borders – between 
philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience, psychology and sociology, 
technology studies, as well as research on arts, culture, and literature, in what is 
sometimes called cognitive humanities. It suggests that the human mind is 
embodied and embedded in the world, and hence is not reducible to neurological 
functions in the brain – or to any other object-like definition. As mentioned already, 
the enactivist framework in particular considers minds as dynamic processes 
rather than stable objects: meaning and experience emerge in the continuous 
reciprocal interactions of the brain, the body, and the world. This is a model in 
which minds, bodies, and environments are constituted by each other in a way that 
renders all three concepts somewhat different from their traditional connotations.13 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1992) ground the enactivist view of the 
embodied mind on a specific view on evolution. Building on the work of philosopher 
Susan Oyama and evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin in particular, they argue 
that both organisms and environments should be viewed as mutually specified, 
codetermined, or coevolved. The authors quote Lewontin to illustrate how the 
concept of coevolution pertains to perception: 
Our central nervous systems are not fitted to some absolute laws of nature, but 
to laws of nature operating within a framework created by our own sensuous 
activity. Our nervous system does not allow us to see the ultraviolet reflections 
from flowers, but a bee’s central nervous system does. And bats ‘see’ what 
                                                 
12 As Elizabeth Grosz (1994, xii) notes, the metaphor of embodiment is committed to 
either a weak or a strong form of dualism between mind and body. Moreover, it implies a 
process of making something ideal or abstract into a bodily matter. This study uses 
embodied in phrases that denote such a process, such as embodied reader, embodied 
subjectivity, and embodied estrangement, as well as in established phrases such as 
embodied mind, embodied cognition, embodied experience, and embodied concept. For 
all other uses, I prefer the term bodily. 
13 Since its conception, the Cartesian dualist framework has been challenged by a variety 
of approaches, from Early Romantics and German Idealists to modern approaches such 
as psychoanalysis, phenomenology, poststructuralism, ecological psychology, and 
feminist epistemology. I do not wish to present posthumanist and enactivist critiques as 
exceptional in this regard. Many of these strains of thought are in active dialogue with the 
cognitive approaches discussed here, and will be referenced accordingly, but in-depth 
discussion of any of them is beyond the scope of this study. 
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nighthawks do not. We do not further our understanding of evolution by general 
appeal to ‘laws of nature’ to which all life must bend. Rather, we must ask how, 
within the general constraints of the laws of nature, organisms have constructed 
environments that are the conditions for their further evolution and reconstruction 
of nature into new environments. (Lewontin 1983, cited in Varela et al. 1992, 202) 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch emphasize that the notion of mutual specification of 
organism and environment should not be confused with the view that different 
organisms simply have different perspectives on the world – a view in which the 
world is still treated as pregiven. In the enactivist view, “the world is not a landing 
pad into which organisms parachute” (Varela et al. 1992, 199). Rather, “organism 
and environment are mutually enfolded in multiple ways, and so what constitutes 
the world of a given organism is enacted by that organism’s history of structural 
coupling” (Varela et al. 1992, 202).14 Structural coupling, a systems-theoretical 
term here applied to the biological context of coevolution, refers to developments 
in which organisms of a species coevolve with organisms of another species, or 
with other features of their environment such as habitats. A well-known example to 
illustrate a “history of structural coupling” is the capacity of the microbes in human 
guts to digest lactose from bovine milk – a capacity still lacking in regions of the 
world not accustomed to breeding cattle (see Nuismer 2017). 
Whereas coevolution usually refers to evolution of anatomical traits such as 
the digestive abilities of gut flora, the emphasis of the enactivist approach – and 
the more elaborate term mutual specification of organism and environment – is on 
how perception and cognition are shaped in coevolutionary processes. Lewontin’s 
example of bee and bat senses highlights this aspect. Moreover, Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch bring the notion of mutual specification to the level of individual 
perceivers, in asking how experiential worlds are both constrained by the biological 
histories of structural coupling and constantly being reconfigured in everyday 
                                                 
14 David Abram (1996), in work that has no connection to the enactive paradigm beyond 
a shared interest in the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also articulates 
a related view of perception: “However determinate one's genetic inheritance, it must still, 
as it were, be woven into the present, an activity that necessarily involves both a receptivity 
to the specific shapes and textures of that present and a spontaneous creativity in 
adjusting oneself (and one's inheritance) to those contours. It is this open activity, this 
dynamic blend of receptivity and creativity by which every animate organism necessarily 
orients itself to the world (and orients the world around itself), that we speak of by the term 
“perception” (Abram 1996, 50). 
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perceptual actions. This work has been carried on by cognitive scientists and 
philosophers such as Daniel Hutto, Michelle Maiese, Giovanna Colombetti, and 
Alva Noë. 
Perhaps the most challenging notion presented by the contemporary 
enactive approach is that there can be no “entirely inert, inactive perceiver” (Noë 
2004, 12) – the kind of cerebral cogito much of Western philosophy and much of 
20th century cognitive science are grounded on. The “4E” paradigm of cognition 
focus on embodied, embedded, enactive and extended aspects of cognition 
(Menary 2009, Stewart, Gapenne, and DiPaolo 2010), and the enactive approach 
in particular promotes the idea that many cognitive actions involve skillful activity 
(Noë 2004, Gallagher and Zahavi 2007). For example, perceiving “isn’t something 
that happens in us, it is something we do” (Noë 2004, 216; see also O’Regan and 
Noë 2001).15 Thus neural activity is considered necessary but not sufficient for 
perceiving or having perceptual experience – rather, in the enactive approach, 
perceiving is “realized in the active life of the skilful animal” (Noë 2004, 227). 
Alva Noë (2004, 78) asks his readers to consider a commonplace event: 
seeing a circular plate from an oblique angle (e.g. a clock on the wall). The plate 
looks elliptical, even though you know it is in fact circular. Noë argues that one 
perceives both the (actual) circular shape and the (apparent) elliptical shape 
simultaneously, and thus the potential for bodily movement is already present in 
the act of perception. The example also highlights the role of appearances in 
perception. According to Noë, perception is always permeated by variations of 
perspectival properties, such as the varying ellipticality of the perceived plate. 
These variations are how we find out about an object as we move with it: therefore, 
temporary appearances do not obscure “the true nature” of physical reality but on 
the contrary – they are what our knowledge of physical reality is based on (Noë 
2004, 86; see also Gibson 1979).16 In Noë’s (2015, 10, emphasis original) more 
                                                 
15 The second generation approach to cognition is also referred to as the 4E approach or 
paradigm. I mostly use “second generation.” For differences in usage, see Kukkonen and 
Caracciolo 2014. 
16  Alva Noë (2004, 2015) focuses on action and perception. Other scholars have 
discussed the enactive dynamics of other cognitive phenomena, such as emotion and 
feeling (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, Colombetti 2014), and imagination and 
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recent articulation, seeing, as well as other kinds of perception, is “the organized 
activity of achieving access to the world around us.” 
The enactive approach could be characterized as the exploration of “the 
active life” of Noë’s (2004, 227) “skilful animal.” This entails maintaining an 
awareness of the whole embodied and situated being as the subject of cognition 
(Thompson 2007), and thus reconfiguring the models of mind developed in the 
more cerebral approaches (most prominently, computationalism and 
connectionism). The generative dilemma in the center of this conception is an 
epistemological and a methodological one: If minds are dynamic processes rather 
than stable objects, how should one study them? Evan Thompson (2009) stages 
the initial dilemma of enactive thought between representation and experience: 
It is one thing to have a scientific representation of the mind as “enactive” - as 
embodied, emergent, dynamic, and relational; as not homuncular and skull-
bound; and thus in a certain sense as insubstantial. But it’s another thing to have 
a corresponding direct experience of this nature of the mind in one’s own first-
person case. In more phenomenological terms, it’s one thing to have a scientific 
representation of the mind as participating in the “constitution” of its intentional 
objects; it’s another thing to see such constitution at work in one’s lived 
experience. (Thompson 2009, 78) 
The solution to this dilemma, first presented in The Embodied Mind and since 
developed independently by both Varela and Thompson, has been to engage in 
contemplative practices of the Buddhist kind while also continuing to study neural 
processes by means of objective science. Thompson reports that Francisco Varela 
believed first person investigation of the enactive mind to be crucial for the 
development of this line of thought. Without it, he thought, neurophilosophers 
would “fall prey to one or another extreme view – either denying experience in favor 
of theoretical constructions or denying scientific insight in favor of naive and 
uncritical experience” (Thompson 2009, 78). This dilemma is alive in the field of 
neurophenomenology, in which experiential accounts of cognizing are combined 
with neuroscientific experiments, as well as in experiential research of 
contemplative practices (see Varela 1996, Thompson 2014). 
                                                 
remembering (Hutto and Myin 2013). 
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For a literary scholar, this dilemma is not necessarily quite as difficult to 
resolve. Literary research is made in the first person by default – as a field, it is 
dependent on the analytical readings made by skilled and trained individuals who 
develop their collective knowledge through established academic procedures. The 
ambiguous and subjective qualities of cultural phenomena are not only accepted 
but celebrated, even with the perpetual argument over the social, economic, and 
philosophical value of such a mode of knowledge. The work done in the 
development of reception theory and reader-response criticism shows that 
personal experience is highly relevant to literary studies (see Barthes 1974, Iser 
1978, 1993, Fish 1980, Jauss 1982), even if the experience in question is rarely 
ascribed to the scholar himself, or to a specific embodied subject of any kind. The 
contemporary approaches in literary studies that draw on cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind (as well as from affective science and affect theory) can 
critically build on such traditions. Insights found in feminist and ecocritical 
approaches can also contribute to the understanding of embodied cognition and 
narrative (see e.g. Warhol 2003, Easterlin 2012, Troscianko 2014, James 2015, 
Weik von Mossner 2017a).17 
For the second generation approach to literature and cognition, reading is 
always a bodily practice, and it necessarily involves some amount of experiential 
change. Fictional texts, as well as nonfiction, contain various suggestive cues that 
guide the embodied reader to adopt stances, positions, and attitudes toward the 
texts themselves, the imaginative realities they evoke, and the experiential realities 
of everyday life. According to the enactivist approach, this action is reciprocal: texts 
provide cues and guidance, but readers are always actively involved in the 
meaning-making process (see Caracciolo 2014c, Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014, 
Polvinen 2016, 2017). Therefore, and against the grain of much research 
associated with cognitive science, the enactivist approach to literature and 
cognition considers any claims about linearly causal “effects” of literature on 
readers too narrow in scope. Rather, the interest literature holds for the enactivist 
                                                 
17  For broader overviews of cognitive approaches to literature, see Kukkonen and 
Caracciolo (2014), Weik von Mossner (2017a). 
  31 
framework lies in its capability to move readers on the level of the whole cognitive 
system, that is, the embedded and extended individual. From a posthumanist 
perspective, the embedded and extended individual found in enactivist theory can 
also be viewed as more-than-human. This combination of views has 
methodological implications. 
 
Method: Performative Enactivism 
 
In this study, I develop an exploratory mode of reading, performative enactivism, in 
which one becomes aware of the material connections and co-operative loops 
salient to particular reading events. Alternatively, performative enactivism could 
also be described as embodied, experiential and environmental close reading or 
more-than-human close reading. The method for reading is informed by enactivist 
approaches to literature (Caracciolo 2014c, Kukkonen 2014, Troscianko 2014, 
Polvinen 2016, 2017), as well as the posthumanist approaches mentioned above. 
My readerly awareness is thus shaped by two sets of theoretical constraints, the 
enactivist one dealing with the experientiality of fiction and the posthumanist one 
with materiality. 
From the enactivist side, my reading is guided by Merja Polvinen’s (2016, 
2017) critical notion of the double vision of fiction and Marco Caracciolo’s (2014c) 
theoretical work on the experientiality of narrative. The double vision of fiction is a 
mode of reading that allows emotional engagement and immersion but is 
simultaneously aware of fiction as an artifact (Polvinen 2016, 30). By foregrounding 
such a mode of engagement, Polvinen (2017, 139, 148) critiques some of the 
“apparently common-sense concepts” that empirical studies of reading often 
adopt, such as the notion of reading as immersion or transportation and the 
assumption that readers’ emotional engagements with fiction can be reduced to 
“empathic identification with characters.” 
Countering such oversimplified views of readerly engagement, Polvinen 
(2017, 148) argues that “[f]ictions are interactive cognitive environments that 
require from readers a combination of skills that is much more complex than 
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traditionally computational cognitive sciences assume,” and that both empirically 
and theoretically oriented studies of literature should “sharpen their own 
conceptual and theoretical apparatus” to better to attend to reading as skillful 
activity. This study aims to do just that by developing a performative enactivist 
approach to readerly experience. 
Experience itself is “not an easy target for research, due to its dynamic, 
multisensory, situated, and uniquely subjective character” (Varis 2019b, 2, see also 
Caracciolo 2014b, 6, 14, Nagel 1974, 437). Broadly speaking, I think experience 
encompasses anything that falls under conscious attention, including thoughts, 
feelings, memories, impressions, and sensory experiences in all modalities. The 
boundary between conscious experience and nonconscious cognition is, however, 
remarkably porous and prone to change depending on mental habits, attention, 
and verbalization, among other factors. As psychologist Russell T. Hurlburt, 
echoing the entire history of phenomenology, insists, experience as experienced 
in the moment, or pristine experience, is not the same as verbalized experience or 
experience when reflected upon after the fact, which both fall under the umbrella 
of broad experience (Caracciolo and Hurlburt 2016, 58–59, 77–78, see also 
Hurlburt 2011). Even when scholars such as Hurlburt develop methods for 
studying pristine experience empirically, it is highly questionable whether such a 
momentary form of experience can be captured in any consistent way. 
While my explorations of the experientiality of science fiction draw on 
moments of pristine experience, my articulation of them necessarily becomes 
broad experience. I do not claim that my method would come anywhere near to 
the rigorousness of either Hurlburt’s method or the methodologies of 
phenomenology proper. While I wholeheartedly appreciate the practices that seek 
to develop sensitivities for observing experience in its purest form, learning to 
bracket all presuppositions, this is not an aim I personally share. I accept that 
experience, including moments of pristine experience, is laced through with both 
personal and cultural presuppositions and extrapersonal forces that arise from 
more-than-human environments. The experience I describe in this study is thus 
messy and conflicted, and quite often the description of experience is yoked to 
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serve broader arguments. The term performative in performative enactivism partly 
refers to the fact that the descriptions of experience in this study perform 
instrumental functions, and should not be considered as attempts in repeatable 
experiments. My aim is not to defend the truthfulness of these particular 
experiences but to demonstrate that human cognition is flexible enough to allow 
for experiential exploration of many kinds. 
However, my exploration of readerly experience is grounded on the analysis 
of narrative strategies and techniques that can be traced in the texts studied, and 
thus it also potentially opens to other readers. As a bridging concept between 
readerly experience and those narrative strategies and techniques, I draw on 
experientiality. Experientiality is a narrative-theoretical concept that refers to “the 
quasi-mimetic evocation of real-life experience” that takes place in reading events 
(Fludernik 1996, 12). While Fludernik’s original use focuses on the textual 
properties of the narrative, Caracciolo (2014c) reformulates experientiality as a 
network between the reader, the text, and the environment. 
[E]ven if engaging with narrative does involve mental representations of some 
sort, its experientiality cannot be understood in representational, object-based 
terms. Instead, we should think of experientiality as a kind of network that 
involves, minimally, the recipient of a narrative, his or her experiential background, 
and the expressive strategies adopted by the author. At the root of experientiality 
is, then, the tension between the textual design and the recipient’s experiential 
background. (Caracciolo 2014c, 30; see also 9–11, 114) 
In Caracciolo’s formulation, experientiality is a concept that already assumes that 
any reading happens within an embodied, spatial, and temporal context. This 
contextual stance affords meaningful entanglement with the posthumanist 
approach. Focusing on the entanglement of reader, text, and environment, I adopt 
a posthumanist-phenomenological stance on experiential knowledge. But as 
Astrida Neimanis (2017) reminds us, this kind of knowledge is never immediate or 
transparent, but neither is it purely ideatic or theoretical. A person knows her lived 
body, but only “partially and through different kinds of sensory apparatuses and 
amplifiers” (Neimanis 2017, 30). 
This notion of partial embodied knowledge is something Neimanis’s 
posthuman feminist phenomenology shares with the enactivist approach. In the 
case of professional readers such as literary scholars, theoretical frameworks and 
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assumptions also participate in lived experience and the formation of meaning, and 
thus they should be discussed not just as mere tools but as aspects of the 
experiential background of the reader. Feminist scholars such as Haraway (1991, 
1992) and Grosz (1994), and especially new materialists such as Neimanis, stress 
that such cultural structures of meaning should be considered as material. 
Taking my cue from both Neimanis and the enactivist framework, I 
encounter fictional narratives as affective artifacts that participate in the formation 
of more-than-human experience. What this means in terms of my reading method 
is that I complement the minimal network of experientiality with an awareness of 
the nonhuman forces and actors present in the act of reading. This view is indebted 
to both phenomenology and philosophy of technology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 2002, 
Ratcliffe 2010, Hayles 1999, 2018), both of which also inform the enactivist 
conception of organized activity (Noë 2015, 5–6; 11–18, see also 2.2, 3.2 and 4.1). 
However, the method of performative enactivism is not phenomenological in the 
strict sense, but closer to the often autoethnographical explorations of experience 
undertaken in posthumanist criticism. 
In the crossroads of enactivist and posthumanist approaches, I find that the 
locus of research is necessarily the experiential self, in all its complexity. For this 
reason, I write my analyses in the first person singular, and include aspects of my 
personal life in some of the readings. I find that only as an experiential self in active 
engagement with my surroundings can I give a proper account of the reading 
experience. Perhaps surprisingly, a posthumanist sensitivity to nonhuman things 
cultivates, in my lived body, a somewhat humanist sensibility: that only as a human 
can I explore the world. The posthumanist mode of engagement, however, 
estranges and reconfigures what it is to be that human. I find that I am not merely 
a subject, a sociocultural creature, but also an organism, an assemblage of 
nonhuman forces, and a node in a vast network of interacting entities. As that node, 
I can explore the network. Moreover, I find that the first person approach is 
necessary for effectively communicating the experiential changes that occur 
during reading. 
  35 
I propose that the combination of posthumanist and enactivist approaches 
enables a literary scholar to conduct first person, more-than-human exploratory 
work that investigates the constitution of readerly experience by attending to the 
bodily feelings that arise during the reading event, especially when such 
experience is deliberately altered by the affective technologies of both fiction and 
theory. From the perspective of performative enactivism, one could ask, for 
example: What happens to reading if one considers the reading body as a more-
than-human collective, in which the text is one participant? What happens to 
reading if one practices sensitivity to the dynamic constitution of one’s experiential 
states, such as moods, in engagement with physical environments as well as with 
the virtual environments of fiction? This study explores such messy questions and 
provides partial answers. The core activity of performative enactivism is to 
experience, recognize and describe bodily feelings and responses during the 
reading experience, and this activity is contextualized by a complex view of 
embodied subjectivity and reading as a bodily practice (see 2.1, 2.2). 
I suggest that this mode of exploration can complement existing 
approaches such as ecocriticism or narrative studies by developing (1) a certain 
phenomenological awareness of one’s material and embodied implicatedness in 
the reading process, (2) a certain phenomenological awareness of the more-than-
human extratextual materialities emerging as salient in particular reading events, 
and (3) an understanding of the human subject as part of collaborative, more-than-
human, ever-shifting networks. Moreover, mingling and mixing with posthumanist 
feminist thinking can bring a healthy dose of experimental attitude to cognitive 
literary studies. Especially when operating within the enactivist framework that 
emphasizes the conception of the cognizing subject as a skillful animal exploring 
its environment, it seems logical that a scholar engaging in such thinking would 
consider oneself as an active, creative, dynamically affected, and mutable being, 
and systematically explore that experiential configuration. 
Lastly, a brief note on language is needed. I use both readers and the first 
person singular to refer to reading experience. Readers is used in instances when 
I discuss the experience provided by the fictional narrative in question on a more 
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general level. In sections that discuss reading using the first person singular, I am 
referring to reading as it unfolds in my particular embodied experience. In these 
instances, I provide some context for the specific material and environmental 
actors that participate in the experience. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
 
This introduction to the study (chapter 1) contextualizes the project in the 
crossroads of posthumanist thought and cognitive literary studies, focusing 
especially on the question of how this combination enables to a more-than-human 
mode of thinking with literature. Each of the following chapters of the study is 
structured around reading a particular work of recent American ecological science 
fiction. 
Chapter 2 outlines an approach that brings forth the embodied 
experientiality of reading. The key idea is that different texts evoke and cultivate 
different kinds of experientiality, and repeated engagement with any particular type 
of text trains the reader in attuning to the experiential qualities particular to that 
type. Fictional narratives participate in the naturalization of human-centered 
experiential structures in which intersubjectivity and personal development are 
emphasized and engagements and interdependences with nonhuman materialities 
are downplayed. Science fiction can estrange such habitual experiential structures. 
After considering this view of literary engagement from the perspectives of 
posthumanist feminism and cognitive literary studies, I present a reading of 
Darwin’s Children (2003), a science fiction novel by Greg Bear. The reading 
highlights the ways in which naturalized embodied experience is both perpetuated 
and estranged by the textual design of a particular science fictional narrative. In 
Bear’s novel, the activation of a retrovirus inherent in the human genome brings 
forth a whole generation of genetically altered children. The novel foregrounds the 
non-human entities and processes inhabiting and constituting the human body, 
constructing humans as multispecies ecosystems or, in Bear's analogy, 
“spaceships for bacteria” (Bear 2003, 376). The novel encourages readers to 
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empathize and identify with a mutant figure, but eventually undermines the 
transformative aspects of such engagements by naturalizing the initially strange 
aspects of mutant embodiment and presenting an affective vision of universal 
humanity that is grounded on familial unity. 
As a contribution to the field of cognitive literary studies, I argue in chapter 
2 that cognitive approaches to reading would benefit from adopting posthumanist 
feminist methods that refocus the study of embodied experience to the collective, 
more-than-human processes involved in its constitution. The posthumanist 
feminist work with figurations (e.g. Haraway 1992, 2008, 2016, Braidotti 2002, 
2013, Neimanis 2017) seems particularly useful. At the same time, it is important 
to acknowledge how cognitive literary studies, and specifically the enactivist 
approach, already train readers in developing their bodily sensitivities and 
capabilities in collaboration with works of fiction. The chapter also introduces the 
method of performative enactivism, which draws on both posthumanist and 
enactivist approaches and focuses on analytical reading as a bodily skill. 
Chapter 3 discusses how mutant figures complicate bodily reading by 
estranging naturalized forms of embodied experience. The chapter begins with a 
brief overview of mutant narratives and mutant figures in the wider context of 20th 
and 21st century Anglo-American science fiction. Mutant figures are considered, 
from the perspective of embodied cognition, as potential sites of contesting the 
habitual experiential patterns that separate minds from bodies and humans from 
nonhumans. I place focus on reading mutant figures primarily for their bodily 
affectivity rather than for their psychological aspects, which further develops the 
method of performative enactivism. As a means of considering how performative 
enactivism benefits from focusing on kinesic and kinetic aspects of readerly 
engagement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, Bolens 2012, Cave 2016), the chapter 
discusses Paolo Bacigalupi’s short story “The Fluted Girl” (2003). 
In chapter 4, I analyze Bacigalupi’s short story “The People of Sand and 
Slag” (2004) and the novel The Windup Girl (2009) from a performative enactivist 
perspective and introduce the concept of readerly choreography. My claim is that 
Bacigalupi utilizes bioengineered figures to demonstrate and criticize how capitalist 
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power dynamics shape human and nonhuman bodies, and turns readers toward 
their own affective engagement with fictional figures by employing blatantly 
manipulative narrative strategies. I argue that focusing on such readerly 
choreographies, or genre-typical patterns of bodily feelings evoked in reading, 
amplifies the experientiality of the narrative and enables interpretations that are 
sensitive to the more-than-human aspects of the reading process. 
The joint theoretical contribution of chapters 3 and 4 is a posthumanist re-
evaluation of how we read characters. Engaging with the previous work in cognitive 
literary studies, I argue that theories of literary character lean disproportionately on 
a historical conception of human minds as disembodied or individually bounded, 
and on an evaluation of fictional characters based on the fullness of their “inner 
lives,” that is, their “roundness” (see e.g. Hochman 1985, Vermeule 2010). I 
propose that reading “flat” and type-based characters as affective figures can 
contribute to a posthumanist understanding of human minds as collective and 
more-than-human. The posthumanist feminist concept of figuration can help grasp 
how individual figures participate in wider cultural dynamics. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on literary strategies of estranging ecological 
experience with the help of Jeff VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach trilogy 
(Annihilation, Authority, and Acceptance, all published in 2014). The trilogy 
combines elements of science fiction, horror, and Weird fiction into intense 
figurations of mutant bodies, nonhuman agency, and more-than-human 
experience. In chapter 5, I consider The Southern Reach trilogy in the context of 
Weird and New Weird fiction and propose that it gives rise to experiential change 
that could be described as embodied estrangement. In VanderMeer’s work, the 
defamiliarization of human bodies and perception is a means of navigating the 
themes of nonhuman agency and more-than-human ecologies. I argue that 
Annihilation in particular offers its readers a readerly choreography that allows 
them to live through bodily feelings associated with encountering the monstrous 
nonhuman, and thus enables them to move closer to an acceptance 
groundlessness as a lived condition. 
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In chapter 6, I argue that Authority and Acceptance develop an 
understanding of embodied experience as more-than-human by their use of 
haunting experiential motifs. Haunting is also the primary means in which the trilogy 
evokes nonhuman and more-than-human meaning-making. Acceptance, in 
particular, also invites its readers to experience embodied estrangement as an 
ongoing part of everyday life. Gathering together the threads of the whole study, I 
present the practices of more-than-human reading and writing as means of 
practicing posthumanist sensitivities. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarizing the central argument and 
explicating its purpose in the larger context of the ongoing socio-ecological 
transformation. I propose that a performative enactivist take on readerly 
experience configures the human-centered and destructive aspects of 
Anthropocene cultures as collective, more-than-human, material, and bodily habits 
which can be gradually estranged and reconfigured by bodily practices. Reading 
mutant narratives is one such bodily practice. 
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2 Bodily Reading and Experiential Change 
 
One of the central aims in this study is to find out how mutant narratives could help 
their readers develop modes of more-than-human experience, as part of the larger 
project of working toward a more ecologically viable culture. I argue that such a 
development of experience can take place through the practice of bodily reading. 
In this chapter, I show how complex the matter of bodily reading is and search for 
a balanced blend of theories and methodologies to develop it further as an 
analytical skill. After theoretical and methodological considerations, I foreground 
Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children (2003) as a conflicted mutant narrative that utilizes 
both estranging and naturalizing strategies in its portrayal of mutant embodiment 
but ultimately perpetuates human-centered patterns of feeling and perception. 
The key idea in this study is that different texts evoke and cultivate different 
kinds of experientiality, and repeated engagement with any particular type of text 
trains the reader in attuning to the experiential qualities particular to that type. With 
mutant narratives, the particularity lies in the oscillating dynamic of 
defamiliarization and familiarization, especially in relation to human bodies and 
embodied experience. Mutant narratives defamiliarize aspects of human 
embodiment normally taken for granted, such as reproduction, sensory perception, 
or – as in the Darwin’s Children passage discussed below – the functions of 
hormonal glands. They also attune their readers to strange and diverse forms of 
embodied experience, thus familiarizing them. Through the oscillation of these 
defamiliarizing and familiarizing effects, mutant narratives contest and possibly 
reconfigure our culturally established modes of relating to our environments. 
Cognitive reading studies suggest that reading fiction can help to effect 
changes in self-perception (Kuiken et al. 2004, Sikora et al. 2011), personality traits 
(Djikic et al. 2009), environmental perception (Kuzmičová 2016), and behavior 
(Kaufman and Libby 2012). Other studies further suggest that it matters how 
people read: when guided toward emotional and experiential engagement, the 
students taking part in one study experienced the reading as more meaningful and 
  42 
were more willing to discuss the fictional work, compared to the control group that 
was instructed to interpret the text in a more detached mode (Fialho, Zyngier, and 
Miall 2011). Studies on reading groups also suggest that when experienced as a 
social activity, reading fiction can “increase the belief that participants have 
significant goals and that both their past and present life have heightened meaning” 
(Longden et al. 2015, 118). Moreover, reading is not only social but environmental 
too, and thus physical surroundings also matter to reading experience: the bare 
rooms of research facilities might not be optimal settings for imaginative thinking 
and emotional engagement (Kuzmičová 2016). 
While the situatedness and complexity of singular reading events makes it 
difficult to generalize any of these findings to all fiction reading, the research 
suggests that in the right modes and settings, engagement with fiction can 
participate in the life of the readers in meaningful ways. Empirical studies suggest 
that reading is a context-dependent, environmental, and social activity. Studies of 
actual readers reading can inform both literary theory and method. In this chapter, 
I introduce studies that identify specific reading styles, such as “expressive 
enactment” (Sikora et al. 2011), and suggest that the insights in these styles can 
contribute to developing new modes of close reading. Incorporating insights from 
studies of reading can increase the scholar’s readerly sensitivity to the text at hand, 
thus enabling richer interpretations. 
This chapter begins with a theoretical survey of reading as a bodily practice. 
In section 2.1, I introduce feminist and posthumanist theories of material 
experiential change and discuss how they contribute to performative enactivism. 
In section 2.2, I discuss how the second generation approach to cognition and 
literature could complement the theorizing of embodied experientiality by including 
a first person experiential mode in its methodologies. I argue that the second 
generation approach tends to universalize embodied experientiality at the cost of 
downplaying how both personal backgrounds of readers and the particularities of 
fiction play into the reading process. Section 2.3 demonstrates the gist of this 
argument through a reading of Greg Bear’s novel Darwin’s Children, in which the 
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affective strategies of the novel take hold of my reading experience, guiding me to 
adopt human-centered attachments to familial unity and universal humanity. 
 
2.1 Performative Enactivism and Materialist Notions of 
Self 
 
By considering experientiality as a dynamic event taking place in the enmeshment 
of embodied readers, physical environments and textual designs, the enactivist 
approach to literature already diverts from the traditionally narrow focus on 
narrative as a primarily social and psychological phenomenon (see Caracciolo 
2014c, Kuzmičová 2016). The notion of situated embodiment necessarily brings 
with it the notion of materiality. Reading fictional narratives through the enactive 
approach, the bodies, spaces, substances, and processes participating in the 
constitution of lived experience are brought forth as salient elements of the reading 
experience (see 2.3). 
Posthumanist approaches to literature take this material aspect of reading 
further, acknowledging nonhuman elements both in the textual design and in the 
situations in which meanings are generated, such as the reading event. Moreover, 
they approach fiction with the conviction that humanity, both as a conceptual entity 
and a biological species, is constituted by complex networks of human and 
nonhuman beings. Informed by systems theory and allied with critical humanist 
approaches (including feminism, postcolonialism, animal studies, monster studies, 
critical race studies, and disability studies), posthumanist studies of literature focus 
on the construction of humanity and nonhumanity in the texts they discuss. 
Whereas the cognitive approach to literature, and especially the more 
scientifically oriented strands of it, tends to construct general theories about 
universally shared or biologically basic cognitive patterns of “the reading mind,” 
the posthumanist approach tends to criticize universalizing practices and articulate 
the genealogies of specific social imaginaries and material instances of meaning-
  44 
making.18 Due to this difference in positioning, they also tend to support very 
different takes on academic writing: the cognitive approach prefers to distance the 
author from the text, whereas the posthumanist approach sees the two as 
irrevocably entangled. Combining the two approaches thus entails a significant 
tension. In my view, the tension is a generative one: the combination orients 
research toward questioning both evolutionary-biological and social-
constructionist assumptions about “human nature,” and toward conducting 
detailed, contextualized readings of texts and cultural patterns. Both approaches 
challenge the scholar to articulate how the biological/material and the 
social/cultural are entangled in human meaning-making practices. A combined 
approach must thus remain reflective at all times, restraining itself from 
generalizations that come too easily. 
In the sections that follow, I will briefly introduce the materialist and 
posthumanist feminist theorizations of experiential change as well as the enactivist 
take on organismic selfhood, and propose an initial synthesis of the two 
approaches. 
 
The Materialist Feminist View of Subjectivity 
 
If mutant narratives contain the potential of estranging and reconfiguring one’s 
embodied experience, it would seem that they do so only when encountered in 
attentive and responsive ways. A posthumanist outlook makes it possible to view 
human subjectivity as something both culturally and materially produced, and also 
experientially attend to such production as it unfolds. As I will argue in this section, 
it enables a scholarly reader to open up to the potentially transformative 
engagements with mutant narratives. 
Personal experience is, however, a challenge to posthumanist practices. If 
posthumanist practices seek to destabilize the notion of a stable, sovereign 
                                                 
18 One clash between these lines of thought stems from their philosophical groundings: 
cognitive approaches to literature have generally been associated with analytical 
philosophy, whereas posthumanist thought is associated with continental philosophy. 
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humanist subject, what else is there to work with? What is the locus of experience? 
Posthumanist scholars too work from specific situated standpoints centered on 
some forms of experiential selfhood, but how do they distance such standpoints 
from the forms of subjectivity they critically target? 
Posthumanist feminism (or feminist posthumanism, or plural forms of both 
terms) provides partial answers to the challenge. Judith Butler’s performative 
gender and Rosi Braidotti’s materialist theory of becoming are particularly 
influential in posthumanist feminist theorization of subjectivity, and reviewing them 
lays the ground for the methodological considerations at the end of this section. 
With its deep roots in critiques of humanistic ideals and androcentrism, feminist 
theory helps us to delve deeper into topics relevant to both posthumanism and 
cognitive literary studies: bodily materiality, cultural construction of embodied 
experience, and the dynamics of subjective and collective change (see Åsberg et 
al. 2011, Braidotti 2013, 24–26, and Neimanis 2017, 10–12). Reviewing Butler’s 
and Braidotti’s materialist notions of subjective change also provides context for 
Donna Haraway’s (1992, 1997, 2008, 2016) technique of figuration and its 
potential for cognitive literary studies. 
Posthumanism feminism draws on the history of poststructuralist feminism. 
Poststructuralist feminism has advanced the idea that gendered identities and 
subjectivities, along with the experiential understanding of one’s embodiment, are 
produced through participation in linguistic communities. This idea opposes the 
conception of subjects preceding language and claims that there are no fixed or 
stable identities (Nayar 2014, 17, see also Callus et al. 2014). 
The poststructuralist feminist conception has been problematized by the 
material turn in feminism, which holds on to the social constructivist view but 
downplays the role of language in the production of identities and subjectivities. 
Instead, it foregrounds the material elements that participate in the formation of 
bodies and identities, including biological, technological, economic, and ecological 
elements (see Barad 2003, Alaimo 2010, Bennett 2010, and Åsberg et al. 2011). 
In their introduction to the collection New Materialisms, Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost (2010) describe New Materialism as a turn away from the linguistic and 
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discursive forms of social constructivism, for which “overtures to material reality 
are dismissed as an insidious foundationalism” (Coole and Frost 2010, 6). New 
Materialists consider matter and its forms as active in themselves, not as blank 
slates subjected to human inscription of meaning. While subscribing to this notion, 
Coole and Frost acknowledge the value of social constructivist analyses of power, 
and propose a hybrid form of critical thinking, critical materialism, that appreciates 
the dynamicity and force of both social and material processes (Coole and Frost 
2010, 27). 
I admire Coole and Frost’s aim toward a balanced approach, and hope, in 
this section, to develop similar balance between notions of bodily materiality and 
performative gender. The tension between these notions, in feminist theory, is 
bound to the same major themes as certain discussions in the cognitive framework: 
How could we think of minds and bodies without rigid dualist scaffoldings and how 
should we account for the biological and physical dynamics at work in human life? 
However, while cognitivist discussions tend to consider human minds as non-
gendered and universally similar, posthumanist feminist discussions are focused 
on questions of difference between variously positioned human subjects, and also 
between those considered human and those considered nonhuman. Moreover, 
posthumanist feminisms tend to prioritize relationality rather than distinct objects. 
Stacy Alaimo’s trans-corporeality, for example, “does not concentrate on bodies, 
things, and objects as separate entities, but instead traces how the (post)human 
is always already part of intra-active networks and systems” (Alaimo 2016, 133). 
Such conceptual work helps us build a dynamic model of subjectivity that can be 
mobilized in literary analysis, and lays the ground for considering the bodily 
affectivity of readerly engagements. 
The notion of performative gender is often traced back to the work of Judith 
Butler. For Butler (1990, 112), “gender ought not to be conceived as a noun or a 
substantial thing or a static cultural marker, but rather as an incessant and 
repeated action.” Repetitive performative action shapes the physical contours of 
human bodies, in a process that Butler calls materialization. One learns, mostly 
unwittingly, to express gender: to walk like a woman, to stand like a man, to arrange 
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one’s face in socially acceptable compositions – and, through repetition, these 
movements of the body, as well as gender categories, become stabilized. Rather 
than discussing predetermined subjects, this approach discusses events in which 
all participants are produced, shaped and turned. 
According to some critics, including Rosi Braidotti (2002, 33, see also 
Gatens 1996), gender theory “tacitly assumes a passive body on which special 
codes are imprinted.” Braidotti traces this model of gender to the social-
psychological roots and Anglo-American historical context of gender theory, and 
claims that poststructuralist feminism, in the European context at least, generally 
employs a more dynamic and interactive notion of embodiment (Braidotti 2002, 
32–33). Braidotti herself develops an approach she calls a materialist theory of 
becoming. In this theory, bodies already contain forces and intensities that ground 
the processes of subject-formation, and cannot be performatively shaped into just 
any form. The most prominent intensities lie in sexual difference, but Braidotti also 
brings up differences in other material groundings of bodies, such as location, 
language, or ethnicity (Braidotti 2002, 21, 27). 
Feminists cannot hope . . . merely to cast off their sexed identity like an old 
garment. Discursive practices, imaginary identifications or ideological beliefs are 
tattooed on bodies and thus are constitutive of embodied subjectivities. Thus, 
women who yearn for change cannot shed their old skins like snakes. This kind 
of in-depth change requires instead great care and attention. It also needs to be 
timed carefully in order to become sustainable, that is to say in order to avoid 
lethal shortcuts through the complexities of one’s embodied self. (Braidotti 2002, 
26) 
Braidotti (2002, 7) stresses that subjectivity should not be confused with 
individualism or particularity as, for her, subjectivity is a “socially mediated process” 
and the “emergence of new social subjects is always a collective enterprise, 
‘external’ to the self while it also mobilizes the self’s in-depth structures.” She has 
characterized subjectivity as fictional choreography: a slowly changing network of 
habitual patterns and responses, materializing through repetitive action but 
mutable through careful imaginative work (Braidotti 2002, 22). Braidotti’s theory of 
experiential change informs my understanding of bodily reading in that it presents 
subjectivity as something socially and culturally mediated but not detached from 
particular material and bodily situations. Within such a notion of subjectivity, it 
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becomes possible to consider reading as a means of slow cultural and personal 
transformation. In chapter 4, I will build on Braidotti’s notion of fictional 
choreography to theorize how fiction suggests readerly choreographies. For now, 
I will focus on explicating a more general level of experiential change. 
While Butler and Braidotti disagree on the issue of bodily materiality, I find 
their views on subject-formation mutually complementary rather than oppositional. 
From a pragmatic perspective, the two views achieve two different sets of effects: 
Butler’s gender performativity agitates subversive performative play in spite of 
traditional gender roles, whereas Braidotti’s bodily materiality encourages one to 
attend to the complexities and contradictions of one’s already-sexed bodily state – 
and, perhaps, to slowly move toward new forms of subjectivity, in a mode 
resonating with Haraway’s (2016) staying with the trouble. Thus, while Butler 
compellingly describes how subjects emerge in performative social processes and 
how identifying this dynamic can serve the emancipatory aims of feminism, 
Braidotti’s account of subjectivity is more sensitive to the material constraints 
placed by the specific histories of individual and collective bodies. 
When it comes to the practical means of subjective transformation, Braidotti 
foregrounds conceptual and analytical engagement: careful analysis of discursive 
practices and social imaginaries, and generation of counter-imaginaries. She 
understands social imaginaries as sources for unconscious identifications, 
stimulants or points of reference that “act like magnets that draw the self heavily in 
certain directions and stimulate the person accordingly . . . analogous to discursive 
glue that holds the bits and pieces together, but in a discontinuous and 
contradictory manner” (Braidotti 2002, 40). By opening up a distance between 
social imaginaries and one’s sense of self, counter-imaginaries can facilitate 
“processes of resistance to social roles and norms” (Braidotti 2002, 40–41). In the 
context of this study, we could view mutant narratives and mutant figures as 
potential counter-imaginaries. 
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Figurations as Affective Technology 
 
Understanding the material aspects of feminist conceptual work requires us to 
think of concepts as figurations, that is, as “material-semiotic knots” (Haraway 
2008, 4–5) or “dramatizations of becoming” (Braidotti 2013, 164) that become 
part of our lived experience. Astrida Neimanis (2017, 5) describes figurations as 
“embodied concepts . . . already here, semi-formed and literally at our fingertips, 
awaiting activation.” In her helpful analysis of Haraway’s figurations, Michelle 
Bastian (2006) describes figuration as both a technique for meaning-making and 
as the patterns of meaning that result from using such technique. 
Butler’s notion of performative gender is arguably an apt example of 
successful feminist figurative work, at least in the pragmatic sense, as it has 
become widely accepted among the younger generations of contemporary 
Western societies. Performative gender has nourished the use of linguistic markers 
of variating sexual identities and orientations (cis, trans, etc.), and it has 
materialized in lived bodies at the intersubjective level of habitus and gesture, but 
often also at the sociotechnological level of anatomical modification. 
Thinking in figurations is also helpful for considering how fiction might inform 
embodied experience, as posthumanist feminist thinkers also use the term to refer 
to affectively experiential patterns of meaning in fictional contexts or “performative 
images that can be inhabited” (Haraway 1997, 11). Braidotti (2013, 164), following 
Deleuze, even characterizes figurations as “conceptual personae.” In the analytical 
sections of Metamorphoses, Braidotti (2002) foregrounds science fiction 
narratives, such as David Cronenberg’s films and the Alien film series, as potential 
counter-imaginaries. Through comparative and diffractive readings, she draws out 
the often complex and ambiguous political implications of the figurations of popular 
culture, claiming for example that the popular figuration of the cyborg “evokes 
simultaneously the triumphant charge of Schwarzenegger’s Terminator and the 
frail bodies of those workers whose bodily juices – mostly sweat – fuel the 
technological revolution” (Braidotti 2002, 18). Braidotti also claims that our current 
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figurations do not adequately respond to the lived experience of people in rich 
countries. 
There is a noticeable gap between how we live – in emancipated or post-feminist, 
multi-ethnic societies, with high technologies and telecommunication, allegedly 
free borders and increased control, to name just a few – and how we represent 
to ourselves this lived familiarity. This imaginative poverty can be read as the ‘jet-
lag’ problem of living simultaneously in different time-zones, in the schizophrenic 
mode that is characteristic of the historical era of postmodernity. Filling in this 
gap with adequate figurations is the great challenge of the present. And I cannot 
think of a bigger one for the future. (Braidotti 2002, 6) 
Similar imaginative poverty can be diagnosed in the context of the ongoing 
ecological catastrophe, and the cultural shift toward the ecological reconstruction 
of societies. There are few popular figurations that respond to the particular need 
of fleshing out such (actual and potential) lived conditions that academic thinkers 
have diagnosed as Anthropocene disorder (Clark 2015) or fossil subjectivity 
(Salminen and Vadén 2015). On the other hand, artists are constantly engaged in 
this figurative work, reworking notions such as the posthuman in experiential forms 
for non-academic audiences, and generally amplifying and intensifying underlying 
trends in the collective imagination. In performative arts, for example, posthumanist 
methodology is developed by such works as Tuija Kokkonen’s Performance by 
Non-Humans (2010–), Saara Hannula’s The Bodybuilding Project: An Introduction 
(2014), and Humanoid Hypothesis (2015–2016) by the Toisissa tiloissa / Other 
Spaces collective. These particular performative works have contributed to the 
shaping of my performative enactivist method. 
This study follows such posthumanist and feminist work in suggesting that 
contemporary science fiction is a fertile site for the emergence of such popular 
figurations. The “science-fictional metamorph,” to give an example that comes 
remarkably close to my discussion of mutant figures, has been foregrounded as a 
potentially feminist figuration that may be able “to shift our conceptual reality slightly, 
and to challenge the stability of established ontologies and structures for 
determining difference and belonging” and, more specifically, “challenge the notion 
of the human as a contained, universalized subject” (Hellstrand 2017, 26, 27). 
While Hellstrand’s politically oriented analysis mostly considers how metamorphing 
fictional bodies reconfigure conceptualizations and bodily markers of sameness 
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and otherness, my analysis focuses more on how fictional bodies materially 
participate in the embodied experience of readers. 
In the context of cognitive literary studies, we might think of figurations as a 
kind of affective technology. In her feminist take on narratology that draws on the 
work of Butler, Robyn Warhol (2003, 24) describes narrative techniques as 
“devices that work through readers’ bodily feelings to produce and reproduce the 
physical fact of gendered subjectivity.” In Warhol’s (2003, 10) model, the body is 
understood “not as the location where gender and affect are expressed, but rather 
as the medium through which they come into being.” For Warhol, feelings are 
always socially and culturally constructed to some extent, and bodily events such 
as crying over a sentimental novel are considered in terms of generating rather 
than expressing feelings.19 
Bodily feeling, as a phenomenological concept, should not be simply 
equated with emotions (see Ratcliffe 2010). Bodily feelings vary from emotionally 
neutral sensations to deeply emotional bodily experiences. Bodily feeling and affect 
can be used as partly overlapping concepts, but whereas bodily feeling is tied to 
an individual body, affect can be considered as a collective or cultural phenomenon 
that informs feeling (cf. Ahmed 2004, Seyfert 2012, Vermeulen 2014). Feeling is 
more akin to physical exercise: the more you do it, the readier you become to do it 
again. As works of fiction prompt readers to affectively engage in the twists and 
turns of plots as well as with their materially evocative elements such as rhythms 
and sensory impressions, they participate on the moment-to-moment production 
of subjectivity (see also 4.1). 
This attention to moment-to-moment experience is crucial to the particular 
brand of posthumanist theory I want to develop, and to the reading method that is 
the main focus of this chapter. Through theorizing experiential change with the help 
of these feminist thinkers, I aim to zoom in on the microlevel, in all its complexity 
                                                 
19 According to Warhol (2003, 14), literary criticism and film theory have tended to use 
the expressive model, and thereby “granted privilege to the idea that every person harbors 
‘real’ feelings, whether consciously or subconsciously expressed, and that literary texts 
tap into those feelings in more or less legitimate ways.” Warhol (2003, 35) further links this 
claim to the modernist prejudice against popular forms that “so readily and mechanically 
arouse emotion: it’s too easy; it must not be ‘authentic’.” (See also 4.1.) 
  52 
and multiplicity. At the microlevel of experiencing specific events, such as reading 
a novel, the material, bodily, and social structures of gendered experience and 
feeling are iterated or creatively altered (see Warhol 2003). Viewed together, 
Butler’s and Braidotti’s work gives rise to a notion of embodied subjectivity as a 
network of habitual patterns, thoroughly entangled in material processes and social 
imaginaries. Carrying this complex notion with me into particular readings, I hope 
to articulate the experientiality of reading in terms of minute changes in the habitual 
patterns of bodily feeling. 
The main context of analysis in this study is not, however, gendered 
subjectivity as such. Rather, my strategy is to build on feminist theorizing of 
gendered subjectivity and experiential change and apply it to other aspects of 
embodied subjectivity, particularly the aspects related to human exceptionalism, 
thus enabling movement from these dominant figurations into more-than-human 
directions. From a posthumanist feminist perspective, “human” is a category as 
material-discursively constructed as “gender” (see Braidotti 2013, Hellstrand 
2016). As feminists before me, I will focus my analyses of the category of “human” 
on border cases: figures that just barely, if at all, “pass as human” (see Koistinen 
2015, Hellstrand 2016). Staying at the fuzzy and fluctuating borders of humanity 
makes it easier to see how the human and the nonhuman leak into each other, 
constituting each other as well as the boundary between. 
 
The Enactivist View of Organismic Selfhood 
 
Posthumanist feminist performativity is largely compatible with the second 
generation approach to cognition. Even if the constituent theoretical traditions are 
quite different, both strains of thought arrive at the same challenge: how can the 
theoretical understanding of human subjectivity be reconfigured in ways that can 
account for its dynamic emergence in material environments? The paradigm cases 
for both traditions aim to challenge static models with dynamic ones: the second 
generation cognitive approach seeks to develop models of perception and 
cognition that focus on the entire living organism rather than just the brain, and the 
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posthumanist approach seeks to replace notions of detached, static human 
subjects with more-than-human, processual subjectivities. 
Enactivism is concerned with living beings and their dynamic relationships 
with environments. Cognition is characterized in terms of bodily processes that 
involve embodied experience and coupling with environments. But how do the 
basic notions of enactive theory compare with the principles of posthumanist 
feminist performativity introduced above? 
In the enactivist framework, living is never merely static existing but an 
ongoing process of self-regeneration, or autopoiesis, in metabolism and movement: 
“Living beings are autonomous systems that actively generate and maintain their 
identities” (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, 55–56). In living activity, the organism 
is generated as a self. Michelle Maiese calls this kind of basic identity 
“sensorimotor subjectivity” and argues that it necessarily involves an egocentric, 
spatial and temporal structure (Maiese 2015, xi). 
To stay alive, the living system must establish itself as a unity located in space, 
and also must make sense of the world and renew itself in order to survive. Self-
regeneration and metabolism propel a living organism forward in time, beyond its 
present condition and toward a future moment when the organism’s needs might 
be satisfied. Thus, the basic sense that “I am here now” is rooted in the dynamic 
space-time process of autopoiesis. (Maiese 2015, xii) 
It would seem, then, that enactivism upholds the conception of a central self based 
on biological organization, a necessarily stable point of reference incompatible with 
postmodern notions of fluid boundaries and discursively produced subjects. On a 
closer look, we have to (1) distinguish between the biological self and the cultural 
subject and (2) admit reciprocal feedback between these levels, and dynamic 
change in the overall organization of self-centered experience. 
Thus, even if the conception of selfhood that enactivism sketches seems to 
promote stability by being rooted in individual biological bodies, the conception is 
not, in fact, based on any essential quality but rather the principle of activity. Living 
beings “don’t just passively process pre-existing information from the world but 
they bring forth or enact their own cognitive spheres in ongoing, continuous 
reciprocal interaction with their environment” (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, 
55–56). Such continuous reciprocal interaction – be that metabolism, niche 
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construction, or social interaction – is where bodies, as living beings and cognitive 
agents, are generated. There is no neutral, object-like self. This is also for the 
simple reason that maintaining a self necessarily involves care and desire – for the 
organism itself and for its immediate environment. 
Among living animals like us, this egocentric, spatio-temporal orientation is 
bound up with the capacity for perception, movement, and intentionality. Indeed, 
one’s awareness of oneself as a single coherent being consists not only in 
proprioceptive awareness of one’s body, but also in the awareness of oneself as 
the author and source of movement. And in my view, the reason why the body 
serves as a point of convergence of perception and action is that the body is the 
locus for desiring and caring. From the time that we are infants, everything that 
appears to us as something is necessarily valenced. Objects or events attract or 
repulse us, we are provoked by what strikes us, and we experience ourselves as 
affected by our surroundings. For objects and events to matter, there must be a 
sense of an “I” or “me” to whom they matter. (Maiese 2015, xii, emphases original) 
Enactivism begins from acknowledging the phenomenological truth of there being 
a sense of self, in its minimal formulation: the sense of being a body, and an “author 
and source of movement” (see also Sheets-Johnstone 2011). But a self is not the 
body: rather, it is a mode of organization, realized in the ongoing process of activity 
– that is, life. It is this dynamism that also makes enactivism compatible with 
poststructuralist approaches to subjectivity. Enactivism acknowledges that while 
biological organization is guided by relatively stable organismic and species-
specific patterns, most likely including a minimal sense of the body as “the locus 
for desiring and caring,” selfhood is also something that emerges from the varying 
contextual circumstances of the living being, which may well include social and 
cultural aspects. 
In the enactivist framework, the logic of self-renewal in continuous 
reciprocal interaction with environments is described as a basic dynamic in all 
lifeforms. Yet, as illustrated by Caracciolo’s (2011) feedback loop model, it is also 
realized at the level of socio-cultural subjectivity – which can be considered as an 
ongoing material process of self-renewal. To rephrase Butler’s and Braidotti’s 
feminist thinking in enactivist terms: the notion of materialization elucidates the 
reciprocity between a living body and its environment. By constraining its actions 
according to social expectations and integrated belief systems, the living being 
enacts its cognitive sphere and, in effect, modifies its environment (the gendered 
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practices in social situations, for example). An environment is always already an 
experiential sphere, or a lifeworld (Husserl 1970, see also Thompson 2007, 34–
36). As Butler’s and Braidotti’s theorization well illustrates, these experiential 
spheres are never merely individual, but always collectively constituted, maintained, 
and renewed. 
On the basis of such a view of enactive subjectivity, one can consider 
reading as a process that participates in the materialization of lived bodies – 
similarly to the patterns of physical exercise, gender expression, or eating. 
Engaging in repetitive patterns of reading, as described by Robyn Warhol (2003), 
may be considered not only as gradual change in the individual, but also as a 
collective and ecological activity. The term niche construction provides a helpful 
image of such activity: an individual organism actively modifies its immediate 
environment (mental and cultural as well as physical) and by these modifications 
effects a change in the living conditions of the future inhabitants of the environment 
(Laland and Brown 2006, Kukkonen 2019, see also Caracciolo 2016, 50–51). 
With this slow material change in mind, we can consider how the notion of 
performativity is used to reconfigure the phenomenological method. Through such 
phenomenology, we can return to sketching the performative enactivist reading 
method. 
 
Posthuman Feminist Phenomenology 
 
Posthumanist approaches employing feminist methods have produced first person 
research that explores the entangled aspects of engagement. Posthumanist 
feminists tend to emphasize “situated knowledges” – the material processes in 
which selves and others are constituted – and yet move away from any naturalized 
conception of identity. This material and dynamic view of knowledge and 
subjectivity provides common ground for collaborations between posthumanist 
feminism and the enactivist approach. Possibly the most detailed posthumanist 
practice available for a cognitively bent scholar, the posthuman feminist 
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phenomenology of Astrida Neimanis (2017), investigates lived experience beyond 
the comfortable boundaries of naturalized human subjectivity. 
Neimanis’s consistent project in the last decade has been the reimagination 
of human bodies as “bodies of water.” This should be understood in a materialist 
sense: she has explored how water connects the lived human body to other bodies 
of water, such as rain, rivers, oceans, fish and plant life. In her work, rethinking 
embodiment from an aquatic perspective becomes a way of amplifying the 
significance of water in the constitution of lived bodies. In its ethical consideration 
of nonhuman bodies, Neimanis’s practice resembles other posthumanist feminist 
conceptual work, such as Donna Haraway’s (2008) companion species or Stacy 
Alaimo’s (2010) trans-corporeality. Moreover, it provides an opening for 
considering literature as a participant in embodied experience, or as an affective 
technology. 
Neimanis’s approach complements both the humanist tradition of 
phenomenology and the feminist understanding of bodily material change by 
providing a more-than-human conception of embodiment. While this conception is 
not altogether new to phenomenology, Neimanis’s approach focuses especially on 
describing lived bodies that are augmented, dispersed and mediated through their 
access to “sensory apparatuses” of science and technology. She further extends 
this cybernetic relationality to our mediated knowledge about pollution and 
ecosystems: 
Could we not imagine a similar sort of reconfiguration – one that stretches and 
disperses our bodies – when we read how our human wastes and emissions are 
transforming entire oceanic ecosystems? By paying attention to the 
measurement of water levels in aquifers, reservoirs, or lakes, might our own thirst 
be imagined as a more extensive, collaborative gullet? (Neimanis 2017, 59) 
Taking seriously the notion that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is 
both embodied and mediated, Neimanis thus challenges the idea of “purely human” 
embodied knowledge. In addition to technological devices and mediated 
information, Neimanis (2017, 61) also figures artworks and stories as amplifiers of 
more-than-human modes of embodied experience. 
This step into the realm of artifice and fictionality provides and opening for 
cognitive theories of narrative. The notion of amplification contributes to the 
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understanding of fiction’s affective powers by capturing how they raise and 
intensify bodily feelings particular to engagement with nonhuman materialities such 
as water currents. By amplifying those bodily feelings, art and fiction can guide our 
attention to the otherwise downplayed more-than-human aspects of embodiment. 
As cognitive literary critic Terence Cave puts it when discussing his practice of 
kinesic reading, which is attuned to bodily feelings, 
once one begins to notice such effects in literature and indeed elsewhere, 
reading becomes subtly different: kinesic reading brings to the surface 
something you always already felt when you read the text properly, but somehow 
ignored for the sake of supposedly ‘higher’, more intellectual or aesthetic 
pleasures. (Cave 2016, 29) 
The practice of amplification can thus help to attend to reading-related bodily 
feelings that are otherwise too vague, or considered secondary in approaches that 
do not focus on the bodily aspects of reading. Moreover, as Cave (2016, 41) also 
suggests, such amplification also requires the professional reader to purposefully 
slow down her attention and responses, as many of the kinesic and affective effects 
of reading happen slightly faster than conscious reflection (see also 3.2). Bodily 
reading in the posthuman feminist phenomenological mode would thus require that 
the professional reader attend both to the material forces and effects of literature 
and to her own active and skillful responses to those forces and effects. Moreover, 
the relationship between the reader and the literature cannot be figured as a one-
directional subject-object relation, but rather as “thinking with” (Neimanis 2017, 
see also Cave 2016, Haraway 2016) or “mutual enfoldment” (Varela et al. 1992). 
Whereas Neimanis thinks with water, and the scientific and theoretical 
apparatuses that amplify her embodied experience of water, I think – and feel – 
with literature, and with the theoretical apparatuses relevant to the embodied 
experience of literature. Considering readerly engagements as performative 
instances of inhabiting figurations (Haraway 1997, Bastian 2006) enables a 
conception of readerly bodies as partially constituted by literature in moment-to-
moment interactions – in similar ways that they are partially constituted by water, 
nutrients, bacteria, gendered habits, or ideology. In ways that will later be 
discussed with the help of material ecocriticism, literature itself is figured as 
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partially constituted by nonhuman forces: it is one outcome of the entanglement of 
human and nonhuman actors and forces (see 4.2, 6.2). 
 
What is Performative in Performative Enactivism? 
 
In this section, I have discussed how materialist and posthumanist feminist thinkers 
articulate experiential change in terms of slow bodily developments that involve 
cultural mediation. In the posthuman feminist phenomenology of Astrida Neimanis 
in particular, such developments can also be purposefully aided and explored by 
engaging with nonhuman materialities, scientific practices, and artworks. While I 
see Neimanis’s engagement with watery bodies as similar to bodily reading in some 
respects, I do not claim that they would be analogous in all respects. I readily admit 
that water’s involvement in cellular regeneration is somewhat different from 
literature’s power to elevate our pulse or affect our perceptions. The crucial 
elements I wish to adopt from Neimanis’s practice are the conception of human 
bodies as radically open to and partially constituted by forces usually conceived as 
“outside” individual embodiment, and a readiness to explore such processes of 
constitution. For my approach, such “outside” forces include literature, and fiction 
more widely. This dynamic and material view of embodiment shapes how I attend 
the practice of bodily reading. 
Posthumanist feminism informs the performative in performative enactivism: 
by emphasizing how bodily material change takes place in everyday actions such 
as walking and watching television, feminist thinkers such as Butler, Braidotti, and 
Warhol foreground performativity in the simple sense of habitual acting out of bodily 
routines. Through their critical practices, however, they also foreground 
performativity as a conscious mode of generating experiential change. 
Performative enactivism involves the exploration of both these modes of 
performativity in the context of bodily reading: on the one hand, it attends to how 
science fictional narratives inform readerly engagements that tend to escape 
attention, such as identification with protagonists or imaginative construction of 
space; on the other hand, it seeks to consciously live through those moments of 
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readerly engagement, and explore how they guide and shape embodied 
experience. Critical reading thus becomes a mode of performative experiential 
change. 
 
2.2 Experientiality and the Affordances of Reading 
 
In this section, I consider the concept of experientiality and the role of first person 
embodied experience in the second generation cognitive approach to literature. 
These considerations add theoretical and methodological detail to the general 
conception of bodily reading and experiential change presented above. Let me first 
set up a common point of reference that also introduces the theme of mutant 
embodiment. 
In the following passage from Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children (2003), 20 
embodied experience is foregrounded and defamiliarized. The focalizing character, 
Stella Nova Rafelson, is a 12-year-old girl, and the reader already knows that she 
is one of the generation of mutant children born after a wave of a viral epidemic. In 
the scene below, she has just entered a convenience store and encountered a 
hostile, prejudiced man and his cautious friend. 
Stella drew herself up to a lanky five feet nine inches and extended her long-
fingered hand. 
“Pleased to meet you, David. I’m Stella,” she said. 
Dave stared at her hand in disgust. “I wouldn’t touch you for ten million 
dollars. Why ain’t you in a camp?” 
“Dave!” the stooped fellow snapped. 
Stella felt the fever scent rise. Her ears tingled. It was cool inside the minimart 
and hot outside, hot and humid. She had been walking in the sun for half an hour 
before she had found the Texaco and pushed through the swinging glass doors 
to buy a drink. She wasn’t wearing makeup. The others could see clearly 
whatever the dapples on her cheeks were doing. So be it. She stood her ground 
by the counter. She did not want to yield to Dave, and the clerk’s halfhearted 
defense rankled. 
Dave picked up his Luckies. Stella liked the smell of tobacco before it was lit 
but hated the burning stink. She knew that worried men smoked, unhappy men, 
nervous and under stress. Their knuckles were square and their hands looked 
like mummy hands from sun and work and tobacco. Stella could learn a lot about 
people just by a sniff and a glance. “Our little radar,” Kaye called her. 
                                                 
20 From here on, the novel will be referred to as DC. 
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“It’s nice in here,” Stella said, her voice small. She held a small book in front 
of her as if for protection. “It’s cool.” 
“You are something, you know it?” Dave said with a touch of admiration. “An 
ugly little turd, but brave as a skunk.” 
Dave’s friend stood by the glass doors. The sweat on the man’s hand reacted 
with the steel of the handle and reeked like a steel spoon dipped in vanilla ice 
cream. Stella could not eat ice cream with a steel spoon because the odor, like 
fear and madness, made her ill. She used a plastic spoon instead. 
“Fuck it, Dave, let’s go! They’ll come and get her and maybe they’ll take us 
too, if we get too close.” 
“My people aren’t really infeckshus,” Stella said. She stepped toward the 
man by the counter, long neck craned, head poking forward. “But you never 
know, Dave.” 
The clerk sucked in her breath. 
Stella had not meant to say that. She had not known she was so mad. She 
backed off a few inches, wanting to apologize and explain herself, say two things 
at once, speaking on both sides of her tongue, to make them hear and feel what 
she meant, but they would not understand; the words, doubled so, would jumble 
in their heads and only make them angrier. 
What came out of Stella’s mouth in a soothing alto murmur, her eyes focused 
on Dave’s, was, “Don’t worry. It’s safe. If you want to beat me up, my blood won’t 
hurt you. I could be your own little Jesus.” 
The fever-scent did its thing. The glands behind her ears began to pump 
defensive pheromones. Her neck felt hot. 
“Shit,” the clerk said, and bumped up against the tall rack of cigarettes 
behind her. 
Dave showed the whites of his eyes like a skittish horse. He veered toward 
the door, giving her a wide berth, the deliberate smell of her in his nose. She had 
snuffed the fuse of his anger. 
Dave joined his friend. “She smells like fucking chocolate,” he said, and they 
kicked the glass doors open with their boots. 
An old woman at the back of the store, surrounded by aisles jammed with 
puffed bags of potato chips, stared at Stella. Her hand shook a can of Pringles 
like a castanet. “Go away!” 
The clerk moved in to defend the old woman. “Take your Gatorade and go 
home!” she barked at Stella. “Go home to your mama and don’t you never come 
back here.” (DC 23–24) 
The passage sketches a scene with five characters in a convenience store, two of 
them named – Stella and Dave – and the others left nameless: Dave’s friend, the 
store clerk, and an old woman at the back of the store. The focalizing character, 
Stella, is drawn to the middle of a conflict springing from the others’ aversion toward 
her unusual bodily features. This conflict is escalated both by her reckless words 
and by her bodily response to the threat on her safety – the chocolate-smelling 
defensive pheromones produced by her special glands. How does reading this 
scene describe and evoke embodied experience? 
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In the passage, various aspects of Stella’s embodiment are foregrounded. 
She is described as a being with certain physical proportions, as well as with limbs, 
ears, eyes, and a mouth, and from contextual cues we can assume her to be 
human – she enters the store with human intentions (buying a drink), she employs 
human language and customs, and she is referred to with a personal name. 
However, certain features of her body are described in ways that mark them as 
different from normal human embodiment: the dapples on her cheeks do not 
merely exist but do something; her tongue is two-sided in a way that enables two 
simultaneous streams of voice; and the glands behind her ears produce 
pheromones intentionally and perceptibly, as opposed to the current biological 
knowledge that normal human pheromone production is both involuntary and 
inaccessible to conscious perception. 
In phenomenological terms, the aspect of Stella’s embodiment that arises 
from these observations could be characterized as a living body (Körper), or the 
body as an object of physical description. The complementary concept to a living 
body is a lived body (Leib), or the body as a subjectively experienced condition 
(see e.g. Thompson 2007, 231–233, Sheets-Johnstone 2011). This latter aspect 
of embodiment is present both in Bear’s description of sensory perceptions – 
Stella’s feelings of heat and humidity are foregrounded, as are her various olfactory 
perceptions – and in the deictic expressions marking her physical body as the 
center of perception and action (“she stood her ground by the counter,” “she 
stepped toward him,” “her head poked forward”). At times, the description shifts 
sharply from the living body aspect to the lived body aspect: “The glands behind 
her ears began to pump defensive pheromones. Her neck felt hot.” 
This kind of analytical breakdown is a procedure that lies at the core of 
literary interpretation, and narratological analysis especially. Using a concept or a 
set of concepts as instruments, the analyst scrutinizes the textual object, with the 
aim of finding out how it is constructed. While I wish to also include this kind of 
analytical process in my readings, my main focus will be on a different mode of 
readerly sense-making. The analysis above considers the text as a static object 
separate from the reader’s mind, metaphorized as a mechanical device that can 
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be taken apart to see how it ticks. I am more interested in the text as a cybernetic 
device – a set of cues that operates in collaboration with the reader’s embodied, 
situated mind, the collaboration giving rise to readerly experiences whose features 
are repeatable to some extent, but infinitely variable in their details. 
Even if I can extract a passage from Darwin’s Children and place it in the 
body of this study, every time I read through it, I will experience the reading in a 
slightly different way. The text cues my ephemeral thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions, my memories and habits, as well as my changing notions of context 
and environment. In summertime, I attune more readily to the allusions to being 
hot and sweating; sometimes, I visualize Stella’s perception of the sweaty hand 
reacting with the door handle as zooming in, as if on a chemistry documentary; 
sometimes I fear for Stella’s safety, sometimes I don’t. In terms introduced by N. 
Katherine Hayles (2018), the text, I, and the environment come together to form a 
temporary cognitive assemblage, in which all participants contribute to the 
resulting cognitive activity. Such a collective view of cognition is also central to the 
notion of the extended mind (see Clark 2004). 
A cybernetic notion of bodily reading necessarily involves the reader, as part 
of the system studied. Thus, the approach developed in this study centers on the 
phenomenology of reading: that is, on how literature appears in the reading 
experience. While my discussion offers analyses of textual features as well as 
metacommentaries and conceptual articulations of reading experiences, such 
commentaries are secondary to the aim of describing the experiences themselves. 
 
Making Sense of Fictional Experience 
 
There is both difference and continuity between textual cues that evoke embodied 
experience and actual embodied experiences inspiring the text. Embodied 
experience is non-verbal, whereas textual cues are verbal. But experience and 
discourse constitute each other. Embodied experience is already affected by 
discourse and the imaginative faculties of the mind, and discourse is in turn 
grounded in embodied experience. 
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Experience is narrativized as it unfolds. The repertoire of possible 
sensations, for example, is somewhat constrained by the repertoire of descriptions 
for those sensations. Most humans know to expect heat on their skins when they 
go out on a sunny summer day, and they know how to describe it without searching 
for words: “I feel hot.” But sometimes they encounter sensory stimuli previously 
unknown to them – feeling –30 centigrade air for the first time, many people used 
to warmer climates do not quite know how to verbally describe the sensation. Is it 
hot or cold? Does it damage my face? Does it hurt? Do I enjoy it? In encountering 
new, strange sensations, humans start making sense of them by referring to their 
previous experiences. The chilled southerner might say “this is nothing like sticking 
your hand into a freezer” or “this is a bit like getting scalding water on your skin.” 
After the initial confusion and word-searching, the southerner might be provided 
with a fitting expression, such as “frostbite” or the Finnish tulipalopakkanen (“fire 
freeze”), and adopt it to make sense of the sensation. New sensations, and verbal 
descriptions for them, thus add to the repertoire of possible sensations. 
Verbal descriptions of sensations provide a simple example of the dynamic 
between embodied experience and meaning-making. They are, however, only a 
minor part of the whole mapping. As a number of cognition-oriented researchers 
have pointed out, meaning-making is not always verbal, and many people do not 
experience verbal language as their primary mode of thinking. Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone (2011), for example, has argued for the primacy of movement and 
kinesis in cognition, and Oliver Sacks's Musicophilia (2007) presents a collection 
of case studies on musical understanding. If one wants to draw up a 
comprehensive model of subjectivity, one has to account for the modes of non-
verbal cognition. This is also true for scholars working primarily with literature: even 
though literature is made of words, it evokes and employs non-verbal modes of 
cognition. 
For cognitive linguists and philosophers such as George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson (1980, 1999), verbal and abstract thinking has its bases in the structure 
and tendencies of embodied experience. Recent contributions to cognitive science 
and philosophy have taken a step further, claiming that the embodied sense-
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making processes of humans connect them to nonhuman sense-making – through 
shared developmental histories, humans share sensory and cognitive abilities with 
animals and plants (see e.g. Thompson 2007, Currie 2011, Mancuso 2017). In this 
wider view, cognition is reconfigured as “know-how”: remembering, for example, 
can be understood as “the capacity to re-enact embodied procedures, often 
prompted and supported by external items” or “a kind of knowing what to do in 
familiar circumstances” (Hutto and Myin 2017, 30). A pine tree knows how to grow 
its roots toward water and nutrients; an arctic fox knows where and how to jump to 
catch a mouse it hears scuttling under the snow. 
Much of cognitive literary studies build on the idea that humans make sense 
of fictional and actual environments by using largely the same cognitive skills and 
resources. A particularly influential idea is that everyday cognition already involves 
an imaginative or “simulative” aspect, in which the mind responds to the 
environment in nonrational, bodily ways and creates experiential models of the 
people it encounters, whether they are actual or fictional. As neuroscientist Vittorio 
Gallese (2011, 197) explains, “our brain–body systems are equipped with a pre-
rational, non-introspective process – embodied simulation – generating a physical, 
and not simply “mental,” experience of the mind, motor intentions, emotions, 
sensations, and lived experiences of other people, even when narrated.” For 
literary scholars, the embodied simulation view provides a chance to discuss 
making sense of fiction in terms of making sense of the world. In Alexa Weik von 
Mossner’s (2017b, 556) words, “we also map the movements, sensations, and 
emotions of fictional people onto our own bodies.” 
While I appreciate the general idea that the experience of both 
environments and fiction is partly “a pre-rational, non-introspective process,” I am 
not convinced that the process necessarily constructs “models” in the mind of the 
experiencer. Rather, I draw on the somewhat simpler idea, advanced by enactivist 
thinkers such as Alva Noë (2004), that experience deals in bodily feelings and 
actions that do not necessarily involve mental representations. While I agree with 
Weik von Mossner on the view that the readers’ understanding of their own bodies 
necessarily organize their understanding of fictional bodies, I want to leave room 
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for strange and unstructured bodily feelings that do not exist in relation to such an 
organization. I also want to draw attention to the limitations of the simulation model 
by foregrounding readerly awareness of fictionality (see 3.1, 4.1). 
Many cognitive literary scholars, including Cave (2016) and Levine (2015), 
have turned to affordance theory to characterize how cultural practices participate 
in cognitive dynamics. Coined by the ecological psychologist James J. Gibson 
(1979), the term affordance refers to specific potentials for action provided by 
features of the environment – a tree might afford climbing, utilization as firewood, 
or aesthetic enjoyment; a coffee cup might afford holding and drinking coffee, or 
storing your collection of rare coins; the face of a friend affords social and physical 
engagement of many sorts, such as eye contact or a kiss on the cheek. As should 
be clear from these examples, affordances are flexible and somewhat 
improvisational, but also limited in situation-specific ways. Not only do they offer 
resources for action, but they place constraints, too – you cannot possibly hold 
your coffee in a living tree (although you might craft a cup out of one), and you 
cannot use your friend’s face for firewood. 
Cognitive literary studies propose that the skills and tendencies trained in 
daily environmental engagements are also utilized in reading literature. In 
producing cultural meanings, “we tend to reutilize in various ways the meanings 
that are already there, as part of our physical engagement with the world . . . human 
cultures find affordances in the combination and modification of the embodied 
patterns of our interaction with the world” (Caracciolo 2014a, 389). Fiction 
provides us with multiple affordances, ranging from engaging emotionally with 
fictional people and events to using a book as an ad hoc serving tray. While the 
notion of affordance is practical, it does not, however, help to explain how our 
experiences with fiction are patterned, or how they unfold in time. Moreover, as 
Varela and others (1992, 203) point out, the notion of affordance rests on the 
separation of the environment and the experiencer – and on the view that both of 
them are somewhat stable. Enactivist thought presents both environments and 
experience in more dynamic ways. 
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In Alva Noë’s (2015, 5–6, 11–18) terms, daily encounters with physical 
environments do not only provide human cognizers with affordances for action but 
also organize them in structured activities. They train them in negotiating possible 
and suitable encounters, in living with and thinking with the multiplicity of bodies 
around them. While affordance focuses on the features of the object or the 
environment in question, organized activity considers the action of engaging with 
such features. For Noë, organized activities are 
primitive and natural; they are arenas for the exercise of attention, looking, 
listening, doing, undergoing; they exhibit structure in time; they are emergent and 
are not governed by the deliberate control of any individual; they have a function, 
whether social or biological or personal. And they are (at least potentially) 
pleasurable. (Noë 2015, 5–6) 
If we view engagement with fiction as such an organized activity, similar to driving 
a car or cooking dinner, we realize that it is largely habitual and pertains to the 
whole lived body rather than just the brain or a neural network. While reading, as 
Warhol (2003) and Kukkonen (2019) also point out, people fall into habitual 
patterns of expectation, response, and feeling. Moreover, all fiction provides 
affordances for thinking, feeling, articulating, and organizing one’s experiential 
world. In this study, I argue that mutant narratives offer particular kinds of 
affordances – namely, affordances for reconfiguring one’s habitual patterns of 
perception and environmental engagement, and thus modifying one’s lived 
environment. This is an inherently enactive and affective process. 
 
Enactive and Affective Reading Styles 
 
When aiming to figure out how literature can give rise to new and strange 
experiences, beginning from the experience itself seems like a reasonable starting 
point. As Caracciolo and Hurlburt (2016) point out, empirical studies of experience 
surprisingly rarely inform either psychological theory or narrative theory. Even more 
rarely is the study of experience systematically included in the methodology of 
studying minds or reading. There appears to be a rift between the mind of the “lay” 
reader, immersed in the experience, and the mind of the theoretician, positioned 
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in a detached space somewhere above or outside experience. As Troscianko 
(2013) and Polvinen (2017) have argued in the context of empirical reading studies, 
the lack of sufficient attention to readerly experience can lead researchers to 
uncritically adopt common presumptions about reading, which in turn can lead to 
“flawed experimental data about the exact [experiential] processes involved” 
(Polvinen 2017, 140). 
In addition to neglecting the nuances of first person readerly experience, 
“first generation” approaches to readerly cognition, including many of the 
applications of affordance theory introduced in the previous section, often fail to 
include affect in their models of embodied sense-making. Affect is habitually 
separated from cognition and screened out from literary analysis. This tendency 
might be traced back to influential critiques made by the New Criticists, especially 
“The Affective Fallacy” by William K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley (1967). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley identify a trend in literary criticism which they describe as 
“the affective fallacy”: “a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and 
what it does)” (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 21). Affective fallacy, the authors 
continue, “begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the 
psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism” 
(Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 21). Their primary target is a particular kind of 
“romantic reader psychology” (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 34) that focuses 
solely on the emotional experience of the critic, thus losing sight of the text itself. 
This kind of analysis, the authors claim, cannot get beyond the personal into the 
objective. 
The report of some readers . . . that a poem or story induces in them vivid images, 
intense feelings, or heightened consciousness, is neither anything which can be 
refuted nor anything which it is possible for the objective critic to take into 
account. The purely affective report is either too physiological or it is too vague. 
(Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967, 32) 
It is undoubtedly true that focusing on the affective experientiality of narrative 
cannot meet the ideals of objective criticism. Such an approach does not treat the 
text as an object, but as a participant in experience. The New Critical concern that 
the text and its detailed analysis are lost in the throes of scholarly passion is, 
however, left ungrounded in the current research climate. The second generation 
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cognitive critics seek to bring back affect, but not without losing their reflective and 
analytical capabilities, that is, their readings are not “purely” affective, as Wimsatt 
and Beardsley would put it. Troscianko (2014), Polvinen (2016, 2017), Kukkonen 
(2019), and others are developing enactive reading styles that systematically 
include experientiality (including affectivity) in their theoretical models. In a later 
section, I discuss how these reading styles do not yet quite translate to experiential 
methodologies, but first, I will illustrate the notion of an enactive reading style with 
the help of an empirical example. 
In an empirical phenomenological study on reader-response conducted by 
Don Kuiken, David S. Miall and Shelley Sikora (Kuiken et al. 2004, Sikora et al. 
2011), the participants read a long poem. During and after reading, the 
participants filled in a structured questionnaire and provided commentaries on the 
text and their reading experience. Analyzing these responses, the authors 
identified several styles of reading, including a style of reading they call “expressive 
enactment” (Sikora et al. 2011, 263). In the responses of this style, readers 
described “transformations of meanings central to readers’ experience of the 
poem,” often referring to their bodily feelings and autobiographical memories, and 
using sensory language, metaphors, and expressions that blurred the boundaries 
between the fictional characters and the readers themselves. 
The authors describe such a mode of engagement in terms of readers 
working with affective themes. Such themes recur throughout each reader's 
commentary, but they are constantly modified (or “enacted”) as the participant 
develops his or her initial intuition about the personal relevance of the theme. This 
results in a movement “toward increasingly intricate and intimate personal 
understandings and progressive articulation of initially vague and inexpressible 
convictions” (Kuiken et al. 2004, 193). The authors point out that expressive 
enactment differs from other modes of reader response in that it combines 
personal reflection with engagement with the formal features of the text (Sikora et 
al. 2011, 267). The transformative process of working with an affective theme takes 
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the form of a loop that alternates between personal reflection and engaging with 
particular passages of the text, gradually getting deeper into the theme.21 
Kuiken’s, Miall’s and Sikora’s study suggests that through this kind of 
dynamic engagement, reading can turn out to be a self-transforming process. 
Other studies on readerly engagement, and particularly on reading groups, also 
suggest that reading fiction is both affective and reflective, that interpretations 
develop over time, and that, at least in supportive environments, it can provide 
transformative experiences to readers (see Fialho, Miall and Zyngier 2011, 
Polvinen and Sklar forthcoming). Such studies offer insights into the dynamics of 
affective reading in general, but they can also inspire the development of 
performative enactivism by providing examples of actual readers reading in 
affective and enactive ways. 
From the enactive perspective, the crucial point is that the transformative 
effects of reading are not the doing of narratives in themselves, and neither are 
they products of imagination or personal will only. Rather, experiential and 
behavioral change requires active, skillful engagement with texts. 
 
Experientiality and Experience in Cognitive Literary Studies 
 
Reading the excerpt from Darwin’s Children from a detached analytical perspective, 
one could make note of the strong association between certain scents and certain 
affects (vanilla + steel = fear, chocolate = calming persuasion), as well as of the 
construction of a sense of physical threat (from Dave toward Stella) and 
psychological/biochemical threat (from Stella toward Dave and the others) 
achieved at the level of the entire passage. But how can one read a passage like 
this and identify in it such things as “threat” to a body? How does an illusion of lived 
reality emerge from words on a page? 
As a concept that captures this aspect of the reading event in a way 
compatible with the notion of embodied cognition, let us consider experientiality. 
                                                 
21 Caracciolo (2014a, 394–395) also discusses the study by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora. 
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In contrast to Fludernik’s (1996, 12; see 1.2) definition that construes 
experientiality as primarily a property of narrative, Marco Caracciolo’s (2014c) 
recent use of the term focuses on the phenomenology of the event of text-reader 
interaction. The primary benefits of Caracciolo’s networked model, for the 
purposes of this study, are its dynamicity and flexibility. The model views 
experientiality as a changing phenomenon, and allows both textual analysis and 
historicizing/contextualizing approaches. Moreover, in presenting the model as a 
network, Caracciolo enables one to discuss the interactions between textual 
design and the embodied, active reader. 
In Caracciolo’s (2014c, 30) articulation, experientiality arises from the 
tension between the reader, their experiential background, and the text. For a 
literary scholar, along with this tension comes a particular balance: an awareness 
of both the textual design and one’s own experiential background, and the ability 
to tease out the dynamic processes between the two. Only by implementing such 
an awareness can a scholar distinguish between the experientiality of their 
personal reading and the experientiality of someone else’s. For example, the 
passage from Darwin's Children does not necessarily appear threatening to a 
reader who has never experienced physical violence. But for a reader traumatized 
by such violence, it might cause severe distress. Moreover, as we shall see in 
section 2.3, experientiality is permeated by the contexts and intertexts salient to a 
particular reader. Professional reading thus requires focused attention and 
metacognitive skills. Caracciolo (2014a, 388) sees the interpretations formed 
during reading as “mostly pre-reflective (in the sense that readers make meaning 
without being aware of their own meaning-making activity)” whereas “the ‘virtuoso’ 
interpretations of literary criticism are maximally reflective.” Professional readers 
thus need to balance their personal and pre-reflective experiences with more 
general and reflective views of the texts they read. 
This is a balance that is necessarily achieved through careful practice. In 
the second generation approach to literature and cognition, the need for such a 
praxis has been acknowledged, and it is cultivated with care. Marco Caracciolo, 
Karin Kukkonen, and Emily T. Troscianko, among others, have presented detailed 
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observations about the particularities of embodied engagement with narratives in 
both fictional and nonfictional genres, and suggested practical guidelines for 
embodied reading (see Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014 for an overview of the 
second generation). However, as the following brief review of their recent work 
suggests, they base their readings and theories on phenomenological intuitions 
that are likely to be based on personal, embodied experience, but they also 
downplay the situated and first-person aspects of their embodied engagement. 
Karin Kukkonen (2014) has sketched a model for an embodied reader for 
the purposes of second generation cognitive literary studies. She performs a 
comparative exercise by asking how the reading made by an embodied reader 
would differ from a reading made by Wolfgang Iser’s implied reader. She imagines 
an encounter where the two model readers compare notes of their reading of a 
text in which the embodied experience of the protagonist is foregrounded. 
The embodied reader would have a more fine-grained sense of the experience 
of reading the passage, drawing on the overall kinesic shape of the motions 
described and the import of the environment in the mind of the hero. She would 
also quite likely be able to provide a first-person account of the particular 
experience, a thick description, of the emotion of fear that the hero undergoes 
here. The implied reader would not step into the hero’s shoes but consider the 
emotional experience that this passage evokes as part of the overall design of 
the novel, which works to introduce readers to a particular worldview conveyed 
in the entire set up of the novel. (Kukkonen 2014, 371) 
Kukkonen also notes that the embodied reader model of the second generation 
framework tends to focus on the “here and now” of the text at hand instead of 
considering the temporal progression of the entire text, and “favours immersive 
states of reading” instead of detached ones. In doing so, the embodied reader 
could learn from the implied reader (Kukkonen 2014, 372). Kukkonen then goes 
on to suggest that Bayesian predictive models could help to describe the 
interpretative process of an embodied reader. Thus, she develops a synthesis that 
combines the two reader models in a way that produces a nuanced cognitive 
analysis of the text excerpt. 
Kukkonen’s Bayesian model is rather abstract and aimed at describing the 
non-reflective processing of a text. As such, it represents the more science-
oriented end of the cognitive literary studies spectrum. It does not seem very 
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helpful to a scholar seeking to develop the enactive approach as an experiential 
practice. Still, even when the structure of Kukkonen’s argument distances the 
embodied reader model from professional interpretation, her creative use of the 
reader models as relatable figures metonymically connects them to actual persons 
employing the models. Implicitly, she models not just for hypothetical lay readers 
but also for ideal professional readers in the second generation framework – who 
focus not only on the immediate “echoes” of embodied experience in fiction but 
also pay attention to narrative progression and theme. As she claims in the opening 
sentence of the article: “Even if a literary theory is not expressly geared to reader 
response or the empirical investigation of what real readers do, every attempt to 
theorise interpretation models its ideal readers as it describes how meaning 
emerges from text” (Kukkonen 2014, 367). 
In much of Marco Caracciolo’s work, the ideal reader comes across as 
strangely detached. Caracciolo has on several occasions discussed the 
relationship of readers and fictional characters as embodied engagement, but he 
is curiously quiet about the implications of this engagement to the actual embodied 
minds of professional readers. He discusses readerly engagement in terms of 
“virtual bodies” (Caracciolo 2011), creative imagination (Caracciolo 2012), and 
empathy (Caracciolo 2014a), and even draws a mapping of the various 
interpretative approaches to literature and embodiment (Caracciolo 2014b), but in 
so doing he always considers the “reader” as a position evoked by textual cues 
rather than as a human being with a particular historical subjectivity. This decision 
is grounded in his non-empirical stance (Caracciolo 2014a, 32), but it still feels like 
an evasion of one of the central challenges of the enactive approach. 
Emily T. Troscianko (2014), on the other hand, satisfyingly problematizes 
the role of subjectivity in professional engagements with literature. She criticizes 
earlier readings of Kafka’s “Ein Hungerkunstler” for not noticing that the portrayal 
of the starving artist does not actually describe the embodied experience of hunger. 
For her, as a person with a lived experience of anorexia nervosa, this aspect of the 
text is readily available. She critically reviews earlier readings of the story, and 
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makes note of how they tend to idealize and valorize the fasting of the starving 
artist without a proper reference to textual evidence. 
Interpretations like this are unfaithful to both the embodied experience evoked in 
the text and the embodied experiences that happen in the world outside the text. 
Although we might demand more from a critical reading than fidelity to the 
narrative/experiential level of the text, we should demand it as a basic minimum, 
remembering that most non-professional readers probably read books for 
experiences, not for meanings, and that even if an elucidation of Kafka’s text like 
“it is by food we survive” seems trivial, this triviality is in fact the basis of readers’ 
responses to a cognitively realistic set of contingencies in the fictional world. 
(Troscianko 2014, 339) 
Troscianko’s critique that Kafka criticism tends to divert from the textual basis of 
experientiality is well grounded in her argument, but her account of cognitive 
realism can be further problematized. Troscianko grounds the cognitive realism of 
Kafka’s story in the cognitive-scientific, physiological, and folk-psychological 
accounts of hunger, and to the textual evidence that corresponds with these 
accounts (Troscianko 2014, 332). She equates this understanding of cognitive 
realism with “the embodied experientiality evoked by the text” above. This account 
does not acknowledge the fact that the text might not evoke the same 
experientiality to all readers, despite its potential. The cognitive realities of many 
literary scholars might be painstakingly cultivated to screen out embodied 
experientiality as trivial or distracting, in a habitual fashion similar to the continuous 
denial of hunger practiced by the anorectics Troscianko discusses. Denial of 
embodiment is as real an experience as embracing it. The abstracted readings of 
Kafka scholars can be based on their lived experience of the text – a theory-
cultivated experience in which theme is detected before, or even instead of, bodily 
feelings.22 
While I agree with Troscianko that cognitive literary studies should focus on 
acknowledging embodied experience in reading, I also think that they should resist 
falling back on a naturalized conception of embodied experience. In folk 
psychology and academic practices alike, embodied experience is thoroughly 
modified by theoretical models and integrated belief systems. In a stratified and 
                                                 
22 For further problematization of embodied experience, see Caracciolo and Hurlburt 
(2016), a work that is also a remarkable exception to Caracciolo’s normally detached style. 
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specialized society, professionals in financially secure positions can live for years 
and years without giving much conscious thought to their bodily needs and 
functions – in fact, they are often encouraged to do so – and in such contexts, 
detached readings of literature are likely to emerge. With this cultural situation in 
mind, it is important to examine the dynamics in which mental practices modify 
lived experience, and vice versa. 
The rhetorical separation of the hypothetical “embodied reader” from the 
scholarly subject may be dismissed as an irrelevant feature of academic decorum, 
or lauded as a form that keeps the readings from falling into the ambiguities of 
subjective experience. The particular claim I make is that this separation stands in 
the way of a potentially fruitful line of research: the line of enactive-
phenomenological investigation of reading in the spirit of Francisco Varela. 
The enactive approach starts from the premise that cognition is not 
interaction between stable cognizing entities and predetermined, object-like 
environments, but that both environments and experiencing selves are constituted 
in situated action. The embodied and enactive reader models already contain, in 
seed, the two aspects of performativity discussed above in the context of 
posthumanist feminism. The posthumanist feminist figuration of more-than-human 
bodily subjectivity is thus compatible with the enactivist notion of mutual 
enfoldment of self and world. The enactivist framework also has room for the sort 
of developmental openness Astrida Neimanis’s work demonstrates: the theory 
acknowledges a feedback loop between sociocultural practices and embodied 
experience, that is, the possibility of experiential change (Caracciolo 2014, 36; see 
also Varela et al. 1992). Careful attention to first person experience that unfolds 
during reading is, I propose, a key practice in such exploration, and therefore it 
should be foregrounded rather than downplayed. 
The model of the embodied reader carries an invitation to problematize the 
persistent tacit assumptions of academic subjectivity. As demonstrated by Emily 
Troscianko’s (2014) reading of Kafka’s “Der Hungerkünstler,” research is made by 
historically and spatially situated bodies in particular meaning-generating networks, 
and acknowledging this situatedness can bring out previously neglected ethical 
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dimensions in textual criticism, such as writing about eating disorders in socially 
responsible ways. However, even in Troscianko’s reading, the lived experience of 
the scholar is given as a natural foundation of interpretation rather than 
problematized as a perceptually and historically constituted subjectivity. Thus it 
appears that there is room in the second generation framework for more nuanced 
explorations of how subjectivities are generated in the bodily practices of reading 
and writing. I suggest that, on the one hand, models of embodied cognition 
developed in enactive theory can be useful in understanding the imaginative work 
of posthumanist thinkers such as Neimanis. On the other hand, the figurations and 
practices developed in posthumanist approaches can provide detail and variation 
to enactivist models of embodied experience. 
The task of attending to two or more traditions arguably bears the risk of 
dilettantism: a hybrid approach is always at the verge of losing focus and 
systematicity. Thus, there must be some organizing principle that brings the hybrid 
together and makes it into a coherent practice. In this study, the organizing 
principle is the careful examination of embodied experience as it unfolds in reading 
a selection of speculative fiction, a task I turn to in more detail in the next section. 
 
How to Become an Embodied Reader 
 
Lived experience is crucial to all of the studies reviewed above. The studies made 
in the second generation cognitive framework construct a specific kind of reader: 
one that engages in reading emotionally and affectively without losing their 
interpretative abilities. The posthuman feminist phenomenological approach, on 
the other hand, is aimed particularly at developing more-than-human modes of 
engagement: environmental perception, attention to the dynamics of nonhuman 
materialities, and awareness of one’s bodily entanglement with nonhuman things 
and processes. 
My method, in its shortest formulation, is to become a reader who can 
incorporate and perform these relational and attentional skills, and articulate the 
resulting reading experience in enactivist and posthumanist terms. This is a 
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somewhat circular process, as it both begins and ends in a more-than-human 
conception of embodied experience. I accept this circularity, and stress that the 
focus of the methodology should not be seen to be on whether more-than-human 
embodied experience is possible – I begin from the assumption that it is – but on 
what exactly happens to reading when it is considered as bodily and more-than-
human. The focus is thus on the particular process of reading science fictional 
texts in a performative enactivist mode, and on the particular experiential dynamics 
that can be identified in the process. 
As phenomenologist Matthew Ratcliffe (2010, 363), suggests, the body can 
be something through which we feel something else, or relate to the world, and 
bodily feelings can mediate that relating. In bodily performance, such as dance or 
sports, the feeling body “makes itself present via proprioception, kinesthesia, and 
even interoception” (Colombetti 2014, 122), while the focus of experience is on 
aspects of the surrounding world and not the body itself. I suggest that the reading 
body can also be such a performative body, present in the experience of reading 
but not the primary intentional object of awareness. Moreover, like other bodily 
skills, the skill of bodily reading can be consciously trained. 
This methodological aim of developing readerly skills is decided on the basis 
that, despite the vast variety of theoretical frameworks and approaches, first 
person readings still form the heart of literary research. A literary scholar is, first 
and foremost, an expert reader: a person trained in awareness to texts and their 
particular effects, in identification of context and tradition as well as linguistic 
phenomena. A literary scholar is someone who develops their sensibilities 
regarding the texts they encounter. Theory is a way for developing those 
sensibilities. Thus, I propose that synthesizing the enactivist understanding of the 
experientiality of fiction and the posthumanist feminist understanding of 
performative materialization into a performative enactivist method can train a 
professional reader in the cultivation of the cognitive skills necessary to the task of 
first person enactive engagement with literary works. 
While neither the bodily aspects of lay reading nor the performative 
enactivist method are specific to reading science fiction, I propose that science 
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fiction offers its readers affordances for such training by creating cognitive 
environments that are not only strange in the ideas they present but also affectively 
and experientially estranging. Hence, in the following analytical chapters, the 
method is complemented with analytical perspectives stemming from cognitive 
narratology and science fiction studies. 
 
2.3 Lived Experience and Reading Greg Bear’s 
Darwin's Children 
 
Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children (2003) was published as a sequel to the Nebula-
award-winning Darwin’s Radio (1999).23 Both novels were marketed as thrillers 
that draw on evolutionary and epidemic anxieties, with taglines such as “The Next 
Great War Will Start Inside Us” and “More Evolved, More Dangerous” on the book 
covers. Formally and stylistically, Darwin’s Children is a conventional popular novel. 
Content-wise, it is radical and ambitious, as it speculates on established theories 
of evolutionary biology. This tension between form and content affords a chance to 
discuss how reading the novel both estranges and naturalizes embodied 
experience. 
The novel presents a scenario in which ancient retroviral elements in the 
human genome are activated, due to complex environmental changes on a global 
scale, and a generation of strange children is born – one of whom is Stella from the 
scene discussed in the opening of section 2.2. The retroviral elements are named 
SHEVA, and the children are labeled with various tags, Homo sapiens novus, virus 
children, and Shevites being the more polite ones. Moreover, the novel draws on 
                                                 
23 Critical commentary on Greg Bear’s work consists mostly of references to Blood Music 
(1985) in the context of cyberpunk. Scott Bukatman (1993) and N. Katherine Hayles 
(1999) offer readings of Blood Music in relation to the “virtual subject” in postmodern 
science fiction. Longer analyses of Bear’s work are provided by Roger Luckhurst (2007) 
and Laurel Bollinger (2009, 2010), while Heather Schell (2002) and Tom Idema (2019) 
focus specifically on the Darwin novels. As the primary purpose of my analysis of Darwin’s 
Children is to discuss Bear’s take on mutant embodiment rather than to enter into a deeper 
engagement with the author’s ouevre, such previous analyses are discussed here only 
minimally. 
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the biological theory of symbiogenesis (Margulis and Sagan 2002, Gilbert et al. 
2012) to present a vision of a universal humanity joined by communication that is 
both biological and spiritual (see also Idema 2019, 79–100).24 
The inclusion of spiritual speculation in the novel is a brave move from Bear, 
given his reputation as a hard science fiction writer, and the careful construction of 
a plausible biological model that explains the emergence of a new clade of 
humans.25 Perhaps for this reason, he is compelled to add a “Caveats” section at 
the end of the novel. In the caveats, he inserts an authorial note in which he 
describes the speculations as “based on empirical evidence” but “remarkably and 
uniquely difficult to present scientifically, since it’s necessarily anecdotal” (DC, 457). 
For him, the experience is personal, but in a way that goes beyond personal: 
Epiphany is not limited to our conscious selves, or even to human beings. 
Imagine epiphany that touches our subconscious, our other internal minds – the 
immune system – or that reaches beyond us to touch a forest, or an ocean… or 
the vast and distributed “minds” of any ecological system. (DC, 458) 
On a first glance, such epiphany seems like a perfect experiential image of 
ecological interconnectedness. However, despite the author’s ecological and even 
more-than-human aspirations, I argue that Darwin’s Children ultimately reiterates 
and supports human-centered experientiality. Much of this has to do with the 
novel’s strategic use of familial affect. 
Darwin’s Radio features a love triangle between epidemiologist Christopher 
Dicken, molecular biologist Kaye Lang, and archaeologist Mitch Rafelson – as well 
as the controversial SHEVA pregnancy of Dr. Lang. The scientist characters justify 
the extensive theoretical exposition in the novels, help construct a complex 
dramatization of science and politics in a time of crisis, and provide emotional 
tension. The emergency measures enforced by the U.S. health officials to control 
the “plague” – segregation of sexes, abortion of all fetuses – force Lang and 
Rafelson to leave their homes and careers and live their life in hiding. At the end of 
                                                 
24 Another major evolutionary-theoretical influence behind the Darwin novels is Stephen 
Jay Gould’s punctuated equilibrium hypothesis (see Eldredge and Gould 1972). This 
hypothesis states that the evolution of species is structured as long periods of stasis 
punctuated by periods of rapid change, or “leaps in evolution.” 
25  The scientific coherence of Darwin’s Radio especially has been commended by 
biologists (see Goldman 2000, Lynch 2001). 
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the novel, their child Stella is born. Darwin’s Children begins twelve years later. The 
family is still in hiding, and Stella has grown into a rebellious teenager who 
vehemently claims that she is not like her parents – she is “a part of something 
worthwhile, something not human” (DC, 242). In the hope of finding other Shevite 
children, she runs away from home, thus asserting herself as a mutant rather than 
a human. This theme of teenage mutant rebellion is developed throughout the 
novel. 26  Adolescent Shevites are depicted in stark contrast to their parent 
generation, and they repeatedly use “human” as a derogatory term. 27  They 
develop their own language and culture, including songs and games that involve 
“signs and smells and spit, eyes that twirl and brows that knit” (DC, 206). 
The mutant adolescents of Darwin’s Children thus present readers with a 
potential challenge to and reconfiguration of naturalized notions of humanity. 
Moreover, the novel presents them with a situation and several relatable characters 
that they can affectively engage in imagining. This much can be agreed on – but in 
a particular reading situation, some aspects of the novel are bound to emerge as 
more powerful than others. 
In the previous sections, I argued that fiction participates in the lived 
experience of readers through evoking experientiality, and more precisely by 
evoking bodily feelings. The experientiality of actual reading situations comes 
together in the crossing of textual cues, bodily responses, and the readers’ 
personal background. In developing the method of performative activism through 
the following reading of Darwin’s Children, I aim to describe some of the bodily 
feelings and perceptual dynamics suggested by the text. Along with these 
immediate perceptions, I pay attention to the affective alignments the novel invites 
me to take up. Bringing together these various aspects of reading experience, I 
wish to portray experientiality as a complex, temporal, and situated phenomenon. 
                                                 
26  Influential works of fiction that convey mutant embodiment by imagining a “next 
generation” of mutants include Theodore Sturgeon’s More Than Human (1953), The X-
Men (1963–), and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981). Like Darwin’s Children, 
these works connect wide-scale mutations with rapid environmental and cultural changes 
(see also 3.1). 
27 See DC, 182, 206, 242, 248, 250, 251, 263, 285, 288, 327, 387. 
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This broad approach to readerly experience lays ground to the more focused 
readings in later chapters. 
 
Amplification of Affect, Attention, and Sensory Perception 
 
As both phenomenologists (Heidegger 1926/1996, Ratcliffe 2010) and enactivist 
cognitive philosophers (Thompson 2007, Colombetti 2014) have argued, human 
beings are always in a mood of some kind, and there is thus no cognition untainted 
by affect, except in the analytical operations of cognitive scientists and 
philosophers (and, it might be added, of literary critics too). The ubiquity of 
affectivity prompts the enactivist literary scholar to ask how affect, emotion, and 
perception are evoked and entangled in reading experience.  
While reading Darwin’s Children, I have made notes in the hope of capturing 
momentary impressions and insights. The notes record a movement between my 
personal experiences and the affective trajectories evoked by the textual design. 
These impressions already entail a reflective style of thought. 
By p. 128, the epidemic plot is in full swing, and I feel the exhaustion of all the 
heroic workers and parents. It latches on to the exhaustions I know from 
experience: relationships, work, being unable to help or save someone despite 
my best efforts. 
I am drawn to the dynamic between Mitch and Kaye, their stress and their 
love, their commitment. The character of Mitch reminds me of V: the self-denying 
strength required by the role of the father, and the moment of letting go, when 
he asks his wife: “I need you to tuck me in.” I am moved to tears by Kaye’s 
frightened reaction to this, her awakening to his husband’s emotions. 
I have been reading for seven hours. In the crossing of narrative events 
and the events of my own life, I feel grief. I am still, like a film over cream, set but 
not stable. (Notebook, 25.9.2017) 
In this note, I describe a mode of engagement with the novel that feels entirely 
natural: an emotional attunement to the pathetic life events of the fictional 
characters, and to their personalities. I am under what Marco Caracciolo (2016) 
has called a “character-centered illusion” – a willing imagining of fictional 
characters as quasi-people, whose lives and emotions I can sympathetically and 
empathetically engage with. The novel constantly presents affordances that enable 
this kind of engagement, which are also the basic elements of a modern realist 
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novel: small dramatic scenes of interpersonal engagements and personal worries, 
as well as descriptions of everyday environments, objects, and habitual patterns. 
Even when scientific analysis or theoretical work is presented, as focalized through 
an individual scientist character working on a specific problem, the analysis is laced 
with an attunement to the social realities of the scientific and familial communities 
of the individual. 
During the reading event, these affordances exercise some aspects of my 
emotional and social cognition. Feeling through the fictional exhaustion, stress, and 
love of the characters, I also relive some of the emotional states connected to the 
past events of my personal life. In this way, my personal background shapes the 
experience of reading the novel, thus playing into the dynamic of narrative 
experientiality. A reader in a different mental state (myself, at another time, included) 
would attend to different aspects of the novel. However, even based only on the 
style and techniques of the novel, bracketing the themes and topics as well as the 
personal backgrounds of particular readers, it can be argued that the novel invites 
its readers to employ their social and emotional skills, and prompts in its readers 
emotional and social responses. 
In literary studies focusing on cognition and affect, such responses are often 
discussed in terms of empathy, sympathy, or mind-reading, that is, the mental 
activity of making sense of the hypothetical minds of others (see Zunshine 2006, 
Keen 2007, Vermeule 2010). Such processes of sense-making also involve our 
capability to make sense of the bodily gestures and expressions of others (Bolens 
2012, Cave 2016). To some extent, we make sense of fictional minds and bodies 
in the same way we make sense of actual people. As much is agreed on in cognitive 
literary studies, but here I want to suggest that making sense of fictional people 
also affects our moment-to-moment perceptions and impressions of the actual 
people in our lives. 
Darwin’s Children constructs a specific style of social perception. Every new 
character is introduced, when entering a scene, with a brief but meticulous 
description of their bodily appearance. The introductions are very similar in style 
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and tone, independent of the focalizing character, serving to ease the reader into 
a socially shared mode of observation. 
Jurie wore brown oxfords, wool slacks, a dark blue shirt with a broad collar, and 
a sleeveless, cream-colored knit sweater, all clean but rumpled. At fifty-five, his 
features were still youthfully handsome, his body lean. He had the kind of face 
that would have fit well right above the collar of an Arrow shirt in a magazine ad. 
Had he smoked a pipe, Dicken would have thought him a cliché scientist. His 
body was too small, however, to complete the Oppenheimer effect. Dicken 
guessed his height at barely five feet three inches. (DC, 218, as focalized by 
Christopher Dicken) 
 
Cross was in her middle sixties, portly, her short-cut, scraggly hair brilliantly 
hennaed, her face jowly, her neck a landscape of hanging wrinkles. She 
possessed a voice that could carry across a crowded conference hall, yet carried 
herself with the poise of a ballet dancer, dressed in carefully tailored pant suits, 
and somehow could charm the butterflies out of the skies. (DC, 290, as focalized 
by Kaye Lang) 
Such descriptions help me to imagine the characters as fictional people embedded 
in their lifeworlds (and evaluate their personality and social status based on their 
appearance), but they also subtly affect my perceptions outside the reading 
situation. Through this conventional device, the novel guides me to mimic the 
narrative perspectives and enact similar modes of attention: to take note of the 
facial features, expressions, clothing, and habitual patterns of movement in the 
people I encounter. While some effects of such shifts in focus probably escape my 
attention, others I become aware of. Take hands, for example. After introductions, 
the descriptions often focus on hands as both a sign and a product of a person’s 
life choices, for instance when readers learn that Mitch’s callused hands are a 
product of years of archaeological digging, yet in absence of that work, they go 
smooth (DC, 4, 27), or when introductory handshakes are minutely described (DC, 
214 et passim). Accordingly, in social situations throughout the reading week, my 
awareness of the hands of others is heightened. 
By guiding my attention in this way, reading participates in my life. In a 
normal reading situation, most of such participation would be left unnoticed by 
readers, myself included, as it feels like such a natural part of everyday experience. 
It is only when the narrative diverges from this naturalized mode that its experiential 
effects come properly to the fore. In Darwin’s Children, such a defamiliarization of 
embodied experience happens primarily through the mutant perspective of the 
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adolescent Shevite character Stella. This perspective is also narrated in a realist 
manner, but the sensory aspects portrayed are slightly different from conventional 
presentations of human perception. For example, the Shevites navigate their social 
world with smell as well as sight. In the passages focalized by Stella, introductory 
descriptions of people include olfactory perceptions: 
Stella could see that these children had lived lives different from her own. They 
all smelled lonely and left out, like puppies pulled from a litter, whining and 
searching for something they had lost. Beneath the loneliness and other 
emotions of the moment lay their fundamentals: Will smelled rich and sharp like 
aged cheddar. Kevin smelled a little sweet. Mabel smelled like soapy bathwater, 
steam and flowers and clean, warm skin. (DC, 58) 
As I keep reading the novel, I experience the foregrounding of olfactory perceptions 
bleeding into my everyday life. During the reading week, my perception of the odors 
of food, spaces, weather, and human bodies is more fine-grained than usual. This 
is also one of the more persistent effects of reading the novel: since the first reading, 
I have paid more attention to my olfactory environments, and to the knowledge 
acquired via smelling. The issue of scents also emerges in everyday conversations. 
September is mushroom season, and the communal house I live in is often filled 
with the odors of drying mushrooms, and describing these odors is a common topic 
in kitchen talk. While such serendipity might seem trivial, in this particular case it is 
bound to feed back into the amplification of my olfactory experiences. 
Such reciprocity of reading and lived experience highlights how literature 
can take part in the dynamic organization of our lives, and also the fact that such 
participation cannot be easily separated from other experiences not directly related 
to reading. Noë (2015, 8–9) notes that organized activities take place on a level of 
attention that is not quite conscious – they are habitual, and they feel natural 
enough to escape our notice. My enhanced experience of scents is just barely 
strange enough to cross the threshold of my conscious attention. Staying with that 
moment of subtle strangeness guides me to attend also to the less obvious 
changes, such as the increased attention of people’s hands mentioned above. The 
amplification of sensory perception in the process of reading can thus be said to 
involve a fair amount of feedback between readerly experience and other lived 
experience. 
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The defamiliarization of embodied experience on the narrative level, and the 
experiential estrangement it gives rise to, contain potential for a wider 
destabilization of established habits of perception and experience. In section 3.1, I 
argue that most narratives involving mutant embodiment are geared to enable 
such a destabilization, and thus they can also be of help in developing new 
perspectives on embodied experience. The particular case of Darwin’s Children, 
however, makes an exception to this general tendency, as it systematically 
naturalizes the potentially estranging effects of readerly attunement to mutant 
embodiment. 
 
Naturalization of Mutant Embodiment by Realist Means 
 
Despite their appearance in a novel characterized as science fiction, Bear’s 
techniques for representing character and social perception are part of the long 
trend of realist narration. This is essential to the way they shape my daily 
perceptions. Riikka Rossi (2012) has claimed that realist literature utilises our 
everyday frames of reference in evoking Barthesian “reality effects,” and that these 
effects can be considered as cognitive. According to Rossi, realism encourages 
the reader to employ a non-reflective attitude toward the storyworld, that is, to 
interpret it as if it was the actual world and not a fictional construct. While this in no 
way implies that realist texts could not convey or evoke critical attitudes toward, 
say, societal problems, realist techniques tend to work towards hiding the 
representational and reality-shaping powers of narratives. 
Science fiction often uses realist techniques for its production of plausibility. 
Both realist and science fictional texts seek to create a sense of “documentary 
verisimilitude” by using detailed description and literal language (Roberts 2005, 15, 
Stockwell 2000, 196, see also Mandala 2010, McHale 2018). For Roger Luckhurst 
(2007, 215), Bear’s use of a realist style is tied to his status as a writer of “hard” 
science fiction, which emphasizes “rigorous technological and scientific 
extrapolation in blunt, instrumental prose.” Even when the features of the 
storyworld are outlandish, a realist style of narration guides the reader to accept it 
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as natural, as in the case of Stella’s sophisticated sense of smell. A Shevite sense 
of smell is not typically part of any human reader’s experiential background, and 
thus it probably gives rise to an initial feeling of strangeness in readerly experience. 
Yet the estranging effect is short-lived, as the realist style of narration smooths over 
the difference and naturalizes the sensory abilities of the mutant figure. 
The experiential plausibility of the character of Stella is created through 
framing her as an ordinary adolescent middle-class girl who resists the authority of 
her parents, goes to school, and gradually finds her place in the social life of her 
peers. Readers learn trivial things about her dietary preferences and the repetitive 
duties of daily life. Compared to the occasional science fiction texts that are 
experimental, and thus challenging both in their storyworlds and their narrative 
techniques (think of Ann Leckie’s Ancillary Justice, 2013, or Catherynne Valente’s 
Radiance, 2015), Darwin’s Children limits its challenging aspects to the diegetic 
level of the storyworld. 
I propose that the realist techniques used in Darwin’s Children to naturalize 
social behavior also serve to downplay the transformative potential of mutant 
embodiment. Presenting Stella as just another ordinary girl, whose perspective can 
be presented in the same style as any normal human, encourages the reader to 
keep on reading with a “natural attitude” – as if human experience, even when 
mutated, is transparently communicated through realist techniques. With its realist 
style, Darwin’s Children also effectively hides the narrative techniques that 
temporarily shape readers’ perceptions and affects, presenting itself as a 
transparent window to a plausible reality rather than as a construction of a 
speculative fictional world. 
Crucially, the naturalizing effect also extends to the levels of society and 
species. In Darwin’s Children, the Shevite sense of smell and the ability of 
intentionally producing scents serve as the basis of a whole culture, including 
idiosyncratic styles of communication. The sociality of the Shevites entails some 
potential for posthumanist subversion, as the novel envisions social practices that 
are strange and potentially threatening to normal humans. The young Shevites 
share moods and desires biochemically, through scent and spit, and enter into 
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modes of social decision-making that are fluid enough to be called anarchist. 
Toward the end of the novel, I encounter descriptions of everyday life in the Shevites’ 
commune: 
She took her tray from the food line and walked into the refectory, large and quiet, 
twelve workers off duty, none speaking, gesturing and facing and flashing, 
pleasant odors of cocoa and yogurt and jasmine – someone was being very 
pleasant – mingled together and out of context at this distance, like words pulled 
out of a conversation and tossed together randomly, the discourse going on at 
the old wooden tables and benches. (DC, 423) 
The Shevites are portrayed as extremely prone to social bonding and group 
formation, engaging in animated “discourse” even while they are silent. Even if the 
particulars of the narrated situation (communication by “gesturing and facing and 
flashing” as well as producing “pleasant odors of cocoa and yogurt and jasmine”) 
are unfamiliar, the everyday frame of animated lunch-time conversation is familiar. 
This is a technique Bear uses throughout the novel, as is shown by the examples 
on confrontation (see 2.2) and introductions (see above). 
Shevites are thus constructed as relatable despite their strangeness. 
According to Seo-Young Chu (2010), the sociality of Shevites makes them utopian, 
to the extent of becoming a model for global subjectivity: 
Addicted to multimedia information, profoundly dependent on live connections, 
at home in social-networking sites, Bear’s Shevites science-fictionally personify 
many of the ways in which globalization has been affecting humanity in the late-
twentieth- and early-twenty-first centuries. At the same time, Bear’s Shevites 
personify the ways in which globalization is asking – even requiring – humanity to 
change if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and our planet. Generous, 
democratic, peaceful, and devoted to consensus decision making, Shevites 
would be exemplary citizens in a globalized world. (Chu 2010, 115–116) 
According to Chu, such virtues – generosity, democracy, peacefulness, consensus 
decision making – serve as a moral blueprint for the global community. Chu also 
notes that the evocation of global subjectivity is a common function for mutants in 
science fiction. “To make humanity recognizable as a single species,” Chu (2010, 
110) writes, “is to call attention to the fact that human beings are physical 
organisms.” Following Chu’s line of thought, we can say that Darwin’s Children 
naturalizes as features of the specific genetic makeup of Shevites, itself produced 
through the mysterious ends of evolution, personified in the novel as Gaia. Due to 
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their status as physical organisms, the Shevites thus come to represent a potential 
new form of humanity. 
From an enactivist perspective, the acknowledgment of humanity’s shared 
evolutionary background (and a potential evolutionary future) provides 
opportunities for discussing the shared aspects of lived experience, as, for 
example, the sensory capabilities and tendencies discussed above. From a 
posthumanist feminist perspective, however, this kind of universalization is 
problematic, since it erases the unshareable and untranslatable differences 
between different human individuals and cultures, and between humans and other 
species (see Hellstrand 2016, Haraway 2016). 
Most other mutant figures of contemporary science fiction foreground the 
risky and horrifying aspects of humans as physical organisms, such as disease, 
contamination, deformation, and all kinds of anxieties related to sexual 
reproduction (see 3.1). In Bear’s naturalized figuration of the mutant, those aspects 
are diminished. Shevites are superhuman rather than posthuman – capable of 
communicating with the previous edition of humanity, Homo sapiens, and willing to 
do so. Compared to other recent renditions of mutated humans, such as Peter 
Watts’ radically modified bleeding-edgers (in Blindsight and Echopraxia), Octavia 
E. Butler’s predatory Clayarks (in the Patternist series), or Margaret Atwood’s ironic 
Crakers (in Oryx and Crake, The Year of the Flood, and MaddAddam), Shevites 
are untypically safe, obedient, and comprehensible. While Darwin’s Children, as a 
conflicted and hybrid text, can definitely be considered a mutant narrative, it 
ultimately does not challenge its readers to enact more-than-human modes of 
experience. Rather, it is an example of a text in which radical themes – 
symbiogenetic evolutionary theory, the emergence of a new strain of humans, and 
the subsequent societal changes – are downplayed by conventional form. 
Moreover, the novel presents an overarching unifying theme that affectively 
embraces difference and encloses it under the wide umbrella of universal humanity. 
A central device in this process is Bear’s utilization of nonconscious affective 
communication. 
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Nonconscious Affective Communication 
 
In Darwin’s Children, Bear’s vision of universal humanity is intertwined with his 
interpretation of cognitive and evolutionary theories. In the course of the novel, 
evolution emerges as a purposeful pattern that humans can tap into by using their 
intuitive skills, primarily dreams, visions, and prayers. Networks of communication 
emerge on all levels of the systems Bear envisions, from the biological to the social 
and the cosmic, and the Shevites represent a leap in evolution after which humans 
are able to grasp such networks. While Bear’s cosmic vision draws on complex 
theoretical understanding, I propose that its affective appeal is based on an 
evocation of a bodily feeling that is ultimately simple: the desire for familial warmth 
and comfort. I argue that Bear evokes such a bodily feeling by his realist depiction 
of intersubjective relations and then enlarges them to encompass the entire human 
species. 
On the biological level, Bear envisions a network of communicating 
biological entities within human bodies, which the novel explicitly refers to as 
“minds.” Closing her eyes, Stella can “feel the warmth behind her eyelids, the sun 
passing over her face, the suspended redness, and below that the rising up of all 
her minds, all the parts of her body that yearned” (DC, 388).28 In this description 
of bodily experience, the “rising up of all her minds” is entwined with the experience 
of feeling the sunlight on her face: it is Stella’s whole living and lived body that 
cognizes and reaches toward its environment. Reading the description, I feel a 
humming warmth in my face, chest and stomach, and this feeling easily associates 
with the bundled affects of warmth, life, and desire. 
The bodily feeling of rising toward warmth is something that even a 
unicellular organism would appreciate (see Thompson 2007, 157). The “yearning” 
of Stella’s bodily minds could be understood in enactivist terms as autopoiesis: her 
                                                 
28 Such systems are presented as biological in the novel, as they are associated with the 
microbiological work of Kaye Lang and referred to as “deep minds . . . [m]inds that talk to 
each other through chemicals” (DC, 58). The novel does not explicitly provide further detail, 
but the context and the author’s epilogue support the interpretation that the immune 
system is at least one of such minds (see also Idema 2019, 98). 
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body consists of mind-like living systems, such as the neuronal system and the 
immune system, which are already capable of enacting and renewing their 
identities. Enactive philosophy, as well as the philosophy of biology that precedes 
it, describes this basic dynamic of living systems as “essentially affective and 
protentional or forward-looking,” as the living system “opens outward into space 
because its metabolism propels it forward in time, and this forward trajectory is 
fueled by want, concern, and need” (Thompson 2007, 156, see also Jonas 1966, 
86). Bear’s presentation of the biological level of Stella’s body as affectively 
oriented, “yearning,” is thus grounded on systems-biological theories of organismic 
intention, and so are the affects of warmth that emerge at the level of readerly 
experience. Moreover, as Stella experiences the biological level of her body as 
yearning, the novel suggests that affective experience can transcend the 
boundaries between the systemic levels (biological, social, and cosmic) and, by so 
doing, perform a communicative function within the body of an organism. 
At the social level, in Shevite practices of “fever-scenting” (DC, 23 et passim) 
and “spit-calming” (DC, 201 et passim), collective moods are cultivated, 
maintained, and communicated by intentionally sharing pheromones and other 
psychoactive chemicals that Shevite bodies emit. The Shevites’ olfactory abilities 
are also associated with their ability to communicate even in their sleep, as the 
pheromones function without the need for waking consciousness. Such 
nonconscious communication often also includes changes in the patterns of 
freckles on the cheeks of the Shevite individuals. In the course of the novel, the 
ability to communicate while sleeping is highlighted periodically at dramatic turning 
points: at the end of the first chapter, at the end of the first part (in a novel 
composed of three parts), and twice during the last chapter of the last part. 
“Got to go,” he murmured. Stella's cheeks produced waves of golden freckles. 
Mitch smiled. 
Even asleep, his daughter could say good-bye. (DC, 5) 
 
In a blur of growth and young time, she tried to forget. And even in their sleep, 
her friends could soothe her. (DC, 184) 
 
Moments later, suckling her son, Stella relaxed and slept. Her cheeks kept 
showing patterns. Even asleep, the new mother could sign her love. (DC, 452) 
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Kaye’s face did not change expression, but Stella saw the tiny freckles darken 
under her mother’s eyes. Even now, Kaye could show her love. (DC, 455) 
The Shevites’ nonconscious communication is presented as highly affective, as it 
is used to greet and soothe others, and to show love. The last of the quotations 
shows how nonconscious affective communication is also depicted as an ability 
that can be adopted by regular humans such as Stella’s non-Shevite mother, Kaye, 
who not only develops Shevite-style freckles but uses them to nonconsciously 
communicate her emotions. In focusing on such intuitive abilities, Bear’s novel 
presents mind-reading skills and social attunement as natural abilities that are, in 
principle, shared by all humans. The shared nature of such natural abilities 
supports the novel’s naturalization of the mutant figure and the subsequent vision 
of universal humanity. At the social level, nonconscious affective communication 
thus bridges Shevites and non-Shevites. 
Nonconscious abilities also figure in the lives of the non-Shevite humans of 
Darwin’s Children. Especially in the chapter focusing on Mitch Rafelson’s work on 
an archaeological site, intuiting and dreaming emerge as a crucial part of the work 
of a researcher. In this chapter, Mitch Rafelson searches for the remains of an 
ancient hunter-gatherer group consisting of both Homo sapiens and Homo erectus 
individuals. In the political situation of the storyworld, finding these remains would 
help to make the case for a peaceful coexistence of Homo sapiens and Homo 
sapiens novus, and finding them is thus crucial both for the continued safety of 
Mitch’s own family and the continued life of the entire species. In this affectively 
charged situation, Mitch dreams. 
He had dreamed about the bones in the night. He did not know whether artists 
dreamed their work – or whether detectives dreamed solutions to their cases. 
But the way he worked was, he often dreamed of the people he found, in their 
graves or where they had fallen and died. 
And sometimes he was right. 
Often he was right. 
Hell, nine times out of ten, Mitch’s dreams turned out to be right – so long 
as he waited for them to evolve, to ripple through their necessary variations and 
reach their inevitable conclusion. (DC, 351) 
Here, the archaeologist taps into the shared senses, instincts, and sociality of all 
humans, embodied in a dream in which he enacts the movements of the leader of 
the Homo erectus hunter-gatherer group. Eventually he also connects to the Homo 
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erectus figure through trance and visions on the fieldsite (DC, 362–366). In Mitch’s 
visions, everything falls into place in a great chain of ancestors, different but all 
essentially human, and the insight about this chain reaches the present through 
species memory. Both dreams and evolution are figured as predetermined chains 
of events that “ripple through their necessary variations and reach their inevitable 
conclusion.” Here, nonconscious affective communication bridges the individuals 
(Mitch and the ancient hunter) across time, as well as the clades of Homo sapiens 
and Homo erectus. 
Toward the end of the novel, the vision of nonconscious affective 
communication takes on even more mystical and transcendental qualities, as when 
three young Shevite women, one of them pregnant, enter into a collective 
experience of visualizing the deep minds as golden kernels. 
Stella reached down to where LaShawna was, using her palm-touch for guidance. 
She actually did see something at the bottom of a long, deep well, three 
somethings, actually, and then four, the baby within her joining. Like four 
luminous golden kernels of corn, hidden away at the bottom of four separate 
tunnels of memory and life. (DC, 446) 
This mystical event is connected to the events centering on the character of Kaye, 
in which she is overwhelmed by the felt presence of an entity emanating pure love. 
The experience of being visited by this “caller” is characterized as an epiphany. 
While the source of the visitation is not traced back to the Christian God, all textual 
clues point to an immaterial, all-powerful, all-loving force beyond biology. Given the 
symbiogenetic theme of the novel, the force might also be traced to the notion of 
the Earth system as a regulator of ecosystemic activity, and its origins in James 
Lovelock’s (2000) Gaia hypothesis. In the dramatically heightened moment of 
death, Kaye’s inner monologue takes on the tone of a sermon: 
The memories fall away. We are shaped, but in ways we do not understand. Know 
that thinking and memory are biology, and biology is what we leave behind. The 
caller speaks to all of our minds, and they all pray; to all of our minds, from the 
lowest to the highest, in nature, the caller assures us that there is more, and that 
is all the caller can do. (DC, 455) 
At this point of the novel, the “prayer” of all minds including the biological, as an 
ultimate form of nonconscious affective communication, connects the 
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experiencing individual, and by extension the human species and other biological 
life forms, with a divine immaterial force. 
As the analysis above shows, Darwin's Children encourages its readers to 
consider a conception of cognition that is both more nuanced and more distributed 
than a conception centered on the waking consciousness of an individual subject. 
The reiteration of phrases such as “even asleep” in dramatically heightened 
moments emphasizes this issue as one of the key thematic features of the novel. 
Such a view of cognition is linked in the novel to systems biology, and more 
specifically to the symbiogenetic view of evolution promoted by microbiologist Lynn 
Margulis (Margulis and Sagan 2002). The symbiogenetic view emphasizes the role 
of symbiotic merger in speciation and discards the notion of “individual” organisms 
and species in favor of a view of “organisms as communities” (Margulis and Sagan 
2002, 20). 
Bear’s poetic interpretation of cognitive and evolutionary theories is 
fascinating from an enactivist perspective, as it appears to fit well with not just 
symbiogenesis but also with the harmonious notion of “the deep continuity of life 
and mind” advanced in an enactivist context by Evan Thompson (2007). 
Throughout the novel, nonconscious affective communication bridges together 
living systems of all levels – but, as should be apparent by now, all of those systems 
are human. Nonconscious affective communication serves an instrumental role 
that strengthens the experience and conception of the human family unit and, by 
extension, the human species at the top of a hierarchical order of care and 
meaning, and thus it cannot be said to develop a more-than-human or ecocentric 
view of the world. Rather, Bear’s poetic construction celebrates evolutionary 
humanism, as the vast timescale of human evolution and the intuitive abilities of 
individuals are evoked as elements in an awesome cosmic order. Inevitably, after 
all the “necessary ripples and variations,” in the center of that order stands Man. 
Whereas Margulis and Sagan stress that the “communities” they discuss involve 
multiple species, most often none of which are human or even animal, Bear’s 
treatment of the model is all about the human – and, as Chu proposes, about the 
  93 
human as a single species. Such a treatment collapses both human otherness and 
nonhuman otherness into panhuman sameness. 
 
The Comforting Promise of the Family of Homo 
 
Tom Idema (2019, 97, emphasis original) has argued that epiphany in the Bear’s 
Darwin books is “not merely ‘about’ evolution – rather, it constitutes an evolutionary 
signal. To be open to what is happening in the world around you means becoming 
a participant in the making of the future.” Thus, for Idema, Kaye’s and Mitch’s 
openness to intuitive thinking through dreams and epiphanies is a mark of 
evolutionary adaptability, rewarded by their successful production of offspring. This 
line of thought leads Idema, who also draws on Margulis and Sagan (2002), to 
propose that the Darwin novels supports “a symbiotic view of life” in which an 
individual body participates “in a community of others that contribute to its welfare” 
(Gilbert et al. 2012, 333, cited in Idema 2019, 98). He concludes on a profoundly 
materialist note about intuition and epigenesis. 
This approach to health as constructive participation in “a community of others” 
is exactly what makes Kay [sic] and Mitch sensitive to calls from the inside, which 
are actually transferred calls from the outside. Could it be that in times of 
upheaval, strong stress signals induce epigenetic mechanisms that are 
accompanied by emotionally intense experiences and imaginative ideas? (Idema 
2019, 98, see also Gilbert et al. 2012) 
I agree with Idema that Darwin’s Radio and Darwin’s Children indeed support the 
kind of interpretation in which Kaye and Mitch “seem to remember their nonhuman 
origins and move towards a new stage of evolution” (Idema 2019, 98). The novels 
put forth a symbiogenetic view of evolution, and thoroughly reconfigure the role of 
human cognition in evolutionary processes. The human mind is not viewed so 
much as a solid result of evolutionary history but as one aspect of a more-than-
human network of actors in mid-transformation. Neither the thoughts nor the 
offspring of Kaye and Mitch are presented as products of human bodies only. 
Rather, they emerge from the interaction of human bodies that are already 
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rhizomatically laced with microbiological life and responsive to planetary and 
populational trends. 
However, the radical potential of more-than-human adaptability in Darwin’s 
Children is also mapped as part of the cosmic transcendental order of evolutionary 
humanism that both privileges the human species and sidelines material agency. 
While Thompson’s formulation of the deep continuity of life and mind shows us that 
the conception of minded/mindful life can be laid out in purely materialist terms, 
Bear’s narrative introduces a transcendental layer to the conception – “there is 
more,” a life beyond memory and biology, manifested in the text as luminous golden 
kernels. By introducing this aspect, Bear’s novel downplays the radical potential of 
the symbiogenetic conception of mind. If there is a transcendental force that guides 
and shapes evolutionary and biological forces, material life is ultimately presented 
as secondary. This is both an antimaterialist and human exceptionalist view of 
biological life. 
Somewhat ironically, the force of the vision of transcendental connection is 
based on the affective techniques utilized throughout the novel. The descriptions 
of bodily feelings, including familial connection, touch, warmth, pain and 
exhaustion, familiarize my reading body with the fictional characters and help me 
to tune in to their fictional lives. Moreover, the scenes portraying harrowed parents 
and hard-working researchers repeatedly amplify my feelings of carrying a burden 
of responsibility. Thus, I am also tempted by the novel’s promise of a transcendental 
yet natural unity. That promise offers me a comfortable escape and a temporary 
relief from griefs and burdens. What might a person want more than an experience 
of unity, a profound sense of being loved by a completely unjudgmental entity? The 
promise of epiphany is the promise of ultimate comfort and ultimate naturality. 
Moreover, the unity it offers still centers around the exceptionality of the human 
species. 
Such speciesism is apparent in the novel’s dramatic closure, which takes 
place on the archaeological site of Mitch Rafelson’s team. Watching the newly 
exhumed ancient bones, Stella returns to the protective arms of her human father 
Mitch, who has heroically found the bones and thus revealed an evolutionary chain 
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that spans from Homo erectus to Homo sapiens novus. In the human father’s arms, 
Stella thus joins this chain of humans, too. Even if there was a seed of subversion 
in the first stages of mutant embodiment and mutant sociality, that potential is now 
brought to a close, as readers are invited to enjoy the warm, familial embrace that 
affirms universal humanity and erases all uncomfortable differences. 
As Sara Ahmed (2004) has argued in her analysis of collective feelings, this 
kind of pathos involves the construction of borders: the “we” of Homo has to stand 
in contrast to a “them” of some kind. The familial bond, into which the reader is 
invited to enter, is tight against outsiders: animal, vegetal, mineral and other 
nonhuman beings. In Ahmed’s (2004, 28) view, “emotions work to create the very 
distinction between the inside and the outside,” both for individual bodies and 
collective bodies. In Darwin’s Children, the narration only invites the reader to form 
affective alignments between humans of different types – nonhuman life is 
ultimately subjugated to human life.29 In this way, Bear’s novel exemplifies how 
speciesism is naturalized through realist characterization and narration. 
From this perspective, we could reconsider how the novel uses its readers’ 
attunement to its affective cues for broader purposes. By inviting readers to 
rehearse their personal and familiar emotions by attuning to the fictional lives of the 
characters, the novel offers affects of both pain and comfort. Through the narrative, 
such personal and familial emotions are contextualized as a part of (potentially 
universally) shared human life. If the resonance between the emotions I feel and 
the fictional emotions of Mitch and Kaye makes sense to me, it is likely that the 
extension also makes sense. Thus, I am moved to succumb to the familial pathos 
of the great reunion of Humans, from Homo erectus to Homo sapiens novus. In this 
way, the formal features of the novel play into producing a particular set of ethical 
possibilities: I am guided to elevate my personal emotion into an exemplary case 
                                                 
29 The SHEVA retrovirus presents a noteworthy exception: it is definitely of nonhuman 
origin, its incorporation into the human genome deriving from the shared evolutionary past 
of all placental mammals. Kaye Lang’s research into the retrovirus takes on affective 
modes, in which she empathetically enacts the perspective of the microbiological entity. 
However, this quest into the nonhuman world serves the higher goal of asserting the 
exceptional quality of the human body and mind. Despite its nonhumanness, the retrovirus 
suffers the same fate as Shevite subversiveness: it is ultimately incorporated into the 
harmonious community of Homo. 
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of universally human emotion. This experiential dynamic is human exceptionalism 
from start to finish, since it guides my emotions into a narrow template of 
interhuman sociality. 
 
Why Darwin’s Children Does Not Afford a Posthumanist Reading 
 
In this section, I have argued that Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children invites its readers 
to take part in an affective vision of universal humanity. The novel suggests such a 
vision both explicitly and through its affective force on receptive readers. This is 
apparent in the structural similarities between the standard and the mutant 
perspectives, in the theme of nonconscious affective communication, and 
ultimately in the storyline of Mitch Rafelson’s archaeological quest, which joins 
three different clades of Homo in familial unity. 
Enacting the embodied reader model, I have adopted the strategy of least 
resistance. I am interested in the novel as a system that produces experientiality 
through affective devices (see Caracciolo 2014c, Warhol 2003, 24), and therefore 
I have approached it like I would a rollercoaster ride, a gym device, or a new winter 
coat. Getting acquainted with any of these devices involves a fair amount of 
adaptation, even surrender, as my body finds the appropriate positions and 
movements through which I can employ them. I have intentionally allowed the novel 
to guide my bodily feelings and emotional patterns, in the hope that this strategy 
can give rise to insights about the formation of embodied experience in reading. 
However, my affective reading of Darwin’s Children is not “natural” in the 
sense that it would necessarily arise from my biological or evolutionary makeup. 
Rather, I am guided into adopting a certain style of embodied experience, through 
which the empathetic, socially attuned reading feels natural (see Warhol 2003, 
Braidotti 2013, Noë 2015). A central device in this stylization of experience is 
narrative form itself: by repeatedly encountering the certain narrative conventions 
for representing people and environments, I grow to understand these conventions 
as neutral mirrors of the actual world. Realist characters feel “realistic” because 
readers have been culturally familiarized with this mode of representing human 
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experience.30 As Alva Noë (2015, 51–52) has argued, different conventions and 
practices afford different styles of perception: observing still-life paintings trains us 
to perceive the world as sets of immobile planes, while playing sports enables a 
more dynamic and task-oriented style Noë (2015, 51) calls “seeing in the wild.” I 
suggest that the same is true about literature: different kinds of literature train us in 
different kinds of perception and feeling, thus participating in the formation of our 
habitual patterns of engaging with our environments. 
Exploring the implications of this suggestion is the main task of the rest of 
this study. In the course of that exploration, some of the experiential patterns that 
cognitive literary theory presents as simply “mimetic” are unsettled by 
posthumanist interventions. On the other hand, enactively attending to mutant 
narratives makes experiential some of the stickier human-centered habits, thus 
highlighting that theoretical posthumanist reconfigurations of subjectivity do not 
painlessly give rise to metamorphoses of embodied experience. 
In the affective patterns it suggests and upholds, Darwin’s Children is a 
remarkably human-centered novel. It affords certain bodily feelings and emotional 
alignments (the warmth of familial unity, uplifting feelings of universal humanity) 
while excluding others (e.g. transspecies affection). My analysis of the novel also 
points to the limits of a bodily posthumanist reading: while some aspects of the 
novel, such as its engagement with evolutionary theories, do afford posthumanist 
analyses, its affective patterns do not. As the main aim of this study is to explore 
the possibility of more-than-human embodied experience, Darwin's Children thus 
needs to be contrasted and compared with readings of stories that involve more 
defamiliarization and experimentation, and allow for such posthumanist 
explorations. In the chapters that follow, I foreground how reading the mutant 
narratives by Paolo Bacigalupi and Jeff VanderMeer in a performative enactivist 
manner can develop an awareness of the manipulative aspects of fictional narrative, 
and give rise to more-than-human modes of experience. 
                                                 
30 Furthermore, unnatural narratology has argued that realist narratives, in fact, involve 
unnatural or outright impossible moves, such as omniscience, and they thus do not hold 
any special claim to being the most unmediated and accurate style of representation (see 
Alber et al. 2013). 
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3 Mutant Figures and Bodily Reading 
 
Having outlined a bodily, experiential and more-than-human method of reading – 
performative enactivism – I am faced with the fact that reading is a complex task 
that cannot be explained through simple comparisons to our everyday interactions 
with actual people and places. If we consider reading as an event in which both 
the text and the environment participate, we soon realize that every instance of 
reading is partly constituted by readers’ own experiential backgrounds and current 
contexts – including the histories of both production and reception of fiction 
(Mikkonen 2014). One previously expressed critique of the embodied reader 
model is that the model guides the reader’s attention toward a narrowly 
experienced present moment: one is focused on reading only for affective cues, 
dismissing things like plot, genre, or intertextuality partially or completely (see 
Kukkonen 2014). This critique is worth noting: any reading, including my reading 
of Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children in the previous chapter, is bound to take place in 
a network of not only personal contexts but also the material and cultural conditions 
shared with other human and nonhuman bodies. This means that reading, even 
when experienced as personal and particular, is historically, socially and 
geopolitically situated. 
One of the factors contributing to this complex situatedness is genre. The 
particular context of science fiction is both similar to and different from both the 
literary mainstream and high-brow experimental literatures. Even if genre 
boundaries have become increasingly blurred during the 21st century (see Wolfe 
2011, Pettersson 2016, 64–74), the particular conventions of writing, publishing, 
reading, and discussing in the science fiction context still affect both the texts at 
hand and their reception. Bo Pettersson (2016) has suggested that the knowledge 
of the generic context of a work of fiction is ingrained in how the readers interpret 
its particular way of making sense of reality, that is, mimesis: 
Literary representation is not only based on the world and genres authors know 
and employ but also on what readers consider real in the fictional worlds depicted. 
Assessing how representation works in literature is fundamental for readers so 
that they can understand how the real and the fantastic blend in literature. That 
is, mimesis and genre are often co-determined in interpreting literature: if you do 
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not know the genre, you may misunderstand what is represented and the other 
way around. (Pettersson 2016, 76–77) 
Readers of realist and nonrealist texts alike negotiate different narrative strategies, 
such as allegory or documentary realism, and different levels of fictionality, such as 
the imaginative recasting of actual places and people. Much of contemporary 
fiction requires these kinds of readerly skills. Mutant narratives are no different, as 
they build on shared generic knowledge of mutant figures. In this chapter, I focus 
on how science fictional character invites readers to employ their knowledge of 
generic contexts and fictionality at the level of embodied experience. Repeated 
encounters with mutant figures across texts feed into the shared experiential 
background of science fiction readers, thus guiding how we respond to any new 
iteration of them. 
In section 3.1, I provide an overview of mutant figures in Anglophone 
speculative fiction, and unravel some aspects of their construction by comparing 
them to narrative-theoretical models of fictional character. In this process, it 
becomes questionable whether the term character can be meaningfully applied to 
all of them, and whether character theory can contribute to reading them in the 
context of embodied cognition and more-than-human experience. This discussion 
also ties into Pettersson’s (2016) notion of the codetermination of mimesis and 
genre: it appears that some science fictional characters are not intended to be 
encountered in ways that character theory suggest we should, that is, as 
representations of humans, but as “pieces of equipment” (Jones 1999, 5). Thus, 
instead of character-theoretical approaches, I adopt the term figure as an option 
that allows movement away from anthropomorphic modes of reading. 
This reconfiguration is needed for a posthumanist understanding of the 
theme of artificial persons – human or nearly human bodies and minds that take 
shape in systemic processes of mutual specification. While all science fictional 
variations of this theme foreground and defamiliarize human embodiment, 
narrowing the focus of the biological and biotechnological variations to mutants 
can orient us toward the material and more-than-human entanglements relevant 
to ecological reading and ecological subjectivity. Due to their entangled nature, 
mutant figures also may show how theories of narrative sense-making, usually 
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limited to the human and the intersubjective, could be modified to better grasp the 
more-than-human aspects of life and perception. 
Paolo Bacigalupi’s fiction provides an interesting case study for a number 
of reasons. First, it engages with the themes of biological evolution, biotechnology, 
and societal change at the time of climate change, as well as with personal change 
in this wider context. Second, it both employs and reconfigures the traditions of 
science fictional characterization. Bacigalupi utilizes time-worn stock types of 
popular fiction, from artificial girls and cyborg gunmen to cunning oriental 
merchants. His work thematically connects the technique of type-based 
characterization to the context of cultural stereotyping and social construction of 
identity. Third, Bacigalupi’s fiction is highly affective in its frequent descriptions of 
material events, strange bodies, violence, and action, and this affectivity affords a 
demonstration of what performative enactivist reading can do in terms of embodied 
experience. Bacigalupi’s human characters tend to be as objectified and 
instrumentalized as cattle or genetically modified corn, and the affective patterns 
of being instrumentalized resonate in embodied experience in disturbing and even 
destructive ways. 
In all narratives featuring mutant figures, embodiment is foregrounded and 
defamiliarized. While this does not often happen via experimental narration of inner 
experience, the sheer strangeness of the described bodies can prompt the reader 
into experiencing their own embodiment in estranged ways. I demonstrate how this 
estrangement happens through the performative enactivist method described in 
section 2.1. In section 3.2., I approach the experientiality of reading these recurring 
figures through the notion of kinesis, the imaginative enacting of the bodily states 
and movements of fictional actors (Bolens 2012; Cave 2016). With the help of 
Bacigalupi’s short story “The Fluted Girl” (2003), I also discuss how the notion of 
kinetics enables us to think of textual materiality beyond human-like figures (cf. 
Abram 1996, Oulanne 2018). 
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3.1 Mutant Figures 
 
The mutant embodiment of Greg Bear’s Stella, discussed in chapter 2, is not 
isolated from other instances of mutant embodiment, fictional as well as actual. 
These other instances contribute to the experiential background of readers of 
Darwin's Children on various levels of specialization: any reader embedded in the 
Western cultural context is bound to read the novel in relation to the transmedially 
franchised mutant superheroes of comic books and blockbuster films, such as 
Spider-Man (since 1962), the X-Men (since 1963), and the Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles (since 1984), or the mutants of horror films such as The Fly (1958 and 1986) 
and The Thing (1951 and 1982). 
However, the genealogy of the mutant figure extends far beyond these most 
popular instances. The modern mutants of Anglo-American science fiction emerge 
from a long history of metamorphoses and monstrous/divine figures in both 
Western and non-Western mythologies. Grotesque imaginary, such as Francois 
Rabelais’ The Life Gargantua and Pantagruel (La vie de Gargantua et de 
Pantagruel, c. 1532–1564) and Victor Hugo's The Hunchback of Notre Dame 
(Notre-Dame de Paris, 1831), and modern-day magical realism – just think of the 
pig-tailed children of Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude 
(Cien años de soledad, 1967) and the telepathic witches of Salman Rushdie’s 
Midnight’s Children (1981) – also contribute to the trope.31 
Mutant narratives are engaged in imagining species, genetics, and 
environments, and they do it with all the various strategies and devices of fantasy 
and speculation. Most iterations of the mutant figure are not overly concerned with 
fidelity to the actual biological dynamics of genetic mutation: creatures are 
transformed both before and after their births, in situations ranging from accidents 
in nuclear power plants to intentional genetic manipulation. As a popular-biological 
                                                 
31 Speculative fiction is also an inherently transmedial genre, and influences constantly 
travel between literature, film, videogames, comics, and other media. While I limit the 
following overview mostly to science fiction literature, leaving other media completely out 
of the discussion would be neglectful. I will thus refer to influential works in other genres 
whenever necessary. 
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term, mutant is slightly pejorative, used to indicate freaks of nature whose genetic 
mutations make them significantly different from their parent organisms. They are 
often functionally defective, as in the case of albinistic animals, or humans suffering 
from various genetically derived diseases. Technically, however, mutation is an 
essential part of sexual reproduction and a driving force of evolution – therefore, all 
sexually generated creatures are in some sense biological mutants. 
Rather than focusing on the technical aspects of their generation, it might 
be reasonable to characterize mutants by their relation to the norm of the species 
portrayed in the work of fiction. Regardless of technicalities, a mutant occupies the 
niche of the freak, the monster, the exception to the rule, the transgression, the 
ambiguous potentiality that might be realized as either destructive or generative 
action. In contemporary science fiction, this niche is occupied by not just genetic 
deviations, but also bioengineered and chemically transformed bodies – as well as 
by bodies of non-biological origin, such as androids and robots.32 
My choice of the term mutant, instead of the better known academic search 
terms like posthuman or monster, is motivated by three aspects: the term's 
historical transformation from a pejorative label into a marker of self-identification; 
its evocation of the issues of genetic determinism and evolution; and its evocation 
of painful subjective transformation. Mutation can also function as a figuration for 
cultural and experiential change. While the terms posthuman and cyborg usually 
focus on the technological and societal entanglements of modern human bodies, 
and monster orients us to considering the anxieties and possibilities lurking in the 
liminal areas of human subjectivity, mutant can add to all of these discussions by 
                                                 
32 Often, mutants and androids give rise to strikingly similar themes: evolution and survival 
in changing environments, living with broken and strange bodies, otherness and social 
exclusion, the fluid boundaries of humanity, technological power and systemic complexity. 
A mutant figure might transgress not only the boundary between human and animal, but 
also the boundary between human and machine. Biological and biotechnological mutants, 
however, might bring in more of the environmental themes this study focuses on. 
In the comic book semiosphere, the classification of freaks includes not only 
mutants (who have been born with peculiar features or abilities) but also mutates (for 
creatures that are transformed by external effects such as radiation) and metahumans (for 
creatures that attain mutant superpowers after birth). Metahumans come close to the 
project of consciously altering human bodies, marked by the terms transhuman and 
posthuman. One could also consider parahumans, hybrids and khimairas as belonging to 
the group of mutants. 
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mobilizing our imagination of biological and ecological change. As the examples in 
the next sections will demonstrate, mutant figures are spanned between controlled 
life (bios) and radical change (zoe), often leaning toward the latter, by describing 
wild alterity where android/cyborg narratives would present bleak systemic 
control.33 
As they incorporate and expand on the dynamic logic of biological mutation, 
mutant figures can help us navigate within a world that does not consist of 
sovereign subjects and mute objects but of bodies “inextricably enmeshed in a 
dense network of relations” (Bennett 2010, 13). Mutant figures point to the 
effervescence of form itself: whatever the current form of the mutant, its next 
iteration is shaped by changed circumstances and chance, and therefore it’s 
bound to be different. This dynamic of continuity and change also thematizes the 
logic of narrative experientiality: every instance of reading fiction both draws on our 
previous experiences and gives rise to new ones. 
 
A Brief History of Mutant Figures 
 
The most prominent feature of mutant figures is abnormal embodiment, in forms 
ranging from the spectacularly freakish to the invisibly deviant. The spectacularly 
freakish is tied to particular historical practices in modern show business: as part 
of the imperial exoticism of the 19th century, all kinds of specimens were brought in 
front of European audiences – strange animals and strange people alike. The figure 
is inseparable from the scientific investigation of living bodies – both as potentially 
reproducible by technological means, as in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), or 
as naturally evolving, as in H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895). The freak shows 
and natural science exhibitions showed their audiences a variety of possible forms 
of animal and human – and served to both confuse and strengthen the boundaries 
                                                 
33 This is a broad generalization. While android narratives such as Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? and A.I. offer bleak control, so do genetic narratives such as Gattaca and 
Brave New World. William Gibson’s cyberpunk offers both bleak systemic control and wild 
alterity. 
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between “normal humanity” and its deviations. Strange bodies were presented as 
objects for the observing eye of the scientific mind – which was never too far from 
the voyeuristic or the dominating gaze (see e.g. Haraway 1992, Grosz 1994). What 
emerged, quite often, is the understanding of evolution as a linear progression from 
lower forms to higher. In this conception, the novel idea of evolution was bent to 
conform to notions deriving from classical and Christian metaphysics. As the 
unfolding history of mutant stories demonstrates, these notions are still in active 
circulation.34 
The stories involving genetic mutation specifically emerged during the 20th 
century, with the development and popularization of ideas in genetics. At this point, 
the mutant figure is tied to the issues of heredity and generational shift – after World 
War II, western stories of mutation tend to describe generations of strange children, 
sometimes leading to new races and breeds of supermen. World War II also marks 
the beginning of the atomic mutant, a creature carrying mutations caused by 
nuclear radiation, a profoundly unnatural creature. A short story by James Blish, 
“Battle of the Unborn” (1950/1955) imagines a world infested by atomically 
mutated humans, and a particularly murderous variation that should, according to 
the responsible bureau, be either sterilized or segregated on a camp. The object-
like aspects of the biologized mutant body are highlighted in a passage that also 
exemplifies the shift of focus from spectacularly freakish bodies to invisible 
deviations only accessible with the instruments of science. 
Homo chaos looks like any ordinary human on the outside; but inside, there are 
easily recognizable signs. No vermiform appendix; a pineal body that shows up 
coal-black on the X rays, even when the pictures are taken through the foramen 
magnum; a type of nervous tissue impervious to silver nitrate; Golgi bodies in the 
brain do not take silver-line stain. And haematological signs: very fast clotting 
time and sedimentation rate; a high white count with a predominance of young 
forms that you would call mononucleosis in a normal human. And a few other 
signs. (Blish 1950/1955, 21) 
                                                 
34 Whereas apes and racialized others were cast in the roles of the lower forms, freaks 
have always played the role of divergent among proper natural creatures: by their presence, 
they disturb the natural order, including the idea of a linear evolutionary progress. 
Biological mutations can be both beneficial and harmful for the life of the individual 
organism, and their effects do not necessarily conform to either aesthetic or moral ideals. 
This risky lawlessness gives the mutant figure a demonic quality that affiliates it with 
tricksters, scapegoats, and other liminal beings. 
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The objectifying list of descriptions, and the project of classifying mutants by 
scientific means, is set in a satirical light by the next twist of the plot: the scientist 
is killed by his mutant colleague, who did indeed look like any ordinary human on 
the outside. In Blish’s narrative, the supposed object of science cannot be 
contained but escapes its boundaries, taking the place of the human subject in a 
paranoid turn that also characterizes American post-WWII monster fiction more 
generally.35 
The 1950s stories from American writers are permeated by traces of 
eugenics and atomic radiation, but also with the hope of an evolutionary leap 
through a generation of children blessed with the gifts of teleportation, telekinesis, 
and telepathy, or other special abilities such as great intellect, as in Children of the 
Atom (1953) by Wilmar H. Shiras. In these stories, the rise of the new generation 
often means the fall of the old. The trope of the superman is utilized and explored 
extensively, echoing Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy and its utilization in national 
socialist ideology. Olaf Stapledon’s Odd John (1935) is credited to have coined the 
term Homo superior, which has been adopted widely in later mutant stories, 
including Blish’s story. 
Sometimes the superman emerges as a group. In Theodore Sturgeon’s 
More Than Human (1953), a handful of dysfunctional misfits are joined at an 
operational level, resulting in a system referred to as a “superorganism” and likened 
to a radio station with several individual receivers. This “new kind of human being,” 
Homo Gestalt, considers human morality as inapplicable to itself. 
“Listen,” she said passionately, “we're not a group of freaks. We're Homo Gestalt, 
you understand? We're a single entity, a new kind of human being. We weren't 
invented. We evolved. We're the next step up. We're alone; there are no more 
like us. We don't live in the kind of world you do, with systems of morals and 
codes of ethics to guide us. We're living on a desert island with a herd of goats!” 
“I'm the goat.” 
“Yes, yes, you are, can't you see? But we were born on this island with no 
one like us to teach us, tell us how to behave. We can learn from the goats all the 
things that make a goat a good goat, but that will never change the fact that we're 
not a goat! You can't apply the same set of rules to us as you do to ordinary 
humans; we're just not the same thing!” (Sturgeon 1953, 211–212) 
                                                 
35 See e.g. Invasion of the Body Snatchers, The Blob, Shepford Wives, and the discussion 
in Badmington (2004). 
  108 
The atomic mutant stories amplified the exciting tensions of the post-WWII years: 
not only has the society been drastically transformed by the war, but the very 
capabilities of human (Anglo-American) culture have been dramatically widened 
by the invention of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. At the threshold of this 
new technology, it appears that a new type of human is also emerging. 
While political and technological circumstances have changed from the 
1950s, the mutant figures of the 21st century still carry this tension of humanity 
hovering at the edge of the future. Some of the novelty of the tension has worn off, 
though – as has been apparent at least since the ironic postmodern mutants of the 
1980s. This ironic shift in the use of the mutant figure involves a great amount of 
genre-consciousness. Postmodern variations of the mutant figure are often crafted 
with a sense of the historical continuum, but earnest narratives of the rise of 
superior beings are harder to find. The epitome of the ironic development might be 
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, a parodic comic book concept created by Kevin 
Eastman and Peter Laird in 1984, which was brought to a wider audience via an 
action figure production line and a television series. Building on post-WWII pulp 
monsters, contemporaneous superhero comics, and urban legends, the series 
takes an abomination – the sewer-dwelling turtle transformed by urban chemicals 
– and turns it into a gang of heroic, identifiable figures. In the same humorous vein, 
the film The Toxic Avenger (1984) features a bullied youngster transformed into a 
monstrous hulk via exposure to toxic chemicals. By presenting monstrous bodies 
as identifiable and sympathetic, these popular iterations of the mutant figure 
participated in a cultural shift that promoted individualistic variation and flexible 
identities while acknowledging the hazardous systemic influences of modern 
consumerist culture. Whereas the atomic mutant was an exceptional, super- or 
subhuman figure, the Turtles and the Avenger are offered as widely shareable 
templates for identification. Monstrosity, they appear to propose, is part of 
postmodern subjectivity (see also Cohen 1996, Badmington 2004, Hellstrand 
2016). 
The atomic age tension that links great power with great responsibility, as 
well as with great challenges in adapting to societal norms, lives on in today’s 
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science fiction – perhaps most prominently in Marvel’s transmedial X-Men, which 
is arguably the most well-known contemporary iteration of the Homo superior trope. 
The franchise has, since its launch as a comic in 1963, survived two generational 
shifts by incorporating new themes, such as transsexuality and homosexuality. 
With the popularity of the X-Men films, queer activists have adopted the motto 
“mutant and proud”36 as a marker of non-binary identity. The thematic shift in X-
Men signals a corresponding shift in the use of the mutant figure: in cultures more 
sensitive to bodily diversity, strange figures have become acceptable points of 
identification. This movement has its roots in stories like Sturgeon’s, in which the 
possibility of a mutant experience begins to take form. The strange bodies are 
considered not only as objects of science or thought-experiment, but also as sites 
of embodied experience, and possibly of experience beyond easy identity-based 
access. 
Articulating both the experientiality and science involved in the lives of 
mutant bodies posits a remarkable challenge for fiction authors. Octavia E. Butler, 
in her Xenogenesis trilogy (1987–1989, also published as the single-volume Lilith’s 
Brood in 2000), navigates this challenge by imagining an alien species that 
intuitively understands and manipulates something that humans can only access 
through technology: genetic structure. For the Oankali, and for the “constructs” 
born from crossbreeding Oankali and humans, accessing and manipulating 
diverse genetic strains is as imperative as breathing and sexual interaction. In 
Imago (1989) Butler articulates this condition in rich descriptions of sensory 
experience. First person accounts of characters going through their adolescent 
and adult transformations evoke the affects of confusion and enlarged sensory 
perception, while also explaining the metamorphosis in biological and biochemical 
terms. 
I slipped into my first metamorphosis so quietly that no one noticed. 
Metamorphoses were not supposed to begin that way. Most people begin with 
small, obvious, physical changes – the loss of fingers and toes, or the budding of 
new fingers and toes of a different design. 
I wish my experience had been that normal, that safe. 
                                                 
36  The phrase is originally coined by the character Charles Xavier but most of all 
associated to the shape-shifter character Mystique in X-Men: First Class (2011). 
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For several days, I changed without attracting attention. Early stages of 
metamorphosis didn’t normally last for days without bringing on deep sleep, but 
mine did. Tastes, scents, all sensations suddenly became complex, confusing, 
yet unexpectedly seductive. 
I had to relearn everything. River water, for instance: when I swam in it, I 
noticed that it had two distinctive major flavors – hydrogen and oxygen? – and 
many minor flavors. I could separate out and savor each one individually. In fact, 
I couldn’t help separating them. But I learned them quickly and accepted them 
in their new complexity so that only occasional changes in minor flavors 
demanded my attention. 
Our river water at Lo always came to us clouded with sediment. “Rich,” the 
Oankali called it. “Muddy,” the Humans said, and filtered it or let the silt settle to 
the bottom before they drank it. “Just water,” we constructs said, and shrugged. 
We had never known any other water.” (Butler 1989, 3) 
Compared to the description of mutant bodies in Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children 
(discussed in 2.2 and 2.3), Butler’s narrative blends the biological and the 
phenomenological in more nuanced manner. The mode of the passage is 
experiential from beginning to end, but details of the narrator’s physical 
transformation are woven in. By describing what a “normal” metamorphosis would 
entail, the passage informs readers that metamorphosis is a common phenomenon 
in the fictional world. The narrator describes the experience of learning to taste 
different flavors in river water, speculating about their correlation with chemical 
structures. 
Imago’s narrator Jodahs, a Human-Oankali hybrid, is overwhelmed by the 
instrumental precision with which his body detects the detail of his environment. 
This sensitivity also applies to his social life: he develops an acute sensitivity for 
other people’s bodily states. What he senses is explained in terms of biochemistry: 
however, the overall effect of the first person narration is that of exceptional 
empathy. Jodahs enjoys his connection to others, needs it more than anything: for 
him, a prolonged solitude can be literally fatal. Throughout the trilogy, Butler 
develops a model of relational and material subjectivity in which every move made 
by and individual body connects it to myriad other bodies – both genetically related 
and environmentally or metabolically relevant. 
The flip side of genetic and environmental accidents, the randomness of 
mutation, is design. Biotechnology – selective breeding, genetic engineering, and 
other modifications to biological creatures – has been the stuff of science fiction 
since its beginning. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and H. G. Wells’s The Island of 
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Doctor Moreau (1896) set the ambivalent tone that lives on in the biopunk of today: 
the ability to use science and technology to modify living beings is presented as 
both marvelous and terrifying. Biotechnology is intimately connected to the 
interlinked themes of reproduction and labor. In Lois McMaster Bujold's Falling Free 
(1988), for example, a new breed of four-handed humans is developed in an orbital 
production plant as workers for industries operating in zero gravity. The first 
generation of Homo quadrimanus, or “quaddies,” are property to the corporation, 
but as they reach adolescence and begin having children of their own, they rise 
against the corporation in a genuine socialist revolution encouraged and organized 
by the lead engineer of the production plant. In Peter Watts’s Blindsight (2006) and 
Echopraxia (2014), the theme of space-faring workers is brought to the 21st 
century as specialized professionals, such as researchers and military experts, are 
required by their employers to radically extend and amplify their bodily capacities 
through prostheses and modifications. Watts’ narration evokes the posthuman 
subjectivity of these “bleeding-edgers” through first person accounts of their 
technologically enhanced sensory experiences. 
The themes of sovereignty and class consciousness are almost always 
present in stories about artificial people. It is well worth remembering that the word 
robot derives from the Czech word signifying “hard work” or “slavery.” The topics 
of breeding and forced bodily labor also highlight the proximity between artificial 
people and the other species subjected to human economies: factory-farmed 
animals, animal test subjects, and the horses and dogs used in sports and certain 
trades. Rising topics are the use of animal/clone bodies for pharmaceutical 
purposes, explored recently in Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam series (2003–
2013) and Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005). The possibility of a synthetic 
yet autonomous organic life is imagined in Rudy Rucker’s Postsingular (2007) and 
Hylozoic (2009), as well as in Jeff VanderMeer’s Borne (2017).37 
Sometimes, most often in works with transhumanist themes such as Bruce 
Sterling’s Schismatrix (1985) or the “Culture” novels of Iain M. Banks, body-
                                                 
37 These themes are discussed in section 4.2 in connection to Paolo Bacigalupi’s novel 
The Windup Girl (2009). 
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modification is presented as voluntary and enjoyable, as part of individualist and 
late capitalist identity play. Pat Cadigan’s short story “The Girl-Thing That Went Out 
for Sushi” (2012) takes the theme of non-binary identification from gender to 
species by portraying space-dwelling people who have chosen to live their lives in 
various marine-life body designs, that is, they have “gone out for sushi.” 
I didn't choose octo – back then, surgery wasn't as advanced and nanorectics 
weren't as commonplace or as programmable, so you got whatever the doctors 
thought gave you the best chance of a life worth living. I wasn't too happy at first 
but it's hard to be unhappy in a place this beautiful, especially when you feel so 
good physically all the time. 
It was somewhere between three and four J-years after I turned that people 
could finally choose what kind of sushi they went out for, but I got no regrets. Any 
more. I've got it smooth all over. 
Only I don't feel too smooth listening to two-steppers chewing the air over 
things they don't know anything about and puking up words like abominations, 
atrocities, and sub-human monsters. One news program even runs clips from 
the most recent re-make of The Goddam Island Of Fucking Dr. Moreau. Like 
that's holy writ or something. I can't stand more than a few minutes before I take 
my kribble into my bolthole, close the hatch, and hit sound-proof. 
A little while later, Glynis beeps. "You know how 'way back in the extreme 
dead past, people in the Dirt thought everything in the universe revolved around 
them?" She pauses but I don't answer. "Then the scope of human knowledge 
expanded and we all know that was wrong." 
"So?" I grunt. 
"Not everybody got the memo," she says. (Cadigan 2012, 8–9) 
Cadigan’s short story evokes many layered meanings attached to mutant bodies: 
sex correction operations, modifications for life in space, and the conservative 
prejudice against new kinds of bodies and identities. Explicitly signaling its genre-
consciousness, the narrative refers to The Island of Dr. Moreau as a cultural staple 
of the fear of monstrous others. 
In light of the many technosystemic entanglements articulated by these 
works of fiction, we might consider mutants as a special case of cyborgs: they, too, 
challenge the boundaries of humanity, and the dichotomies between natural and 
cultural, biological, and technological. They foreground the interconnectivities and 
interdependencies of bodies (animate and inanimate) and systems (ecological, 
social, and technological). Even when they are “freaks of nature,” products of 
genetic accidents rather than technological intervention, mutants are entangled 
with industrial and postindustrial environments. The Homo Gestalt of Theodore 
Sturgeon’s More Than Human (1953), for example, form a collective 
  113 
superorganism. The operational structure of the organism is likened to a radio 
station with four or five individual receivers, and to an all-purpose electric motor. 
Similarly, Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio (1999) and Darwin’s Children (2003) 
imagine an epidemic of strange births, connected to a systemic shift in the 
planetary environment, resulting in an emergence of a new clade, Homo sapiens 
novus. These works of fiction mobilize ideas from systems biology, considering 
individual mutations as parts of a wider evolutionary and ecosystemic change – 
which, in both cases, is connected to the effects of human activity in the biosphere. 
In the fiction of the 20th and the 21st centuries, even the most biological of mutants 
are linked to the technosphere. 
Like cyborgs, mutants thus thematize the coding and programming living 
bodies – biotechnology, in the broadest sense of the word. However, the mutant 
figure is not only about humans and their genetic essence, but also about other 
species and processes: about symbiosis, hybridity, other others and strange 
strangers. The mutant shows how human bodies as partly constituted by 
nonhuman entities, as exemplified by the significance of microbes in Bruce 
Sterling's Schismatrix (1985) and in Joan Slonczewski's Brain Plague (2000). 
Mutant bodies contain strange actors: viruses, bacteria, cancerous growth, 
genetic material from birds, fish, and mammals – and, as in Octavia E. Butler's 
fiction, extraterrestrial material. 
In this brief overview, I have introduced the themes central to my discussion 
of mutant figures: the shifting boundaries of human and nonhuman bodies, freakish 
embodiment and deviant subjectivities, genetics and evolution, and entanglements 
of both technological and ecological varieties. In sum, the science fictional 
genealogy of mutant figures provides rich soil for new variations of the figure. The 
genealogy also informs and enriches readerly engagements with mutant figures, 
old or new. I will now discuss how the experience of encountering mutant figures 
is related to narratological theories of reading characters. 
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Mutant Figures and Character Theory 
 
In the above sections, I have used the term mutant figures, not mutant characters. 
This choice is intentional and grounded on the problematic limitations set by the 
term character. While the term suffices in discussions with nonacademic 
audiences, the specific context of narratology weighs it down with humanist and 
idealist connotations that would guide my readings to search the fiction for 
individuality, complex interiority, and embeddedness in primarily social and societal 
– that is, interhuman – networks of meaning. 
Any introduction to character theory will most likely begin with the mimetic 
statement that characters are “fictional representations of humans” or the 
structuralist statement that they are “human-like textual constructs.” Uri Margolin’s 
(2007, 66) concise definition balances both aspects: “‘character’ designates any 
entity, individual or collective – normally human or human-like – introduced in a 
work of narrative fiction.” What “human or human-like” actually entails could be 
considered as one of the foundational questions of studies of literature and 
narrative and the core of countless literary analyses, but, on the other hand, the 
question is rarely discussed as such. Postcolonial critics, such as James (2015), 
have argued that the narratological notion of mimesis assumes a particular kind of 
reality; and posthumanist critique could well argue that it also assumes a particular 
kind of human. 
Laying the grounds for a posthumanist theory of character, Essi Varis 
(2019b) argues that both narratologists and lay readers tend to consider 
characters as mimetic representations of humans even when the characters’ 
features would point to nonhuman or purely fantastic directions, as when 
encountering fictional figures that are introduced as animal, extraterrestrial, or 
computational. The humanizing tendency is widely shared by readers, as human 
readers are inclined to find human resonance even in radically antimimetic and/or 
nonhuman fictional entities. For Varis, this tendency is amplified by the fact that for 
most people, sociality is limited to interaction with other humans (often much like 
themselves), and thus 
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most of our everyday thinking is filtered through several layers of assumptions 
about what matters to this specific species . . . humans tend to write fiction about 
humans for human readers, because all these human readers are likely 
interested in the ways other humans experience their human condition. (Varis 
2019b, 3) 
This human-centered feedback loop, for me as well as for Varis, is the proper 
context for theorizing fictional characters. It is not that the human-centeredness of 
fiction is necessarily and permanently the natural state for humans – rather, it is the 
model most consistently amplified by the lived environments of humans concerned 
with fiction. 38  Lived experience, including the lived experience of fiction, is 
accumulated through enacting patterns of care and interest (see Colombetti 2014, 
Maiese 2015), and for most humans who read fiction, human sociality is at the 
center of these patterns. As has been argued by scholars of the Anthropocene, 
this situation, particular to rich countries, is an effect of the material organization of 
energy and matter that separates human consumption from more-than-human 
production (Salminen and Vadén 2013, LeMenager 2014, Clark 2015). In a 
hypothetical ecocentric or posthumanist culture, habitual patterns of care and 
interest would perhaps engage other species and nonhuman materialities more 
explicitly, and thus the feedback loops would be altered as well.39 
Not surprisingly, in the humanities the human-centric feedback loop is even 
more effective than elsewhere. Literary theorists are humanists par excellence, as 
storytelling is generally understood as the most human endeavor there is. This is 
also the context in which the particular, human-centric and realist notion of 
mimesis is developed. In most influential narrative theories, mimesis roughly 
accounts for the recognition of human behavior, emotion, action, and social 
contexts, and narrativity stands for “mediated human experientiality” (Fludernik 
1996, 9, 26). Thus, one dominant idea in narrative theory is that literature 
                                                 
38  Polvinen and Sklar (forthcoming) argue that “particular metaphorical structures of 
anthropomorphism, naturalization and belief” also dominate the language and approaches 
used in discussions of literature, whether in homes, schools, or voluntary reading groups. 
They point out that there is little popular vocabulary by which to describe one’s 
engagement with the synthetic aspects of narratives, and suggest that cognitive literary 
theory can play a role in providing that vocabulary. See also Polvinen (2016, 2017). 
39 For such hypothetical cultures in speculative fiction, see e.g. Ursula K. Le Guin’s Always 
Coming Home (1985) or Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy (1992–1996). 
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represents social life, and that it is encountered and understood with the help of 
the same cognitive dynamics that are central to understanding the operations of 
real people. Blakey Vermeule (2010, 7), in her Why Do We Care About Literary 
Characters?, goes particularly far along this path, claiming that “most stories are 
gossip literature.” By “gossip literature,” she means “any insightful or exposing tale 
about other people in which the insight doesn’t necessarily put the other people in 
the best light” (Vermeule 2010, 7). Building on the work of Dorrit Cohn (1999), 
Vermeule (2010, 14) goes on to argue that gaining social information (even about 
fictional people) is the main reward of reading fiction, and as a side gain, readers 
end up practicing their mind-reading skills.40 
While Vermeule’s humanizing approach is not uncritically shared by 
narratologists at large, as the research tradition is built on the foundations of 
structuralism and thus tends to consider all elements of narrative, (including 
character, as textual constructs with specific functions,) the underlying 
assumptions guiding theories of character tend to be anthropomorphic (see 
Jannidis 2012; Polvinen and Sklar forthcoming). This anthropomorphism not only 
foregrounds the human subject, but does so in the specific sense of equating 
human subjectivity with minds, consciousness, and social meaning, thus 
downplaying the materiality and more-than-human relationality of human bodies. 
This anthropomorphic bias is naturalized to the extent that even work that 
explicitly critiques it can inadvertedly support it. Unnatural narratology, for example, 
has experimented with applying the cognitive reasoning of Fludernik’s (1996) 
natural narratology to works that “radically deconstruct the anthropomorphic 
narrator, the traditional human character, or real-world notions of time and space” 
(Alber 2009, 80). While the unnatural approach initially challenges the “mimetic 
bias” of narrative studies (Alber 2009, 79), it eventually reasserts it by means of 
inversion: as nonhuman characters are “antimimetic,” mimesis “naturally” refers 
an imitation of reality in a realist mode (Pettersson 2012) and, more specifically, to 
the imitation of interhuman sociality (Varis 2019b, 4). On the other hand, in 
                                                 
40 The humanizing stance is also common in empirical studies on narrative and empathy 
(see e.g. Hakemulder, 2000, Kidd & Castano, 2013; for a critique, see Keen 2007) and 
rhetorical ethics (see e.g. Nussbaum 1990, Sklar 2013). 
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cognitive approaches that focus on the nonhuman and the limits of human 
cognition, anthropomorphism is viewed as only one possible strategy for 
representing nonhuman experience (see Bernaerts et al. 2014, Caracciolo 2014a, 
2016, Herman 2019, Pettersson 2016). 
For a posthumanist reader, this discussion offers a particular kind of 
challenge: what kind of fictional beings, actions, and perceptions are recognized 
as “human”? I propose that what is prereflectively set as “natural” and “familiar” in 
character theories is the particular experiential realm of modern, Western, 
humanist, intersubjective sociality. Most theories of character do not account for 
readerly experiences in which the reader would be comfortable with, to give a few 
examples, magical thinking (see James 2015, Clark 2015), cybernetic 
entanglements with technology (see Hayles 2018), or communication with 
nonhuman entities (see Abram 1996). They only cover the rationalist humanist 
mode of perceiving reality, which they portray as the “natural” one. Rosemary 
Jackson, in her 1981 defense of the fantastic imagination, concisely articulates this 
argument: 
’Character’ is itself an ideological concept, produced in the name of a ’realistic’ 
representation of an actual, empirically verifiable reality outside the literary text. 
Realism, as an artistic practice, confirms the dominant ideas of what constitutes 
this outside reality, by pulling it into place, organizing and framing it through the 
unities of the text. It presents its practice as a neutral, innocent and natural one, 
erasing its own artifice and construction of the ’real’. ’Character’ is one of the 
central pivots of this operation. (Jackson 1981, 83) 
Herein lies the trouble I have with the term character. It asks us to play along in a 
certain kind of construction of reality, in which reality (both social and material) is 
“out there,” to be accessed and described by both perception and fiction through 
a mode of realist mimetic referentiality. As Jackson points out, this is not a neutral 
practice but a naturalizing strategy that constructs a particular mode of perception. 
Both the concept and the narratological context of character are inherently 
anthropocentric and bound to a naturalized understanding of realism. 
The term figure, on the other hand, allows me to move these 
anthropocentric and realist assumptions into the background.41 My use of the term 
                                                 
41 Unlike most narratologists, I do not make a strict difference between character and first-
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should not be associated with the structuralist-semiotic usage (Greimas 1973) but 
rather with the posthumanist feminist figuration (Haraway 1992, 1997, 2008, 
Braidotti 2002, 2013, Bastian 2006, Neimanis 2017, see 2.1).42 For Haraway 
(1997, 23) “a figure embodies shared meanings in stories that inhabit their 
audiences.” The notion of stories inhabiting their audiences, rather than vice versa, 
sits well with the performative enactivist mode of reading I develop here. In reading, 
figures are incorporated by readerly bodies. What distinguishes figuration from 
figure, in my interpretation of Haraway, is the inclusion of a context, such as the 
appearance of the cyborg in both fictional and documentary works drawing on 
cyberpunk aesthetics, or the entanglement of the lab mouse in the material-
semiotic networks of scientific experimentation and animal rights. 
Figure connotes three aspects of narrative experientiality that I find 
particularly interesting: the material force of fictional bodies, that is, the affective 
and perceptual impact they have on our reading bodies; figures as particular, 
recurring textual patterns in the whole of the narrative; and figures as habitual 
patterns of readerly engagement. Thus, figure allows me to analyze mutant 
narratives in ways that develop more-than-human and enactivist perspectives. 
Moreover, as I explain below in more detail, the term is better suited for analyzing 
fictional actors who do not evoke illusions of deep and complex psyches. In the 
readings of Paolo Bacigalupi’s fiction in sections 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2, I will focus 
primarily on the ways in which mutant narratives invite me to enact the material 
and bodily movements of mutant figures and thus temporarily reorganize the 
habitual patterns of my perception, attention, and feeling. I claim that this enactive 
dynamic both amplifies and reconfigures conventional experiential patterns of 
                                                 
person narrator. In the phenomenology of reading, different techniques of narration – free 
indirect discourse, variable focalization, first-person narration – can give rise to the 
imaginative modelling of fictional people in one’s readerly experience. While it is difficult to 
make generalizations about all narrative techniques and modes, it is safe to assume that 
all of the above-mentioned techniques can effect the experience of encountering fictional 
figures that resemble actual bodies or people (and also used to confuse or counteract this 
effect). This is what matters most for the purposes of this thesis. 
42 It should be noted, however, that especially in her earlier work, Haraway (e.g. 1992), 
draws on the semiotic theory of Greimas, which is not quite as disembodied as the 
structuralist tradition would suggest (see Bertetti 2017). 
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readerly reception, and that Bacigalupi’s fiction encourages readers to reflect on 
their experiential habits of engaging with fictional bodies. 
 
Science Fiction, Realism, and Experientiality 
 
I have now established that character is anthropocentric and bound to a 
naturalized realist understanding of mimesis: the assumption that certain kinds of 
narratives faithfully represent or at least imitate reality. For many science fiction 
authors and scholars, fiction is far more integral to the constitution of realities, and 
as science fiction evokes life-like illusions much as realist fiction does, it 
foregrounds the process of construction (Mandala 2010, McHale 2010, Roine 
2016). No one has experienced faster-than-light travel or encounters with aliens, 
yet science fiction narrates those experiences for us in ways that make them, for 
the duration of the reading, plausible. 
As Pettersson (2016, 41–43, 51) demonstrates in his historical account of 
the concept, the limited understanding of mimesis as “imitation of reality,” although 
drawing on Plato, is quite recent, and the original Aristotelian notion allows for far 
more flexible relations between actual environments and fictional narratives (see 
also Kukkonen 2019, 13–15). A wider notion of mimesis calls for a discussion of 
the strategies narratives use to evoke illusions of reality. Science fiction narratives 
ask readers to continuously engage with these narrative strategies. They are able 
to evoke counterfactual worlds precisely because they make use of realist narrative 
strategies. These include character narration that emphasizes the ordinariness of 
the character; a view of reality from the perspective of an individual, full of 
historically insignificant details, and repetition (see Rossi 2012, Pettersson 2016, 
67–74). In terms of its form, science fiction is thus often indistinguishable from 
realist fiction, and the readers’ identification of it as non-realist depends on 
extratextual knowledge. 
Following Riikka Rossi (2012), I understand the Barthesian “reality effects” 
of realism primarily as cognitive effects that emerge from encounters with a 
particular set of narrative strategies. Realism, in Rossi’s view, produces a particular 
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kind of faith in the continuity of the storyworld and the experience – the kind of 
“natural attitude” or non-reflective stance often complicated by phenomenologists. 
The sense of ontological security is a primitive feeling; ‘basic trust’ in the 
continuity of things and persons is a psychological need of a persistent and 
recurring kind. It is because of this basic trust we believe that cars will not break 
down or suddenly leave the street and hit you on your Sunday afternoon walk. 
The reality effect activated in a literary text could also be seen to activate this 
‘natural’ attitude and intuitive belief in the ‘reality-like’ nature of the story. ‘Walking’ 
through a realist text presupposes a certain non-reflective view. (Rossi 2012, 123, 
see also Giddens 1990, 97–98) 
In the context of Darwin’s Children, such a “natural attitude” is evoked by character 
narration, also when the characterization includes “antimimetic” features, most 
significantly mutant embodiment. As noted in section 2.3, the plausibility of the 
teenage mutant Stella is created through realist techniques, and thus she fits 
perfectly well into the category of realist character. The realist techniques serve to 
evoke a “character-centered illusion” (Caracciolo 2016) that leads readers to form 
empathic bonds to the character, as if she were a real person with feelings, 
thoughts, and aspirations. 
The quasi-realist strategies of most science fiction rarely include formal 
defamiliarization in the sense meant by Skhlovsky (1917). The defamiliarization 
typical to science fiction is different from the defamiliarization typical to 
experimental fiction or poetry. The defamiliarizing elements of science fiction tend 
to exist on the level of storyworld rather than as formal devices. Thus, the effects 
of science fictional defamiliarization can be characterized as diegetic 
estrangement, in which the estranging effect lies in the strangeness of the diegetic 
existent rather than in experimental narrative form (Spiegel 2008). Mutant 
narratives are a good example of this convention: on the formal level of narration 
or focalization, there is very little innovation and thus very little of interest for 
traditional narratologists. Yet, due to the defamiliarizing elements of the storyworld 
such as strange and improbable bodies, the narratives are quite complex on the 
level of readerly engagement. This dynamic between conventional form and 
estranging content makes mutant narratives relevant to cognitive approaches to 
narrative. 
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Recent work in both science fiction studies and cognitive narratology 
discusses the dynamic between defamiliarization and naturalization as 
interdependent. That is, the overall experience of encountering strange worlds 
“only comes into effect after a successful naturalization [of the novum] has taken 
place” (Spiegel 2008, 377, see also McHale 2010, Bernaerts et al. 2014, 
Caracciolo 2016). In terms of experientiality, the narrative strategies of science 
fiction depend both on the evocation of real-life experience, or our personal 
background, and the complex readerly act of encountering and interpreting the 
defamiliarizing elements of the text. Reading Butler’s Imago, for example, we 
recognize the human aspects of mutant embodiment, but also make sense of 
strange Oankali sensations. It is also important to remember that real-life 
experience includes the experience of engaging with fictional narratives, worlds, 
and characters (Mikkonen 2014).43 
In light of science fiction’s complex relations with reality and realism, it is 
remarkable that science fiction also resists realist strategies by drawing on other 
traditions, such as pulp fiction, fairytale, and action adventure. This is apparent in 
the mutant figures that do not seem either to meet the implicit requirements of 
character theory or to evoke plausible reality effects. For instance, this is evident in 
the mutant youngsters of the X-Men franchise, or in the artificial bodies of Paolo 
Bacigalupi’s fiction, discussed in sections 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2. Such figures appear to 
be caricatures rather than fully rendered representations of actual complex 
persons, predictable in their actions and speech, in a single word deriving from 
early narratology, “flat” (Forster 1985). 
It is important to understand that the flatness of these figures is not a lack 
in characterization but an intentional stylistic feature. As science fiction author and 
scholar Gwyneth Jones (1999, 5) has underlined, typical science fiction does not 
treat characters as ends in themselves but as “pieces of equipment” that serve the 
                                                 
43  Despite his thorough conceptual re-evaluation of cognitive estrangement, Spiegel 
(2008) is not particularly interested in the readerly aspects of the phenomenon. After 
identifying the estranging strategies of science fictional storytelling as “diegetic 
estrangement,” he labels the effect on the audience as “just estrangement” (Spiegel 2008, 
376). This choice leaves ample room for further phenomenological and descriptive 
characterizations of estranging effects, on which I will focus below. 
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purpose of making experiential the societies, technologies, and natural worlds of 
their imaginary worlds.44 In some cases, this instrumentality leads to realistically 
constructed, humanist figures such as Stella – and in others, to the type-based 
and “flat” characters deriving from pulp fiction and adventure stories, such as 
Emiko of The Windup Girl (see also Mandala 2010, Jannidis 2012). 
I claim that all mutant narratives defamiliarize embodied experience and 
thus have the potential to effect embodied estrangement (see 5.1). Whether the 
defamiliarization happens via disability, superability, gender, race, or nonhumanity, 
no mutant can be read as a straightforward everyman character. This is what 
makes the mutant figure a particularly interesting trope for both posthumanist 
scholars and cognitive narratologists. However, not all narratives featuring mutant 
figures can be read as mutant narratives in the specific sense put forth by this study, 
as that specific sense requires a certain amount of conflict at the level of narrative 
strategies too.45 
As exemplary mutant narratives, I foreground the works of Paolo Bacigalupi 
and Jeff VanderMeer. They imagine life in transformed societal and ecological 
conditions, reaching for an understanding and evocative description of those 
conditions through speculative worldbuilding and defamiliarizing narrative 
techniques, even if they never quite get there. As in Butler’s Xenogenesis, both 
their thematic content and their narrative form are in painful internal conflict: they 
describe ecological interdependences as crucial to human and nonhuman life, and 
yet they cannot escape the traditions of human-centered thinking and human-
centered narration. In the next section, I discuss how this dynamic tension of 
                                                 
44  Jones’ analysis pays no attention to the many science fiction narratives in which 
perspective is itself part of this imaginative worldbuilding – the New Wave of the 1960s, 
cyberpunk fiction of the 1980s, and many contemporary works developing nonbinary 
perspectives such as Pat Cadigan’s “The Girl-Thing That Went Out for Sushi” (2012) 
discussed above. 
45 Of recent speculative fiction, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam series (2003–2013) and 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005) are not in fact mutant narratives in spite of their 
involvement with themes of animal rights and biotechnology. They engage in speculative 
worldbuilding, but only to the extent that is necessary for criticising current societies and 
ideologies, that is, they do not strive to describe alternative modes of life and experience. 
On the other hand, Rudy Rucker’s Postsingular (2007) and Hylozoic (2009) might be 
applicable. Rucker’s work might even be characterized as new materialist fiction, as it 
foregrounds the vitality inherent in matter itself. 
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human-centered narration and posthumanist themes participates in kinesic and 
kinetic sense-making. 
 
3.2 Kinesis, Kinetics, and Paolo Bacigalupi’s “The Fluted 
Girl”  
 
In Paolo Bacigalupi’s short story “The Fluted Girl” (2003),46 a fairy and a monster 
meet in a castle garden: 
The rich warm smell of greenery reminded her of summer, despite the winter 
season that slashed the mountains around the castle. When she and Nia had 
been younger, before their surgeries, they had run in the mountains, amongst 
the pines. Lidia slipped through the orchids: one from Singapore; another from 
Chennai; another, striped like a tiger, engineered by Belari. She touched the 
delicate tiger blossom, admiring its lurid color. 
We are beautiful prisoners, she thought. Just like you. 
The ferns shuddered. A man exploded from the greenery, springing on her 
like a wolf. His hands wrenched her shoulders. His fingers plunged into her pale 
flesh and Lidia gasped as they stabbed her nerves into paralysis. She collapsed 
to the slate flagstones, a butterfly folding as Burson pressed her down. 
She whimpered against the stone, her heart hammering inside her chest 
at the shock of Burson’s ambush. She moaned, trembling under his weight, her 
face hard against the castle’s smooth gray slate. On the stone beside her, a pink 
and white orchid lay beheaded by Burson’s attack. (“FG,” 28) 
From the perspective of sensory experience, the passage is built on a contrast of 
delicate, colorful elements and hard, grey elements: the orchids and the girl Lidia, 
compared to a butterfly; the stone floor and the man Burson, compared to a wolf. 
The hardness extends to the wider world, to the wintery mountains around the 
castle, whereas the gentle greenness of summer is only a memory, or a product of 
bioengineering by the castle’s ruler, Madame Belari. The metaphorical connection 
between the girl and the orchids is expressed in blunt exposition: “We are beautiful 
prisoners, she thought. Just like you. . . . On the stone beside her, a pink and white 
orchid lay beheaded by Burson’s attack” (“FG,” 28). As the girl and the flower are 
aligned in between the two-fold pressure brought on by the floor and the man, the 
structure of power is made outstandingly clear to the readers. 
                                                 
46 Referred to as “FG” from here on. 
  124 
This kind of metaphoricity is a typical technique in Paolo Bacigalupi’s fiction. 
The mutant figures in his works emerge as objects in the fictional worlds, and they 
are routinely compared to other objects. The figures rise from their background via 
affective and sensory cues such as the situated metaphors in the passage above, 
sometimes with sudden explosive force, sometimes carefully carved into existence, 
inch by inch. 
It is an often-stated claim that science fiction tends to literalize metaphors 
(e.g. Roberts 2005, Stockwell 2000). In Bacigalupi’s work, this technique is utilized 
on the level of character in a way that evokes both the somatic responses tied to 
realist description and the thematic interpretations associated with poetic language. 
Lidia, the protagonist of “The Fluted Girl,” is both literally and figuratively fragile: her 
bones, as well as her twin sister Nia’s, have been hollowed out and crafted into 
musical instruments – as the title of the story informs the readers, she has been 
“fluted.” The twin girls are also trained in the unique skill of playing their instrument-
bodies: 
Each note isn’t simply affected by the placement of fingers on keys; but also by 
how they press against one another, or the floor; if an arm is bent or if it is 
straightened. We froze their hormone levels so that they wouldn’t grow, and then 
we began designing their instruments. It takes an enormous amount of skill for 
them to play and to dance. (“FG,” 42–43) 
The physical implications of the condition of being “fluted” through biological 
engineering are described in detail throughout the narrative. Lidia is described as 
“delicate” (“FG,” 27, 28) and extremely fragile: “A gentle bump against a table and 
she was shattered again, with Belari angry at the careless treatment of her 
investment” (“FG,” 25). Her body is repeatedly compared to glass objects: “You’re 
like glass” (“FG,” 37), claims her friend, and later gives her a small hand-blown 
glass vial full of deadly poison. To heighten the importance of this imagery even 
further, Lidia’s parents are glassblowers by occupation. Literalization complicates 
the metaphor, as it brings up all the material nuances of Lidia’s fragile condition, 
and thus also invites readers to attune to those nuances by enactively imagining 
them. 
On a thematic level, Lidia’s fragility connects to her position as a weak agent 
in the social power structure of the castle. She is thoroughly subjected to her 
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master, Madame Belari, and any careless move she might make would cause her 
destruction. However, her position is not altogether powerless: she has value as an 
“investment,” as a precious object of craftmanship and training that promises to 
profit her owner in the future, and therefore she is allowed some small room for 
movement (she likes to hide from her master from time to time, and sneak out for 
brief walks outside the castle with her friend). 
Madame Belari is a character that evokes the evil queens and witches of 
traditional tales – a classic incarnation of corrupted power, and, in her tall stature 
and black figure-hugging body armor, she forms a contrast to the innocence of the 
pale elfin Lidia. As the plot unfolds, it becomes apparent that Madame Belari, 
despite her status as the ruler of the castle, is fragile, too. She is the property of a 
more powerful investor, and tied by the same chains of exploitation and protection 
she extends to her own subjects. Parallel to this development, Lidia’s innocent 
appearance is also revealed as a result of systemic operations, and a continuous 
performance on the part of Lidia herself. 
By exposing the fragility of Madame Belari and the performative nature of 
Lidia’s innocence, the narrative presents exploitation as a systemic rather than a 
personal evil – thereby opening up the possibility of upward social movement for 
the now-powerless Lidia, on the condition that she too adopts the ruthless logic of 
the system. The story ends on an ambiguous gesture: Lidia offering a lethally 
poisonous treat to her patron. 
 
Cognitive Metaphor and Corporeal Concepts 
 
In a castle governed by an all-powerful ruler, all subjects are weak agents: most of 
them have very little power to manage their own lives, and the positions of power 
they have carefully constructed may shatter in an instant. Their position is fragile – 
as fragile as glass. They also function as instruments in the schemes of the ruler. 
In creating a figure in which these two metaphors – the subject-as-fragile and the 
subject-as-instrument – are combined and literalized, Bacigalupi can effectively 
evoke both affective and analytical responses to the theme of concentrated power. 
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Moreover, the literalized metaphoricity of the “fluted girl” functions as a cognitive 
metaphor. 
In cognitive linguistics and philosophy of mind, metaphor is understood not 
as a mere literary trope but as a heuristic pattern or mode of thought (see Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 1999). We understand the functions and characteristics of 
things based on our understanding of other things. Our understanding of abstract 
concepts, in particular, is based on our understanding of material things and 
embodied experiences. The stock examples of cognitive metaphor theory, “Life is 
a journey” and “Time is money,” exemplify this dynamic: we use a more close-at-
hand frame to guide our conceptualization of a more abstract concept such as life 
or time. “Where do you see yourself in five years’ time,” asks the job interviewer, 
suggesting that we project our future life in terms of travel. “The detour cost us 30 
minutes,” comments a driver, conceptualizing time in terms of money. In the terms 
of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), we map one cognitive domain with the means of 
another. 
A formulation of the prevalent frame metaphor in “The Fluted Girl,” in the 
style of cognitive metaphor theory, would be “An individual subjected to an all-
powerful ruler is a fragile instrument.” The formulation shows how the 
social/societal conceptual domain is mapped onto the material/functional domain. 
The science fiction studies perspective further explains how the metaphor is 
literalized into a fictional figure and elaborated as a speculative biotechnological 
practice of creating the fragile subject. In Brian McHale’s (2018, 317) words, 
speculative fiction “typically proceeds by taking expressions that in most other 
contexts would be treated as figurative, and constructing or implying worlds in 
which those expressions make literal sense.” Lidia makes literal sense as a fragile 
instrument due to the science fictional context that constructs her body through 
her owner’s profit-seeking design and complex medical treatments. Despite this 
literality, the fragility of the figure also maintains its figurative aspect. This twofold 
understanding of metaphoricity is also at the heart of posthumanist feminist 
figurations (Haraway 1997, Bastian 2006, see 2.1). 
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While the basic logic of conceptual metaphor can be explained through 
formulaic descriptions, in readerly experience such metaphoricity is entangled with 
more holistic modes of making sense of human and nonhuman materiality. Such 
bodily sense-making draws on the wider dynamics of recognition and referentiality. 
As Lidia, the fragile instrument, moves around the castle, her kinesic style 
is reserved and careful. The verb most often used to describe her movement is 
“slipped,” as in “Lidia slipped along the dining hall’s edge” and “Lidia slipped 
through the orchids.” Reading these descriptions, I feel the cautiousness and 
reserve of Lidia’s kinesic style as an increased awareness of the sharp corners of 
furniture and the hardness of the floor. This is a mimetic mode of reception. 
Readers understand Lidia’s fictional body by comparing it to actual bodies, 
including the bodies of nonhuman animals and objects such as mice and glass jars. 
Mimesis connotes a referential relationship between fiction and reality.47 
But since the second generation cognitive framework sees phenomena like fragility 
as experiential rather than objective properties, the reality in question is necessarily 
experiential, and a mimetic relationship can only occur if readers already have 
experience of the worldly things evoked by the narrative. As a reader, I can 
calculate the load carrying capacity or the stress-strain curve of a piece of bone 
or a glass jar,48 but my understanding of the phenomenon of shattering breakage 
is still based on my embodied experience with fragile objects. In her work on the 
phenomenology of movement, and dance in particular, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
anchors this kind of sense-making to our capacity of self-movement. She argues 
that self-movement, beginning in infancy, gives rise to corporeal concepts: 
On the basis of these concepts, we forge fundamental understandings both of 
ourselves and of the world. We discover opening and closing in the opening and 
closing of our eyes, mouths, and hands; we discover that certain things go 
                                                 
47 In narratological discussions that draw on James Phelan’s (1989) tripartite model of 
character, the mimetic function is usually discussed in terms of the similarities between 
fictional minds and actual minds. What counts as “mind” in this context is typically defined 
through intersubjective and self-reflective modes of thought, emotion, and perception. The 
kind of bodily and material awareness I am interested in is rarely addressed outside the 
second generation cognitive framework. 
48 In materials science, the term used for materials that break without plastic deformation, 
such as glass, is brittle. I have chosen to use fragile instead, due to the broader range of 
social and emotional meanings it carries. 
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together such as a certain constellation of buccal movements and certain 
feelings of warmth – as in the act of nursing; we discover a differential heaviness 
in lifting our head and lifting our arm and a differential over-all bodily tension in 
the two movements as well. In making kinetic sense of ourselves, we 
progressively attain complex conceptual understandings having to do with 
containment, with consequential relationships, with weight, with effort, and with 
myriad other bodily-anchored happenings and phenomena that in turn anchor 
our sense of the world and its happenings and phenomena. (Sheets-Johnstone 
2011, 118, emphases original) 
In Sheets-Johnstone’s line of thought, corporeal concepts begin with moving one’s 
own body, and are only later developed in contact with other bodies and things. 
Self-movement is also at the base of understanding qualia such as fragility, as we 
learn about the material qualities of our environments through bodily engagement 
with them.49 Sheets-Johnstone’s thinking is very close to Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1999) embodied concepts, and to the logic of generalization inherent in it – 
“certain things go together,” as when opening one’s mouth gives rise to a general 
embodied concept of opening. 
This kind of anchoring and recognition is not properly metaphorical, at least 
not in the meaning employed by cognitive metaphor theory, as it does not map 
meanings across cognitive domains. Rather, it extends meaning within one 
cognitive domain – material happenings and phenomena, opening of mouths to 
opening of doors, for example. For enactivist thinkers as well as Sheets-Johnstone, 
recognition is tied to the skilled actions of animate organisms, and it is discussed 
in phenomenological terms, as an action performed by the whole living body rather 
than just by the neurological system. While Sheets-Johnstone’s work provides the 
general phenomenological basis necessary to the consideration of embodied 
concepts, tying them to our engagements with literature requires theoretical tools 
specifically tuned to the task. 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 See critique of the “Mary in the black and white room” thought experiment in Sheets-
Johnstone 2011, 141–149. 
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Bodily Movement, Kinesis and Kinetics 
 
For Terence Cave (2016), imagination of fictional movement is connected to the 
capacity for identifying and understanding living organisms. What makes a literary 
description of someone performing a bodily gesture “come to life” in reading is due 
to the fact that “the ‘imagination of movement’ is not some symbolic or figurative 
effect, operating reflectively: it is a faint but distinct echo in the reader’s own motor 
response system of what it takes in sensorimotor terms to perform a highly specific 
gesture” (Cave 2016, 29). Cave characterizes this kind of sensorimotor response 
as kinesis, or motor resonance, whereas Guillemette Bolens (2012) prefers the 
term kinesic intelligence. Bolens (2012, 2) also makes a clearer distinction 
between kinesis and kinesthesia: while kinesic responses pertain to the 
intersubjective sensorimotor understanding of other human bodies, kinesthesia 
refers simply to motor sensation: one’s knowledge of the movements of one’s own 
body. 50  Bolens builds her literary-analytical model on the basis that while 
kinesthetic sensations cannot be shared, kinesic intelligence is constantly 
communicated in encounters between people, and between people and artifacts. 
Bolens’s kinesic analysis of literary gestures aims at articulating the combined 
effect of all the literary means that construct kinesic meaning. 
A person’s kinesic style is perceptible in her idiosyncratic movements and the 
singular way she negotiates social codes and physical constraints, while the 
kinesic style of a literary work is experienced through its narrative dynamics, 
which, in relation to the reader’s kinesic intelligence, elicit the understanding of 
bodily events, shaped in language. Kinesic analysis in literature focuses on the 
exact means – narratological, lexical, syntactic, grammatical, and so forth – used 
in a text to construct meaning by referring to bodily movement and by triggering 
sensorimotor perceptual simulations in the reader via linguistic and semantic 
codes. (Bolens 2012, 28) 
Thus, if we analyze my reading experience in Bolens’s terms, my motor response 
system kinesically echoes Lidia’s careful “slipping” through the orchids, whereas 
my increased awareness of sharp corners when reading “The Fluted Girl” is based 
on my kinesthetic knowledge of how it feels to break a bone. Kinesis and 
                                                 
50 Kinesthetic knowledge can be either conscious or unconscious, depending on the 
moment (Bolens 2012, 2, Cave 2016, 40). 
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kinesthetics contribute to my understanding of what it could feel like to train to play 
one’s fluted body in complex choreographies with one’s equally fluted sister – a 
situation that, as such, is not part of any reader’s experiential background. In such 
a way, experiential traces of self-movement and witnessing the movement of others 
inform the imaginative enacting of strange, even impossible, embodied experience. 
Cave (2016, 29, 30) presents the kinesic effects of literature as 
intersubjective, suggesting that “kinesis should be understood as playing a 
fundamental role in mind-reading, in the broadest sense of that term,” and that 
motor resonance and mind-reading should be considered as “a single suite of 
responses [that] affords empathy.” Bolens (2012, 10) also explains that kinesic 
intelligence pertains to “interpersonal gestures and expressive movements [and] 
implies the possibility of intersubjectivity.” Both Cave and Bolens thus present 
kinesis as a mode for understanding the expressive movements of other humans, 
and kinesic analysis as an approach for making sense of such expression in 
literature and art. As such, kinesic analysis would pair well with intersubjective 
approaches to narrative meaning-making, and particularly well with Yanna 
Popova’s (2015) participatory sense-making, in which the reader’s enactive 
construction of meaning is discussed in terms of communicative interaction (see 
also De Jaegher and di Paolo 2007, Colombetti and Torrance 2009). Given the 
posthumanist orientation of this study, however, kinesis proves to be too limited. 
Cave (2016, 37) allows that “there is no sharp cut-off point between the way 
animals ‘read’ each other’s movements and the more elaborate performances that 
humans have developed out of that evolutionary adaptation.” Kinesic perception is 
a social skill not limited to humans, as all kinds of animals are attuned to perceiving 
the movements and intentions of other animals, and the skill tends to cross species 
borders. We know this from our shared lives with domesticated cats, dogs, and 
other animals with familiar styles of kinesic expressiveness. However, neither Cave 
nor Bolens cover the meaning-making processes that are based on the movement 
and feel of nonhuman entities which are remarkably different from human bodies: 
plants, rocks, machines, rain clouds, or drawn lines, for example. 
  131 
This restriction has two important implications. First, the concept of kinesis 
cannot be used to explain affective and meaningful encounters with actual 
nonhuman entities. Second, kinesic analysis does not reach beyond the mimetic 
understanding of fictional movement, into perception and meaning arising from the 
artifact itself, for example, from the dynamicity of drawn lines in a graphic narrative, 
the sensuous feel of words, or the rhythm and pace of narration. Kinesis thus 
cannot account for the way in which our bodily understanding of the behavior of 
fragile glass informs our understanding of Lidia’s bodily condition, or for the 
particular affective power of action verbs such as “shuddered,” “exploded,” 
“wrenched,” or “plunged” in our initial example passage. 
If we wish to discuss mutant figures such as Bacigalupi’s Lidia in terms 
beyond anthropomorphic mimesis, we need yet another term, couched in a 
posthumanist understanding of fictional movement. My choice is to appropriate the 
term kinetic – a term Bolens (2012, 10) employs, in contrast to kinesic intelligence, 
to describe the perception of “aspects of movements that may be objectively 
measured,” and Sheets-Johnstone (2011, 118) employs to refer to one’s 
understanding of one’s own body as a material thing. My use of the term carries 
this distinction between human-like expressive bodies and moving bodies more 
generally, but allows for perceptual movement over the human-nonhuman 
boundary. This movement is grounded on previous phenomenological and 
narratological work. 
Nonhuman entities and dynamics appear as meaningful in both traditional 
and posthumanist phenomenology. Denouncing idealistic aspirations for detached 
descriptions of consciousness, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002, xiv) views humans 
as “through and through compounded of relationships with the world.” Building on 
Merleau-Ponty’s work on language and perception, David Abram (1996) argues 
that a bodily approach to phenomenology encourages an animist experience of 
nonhuman bodies as animate, expressive, communicating beings. 
When we attend to our experience not as intangible minds but as sounding, 
speaking bodies, we begin to sense that we are heard, even listened to, by the 
numerous other bodies that surround us. Our sensing bodies respond to the 
eloquence of certain buildings and boulders, to the articulate motions of 
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dragonflies. We find ourselves alive in a listening, speaking world. (Abram 1996, 
86) 
Abram, following Merleau-Ponty, calls this mode of experience participatory 
perception, which bears a resemblance Popova’s participatory sense-making, but 
with two significant differences. First, Abram’s notion of participation extends from 
intersubjective sense-making to more-than-human relations; second, Abram does 
not apply his notion to literary analysis.51 Abram, writing in the mid-1990s, also 
does not draw on the enactivist framework but on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
and anthropological work on indigenous ways of life. Abram’s approach is, however, 
useful to the material-ecocritical argument I am constructing in this chapter, as it 
provides a bridge between kinesic and kinetic modes of perception. 
While responding to the swaying of a tree is distinct from responding to the 
bending of a human body, the two modes of perceptual meaning-making (kinesic 
and kinetic) definitely exist on the same continuum. This perceptual continuum 
goes both ways. I make sense of the movement of the tree through my kinetic 
understanding of weight, rigidity, and elasticity, familiar to me through my lived 
history as an embodied being in a more-than-human world; and this kind of kinetic 
understanding participates in the way I make sense of human movement, such as 
dance. Likewise, while I certainly perceive human gestures as meaningful and 
expressive, this kinesic mode of perception also pertains to my understanding of 
ominously approaching rain clouds, the vigorous growth of bean sprouts, and the 
gentle swaying of the tree. Whether this kind of perception is a case of animism or 
anthropomorphization is a topic of its own. For now we can merely accept that it 
exists, and that it informs human meaning-making – including the meaning-making 
processes relevant to the understanding of fictional movement and materiality.52 
                                                 
51 Abram makes the radical claim that in a modern society the animist tendencies of 
human perception have been harnessed into the act of symbolic sense-making – primarily 
reading. While I appreciate the stimulus of Abram’s vision of the alphabet as a system of 
magical symbols, this aspect of his thinking does not pair well with the enactive framework 
I am advancing in this study. The enactive approach does not concentrate on the symbolic 
level of textual signs, but on the experiential level of making sense of narratives. 
52  While the scope of this thesis does not allow venturing into the specifics of the 
perceptual abilities of plants, it should be noted that such abilities exist – and thus we can 
assume that plants, too, respond to each other and other worldly things through some kind 
of somatic and bio-chemical dynamics (see e.g. Mancuso 2017). My line of argument, 
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From here, it is not too far fetched to extend participatory perception into 
the realm of reading fiction: to perceiving and attuning to the movement of fictional 
figures and features. The current consensus in cognitive approaches to narrative 
is that both human and nonhuman characters are experienced through 
perspective-taking or empathy, even when the nonhumanness of the character 
would be estranging. This perspectival closeness is considered as 
anthropomorphic: “the empathetic simulation of the nonhuman character’s mind 
requires projecting partial memories of the reader’s own past, embodied 
experiences onto the nonhuman character, which both presumes and results in 
some degree of anthropomorphization” (Varis 2019b, 8, see also Bernaerts et al. 
2014, 73, Caracciolo 2014b, 123–132). 
With my discussion of kinesis and kinetics, I hope to demonstrate that the 
cognitive dynamic of attuning to fictional figures also involves aspects that can be 
considered more-than-human, and that we make sense of nonhuman entities in 
fiction through both antropomorphization and the kind of participatory perception 
described by Abram (1996). Part of our human experience is made up of affects, 
perceptions and judgments that we share with other animals and even plant life. 
We share with mammals a preference for warmth over cold, for example; and with 
green plants, a preference for certain cycles of light and darkness (see Abram 
1996, Mancuso 2017). We also recognize material and kinetic affectivity, such as 
weights and movements, and phenomena such as the glass-like fragility of Lidia’s 
bones. Thus, we don’t have full ownership of our human limitations. 
Moreover, our experiential background of encountering others is not limited 
to encountering other humans. We also have experience of encountering 
nonhuman animals and other entities, and our recognition of their particular forms 
in fiction is not necessarily anthropomorphic. Laline Paull’s The Bees (2014), for 
example, features a heavily anthropomorphized honey bee narrator, but the 
narrative also evokes affects and images that are characteristically beelike and 
                                                 
while placing human life in the larger realm of nonhuman perceptions and responses, stays 
with the perceptions and responses of human bodies as they engage with literature – but 
through the notion of kinetics, I will broaden the understanding of these perceptions 
beyond the intersubjective. 
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thus not cognizable through anthropomorphic appropriation, such as the 
descriptions of insect bodies. These aspects of narrative sense-making are not 
necessarily covered by the approaches that focus on storytelling and narrative 
structure: the recognition of forms and textures is usually not considered central to 
the narrative-theoretical enterprise. However, I suggest that material sense-making 
of this kind is a crucial aspect of our overall engagement with literary artifacts: 
making sense of a plot is not separate from feeling the rhythm and pace of narrative 
time, and making sense of perspective or character usually involves multimodal 
enactment of the kinesic style of the fictional entity. 
To return once more to “The Fluted Girl,” I suggest that Lidia’s bodily 
materiality can be read as both self-propelled (in the sense of Sheets-Johnstone’s 
phenomenology of self-movement and the notion of kinesis) and more-than-human 
(in the sense that it shares material properties with nonhuman bodies). Moreover, 
the short story foregrounds Lidia as an instrument for both Madame Belari and the 
author. For Madame Belari, the particular affordances of Lidia’s modified body 
open a chance for increasing her fiscal and social power. For the purposes of the 
anticapitalist agenda of the story, the fragility of Lidia’s bodily and social status is 
designed to evoke in readers responses of sympathy and horror, which can 
perhaps give rise to moral outrage. The material details of the descriptions of Lidia’s 
bodily movements and feelings amplify this latter dynamic. As I will show in chapter 
4, such an instrumentalization of material affectivity is typical of Bacigalupi’s fiction. 
To conclude, I suggest that the thematic interpretation of “The Fluted Girl” 
is dependent on the kinesic and kinetic modes of sense-making, and that those 
modes include more-than-human aspects that can be described in terms of 
participatory perception. While it is possible to read Lidia’s bodily fragility as a 
purely thematic metaphor for her weak agency, the intelligibility of this metaphor is 
based on the embodied and more-than-human aspects of cognition. Furthermore, 
by fully engaging with the material details of a fictional world as more than a static 
backdrop to human action, we can begin to articulate the manifold more-than-
human dynamics at work in science fictional narratives such as “The Fluted Girl.” 
Thus, through a combination of kinesis/kinetics and the qualities foregrounded in 
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science fiction, we can extend the human exceptionalist work of second generation 
cognitive literary theorists, such as Bolens (2012), Popova (2015), and Cave 
(2016), to more-than-human sense-making processes.  
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4 Readerly Choreographies 
 
The dynamic of kinesic and kinetic sense-making is also at play in Paolo 
Bacigalupi’s other work, of which I will focus on the short story “The People of Sand 
and Slag” (2004) and on the novel The Windup Girl (2009). On a more contrasting 
note to what has come before, I will argue that the mimetic recognition at play in 
readerly imagination is sometimes entwined with a recognition of artifice – the 
reflective understanding of fiction as a form of affective technology that takes hold 
of readers’ cognitive tendencies and twists them to its own purposes. This 
reflective understanding is tied to the entangled notions of artifice and artistry: 
works of fiction are deliberately artificial compositions of elements, and while many 
forms of fiction may hide this artifice (realist novels being a paradigmatic example, 
see 3.1), I argue that science fiction foregrounds it (see also Varis 2019b). Through 
performative enactivist reading, I argue that sustained engagement with the 
technological aspects of science fiction can develop this recognition of the artifice 
into an embodied and intuitive mode of experience. While this line of argument 
could be made with regard to other elements of fiction, I will continue discussing 
fictional figures and fictional movement in particular.53 
Section 4.1 considers the foregrounded instrumentality of mutant figures in 
“The People of Sand and Slag.” I extend my kinesic and kinetic analysis from 
reading individual figures to the wider dynamics of figuration (Haraway 1992, 2008, 
Neimanis 2017) and readerly choreography. These are ways in which fictional 
figures and figurations invite readers to reflectively enact whole kinesic and kinetic 
styles that are thematically relevant (cf. Noë 2015, Kukkonen 2019). In section 4.2, 
my analysis of Bacigalupi’s novel The Windup Girl demonstrates how a mutant 
narrative can thematize and instrumentalize figurations associated with stock types 
of genre fiction, and make experiential the exploitation and instrumentalization 
inherent in the novel’s particular context of capitalist biotechnology. 
 
                                                 
53 See Roine (2016) and Polvinen (2016, 2017) on fictional worlds and Varis (2019a, 
2019b) on fictional characters in graphic narratives. 
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4.1 Moving with the Figures of Bacigalupi’s “The People 
of Sand and Slag” 
 
Paolo Bacigalupi’s short story, “The People of Sand and Slag”54 is dominated by a 
techno-industrial milieu. The main figures rising from that milieu include three 
“tactical defense responders” that guard industrial mining grounds from intruders 
– usually by killing or “slagging” them on the spot – and one dog that intrudes. The 
narrative is systematically permeated by sensory language that evokes forceful 
cutting and slicing, starting from the introductory action scene where the security 
team in the flying vehicle first “cut[s] through the mists over the catchment lakes, 
skimming inches above the water” (“PPS,” 50) and then, against the safety 
protocols of the vehicle, rides barely above the surface of the “roughening terrain” 
(“PPS,” 50). 
Lisa overrode the computers and forced the ship back down against the soil, 
driving us so low I could have reached out and dragged my hands through the 
broken scree as we screamed over it. . . . Ahead, a tailings ridge loomed. We 
ripped up its face and dropped sickeningly into the next valley. The Hentasas 
shuddered as Lisa forced them to the edge of their design buffer. We hurtled up 
and over another ridge. Ahead, the ragged cutscape of mined mountains 
stretched to the horizon. We dipped again into mist and skimmed low over 
another catchment lake, leaving choppy wake in the thick golden waters. (“PPS,” 
50) 
The passage rolls rhythmically forward through a chain of short kinetic verbs in 
past tense: “forced,” “reached,” “dragged,” “screamed,” “loomed,” “ripped,” 
“dropped,” “shuddered,” “hurtled,” “stretched,” “dipped,” “skimmed.” The 
landscape consists of industrial wasteland described in poetic phrases: “a tailings 
ridge loomed,” “the ragged cutscape of mined mountains,” “thick golden waters.” 
The cutting and slicing of this odd terrain sets the tone of the narrative, anticipating 
the cutting and slicing of animate figures that follows later on in the story. In just a 
few lines, the narrative also constructs a dynamic juxtaposition between the 
protagonists and the terrain: their violent action, which so far includes nothing but 
simple movement in a landscape, is directed “against the soil” in a hostile manner. 
The whole setting is conveyed using phenomenological metaphors (Caracciolo 
                                                 
54 Referred to as “PPS” from here on. 
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2013) that convey the particular hard and harsh feel of the focalizing character’s 
experience but also extend beyond the narrative perspective to encompass the 
aesthetics of the wider storyworld. 
The flying passage mimics the thrill of an action film or a first person shooter 
video game, thereby producing a generic frame for reading. The setting evokes the 
genre-typical figure of the hypermasculinized action hero, complete with 
associated kinesic, kinetic and affective style and plot expectations.55 A team of 
problem solvers is on a mission, having fun while at it. Their hardened bodies are 
equipped with overtly fantastic techno-gear (“TS-101 and slashbangs,” “impact 
exoskeleton,” “bandoleers of surgepacks,” “PPS,” 49) and routine protocols for 
typical scenarios. The figures and the premise all play into reading the story in the 
context of action adventure or masculine cyberpunk, and into seeking the familiar 
affective pleasures of corporeal excitement and identification with a heroically 
capable, technologically augmented body (see also Tidwell 2011, 97). This reading 
strategy is, however, soon turned into a new direction. 
“The People of Sand and Slag” employs metaphorical figures and 
kinesic/kinetic effects in a manner very similar to “The Fluted Girl.” The main figures 
of the short story arise from the landscape as metaphorical caricatures, their 
kinesic styles echoing the harshness of their surroundings and their geopolitical 
and economic situation. Again, the complexity of the storyworld complicates the 
reading of simple genre-typical figures. Even though the overall effect Bacigalupi's 
text achieves is distinctly technological and military, the goal of the mission in the 
initial scene is not set up as patriotic or humanitarian: the fantastically equipped 
team of experts is set off by the “monotonous slopes” (“PPS,” 51) of the industrial 
wasteland they are guarding while ripping up its face. Despite their heroic air, they 
are complacent components in a techno-industrial machinery, programmed for 
nonchalantly violent border-control and bonus-hunting. One of the explicit 
                                                 
55  For theoretical models on how cognitive categories, schemas, prototypes, and 
stereotypes might function in reading (genre) literature, see Culpeper (2002) and Hogan 
(2003). While these theories draw on cognitive theories that are too disembodied and 
computational for the purposes of my study, they nevertheless have significant explanatory 
power. 
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motivations of the team's actions is saving up for the new “Immersive Response,” 
a virtual reality gaming platform on which they play war games. 
Ending the introductory scene, the figures plummet from the vehicle into the 
ground, smashing their exoskeletons and limbs into pieces. This is portrayed as 
standard procedure, with no emphasis on the demolition of their bodies. They rise 
from the ground and instantly heal. From this point onwards, it becomes 
exceedingly clear that the narrated bodies are as technological as their vehicle and 
equipment, designed from scratch to be regenerative and truly omnivorous: their 
diet consists primarily of the ubiquitous toxin-saturated mud and sand. One of them 
even explicitly declares: “We can eat anything. We're the top of the food chain” 
(“PPS,” 55). In the grim future of the story, the “food chain” is rather short, as there 
are practically no unmodified organisms left alive. Humans have completely 
adapted themselves to a drastically impoverished ecosystem that seems to consist 
entirely of ore, oil, the hi-tech gadgets manufactured from them, and the 
posthumans themselves. 
The posthumans appear to be content in their niche. In addition to playing 
Immersive Response games, they are in the habit of cutting and piercing their 
invulnerable bodies with trendy packs of blades and spikes. The presentation of 
these habitual practices modulates the initial action hero schema in a superhuman 
or inhuman direction, and suggests that the narrated bodies are part and product 
of a particular ecosystem. 
Whereas “The Fluted Girl” evokes and thematizes one central bodily feeling 
– fragility – “The People of Sand and Slag” generates a more diverse range of bodily 
feelings, ranging from the thrill of the initial scene to awe, disgust, and sensory 
numbing. Once again, these bodily feelings can be described as kinesic and kinetic 
echoes of bodily responses to actual material surroundings. However, in this 
section, I want to advance the argument that in addition to evoking kinesic and 
kinetic echoes, the short story thematizes the very dynamic of kinesic and kinetic 
imagination, and the way habitual patterns of bodily response participate in the 
formation of embodied subjectivity. It does so by using both familiarizing and 
defamiliarizing techniques. 
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Readerly Choreographies and Figurations 
 
The story draws attention to repeated actions: playing a game, eating sand and 
mud, casual modification of bodies, routinely checking the premises of the mine, 
and routinely “slagging” living creatures with the naturalized assumption that they 
are expendable. The routinized quality of such actions is communicated by way if 
using simple statements with no emphasis: “We ate sand for dinner” (“PPS,” 53); 
“After dinner, we sat around and sharpened Lisa’s skin” (“PPS,” 54). This is 
presented in a scene portraying a familiarized, even domestic night at the home 
base: “It was comforting to hear those machines cruising back and forth all day. 
Just you and the bots and the profits, and if nothing got bombed while you were on 
duty, there was always a nice bonus” (“PPS,” 54). For the protagonist, the rumble 
of industrial machinery is the sound of home. 
The everyday frame of the strange actions of the posthuman figures serves 
a twofold purpose: with its plain and matter-of-fact style and conventional narrative 
form, it invites readers to participate in the atmosphere of domestic routine. With 
its strange contents, however, it defamiliarizes that routine and leads readers to 
wonder how it is possible for the characters to experience such a life as natural. 
While readers are invited to adopt the position of a posthuman figure tranquilly 
eating sand for dinner, the experiential background of any human alive would prime 
a sense of estrangement.  
What makes this estrangement particularly embodied is that the narrative is 
bound by the experiential sphere of a posthuman figure. The narrative form invites 
identification with the numb and routinized figures, but a regular human body 
resists it. In such a dynamic, the close connection of bodily feeling and emotion 
becomes salient. As feeling bodies, readers live through echoes of bodily 
movements and rehearse the affective patterns associated with them. Through 
repetition, these affective patterns can shape the habitual movements and feelings 
of readers (Warhol 2003). According to Giovanna Colombetti, “kinetic portrayals” 
in visual arts and music 
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can effectively evoke specific emotions because they reproduce bodily 
movements analogous to those we often experience in our body when we feel 
the portrayed emotions - - - a piece of music that feels ‘angry’ (think heavy metal) 
arguably feels so because it mimics the kinesthetic character of anger, with its 
sense of bodily upsurge and frantic impulse to shake and kick. (Colombetti 2014, 
120) 
While Colombetti does not discuss literature, the point about kinetic portrayals 
easily extends to it. Moreover, the point lends itself well to the analysis of repetitive 
and genre-typical forms of replicating the kinesthetic character of feelings and 
emotions, such as the thrill of the chase scene or the evocation of sublime feelings 
in romantic nature writing, or in certain forms of science fiction and horror (see also 
chapters 5 and 6). The affective force of kinetic portrayals also echoes Robyn 
Warhol’s (2003, 24) notion of narratives as “devices that work through readers’ 
bodily feelings” (see also 2.1). Warhol’s performative model of feeling, along with 
the other cognitive-narratological work discussed above, describes the basic 
dynamic in what I would call readerly choreography: the experience of patterned 
bodily feeling, arising in enactive engagement with specific designs of kinesic and 
kinetic cues in a narrative. 
The notion of readerly choreography comes close to Karin Kukkonen’s 
(2019) designed sensory flow, which develops the second generation approach to 
literature and cognition by drawing on the framework of predictive processing. By 
this concept, Kukkonen explains how readers make sense of the text by predicting 
its flow and adjusting their predictions according to the actual encounter as it 
unfolds, that is, according to the sensory flow of the text. By the notion of design, 
Kukkonen distances her theory from the kind of cognitive literary theory that 
describes readerly engagement with fiction merely in terms of imitations or echoes 
of real-world experience. In designed sensory flow, elements of real-world 
experience are fictionalized, and readerly predictions of elements such as 
character action or plot events also draw from culturally established models 
(Kukkonen 2019, 20, see also Iser 1993). Whereas designed sensory flow targets 
the processual and temporal aspects of bodily reading, readerly choreography is 
more tuned to describing schematic and spatial aspects, such as the affective 
patterns, kinetic portrayals (Colombetti 2014) and kinesic styles (Bolens 2012) 
that particular fictional bodies afford to readers. 
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Readerly choreography thus aims to capture the sense of what it feels like 
to enactively attend to the bodily experientiality of a narrative as it unfolds, with a 
focus on reading singular fictional figures within their generic and environmental 
contexts.56 Drawing on posthumanist feminist theory, such affectively experiential 
narrative patterns can be characterized as figurations (see 2.1, 3.1). While 
posthumanist feminist theory often discusses figurations as “embodied concepts” 
(Neimanis 2017, 5), the term is also often used to refer to culturally established 
and mediated “knots” of meaning such as the cyborg or the lab mouse (Haraway 
1992, 2008). 
The notion of readerly choreography builds on enactivist theory by focusing 
on readerly experience as organized activity (Noë 2015), which is often habituated 
but sometimes, as in the case of reading “The People of Sand and Slag,” estranged 
and reorganized. Noë (2015) argues that art and philosophy can stop our habitual 
organized activities and display them to us. His primary example is the relationship 
between dance and choreography. While dancing is natural to as, as an organized 
activity we are “lost in,” choreography is designed to induce reflection. 
To stage a dance is to put into view this organized activity within which we are, 
by nature, embedded but within which we are, as we tend to be, lost. 
Choreography casts light on one of the ways in which we are organized, that we 
are organized by dancing. (Noë 2015, 14) 
A new choreography can thus make us stop our “absorption” in dancing, and make 
us consciously reflect on how it participates in our lives. Dancing, as other 
organized activities, is “level 1” activity, and choreography, as other artistic and 
philosophical practices, is “level 2” activity (Noë 2015, 29). Importantly, however, 
level 2 affects level 1 not only by affording reflection, but also by informing the 
habitual patterns of activity. Noë suggests that the existence of choreographies 
loops back down and shapes how we think about dancing, and thus how we 
dance, even when we are by ourselves or in our most intimate settings. In a world 
in which dance has been represented, it is not generally possible to dance in a 
way that is insulated from dance’s image, that is, from choreography’s model of 
ourselves as dancing. Watch people dance, and you see them perform; they cite 
and sample the postures, attitudes, steps, and styles that they have consumed. 
                                                 
56 Elsewhere, I have characterized the willing engagement with such narrative dynamics 
as becoming-instrument (Kortekallio 2019a). 
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It is as if their spontaneous, free, untutored forays into dancing are shaped by a 
culturally shared motion bank. (Noë 2015, 31, emphasis original) 
What I suggest about readerly choreographies is analogous to Noë’s suggestion 
about regular choreographies. I propose that all narratives, intentionally or not, 
suggest experiential patterns in which to affectively and corporeally enact them. In 
most cases, enacting these patterns feels natural, and as readers we “go with the 
flow,” empathizing with characters and immersing in the events. Readers “perform 
the moves” without realizing that those moves are informed by long histories of 
narrative production and reception, that is, a kind of “culturally shared motion bank.” 
Sometimes, however, a narrative suggests a readerly choreography that turns our 
attention to the affective and corporeal dynamics of reading. In my reading of “The 
People of Sand and Slag,” this turn occurs when I attend to the bodily feelings and 
movements of the posthuman figures. When the pleasurable thrill of imaginatively 
enacting the motions of action figures is disturbed and estranged, I notice how 
invested I was in that thrill. 
Thus, this prompting of reflectivity does not mean that readers would 
necessarily be disengaged from the narrative, or that they would cease feeling and 
shift completely to a disembodied analytical mode of reading (see also Polvinen 
2016, 2017). On the contrary, the kind of reflective engagement readerly 
choreographies suggest requires readers to feel with the narrative. 
While readerly choreography might also pertain to the experience of 
engagements with particular narratives and the kinesic styles of particular 
characters, I have coined the concept to better grasp the iterative experiences of 
engaging with genre-typical feeling and action, such as the excitement and 
pleasure of reading action adventure stories or the anticipatory dread that fills 
horror film screenings. “The People of Sand and Slag” is exceptional in the way it 
varies the familiar figurations of popular cyberpunk action, exaggerating the 
toughness and physical capabilities of stereotypical, technologically enhanced 
action heroes. This goes on until it becomes difficult for readers to continue to 
perform the habituated experiential moves of excitement, action-derived pleasure, 
and identification with the heroic protagonist. In other words, “The People of Sand 
and Slag” estranges the readerly choreography of popular cyberpunk action. As I 
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will show below, the short story further amplifies my estrangement by evoking 
bodily feelings of disgust and anger. 
Arguably, similar estrangement happens in engagements with many works 
of recent speculative fiction, such as the popular film series Hunger Games, the 
television series Westworld or Altered Carbon, and in action film and television 
more generally. Such fictions in various media tend to aestheticize violent acts and 
present human bodies as dispensable fodder for violence, taking this instrumental 
affectivity to such extremes that the viewers are bound to object. Westworld and 
Altered Carbon, in a tradition that has been circulating at least since the cyberpunk 
wave of the 1980s, also imagine bodies as temporary, exchangeable vessels for 
disembodied minds (see Hayles 1999, Vint 2006). In the logic of the storyworld, 
human bodies are included in the category of natural resources, to be shaped and 
modified into more interesting and fashionable products, in this case, 
hypermasculinized action figures. Staying with this logic of instrumentalization and 
the narrative strategies that encourage readerly resistance to instrumentalization 
opens the way to a posthumanist ethical reading of “The People of Sand and Slag.” 
 
Responding to a “Dead Dog Story” 
 
Bacigalupi’s short stories are particularly direct in their display of fictionality, and 
thus effective in inviting a reflective mode of reading. “The People of Sand and Slag” 
points attention to its affective devices, and thus thematizes the dynamic of kinesic 
and kinetic imagination. This is already apparent in feeling with the bodily action of 
the posthumans, but interaction with nonhuman elements – a dog and the soil – 
takes readerly awareness even further. 
As a counterpoint to the superhuman quality of its protagonists, the story 
provides an icon of vulnerability: a stray dog. The dog is miraculously found where 
the “enemy” was supposed to be, trespassing in the midst of the tailings mounds 
and catchment lakes of the mining area. The protagonists do not first identify the 
creature as a dog: they take it to be an unsuccessful “bio-job,” a bioengineered 
creature similar to their programmable sentinel centaurs. In her analysis of the “The 
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People of Sand and Slag,” Christy Tidwell (2011, 103–104) notes how it matters 
that the animal is specifically a dog, not a rat or a pigeon for instance: “Not only is 
it ‘man’s best friend’ and therefore an inherently sympathetic creature to many 
human readers, but it is repeatedly described as a thing unto itself, not created 
simply for entertainment or service.” For most readers, a dog is an animal that is 
not exploited or instrumentalized, and thus it stands in clear contrast to the “bio-
jobs.” In Tidwell’s reading, the dog represents the inherent value of life, nonhuman 
and human alike. 
The dog is thus offered to the readers as a sympathetic agent. The narrative 
holds the dog's fate in the air as the protagonists debate whether they should 
destroy it, eat it, sell it, or keep it. When they decide to keep it, the tension eases 
only to be increased again as the posthumans realize what hard work caring for a 
vulnerable animal is. For them, breaking a bone or losing a limb may be 
inconvenient if unplanned, and aesthetically pleasurable if planned. In this mindset, 
the dog appears to be poorly designed, and thus not fit for living. They end up 
roasting it on a spit and eating it. 
With the dilemma of what to do with the dog, the story extrapolates from the 
incessant metabolic, regenerative, and habitual processes of the posthuman 
bodies into their ethical capabilities. In the logic of the narrative, the posthuman 
subjectivities of the protagonists are enacted in repeated patterns of bodily action. 
In effect, the sum of their enhanced abilities is presented as a lack. As the 
posthuman figures are not partial to the repeated pattern of fearing hunger, pain, 
disability, and death, they have not developed the ability to assume the pattern in 
others. In fact, they cannot comprehend a reality where such fears are present. 
Despite or due to being invincible, the posthuman body is constrained by the 
practices of self-preservation and exploitation, and therefore it cannot connect to 
others. To highlight this, the narrative presents the posthumans “experimenting 
with vulnerability,” as Lisa, the only female figure in the crew, asks her fellows to 
amputate her arms and legs. As she lies on a beach, a torso already sprouting tiny 
new limbs, she looks at the dog and reflects: “This is as close as I’ll ever get to it” 
(“PPS,” 65). 
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This is where the narrative turns readers toward its own kinesic and kinetic 
effects, and to the readerly choreography that usually results in feelings of 
sympathy or empathy toward the characters. The actions of the posthumans are 
fantastically exaggerated: every move they make is either unintentional or 
intentional violence toward other living creatures or toward earth itself. By 
presenting the figures performing actions that would make a normal human reader 
feel pain, anguish, disgust, or fear – and evoking those feelings as echoes at least 
in the reading body – the narrative highlights the fact that these figures are 
incapable of such feelings. The dog figure widens the readers’ emotional distance 
to the posthuman figures: they are guided to feel sympathy toward the dog’s 
suffering and wonder about the callousness of the posthuman figures. Thus a gulf 
opens between the feeling body of the human reader and the fictional, insensate 
body of the posthuman. 
Donna Haraway has often foregrounded science fiction as a particularly 
fruitful site for exercising the bodily skills of reading and thinking. Haraway uses the 
acronym “SF” to refer to several overlapping phenomena: science fiction, science 
fact, speculative feminism, and speculative fabulation. In “The Promises of 
Monsters” (1992), Haraway refers to science fiction in two contexts: as a site for 
exploring alternative worlds and as a reading strategy. She invites readers to loosen 
their cognitive ties to normative conceptions of (social) reality and think “under the 
sign of SF”: the “science fictional, speculative factual, SF place” becomes a 
conceptual location in which monstrous others can become visible (Haraway 1992, 
295). In reading John Varley’s novella Press Enter, Haraway also refers to the “anti-
elitist reading conventions of SF popular cultures” as a potent method for political 
action: 
SF conventions invite – or at least permit more readily than do the academically 
propagated, respectful consumption protocols for literature – rewriting as one 
reads. The books are cheap; they don't stay in print long; why not rewrite them 
as one goes? Most of the SF I like motivates me to engage actively with images, 
plots, figures, devices, linguistic moves, in short, with worlds, not so much to 
make them come out "right," as to make them move "differently." These worlds 
motivate me to test their virtue, to see if their articulations work – and what they 
work for. Because SF makes identification with a principal character, comfort 
within the patently constructed world, or a relaxed attitude toward language, 
especially risky reading strategies, the reader is likely to be more generous and 
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more suspicious – both generous and suspicious, exactly the receptive posture 
I seek in political semiosis generally. (Haraway 1992, 326) 
Haraway describes the receptive posture of an SF reader in robustly corporeal 
turns of phrases – the SF “motivates [her] to engage actively” and to make the 
stories “move.” In this model of reception, the reader is both conscious of the 
fictionality and artifice involved in the experience of engaging with an SF narrative 
(“suspicious” of it) and able to “test their virtue” by generously accepting the 
experiential affordances it provides. 
“The People of Sand and Slag” is exactly the kind of SF that invites a 
“generous and suspicious” receptive posture. Sympathically engaging with the 
posthuman perspective of these action figures, going along with the readerly 
choreography it suggests, I for one am encouraged to feel the pleasure of good 
design: the rush of the vehicle, and the cut of the blades on the posthuman skin. 
This pleasure extends to enjoying the design of the story itself: its skillful 
manipulation of genre tropes, its vivid language, its grim imagery. The artifactuality 
of this fiction is foregrounded as a source of brutal aesthetic enjoyment. As Abigail 
Nussbaum (2008) has pointed out in her review of Pump Six and Other Stories, 
“The People of Sand and Slag” is blatantly a “dead dog” story: a machine that uses 
the cheapest tricks in the writers' technical manual, and does not even try to hide 
it. Nussbaum’s response, like my own, brings forth the story as an aesthetic and 
affective object, to be compared to other such objects. 
Even at the beginning of the narrative, the double take effected by the 
incredible landing crash of the posthumans invites me to doubt the affective powers 
of style and form: the power of vivid language and first person perspective to 
persuade me to adopt the implicit attitudes embedded in them. However, the 
exaggeration also draws attention to the artifice at play in generating affect, and 
gives rise not only to a double consciousness but an enactive double vision of 
fiction (Polvinen 2017). In other words, I feel the affect, yet I also notice how it is 
achieved through narrative techniques. To rephrase this in Haraway’s terms: I 
become suspicious of the narrative exactly because I generously engage with its 
“images, plots, figures, devices, linguistic moves, in short, with worlds.” 
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In reading the story, attention also takes hold of the technologies presented 
in the story – weapons, vehicles, videogames, and biotechnology. All technological 
production in the story follows the same logic of dividing the world into matter, 
which is considered only as a reified resource, and human reason, which shapes 
matter. As it manipulates the living flesh of its readers, the narrative itself can be 
experienced as a technological apparatus – and thus its readers are aligned with 
matter, the object of violence and utilization. While reading, I am affected by the 
story, sliced and turned and polluted by it, as the hills are sliced and turned and 
polluted by industrial machinery. As I go through the feelings of thrill, awe, pleasure, 
distress, and disgust, I end up enacting a wasteland-like state: the narrative 
exploits my tendencies for feeling with the narrative elements and adds insult to 
injury by doing it with clichés such as the chase scene and the dead dog. 
However, unlike the posthumans of Bacigalupi’s narrative but almost 
certainly like most of his other readers, I am a feeling critter with response-ability 
(see Haraway 2008, 19–27, 71). I am able to respond with anger and reflection, 
and object to the exploitative dynamic the narrative spins out. I do not want to be 
treated as inert matter, neither as a reader nor as a living body. Nor do I wish this 
kind of treatment for other living bodies or Earth systems. When I object to the 
affront of this dead dog story, I am also inclined, by the force of the narrative itself, 
to direct my critical gaze toward industrialized production of technological devices 
and action hero narratives. 
 
Dancing With Affective Devices 
 
In reading ecological science fiction such as Bacigalupi’s “The People of Sand and 
Slag,” awareness of the synthetic aspects of fiction comes to cultivate awareness 
of the synthetic aspects of embodiment and the production of bodies in a 
technocapitalist society. The narrative presents its own affects as material forces 
that rouse certain receptive postures – generosity, pleasure-seeking, moral 
distress, suspicion, self-reflection – and, through kinesic and kinetic experientiality, 
forms an analogical link between textual affectivity and the material-semiotic 
  149 
production of such entities as strip mines, video games, and invincible bodies. In 
this manner, the short story develops in its readers a material-discursive 
conception of narratives and other meaning-generating apparatuses. 
The fictional worlds of “The Fluted Girl” and “The People of Sand and Slag” 
both portray exploitative systems. Whereas “The Fluted Girl” functions as a 
caricature of a society permeated by the entertainment business, “The People of 
Sand and Slag” is a caricature of a society permeated by war and industry. Both 
stories take issue with the advancements of biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
drugs by presenting a rift between the individual benefits of certain treatments – 
invulnerability and picture-perfect physical appearance – and the societal harm 
they can do. Bacigalupi's stories thus articulate class consciousness as well as 
environmental concern, tying them together in the individual fates of their 
artifactual figures. 
Arriving at a systemic understanding can occur in a number of ways, top-
down thematic analysis included, but in my view the narratives themselves invite 
one to begin from the kinesic, kinetic, and affective responses described above. 
As an enactive reader, I have moved from kinesic, kinetic and affective responses 
toward constructing thematic interpretations. This movement activates my 
experiential background of reading science fiction. 
In this mode of reception, fictional figures are primarily encountered as 
affective devices, that is, artifacts that, in their motions and feelings, recreate types 
familiar from literary and cultural traditions (see Caracciolo 2014c, Warhol 2003, 
24). Enacting typical motions and feelings in reading the text, in turn, recreates the 
habitual kinesic, kinetic and affective patterns of response tied to these cultural 
forms: their readerly choreographies. On the level of motor response and affective 
attunement, readers live through (or enact) the readerly choreographies specific 
to, for example, the rebellious robot or the teenage mutant. During personal 
histories of reading, such choreographies are enacted countless times, and thus 
they stay relevant to and active in the embodied experience of readers. This 
enactive performativity plays a part in the constitution of embodied subjectivities, 
as theorized by feminist critics (Butler 1990, Warhol 2003). I propose that literary 
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analysis can take hold of this dynamic in an intentional, methodological manner, 
engaging with fiction through performative enactivism. 
In Bacigalupi’s stories, there is no such thing as a natural human being – 
every figure is produced in specific material-discursive processes. However, there 
is a certain nostalgia for natural humanity. Beneath the posthuman themes, 
Bacigalupi is a remarkably humanist writer: he writes about the advances of 
biotechnology and medicine in order to portray how humans lose their humanity. 
This chapter is very much about staying in that uneasy position: about being both 
critical of and sympathetic to humanism, and about attaching personhood and 
emotion to puppet-like fictional constructs even when we know they are tools. As 
Haraway has repeatedly stated, the crucial time and place for critical inquiries is in 
the middle of a crisis: she urges us to stay with the trouble. In this spirit, I seek to 
learn from these puppets. 
 
4.2 Instrumentality and Materiality in Bacigalupi’s The 
Windup Girl 
Out on the streets, she tries to blend into the daylight street activity. Mizumi-
sensei trained her to walk in certain ways, to accent and make beautiful the 
stutter motion of her body. But if Emiko is very careful, and fights her nature and 
training – if she wears pha sin, and does not swing her arms – she almost passes. 
(WG, 149) 
In The Windup Girl (2009, referred to as WG), Bacigalupi creates yet another 
creature constrained by her production history and social status. Emiko is an 
artificial person, genetically engineered to be an optimal servant, “pillow 
companion, secretary, translator and observer” (WG, 146). However, Emiko has 
been designed for environments particular to Japanese business life – formal 
meetings, rooms with climate control, courteous companionship – not for the 
tropical heat of Bangkok. She is also permanently marked as artificial with a genetic 
tweak that forces her to move in mechanical “stutter-stop” jerks and twitches. This 
gives her a particular style of movement, accentuated by her formal training as a 
“fine courtesan.” Hiding this distinctive style in her new, hostile environment 
requires her to take up certain techniques of the body – a local style of dress (pha 
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sin) and restricted movement (she “does not swing her arms,” as this would cause 
her body to display its characteristic jerks and twitches). 
Besides producing a particular bodily aesthetic, this modification is a means 
of societal control – as the “New People” are easy to recognize as artificial, they 
cannot blend into the social circles of “natural” people. With the New People, 
Bacigalupi creates an artificial slave class that illustrates the thematic tensions of 
his future society: the dramatic global transition to ecosystems constituted only by 
human-created species, the ubiquity of capitalist exploitation of human and 
nonhuman resources, and the desperate need to protect whatever is still 
considered natural. 
Removed from her Japanese niche and brought to the tropical city of 
Bangkok, Emiko has lost her bearings altogether: the climate is too harsh on her 
body and the culture too harsh for her education. Moreover, the protectionist 
agenda of the Thai nation will not tolerate her gene-modified foreignness. After 
being discarded by her former owner, she is classified as “invasive species” – much 
like genetically modified rice and corn, produced by multinational agribusiness 
corporations that threaten to destroy the few remaining domestic grains cultivated 
by Thai farmers. This cultural status constrains Emiko’s movements as much as 
her genetics do. She must be very careful not to betray her abnormal nature, as 
doing so would lead to her destruction. In the day-to-day realism of the novel, this 
condition is portrayed through Emiko’s act of constraining the jerks and twitches 
of her body: if she practices continuous control, “she almost passes.”57 
Reading descriptions of Emiko’s movements, I feel a nervous tension in my 
muscles. I become aware of my posture, of the ways I cross my legs and move my 
hand to turn the page, and of the potential audience watching my body. This tense 
awareness is amplified by other tensions at play in the novel: the personal worries 
of other characters, the societal instability, and above all the anxious anticipation 
                                                 
57 The theme of “passing for human” is typical to cyborg and android narratives, as 
analyzed by Koistinen (2015) and Hellstrand (2016). Fictional cyborgs and androids often 
wish to be integrated into human society, to be treated as ordinary human beings despite 
their apparent differences (e.g. A. I., Blade Runner, or the cylons in the 2004 adaptation 
of Battlestar Galactica). Bacigalupi’s Emiko thus employs themes that are relevant 
primarily to cyborg and android narratives. 
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of the promised monsoons. The monsoons pose both a promise and a threat: they 
might both ease the heat-stricken exhaustion pestering the city and break the great 
dike that protects the city from the risen sea level. Through kinesically attuning to 
Emiko’s careful movements, I get to participate in this complex material-political 
situation in which the whole society is, so to speak, on its toes. 
Crucially for the reading experience, this participation is primarily due to 
affective rather than emotional engagement with the character. Emiko is forcefully 
present as a set of affective descriptions of bodily movements and feelings, but the 
character is too flat and type-based to inspire what Caracciolo (2016) calls 
“character-centered illusion.” Hence, I fail to interpret her as a full-fledged fictional 
person, deserving of empathy or sympathy. Curiously enough, the flatness of the 
figure does not prevent me from feeling pangs of anguish and pain when reading 
scenes in which Emiko is violently abused, or from feeling pleasure and elation at 
the rare scenes in which she enjoys flowing water or freedom of movement. 
In this section, I discuss the dynamics of this apparently conflicted mode of 
engagement through kinesic and kinetic analysis, introduced in sections 3.2 and 
4.1. Discussing bodily feelings at the level of kinesic and kinetic resonance 
provides detail to the analysis of bodily reading, and helps to negotiate the 
boundaries between affective and emotional responses to fictional events. Kinesic 
reading also brings out differences between the kinesic affordances available to 
different kinds of readerly bodies. A female body, responding to a fictional female 
body, draws from a certain kind of experiential background not necessarily 
available for bodies of other genders. While this difference is not absolute or based 
on “natural” sexual binaries, it emerges in a way that demands to be acknowledged 
when reading the stereotypically gendered figure of Emiko. 
This gendered experience is, however, only one way of reading the novel. 
Kinetic analysis in a new materialist vein can develop gendered, human-centered 
experience into a more-than-human one. Kinetically attuning to the material 
aspects of fictional nonhuman beings plays a crucial part in this exercise. 
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Exploitation of the Artificial Woman 
 
Emiko is introduced as an iteration of an old pulp fiction type: the artificial woman, 
an object of sexual objectification, often figured as a puppet, an automaton, or a 
doll. Her first appearance in the novel is in a bar scene in which she is subjected 
to severe sexual abuse, which is described as an everyday occurrence. The 
narration of the scene, focalized through Emiko, is a mixture of violent affective 
cues and contextualizing reflection. 
Emiko moans again as her body betrays her. She cries out. Arches. Her body 
performs just as it was designed – just as the scientists with their test tubes 
intended. She cannot control it no matter how much she despises it. She comes. 
The audience roars approval, laughing at the bizarre convulsions that orgasm 
wrings from her DNA. (WG, 55) 
This passage figures Emiko’s body both as an object that “betrays her” and 
“performs,” and a subjective condition in which she “cries out,” “arches,” and 
“comes.” This duality of embodied experience is central to the novel as a whole, 
and it serves to highlight the instrumental nature of the artificial woman. It is made 
very clear that the audience or the woman abusing her on the stage do not view 
Emiko as a person, but a “piece of genetic trash . . . a toy for them to play with, to 
break even” (WG, 53). Through both objectification and the aesthetics of 
mechanical jerks and convulsions, the character drawn in the scene calls up visual 
memories of countless previous iterations of the artificial woman, from Maria of 
Metropolis (1927) (display of jerking movements) to Pris of Blade Runner (1982) 
(doll-like appearance) and Ava of Ex Machina (2014) (being on display as a sexual 
object), and countless encounters with dramatized sexual violence. 
Scott Selisker (2015) has noted that, in its treatment of the GMO theme, 
The Windup Girl “weds the effects of genetic modification to a logic of 
programmability . . . the novel treats genetics like a program that might allow or 
compel the body to do anything that a computer program might allow a computer 
to do” (Selisker 2015, 508). Selisker especially points out how the depiction of 
Emiko draws on the visual aesthetics of the human automaton, complete with its 
puppet-like, mechanical style of movement. In embodied reading experience, the 
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involuntary jerks of Emiko’s body underline the genetically determined aspects of 
her behavior. 
From the start, Emiko’s identity is narrated as conflicted between pride of 
her training at the Japanese “creche” and shameful anger at the mechanically 
sexual aspects of her engineered body. The training, the acculturation, is what she 
loses at moments of panic and humiliation: “There is no elegance or care to her 
movements now; the telltales of her DNA are violently present for all to see and 
mock” (WG, 54). In these moments, Emiko resembles not the masterpiece of 
Japanese techno-cultural ingenuity that she believes herself to be, but “nothing but 
a silly marionette creature, all stutter-stop motion – herky-jerky heechy-keechy” 
and “nothing but a wind-up” (WG, 54, emphasis in the original) – a mechanical toy, 
possibly even a broken one. Importantly, these insults are meted out in a chapter 
focalized by Emiko herself, forming a base for a narrative of self-loathing and 
callous self-objectification. Emiko is aware that she has been created for the 
purpose of serving as a versatile, sophisticated assistant, and the narration implies 
that her current use as a simple puppet is a mockery of that purpose. 
This conflation of the genetic and the programmatic also gives rise to the 
theme of “nature versus nurture” in the novel – Emiko is depicted as constrained 
both by her genetic design and her behaviorist training, and readers are left to 
wonder which influence dominates her actions. The conflict of these two influences 
is also present in the male perspective on Emiko. When succumbing to the spell of 
Emiko’s sexual attractiveness, Anderson Lake ponders whether his reaction is the 
result of Emiko’s successful design. 
He wonders if she were a real person if he would feel more incensed at the abuse 
she suffers. It’s an odd thing, being with a manufactured creature, built and 
trained to serve. She herself admits that her soul wars with itself. That she does 
not rightly know which parts of her are hers alone and which have been inbuilt 
genetically. Does her eagerness to serve come from some portion of canine DNA 
that makes her always assume that natural people outrank her for pack loyalty? 
Or is it simply the training that she has spoken of? (WG, 262) 
This basic paranoia about the possible mechanistic nature of erotic desire is at the 
heart of artificial-woman narratives. The “schizoid android” theme has been 
identified as one of the characteristic features in Philip K. Dick’s influential work 
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(Hayles 1999, 168–191). Rudy Rucker, in his early cyberpunk novel Software 
(1982), has captured the core of this patriarchal paranoia most lucidly:  
The sex was nice, but confusing. The whole situation kept going di-polar on Sta-
Hi. One instant Misty would seem like a lovely warm girl who’d survived a terrible 
injury, like a lost puppy to be stroked, a lonely woman to be husbanded. But then 
he’d start thinking of the wires behind her eyes, and he’d be screwing a machine, 
an inanimate object, a public toilet. Just like with any other woman for him, really. 
(Rucker 1982, 83) 
By creating such a time-worn iteration of the type of the artificial woman, Bacigalupi 
calls up a generic frame of reading the novel. The choice of figure is both cynical 
and transparent, allowing Bacigalupi to manipulate the affective responses of his 
audience without getting very deep into the ethical questions of exploitation or 
gendered violence. Anderson Lake’s wondering about “if she were a real person if 
he would feel more incensed at the abuse she suffers” also seems pertinent to the 
experientiality of the novel. If Emiko were a real person and not a fictional figure, 
would we still willingly and complacently read about her suffering? I do not think 
that this is not a question most actual readers of the novel would spontaneously 
pose. Awareness of the novel’s fictional status and narrative strategies is built into 
the style and logic of the novel in such an explicit way that it seems unlikely that 
anyone would mistake Emiko for (a depiction of) a real person. This does not, 
however, mean that readers would be unaffected by the stimulation provided by 
the presentation of the figure. On the contrary: the entertaining force of The Windup 
Girl is largely due to the corporeal thrills it affords. 
In fact, let me propose that the novel latches on to its readers’ capacities 
for feeling the thrills, making them aware of its own affective strategies and thus 
inviting them to reflect on the systemic production of affect. It shares this strategy 
of estrangement with the short stories “The Fluted Girl” and “The People of Sand 
and Slag,” discussed in the previous sections. In a reading oriented toward bodily 
engagement, the combination of affective style and type-based characterization 
translates as a peculiar feeling of being played by the narrative (see Polvinen 2012). 
Reading about puppets, I feel that I temporarily adopt the postures, gestures, and 
submissive attitude of one. Accepting this puppetry is a starting point for an 
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analysis of the novel’s gendered structures of feeling and the readerly 
choreography it offers. 
 
Kinesic Description as an Instrumentalizing Technique 
 
As discussed above, Emiko is introduced to readers in a scene in which she is 
sexually abused on the stage of a bar. Scott Selisker (2015) discusses the scene, 
arguing that by depicting a callously watching, objectifying audience, Bacigalupi 
redirects readers’ feelings of disgust from the genetically modified organism (Emiko) 
to the exploitative interaction effected in the act of watching (Selisker 2015, 512). 
While Selisker offers a reading of the objectifying gaze, a complete mapping of the 
scene’s affective force would include other senses besides vision. An analysis more 
attuned to touch and kinesthesia results in a different kind of interpretation of the 
scene’s affects. From a feminist perspective, it is also important to account for the 
experientiality of Emiko’s female body, in all of its stereotypical artificiality, and for 
the meanings emerging in a reading done by a reader grown into female modes of 
embodiment. 
The scene is focalized through Emiko’s feeling body, and it recounts the 
experiential details of her sexual humiliation, from the splash of cold water on her 
nipples to the forced arching of her backbone in the hands of her dominator, and 
to simultaneously feeling the restricting grip of the bar clients’ hands on her ankles 
and wrists and the dominator’s manipulation of her genitals. She “writhes, her body 
shaking and jerking, twitching in the ways that windups do” (WG, 55), and 
eventually climaxes, in what is described as “bizarre convulsions” (WG, 55). 
Reading such descriptions in a mode attuned to kinesic and kinetic 
resonance necessarily evokes mixed feelings, which are also somewhat dependent 
on the reader’s previous experience with both sexual acts and pornographic 
descriptions. Bacigalupi has primed the scene by describing the suffocating heat 
of the bar, and the unbearable perfection of Emiko’s oiled skin, “soft like butter 
when a man touches her” (WG, 51). The action of sexual abuse is punctuated by 
references to liquid running down this perfect, too-hot skin. While the passage does 
  157 
not read as purely pornographic – mostly due to the prominence of the distancing 
and contextualizing commentary from Emiko’s perspective – it does contain 
sexually arousing affects that play into the complex response. 
The jerking and twitching of Emiko’s body is construed by the narrative as 
estranging, as something an onlooker would watch as one would “an insect under 
a magnifying glass: fascinated, and yet also repulsed” (WG, 53). Emiko also 
detaches herself from these movements, in an act of forceful disgust at her own 
body. As mentioned before, this style of movement is familiar from earlier 
encounters with the artificial woman. In the classic genre film Metropolis (1927), it 
is precisely the mechanical, jerking dance of the feminine robot that drives the 
watching crowd of men into a frenzy. Still, from an experiential perspective, it is 
easy to relate to some amount of involuntary nervous muscular spasming during a 
sexual act. The reflexive jerking movements can be connected to the more forced 
attempts at achieving climax, and to the repetitive manipulation of erogenic zones. 
I would thus read the depiction of Emiko’s “inhuman” movements as an 
exaggerating caricature of the mechanical – perhaps stereotypically female – 
aspects of human sexuality. By depicting these aspects as strange and unnatural 
– not only to the audience, but to Emiko as well – Bacigalupi repeats the act of 
severing the sexual female body from the experiencing mind. On the other hand, 
the defamiliarization of the sexual body makes it more available to conscious 
analytical contemplation. 
The recognition of the bodily experientiality of sexual movement does not 
necessarily lead into a naturalizing reading of the scene. Rather, recognizing the 
dynamic helps one to also recognize the acts of fictional construction involved. 
Bacigalupi’s narrative plays with the experiential affectivity of sexual bodies, and 
uses this affective force to increase readers’ involvement in the fictional events of 
the novel. While the abuse of the artificial woman does not necessarily evoke 
sympathetic or empathetic reactions from all actual readers, it is bound to evoke 
at least some kind of affective reaction due to its kinesic and kinetic power. Perhaps 
the abuse only serves as entertainment of the “lower faculties” of the senses, while 
the reader’s analytic mind is already busy situating the scene into the larger plot 
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and thematic unfolding of the novel. Perhaps this analytic reader understands the 
abuse as the motivation for the character’s later acts of vengeance. These 
cognitive processes of detached deduction are not, however, separate from the 
kinesic recognition of bodily movements. Rather, I suggest that kinesic and kinetic 
recognition is integral to the interpretive process. 
After a series of passages highlighting the many limitations to Emiko’s 
agency, she begins to find capabilities of her own. These capabilities all circulate 
around Emiko’s desire for freedom – the dream of a village of New People, up North, 
and the means of getting there. On a kinesic level, this desire is realized most 
forcefully in the two scenes in the novel in which Emiko moves fast. The first one 
begins with walking in a crowd, practicing control, on a mission to find transport to 
the North: 
A woman selling Environment Ministry-certified sticks of sliced papaya watches 
her suspiciously. Emiko forces herself not to panic. She continues down the 
street with her mincing steps, trying to convince herself that she appears 
eccentric, rather than genetically transgressive. Her heart pounds against her 
ribs. 
Too fast. Slow down. You have time. Not so much as you would like, but 
still, enough to ask questions. Slowly. Patiently. Do not betray yourself. Do not 
overheat. 
Her palms are wet with sweat, the only part of her body that ever really 
feels cool. She keeps them open wide like fans, trying to absorb comfort. (WG, 
149–150) 
The passage underscores both the social and the material limitations of Emiko’s 
condition. In kinesic reading, the controlled slowness of Emiko’s movements takes 
central stage. She cannot move freely, fearing that she is found out as a windup, 
and she cannot move fast, fearing that her body overheats. Soon, in escaping an 
assaulter, both of these fears are dispersed: 
Emiko shoves hard against him and ducks under his flailing knife. Behind her, 
she hears a grunt and thud as she bolts for the street. She doesn’t look back. 
She plunges into the street, not caring that she shows herself as a windup, not 
caring that in running she will burn up and die. She runs, determined only to 
escape the demon behind her. She will burn, but she will not die passive like 
some pig led to slaughter. 
She flies down the street, dodging pyramids of durian and hurdling over 
coiled hemp ropes. This suicidal flight is pointless, yet she will not stop. She 
shoves aside a gaijin haggling over burlap sacks of local U-Tex rice. He jerks 
away, crying out in alarm as she flashes past. (WG, 155) 
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Kinesically attuning to Emiko’s movements, I feel exhilarated by this sudden 
explosion of energy after all the constraints and wariness. The motion verbs in the 
passage – “shoves,” “bolts,” “plunges,” and, after a neutral “runs,” “flies,” “dodges,” 
“hurdles,” and “flashes” – evoke a sense of muscular power being rapidly exerted. 
In this instance, the materiality of the body is emphasized in such extent that the 
kinesic and kinetic modes of understanding bleed into each other: Emiko’s body 
reads not just as human, but as material in a more physical sense. The use of power 
in contact with other material bodies on the street directly translates into a basic 
form of energy: heat. Being unable to sweat, Emiko’s body has no way of getting 
rid of excess heat, caused both by the surrounding heat of the dry-season day and 
her own exertion. After running into a passer-by and falling down, she finds her 
limit. 
She collapses. Pushes upright again, drunken, overwhelmed by the furnace heat 
within her. The ground tilts and rotates, but she manages to stand. Leans against 
a sun-baked wall as the man she hit shouts at her. His rage washes over her, 
meaningless. Darkness and heat are closing in on her. She’s burning up. (WG, 
155–156) 
The “furnace heat” within Emiko’s body “overwhelms” her, which is presented in 
the text both as changes in her perception (“the ground tilts and rotates,” darkness 
and heat “close in on her”) and lack of detail in the textual form (omissions of 
personal pronouns; omission of the words of the shouting man). The scene ends 
with Emiko losing consciousness. 
In the other scene featuring a fast-moving Emiko, she is figured as a full-
blown action hero. The narration takes time to focus on Emiko’s visual perception 
and reflections in a style reminiscent of slow-motion frames in action films – in 
which the hero(ine) is fast enough to dodge bullets. 
The white shirts are running for her – running full bore – and yet somehow, 
strangely, they suddenly seem slow. Slow as honey on a cold day. . . .  
The white shirts mouths open to shout again. Their spring guns rise, 
seeking her. Emiko watches their slit barrels zero in on her. Wonders absently if 
perhaps she is actually the slow one. If gravity itself will be too slow. 
The wind gusts around her, beckoning. The spirits of the air tug at her, 
blow the black net of her hair across her eyes. She pushes it aside. Smiles calmly 
at the white shirts – still running, still pointing their spring guns – and steps 
backward into open air. The white shirt’s eyes widen. Their guns glint red. Disks 
spit toward her. One, two, three… she counts them as they fly… four, five – 
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Gravity yanks her down. The men and their projectiles disappear. She 
smashes into the balcony. Her knees slam into her chin. Her ankle twists as metal 
shrieks. She rolls, crashing into the balcony’s railing. It shatters and peels away 
and she plunges into open air. Emiko grabs for a broken copper balustrade as 
she goes over. Yanks to a stop, dangling above an abyss. (WG, 284–285) 
Reading these scenes, I enact a particular readerly choreography. The swiftness 
and fluency of action, combined with the exciting situation, works to alert my 
senses in a pleasurable way. I enjoy Emiko’s control over the situation. However, 
despite the seeming simplicity of the pleasurable experience, there is also a great 
amount of habituation and mediation at play in enjoying this scene. The scene 
evokes bodily memories and schemas of the countless times I have settled on a 
seat or a sofa to watch an action film, comfortable and motionless while stimulated 
with vivid effects. I recognize the chase-and-escape scene as a staple of action 
adventure, and the act of jumping from the rooftop as a familiar motif in such 
scenes. The short descriptive sentences of Bacigalupi’s narration mimic the kinesic 
styles and fast cuts familiarized by cinematic action, and thus activate the 
particular experiential background supposedly shared by Bacigalupi’s readers. 
In comparison to the experientiality of “The Fluted Girl” and “The People of 
Sand and Slag,” the defamiliarizing techniques of The Windup Girl are less drastic. 
Readers are invited to enact the thrill of the action and the capability of the fictional 
figure, which largely stay within the conventions of action adventure in terms of 
their affective intensity. Emiko may move faster than bullets, and she may burn from 
exhausting herself, but these are staple effects. Rather than searching for 
estrangement in our kinesic and kinetic responses to the individual fictional body, 
we can consider Emiko as a mutant figure, that is, as a pattern in the larger network 
of readerly experience. 
 
Making Sense of Artificial Women: Essential Categories or 
Monsters? 
 
A figure such as Emiko that both thematically and formally repeats familiar patterns 
that derive from a long lineage of artificial women invites a reading that considers 
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her as a “thing” rather than as a fictional person (see Oulanne 2018). We do not 
need to search for psychological depth or uniqueness in order to make sense of 
her, as even her existential reflections are iterations of routinized patterns of 
presenting particular kinds of angst. Readers also do not need to fall under a 
character-centered illusion in order to be affected by such a thing-like figure. On 
the contrary, Emiko’s foregrounded fictionality opens up possibilities for 
interpretations that build on the power of fictional figures to move readers in 
corporeal ways. The above kinesic and kinetic analyses describe some aspects of 
this power, but they do not engage the cognitive dissonance between mimetic 
response (feeling with the figures like they were actual persons) and awareness of 
fictionality (knowing that the feeling itself is an effect of narrative strategies). While 
this kind of cognitive dissonance can occur in engagement with many kinds of 
figures and narratives, cognitive literary studies have suggested that narratives 
featuring artificial people – robots, androids, living dolls, and so forth – are 
particularly effective in evoking feelings of unresolvable ambiguity in readers. 
Lisa Zunshine (2008, see also Jannidis 2004, 185–95) has argued that this 
kind of cognitive dissonance is inevitable, as human minds are hardwired for 
perceiving everything in certain essential categories: natural kinds (i.e. living 
beings), artifacts, and substances. Natural kinds, such as people, plants, and 
animals, have inner essences, whereas artifacts perform functions. In Zunshine’s 
(2008, 8–9) examples, a skunk painted to look like a zebra is still perceived as a 
skunk, that is, it retains its “skunkness;” but a cup with the bottom sawed off loses 
its function as a cup and becomes perceived as something else, perhaps a 
bracelet or a cookie cutter. In Zunshine’s humanist model of cognition, these 
categories are mutually contradictory, as one cannot perceive a given entity as 
both an artifact and a natural kind. 
Zunshine (2008, 8) further stresses that cognitive essentialism does not 
result from culture or upbringing, as it has been found even in three-year-old 
children. Zunshine attributes the fascination we feel when encountering fictional 
cyborgs and robots to the way they disturb our categorizing processes. Not 
knowing whether to interpret the figures as inanimate objects or living beings, we 
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hover between the options. In her mind, we remain “perennially titillated by robots, 
cyborgs, and androids because they are brought into the world with a defined 
‘function’ – as artifacts usually are – and then rebel against or outgrow that function 
by seeming to acquire a complex world of human feelings and emotions” (Zunshine 
2008, 19). 
Even though Zunshine’s argument is grounded on sound 
neuropsychological research, I do not find it entirely convincing. In particular, her 
evolutionary-psychological claim that habituation or analysis “will not change the 
cognitive architecture that underlies essentialism” seems too limited (Zunshine 
2008, 22). From a phenomenological standpoint, it is possible to perceive entities 
as simultaneously living and object-like, and to habituate oneself to such a mode 
of perception. From an enactivist standpoint, it seems rather deterministic to 
assume that just because human brains default to particular kinds of 
categorizations, human minds or experience were radically resistant to change. 
While it is true that evolution is slow, and plausible that modern human brains share 
their neurological structure with prehistoric humans – a structure “that evolved to 
deal with natural kinds and artifacts but not with artifacts that look and act like 
natural kinds” (Zunshine 2008, 53) – what matters most for an enactivist response 
is that humans, understood as whole organisms, are capable of remarkable 
learning and change. It seems not only plausible but probable that perceptive 
habits and styles gradually change due to accumulated experience. Perceiving a 
given entity as both living and artificial does not seem all that impossible.58 
The claim about the naturality of essential categorization seems to fall apart 
even when presented with the well-documented existence of animist perception: 
an animist would quite easily perceive rocks or cars as animate beings, and 
particular animals as messages to be attended to, that is, artifacts with a purpose 
(see Abram 1996). But even modern Western habits of perception and the context 
of reading fictional figures show the limitations of Zunshine’s model. The 
                                                 
58 Zunshine (2008, 55) does not claim that there are ontological essences, only that “the 
quirks of our cognitive architecture” have evolved to perceive such essences. For 
discussion about cognitive plasticity and perceptual change, see 2.1. 
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experience of enacting the readerly choreography of Bacigalupi’s Emiko points to 
a more fluid conception of life and artifice. 
As a formal pattern in a fictional narrative, Emiko is the product of the 
transmedial and global genre of contemporary science fiction and of the 
consumerist logic of popular culture. On a diegetic level, she is a product of an 
industrial system that modifies human genetic material according to commercial 
purposes, and sells the cultivated and trained bodies to the service of companies 
and individuals. The language used around Emiko also frames her as a high-tech 
product. Emiko’s former owner often describes her as “optimal,” but, as Emiko 
bitterly reflects, she is “not optimal enough for a return ticket” back to Japan (WG, 
283), as she can be discarded and replaced with a newer model. She is described 
in terms of programming and product development, and at her lowest point 
referred to as a mechanical “marionette creature” and “a wind-up toy” (WG, 54). 
In light of Zunshine’s categories, Emiko reads both as artificial and as living. 
However, the boundary between the artificial and the living is not quite as 
solid as Zunshine suggests. This is apparent in how the figure of the artificial 
woman, especially in the context of genetic engineering, also points to the long 
history of breeding, or artificial selection of inheritable traits. 59  Emiko can be 
aligned with pure-bred dogs or horses, carefully cultivated for both aesthetic and 
functional purposes. The fact that she suffers from the “poor design” of the pores 
in her skin serves to remind readers of the dysfunctions brought on by extensive 
breeding, such as the breathing problems of short-nosed dogs and cats. The 
emphasis on Emiko’s embodied experience of overheating evokes in readers a 
bodily feeling of suffocating anxiety – a feeling that could also be easily attributed 
to dysfunctional dogs and cats. The figure thus combines, in readerly experience, 
features of living bodies (feeling and suffering) and artificial constructs (function 
and purpose). 
                                                 
59 Other influential crossings of the topic of genetic manipulation and the type of the 
artificial woman can be found, for instance, from Theodore Sturgeon’s Venus Plus X (1960), 
Bruce Sterling’s Schismatrix (1985), Nicole Griffith’s Ammonite (1992), and Johanna 
Sinisalo’s Core of the Sun (2016). 
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As the example of pure-bred animals shows, hybrid creatures are a familiar 
part of modern environments, and they thus inform our encounters with fictional 
hybrid figures. However, I wish to stress the point that we should not consider 
fictional figures simply through the cognitive psychology of encountering actual 
living beings and artifacts. The recognition of the basic nature of cognitive 
categories is without a doubt useful for understanding the default operations of 
human minds, but a model that uses those categories to explain our complex, 
skilful engagement with fictional figures seems too straightforward. 
As I have already argued, following Merja Polvinen (2016, 2017; see 4.1), 
engagement with fictional figures necessarily involves an awareness of fictionality. 
This also applies when we make sense of fictional bodies through kinesic and 
kinetic intelligence. All fictional figures, not just those that are explicitly artificial, 
constantly challenge us to acknowledge their ontological ambiguity. They are not 
living creatures but artificial constructs made of words, and yet we cannot help but 
respond to them like we would to living creatures. What makes explicitly artificial 
figures interesting for cognitive literary studies is that they invite us to pause and 
reflect on our responses to that ambiguity.  
Consider how Zunshine describes the experience of encountering fictional 
figures. She explains that when encountering a fictional entity that fits a particular 
essential category, identified unambiguously as either a living being or an artifact, 
readers “go on and on in an agreeable feedback loop” – but when the entity turns 
counterontological, the loop “comes to a screeching halt” (Zunshine 2008, 65). 
When we encounter a fictional character whose ontology seems to pull us in two 
different directions, we intuitively grapple for the ways to restore at least one of 
our broken feedback loops (for we cannot restore both) and to resolve the 
cognitive ambiguity by conceptualizing that hybrid as either a living being or an 
artifact. (Zunshine 2008, 79)  
I propose that the same dynamic could be said to pertain to reading all fictional 
characters, and the “breaking” of feedback loops would also happen at moments 
of metafictional awareness, that is, when a narrator or a character points to their 
ontological status as a fictional construct. Choosing to ignore the fictional entities’ 
fictionality and read them like “real people” is one popular way of resolving 
ambiguity. However, certain kinds of narratives and reading habits can develop 
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other styles of responses, including styles in which readers stay with the ambiguity, 
even enjoy it. Essi Varis (2019a) has suggested that this style of response is typical 
to readers of speculative fiction. 
Building on recent work in cognitive narratology, Varis (2019a) has argued 
that the most fitting analogue for fictional characters is not the human, but 
Frankenstein’s monster. In Varis’s “monster analogy,” fictional characters are 
always artificial, made of recycled parts, yet they prompt us to engage them in 
sympathetic and empathetic ways despite our better knowledge: “creatureness in 
itself can be characterized as monstrous, a cognitively threatening and fascinating 
aberration” (Varis 2019a, 69). We know they are not really alive, yet we engage 
them in the same anthropomorphizing mode of interpretation we use for engaging 
with living beings. The arguments Zunshine makes about the perennial fascination 
of hybrid characters could – as Varis does – be applied to all fictional characters. 
Crucially for my argument, Varis’s model accepts the ambiguity of fictional 
characters as an integral part of reading experience: “there is no need to decide 
whether they should be considered as skillfully crafted plot mechanisms or as 
startlingly relatable mock-humans because they are, by definition, both” (Varis 
2019a, 74). This self-reflective perspective on the activity of reading supports the 
enactivist-posthumanist view of literary engagements I am advancing in this study. 
The realm of fiction constantly participates in our lived experience, and readers 
routinely negotiate many different levels of fictionality in their everyday encounters 
not just with fictional characters but with figures in media and advertisement. 
However, unlike most characters, mutant figures constantly remind readers 
of their ambiguous nature. “The Fluted Girl,” “The People of Sand and Slag,” and 
The Windup Girl are such powerful stories because they foreground the artificiality 
of fictional figures. Genetically engineered figures are particularly strange, as they 
tick all the boxes on the list, fitting both categories: they are both natural (breathing, 
eating, feeling) and artificial (designed, constrained, augmented). Moreover, 
through the affective style of Bacigalupi’s writing, as readers we feel the impact of 
these fictional bodies as perspiration on our skin and tension in our muscles. 
Nevertheless, we also accept them as fictional constructions that add to a long 
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lineage of figures and caricatures. We are invited to shift between perceiving hybrid 
figures as artifacts and as people, and even to keep the apparently contradictory 
views active simultaneously. This cognitive trick transcends not only the distinction 
between artifacts and living things (as presented by Zunshine), but also the 
distinction between the synthetic and the mimetic in fictional character (as 
presented by Phelan). 
Seeing both sides of this divide is a skill we can learn through reading 
mutant figures. Learning this skill is based on the cognitive default settings of 
categorization. We do tend to conceive of artifacts in terms of their functions and 
living things in terms of their essences. Yet, as Zunshine herself demonstrates in 
her readings of golems and Great Expectations, writers exploit this tendency and 
manipulate our minds into thinking beyond it. We can learn to hold categorization 
at bay and realize that sometimes (quite often) things are both artificial and alive. 
From a new materialist perspective, the artificiality of Emiko also aligns her 
with other genetically modified organisms that inhabit Bacigalupi’s post-natural 
storyworld. This alignment helps us understand Emiko as an affective device in the 
wider context of Bacigalupi’s narrative. Reading kinetically, I do not only attune to 
the materiality of human bodies, but also to the materialities of nonhuman bodies 
and forces. The muscular tensions I feel when reading descriptions of weather-
related bodily feelings, for example, are also present when I read descriptions of 
animals working and springs being wound up (see Kortekallio forthcoming). 
This attunement to nonhuman materialities affords a broader new 
materialist reading of The Windup Girl. Bacigalupi’s work has previously been 
analyzed from posthumanist and new materialist perspectives (Tidwell 2011, 
Idema 2019). Developing those perspectives further can enrich our thinking of how 
an artificial, gendered figure might align with various nonhuman figures and forces. 
While still anchoring my reading of the novel to kinesic/kinetic analysis, I will now 
complicate it by incorporating posthumanist feminist perspectives. 
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The Material Agency of a Fictional Fruit 
 
Networks of biological species (some natural, most human-made), corporations, 
and political systems make up much of the experiential texture of The Windup Girl’s 
storyworld. The novel begins with an encounter with a newly re-engineered fruit, 
ngaw or rambootan: 
Not a single one of these furry fruits should exist; he might as well be hefting a 
sack of trilobites. If his guess about the ngaw’s origin is correct, it represents a 
return from extinction as shocking as if a Tyrannosaurus were stalking down 
Thanon Sukhumvit. But then, the same is true of the potatoes and tomatoes and 
chiles that fill the market, all piled in such splendid abundance, an array of fecund 
nightshades that no one has seen in generations. In this drowning city, all things 
seem possible. (WG, 5) 
The passage, narrated from the perspective of the agribusiness agent Anderson 
Lake, details a startling spread of strange species: trilobites, ngaw, Tyrannosaurus, 
potatoes, tomatoes, and chiles. Setting the nutritional plants in direct comparison 
with the creatures mostly known in fossil form is an efficient way of describing the 
situation in this imaginary Bangkok: most of these plant species have indeed been 
as definitely extinct as trilobites and dinosaurs, but now they have returned. The 
mood evoked by the narrative perspective is a mixture of exhilaration and wonder. 
Lake buys two kilos of the sweet furry fruit, not bothering to haggle. 
Reading a story that begins with defamiliarizing basic staples of the 
contemporary diet, readers cannot make too many assumptions about the 
storyworld. Contrary to the majority of far-future science fiction that only mentions 
agriculture in passing, The Windup Girl takes it as its main focus.60 In the novel, 
seed stocks are the most valuable treasure any nation or corporation can harbor. 
Usually only the corporate seeds can survive the disease epidemies and pests 
(“cibiscosis,” “blister rust,” “ivory beetles”) that attack both crops and the health 
of humans. However, Lake’s “guess about the ngaw’s origin” is that it has been re-
engineered by secretive “gene hackers,” whose genius makes Thailand one of the 
rare nations that can cultivate non-corporate food stocks. Genetic engineering is 
                                                 
60 Notable exceptions to the rule include Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy (1992–1996) 
and other terraforming fiction, and N. K. Jemisin’s Broken Earth trilogy (2015–2017). 
  168 
thus characterized as both the reason and the cure for the tangle of extinction, 
poor soils, and impervious strains of plant diseases – whether one is for or against 
it, “[i]t is the ocean they all swim in. The very medium of life” (WG, 69). 
In this biotechnological risk society, most opt to stay with the safe, patented 
food brands engineered by the transnational megacorporations, such as U-Tex rice, 
SoyPRO, and TotalNutrient Wheat. Eating, in this fictional Bangkok, is thus always 
an act that involves caution and a particular awareness to the origins of the food. 
The narrative often makes this point by focusing on particular instances of people 
responding to food items. When the expatriate business people have their first taste 
of the ngaw, they are first wary of the fruit, suspecting it might be tainted with blister 
rust. Lake assures them that the “lady who sold them . . . [h]ad the certificates” 
and that they are “cleaner than U-Tex” (WG, 129). Tasting the fruit that has now 
been labelled as safe to eat, Lake’s associates’ “[e]yes widen,” and “[s]miles 
appear” (WG, 129). One of them “chews thoughtfully” (WG, 129) and reminisces 
about another fruit, the lychee, that he has once tasted. Not only does the ngaw 
stir up bodily responses and memories, but it also makes the group speculate 
about its possible origin, viability, and commercial value. Lake’s search for the gene 
hacker responsible for creating the fruit spans the entirety of the novel. 
The fruit thus appears as a motif in a specific assemblage that is 
simultaneously material, ecological, commercial, and political. Its capacity to evoke 
activity in other bodies is what Bennett (2010, 3) would call “thing-power,” or “the 
vitality intrinsic to materiality,” which is independent of human subjectivity yet 
accessed through “a certain anticipatory readiness . . . a perceptual style open to 
the appearance of thing-power” (Bennett 2010, 5). Bennett, drawing on Latour 
and Greimasian structuralism, would call such a fictional fruit an actant, whereas I 
will limit myself to the more conventional literary-theoretical terms motif and 
device.61 
                                                 
61 Actant, in Latour’s and Bennett’s reformulation of Greimas, is a way for describing the 
activity of nonhuman things (that are usually themselves assemblages of other things): 
“something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special 
motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general.” (Latour 1996, quoted in 
Bennett 2010, 9, see also Greimas 1973.) 
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Drawing on new materialist thinkers such as Bennett and Karen Barad, as 
well as on biosemiotics and actor-network theory, proponents of material 
ecocriticism suggest that matter itself can be considered a text: “a site of narrativity, 
a storied matter, embodying its own narratives in the minds of human agents and 
in the very structure of its own self-constructive forces” (Iovino and Oppermann 
2012, 83). The idea is rooted in conceptions of matter as material-semiotic or 
material-discursive: that is, formed in processes of meaning-making that take 
place between material actors. I agree, in principle, that a posthumanist 
theorization of meaning should find ways to discuss meaning in terms that do not 
confine it to human interaction. However, I would not quite so readily describe 
material meaning-making in terms of narrative. Not only does narrativization rely 
on the cognitive processes of memory and prediction (which scientific consensus 
currently associates mostly with human cognizers), but, perhaps more importantly, 
it appears to be tied to the interpretive traditions of human cultures – whatever 
causal and relational patterns humans find in the dynamics of matter, those 
patterns are, by necessity, already the result of cognitive selection and 
interpretation (see also Hayles 2017). However, in deference to enactivist thought, 
I maintain that material activity on all levels generates meanings in the basic sense 
of creating difference and value (see especially Thompson 2007). 
While Iovino’s and Oppermann’s textualizing articulation mostly makes 
sense to theorists well versed in poststructuralist approaches, they also propose 
that a new materialist approach to reading can “focus attention on bodily 
experiences and bodily practices (where ‘body’ refers not only to the human body 
but to the concrete entanglements of plural ‘natures,’ in both human and more-
than-human realms)” (Iovino and Oppermann 2012, 76). I find this reconfiguration 
of bodily practices the most generative proposal made by material ecocriticism. 
Through impressing themselves upon writers, nonhuman beings push 
through texts written by humans, their impressive force amplified or otherwise 
filtered by the text.62 In Iovino and Oppermann’s readings, such nonhuman agency 
                                                 
62 An evolutionary psychologist might add that the rivers and seas do not only impress 
themselves on writers, or human individuals, but on generations of humans, and that 
through this environmental pressure, the rivers and seas (and other nonhuman entities) 
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is often traced from anthropomorphizing descriptions of nonhuman elements, for 
example rivers and seas.63 In The Windup Girl, however, nonhuman entities are 
not described in terms that would imply anthropomorphism or intentionality. Rather, 
human entities in the novel come to resemble nonhuman constructs in the ways 
they are produced and used. 
In my view, this situation opens up to new materialist analyses of material 
agency that do not require intentionality on the part of the nonhuman. In this 
chapter so far, I have brought out the material aspects of Emiko’s fictional body by 
discussing her as an affective device within the narrative pattern of the novel, and 
argued that this dehumanizing reading strategy amplifies the affective force of 
fictional bodies beyond their function as characters. Now I wish to go one step 
further and consider how the novel aligns human and nonhuman bodies, and 
presents all of them as affective devices. 
In light of the kinetic analyses practiced above, the fictional fruit ngaw 
affects readers in ways that are analogous to the affects of fictional human bodies: 
it is a bundle of affective and sensory cues that draws on and participates in 
readers’ embodied experience in several modalities. Reading descriptions of 
fictional fruit, readers can experience gustatory and kinetic traces of sweetness, 
acidity, juiciness, and viscosity, or even the complex mix of sensations 
characteristic of the ngaw itself, if they happen to be familiar with it. They can enact 
the experience of manipulating the fruit, putting it into their mouths and chewing, 
“spit[ting] the fat pit into [their] palm,” and “[e]xamin[ing] the black seed, wet with 
[their] saliva” (WG, 132). As the fictional fruit organizes around and within itself an 
assemblage of various human and nonhuman forces, readers can recognize 
similar assemblages in their lived material and political realities. By such a bundle 
of cues, the fictional fruit gains material agency. 
                                                 
become cultural objects that are recycled in texts. As I will discuss in more depth in chapter 
6, this is how nonhuman elements can also participate in the lived experience of readers. 
63  The authors stress that anthropomorphism does not necessarily imply 
anthropocentrism, but can function instead as “narrative expedient intended to stress the 
agentic power of matter and the horizontality of its elements” and “reveal similarities and 
symmetries between the human and the nonhuman” (Iovino and Oppermann 2012, 82, 
see also Bennett 2010, 99, Bernaerts et al. 2014, Pettersson 2016, Herman 2019). 
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From the beginning of the novel, food is also evoked as a matter of temporal 
continuities of generations, crops, evolution, extinction and de-extinction. Thus it 
participates in the portrayal of a specific moment of future history and bridges it to 
the contemporary readers’ empirical moment. In a chapter in which Lake searches 
for the history of ngaw from Expansion-era non-fiction books, the temporal relation 
is brought to the foreground: 
Anderson has spent enough time poring over ancient pictures that they seldom 
affect him. He can casually ignore the foolish confidence of the past – the waste, 
the arrogance, the absurd wealth – but this one irritates him: the fat flesh hanging 
off the farang, the astonishing abundance of calories that are so obviously 
secondary to the color and attractiveness of a market that has thirty varieties of 
fruit: mangosteens, pineapples, coconuts, certainly… but there are no oranges, 
now. None of these… these… dragon fruits, none of these pomelos, none of 
these yellow things… lemons. None of them. So many of these things are simply 
gone. (WG, 93, emphasis in original) 
Lake’s irritation of “the waste, the arrogance, the absurd wealth” of the past – the 
present day of the novel’s publication – is readily available to readers. The people 
of the past are, on the same page, explicitly called “fat, self-contented fools” whom 
the focalizer would like to toss of his balcony “the way they undoubtedly tossed 
aside fruit that was even the slightest bit bruised” (WG, 93). Through the temporal 
estrangement of being addressed accusingly by a fictional inhabitant of the future 
world, readers are bound to view the present world as defamiliarized. Even if most 
of the potatoes, tomatoes, and fruit we eat today are not genetically modified in the 
strict sense, they are definitely engineered through artificial selection and brought 
to the market via specialized procedures of trade and logistics. Through the simple 
act of describing the current situation from a fictional future standpoint, The Windup 
Girl can make readers more aware of their dependence on actual networks of food 
production. Whether they would align with the focalizer and consider this 
dependency as “foolish confidence” is of course another matter. 
In the instance of my first person reading experience, the novel guides how 
I perceive my reading and eating body. Buying lunch in a Kurdish restaurant in 
Helsinki – rice, with a sauce of tomatoes, potatoes, and chiles, nightshades of most 
likely Spanish origin – and eating it, I am haunted by the fictional equivalents of the 
foodstuffs, along with their economic and political entanglements. I recognize my 
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eating body as an agent in global networks of food production, logistics, and 
marketing. I am, quite literally, constructed in part by these networks, as they 
enable both the renewing of my tissues and the continuity of my vital processes. 
Moreover, specific foodstuffs affect my dispositions, moods, and capabilities in 
different ways. Food, understood literally rather than as a symbol or metaphor, can 
be conceived of as “an actant in an agentic assemblage that includes among its 
members my metabolism, cognition, and moral sensibility” (Bennett 2010, 51).64 
This awareness of material networks amounts to an altered orientation: I pay more 
attention to the networks and their particular dynamics. With enough rehearsing, 
this attention might become habitual and affect my actions within the networks. 
 
Against Niche and Nature 
 
The ecological notion of niche is central to the affective structures of Bacigalupi’s 
fictional world, as it is adapted for the use of political ideology. The notion serves a 
function within a particular constellation of nature and culture, as it is understood 
as the natural, unalienable habitat of a particular species – a natural boundary that 
should not be transgressed. Any transgressions are, in an idiom coined in the novel 
by the conservationist Christian sect called Grahamites, “against Niche and 
Nature,” and genetically modified organisms are transgressive by default. This puts 
the genetically modified bodies of ngaw and Emiko in a perilous situation. 
In The Windup Girl, The Environmental Ministry of Thailand is determined to 
protect the integrity of the Thai country from invaders. In this protective effort, 
environmental conservation is entangled with economic, political and spiritual 
concerns, as the ministry officers disinfect contaminated fish farms and burn 
contraband stocks of products ranging from grain to electronic appliances and 
luxury clothing. The boundaries of the nation are cared for with exquisite hygiene. 
Anything deemed “against Niche and Nature” is a target of righteous disgust and 
                                                 
64  Jane Bennett discusses both the empirically studied cognitive-affective effects of 
omega-3 fatty acids and the experiential comments on eating provided by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Henry David Thoreau (Bennett 2010, 39–51). See also  
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hatred. Genetically modified humans are only allowed in the country after the 
purchase of severely restricted import permits. Without a permit, a “New Person” 
(the Japanese idiom), or “windup” (pejorative colloquialism), is treated according 
to the rules designed for invasive species. And, as the Thais do not consider 
genetically modified organisms to have souls, the life of one bears no karmic cost 
on the killer. 
While guarding their nation from the foreign agribusiness invaders, the Thai 
also cultivate a rigid system of moralistic rules of acceptable and non-acceptable 
life. In denying access to genetically modified seed, they also close their eyes from 
the development of the life around them: the Thai soil, transformed by the joint 
disasters of climate change, industrial agriculture, and plant disease epidemies, 
already bears strange fruit. Anonymous “gene hackers” create new and 
resurrected strains of vegetal life, including the ngaw that figures throughout the 
novel; the experimental nearly invisible domestic cat, “cheshire,” has gone feral 
and transformed the local ecosystems; and New People mingle with natural 
humans, despite the demands of niche thinkers. As Emiko herself puts it, the Thais 
and the Grahamites are both “focused on their Noah’s ark, after the flood has 
already happened” (WG, 165). The disastrous mixing of the natural and the 
artificial has already happened, in agriculture and human populations alike. 
While this kind of transgression of categories is familiar from cyborg 
narratives, The Windup Girl is exceptional in the way it portrays genetic engineering 
as ubiquitous in all sectors of society. The novel’s focus on genetically modified 
organisms of all kinds, including but not limited to humans, serves to align the 
artificial woman with other artificial lifeforms. While genetically engineered humans 
have sometimes been employed as stand-ins for factory-farmed or genetically 
engineered animals, 65  the alignment with the kinds of foodstuffs already in 
circulation – grains, fruit, and vegetables – is a rarer contribution to the genre. 
When witnessing the nearly invisible movements of the cheshires, Emiko 
notes to Lake: “Just think if they had made New People first” (WG, 164). In his own 
mind, Lake narrates Emiko’s supposed thoughts on the matter: 
                                                 
65 E.g. Atwood: Oryx and Crake (2003) and Ishiguro: Never Let Me Go (2005). 
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If her kind had come first, before the generippers knew better, she would not 
have been made sterile. She would not have the signature tick-tock motions that 
make her so physically obvious. She might even have been designed as well as 
the military windups now operating in Vietnam – deadly and fearless. Without the 
lesson of the cheshires, Emiko might have had the opportunity to supplant the 
human species entirely with her own improved version. Instead, she is a genetic 
dead end. Doomed to a single life cycle, just like SoyPRO and TotalNutrient 
Wheat. (WG, 164) 
Later twists of the plot shed ironic light on Lake’s musings, as the novel eventually 
presents the advance of genetically engineered lifeforms as an inevitable 
development. The apparent sterility of corporate lifeforms, both New People and 
the genetically modified grains they are explicitly aligned with, can be bypassed by 
the efforts of genehackers: at the end of the novel, new life emerges from a strand 
of Emiko’s hair. 
The bioengineered life of Bacigalupi’s fiction challenges the conceptual 
dichotomy between natural species and human culture. Bacigalupi’s portrayals of 
genetically modified bodies are steeped deep in ecological and political 
entanglements. Readers are oriented toward thinking about the networks of 
production, marketing, distribution, and regulation that shape every encounter with 
a technological body in a late capitalist system, whether the body is a potato, 
cultivated to perfection through centuries of artificial selection and a decade or two 
of genetic engineering, or an athlete, born and bred within high-technological 
medical and nutritional networks. The flood has already happened, and 
Bacigalupi’s novel enables us to attune to it with more sophisticated senses and 
devices. It invites readers to corporeally engage with matters of patented life, 
induced sterility, and the precariousness of life in a risky environment. It also helps 
us counteract what botanists Elizabeth Schussler and James Wandersee have 
called “plant blindness”: our tendency to notice plant life only as a background for 
human and animal life, not as significant in itself (see Allen 2003). 
Focusing on the material alignments the figure affords does not erase its 
problematic status as a gendered stereotype, but it does enable some mental 
moves that would be ruled out by a rigidly human-centered approach. 
In Bacigalupi’s postnatural narrative, Emiko is left outside human civilization, 
to live in its ruins and participate in the slow evolution of a new ecology. In this 
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resolution, she does not fill the role of the woman in a rebuilding narrative, 
mothering children for the continuation of human race in a purely human effort. 
Rather, she is conflicted like the character Lilith of Octavia E. Butler’s Dawn, a 
functional part of a system in which the illusion of sovereignty is impossible. She 
may well serve as a mother to future children, but in the genetic sense rather than 
the familial – her children, like Lilith’s, will be “mixed” by an expert, and she might 
not be the one to parent them. In this role as well as in her role in the revolution 
plotline, Emiko is more a construct than a subject, a material node of activity in a 
more-than-human assemblage. As in Haraway’s (2016) “Camille Stories,” fertility 
and reproduction are not individual but collective matters. In The Windup Girl, 
however, the world is not freed of the shadow of the patriarch – the gene hacker 
Gibbons still holds an inordinate amount of power over the reproduction of human, 
animal, and plant bodies. 
It is precisely this conflict that makes The Windup Girl a mutant narrative. 
With its vibrant materiality, it evokes in its readers a corporeal sense of more-than-
human entanglement, and thus reaches toward an ecological understanding of 
more-than-human ethics. Yet it is caught up in the human-centered and sexist 
conventions of both the science fiction genre and of fossil modernity more generally. 
Attuning to the novel’s violent figuration of a gendered stereotype reproduces 
gendered bodily feelings connected to reification and exploitation, but critical 
reflection and a new materialist interpretation of those feelings can help to nourish 
the growth of ecological subjectivity. The novel contains seeds for change – but 
they are only fertile after repeated technological-theoretical interventions. That is, 
they call for critical reading. 
 
How to Appreciate Painful Affects 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed the fiction of Paolo Bacigalupi through the reading 
method of performative enactivism, and especially by applying the notion of 
readerly choreography. I have focused particularly on the bodily and material ways 
of making sense of fictional figures, and the analytical notions of kinesis and 
  176 
kinetics. In order to focus on the bodily and material aspects of fictional figures and 
narratives, I have intentionally ruled out the analytical concept of fictional character. 
Instead, I have discussed fictional bodies in terms of figures. The notion of figure 
has also enabled discussion of individual figures as iterations of genre-specific 
types. I have presented an approach to reading that does not center on reading 
characters mimetically and interpreting the social and psychological networks they 
are embedded in. 
I have argued that kinesic and kinetic intelligence pertain to the thematic 
interpretation of mutant narratives, and that Bacigalupi’s narratives in particular 
thematize the dynamic of bodily responses to fictional figures. Imaginatively 
enacting the movements and bodily feelings of the posthuman and mutant figures 
of “The Fluted Girl,” “The People of Sand and Slag,” and The Windup Girl, I am 
guided to both accept their kinesic styles and, through its defamiliarizing 
exaggeration of painful affects, resist such an easy identification. In this process, I 
become aware of the narratives as affective technologies that make use of my 
capability for bodily and affective response: my response-ability. 
I consider Bacigalupi’s stories as mutant narratives in that they reach for 
posthumanist or ecological modes of storytelling and experience, but still struggle 
with the traditions of both realist narration and the science fiction genre. In my 
readings, this struggle is lodged in the complex affectivity of the central fictional 
figures. The posthuman and postnatural figures of “The People of Sand and Slag” 
invite readers to enjoy the heroically capable bodies and their actions, and yet the 
story defamiliarizes this pleasure by taking the consequences of postnatural 
embodiment to their extreme logical conclusions. The Windup Girl, on the other 
hand, mobilizes the type of the artificial woman in ways that serve to both reinforce 
the binary separations between male and female, mind and body, and the 
particular figuration of women as objects. Kinesically attuning to the sexual 
violence and instrumentalization performed in the novel is a painful and derogatory 
experience: as a performative enactivist reader, I feel that I am also used and 
violated by the novel. Yet the narrative also disturbs any binaries by evoking 
alignments between the artificial female body and other genetically modified 
  177 
lifeforms, and by thematizing the experience of being instrumentalized. 
Bacigalupi’s narrative encourages me to reflect on the painful and shameful 
feelings particular to the trope of the artificial woman, and broaden them to pertain 
to the wider exploitation of other lifeforms. In this way, The Windup Girl calls for 
bodily reading that is performative in that it actively generates meanings, rather 
than receptive, as in simply reading for pleasure. 
In an interview (Prendergast 2010), Bacigalupi admits that the painful 
affectivity of his stories is an intentional strategy: “The stories are designed to hurt,” 
and the pain is meant to drive home his ecological agenda. With this statement, 
Bacigalupi also presents a challenge to literary critics and scholars: the design of 
his stories requires readers to both feel the pain and work with it. I suggest that the 
method of performative enactivism, and the particular analytical notions of kinesis, 
kinetics, and readerly choreography, provide ways for literary scholars to do just 
that: to engage with fictional narratives in enactive ways that can give rise to new 
interpretations about gendered performativity and power, ecological 
interdependence, and more-than-human relationalities. 
Posthumanist feminist approaches, and new materialism in particular, help 
to make sense of how fictional figures participate in the material construction of my 
embodied experience. As affective devices, fictional figures are activated in the 
ways in which I move my body, in the ways I respond to touch and rain, and in the 
way I read other fictional figures: in short, in readerly choreographies. The Windup 
Girl, as a whole, and Emiko, as a particular pattern within that whole, participate in 
my lived experience and amplify certain features in it. 
In this chapter, I have discussed estrangement only minimally, as a cognitive 
dynamic that forms part of the experience of reading mutant figures. It is, however, 
essential to both reading mutant narratives and developing posthumanist modes 
of experience, and thus it deserves more elaboration. The next chapter discusses 
how estrangement functions in the context of New Weird fiction, and develops the 
notion of embodied estrangement. 
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5 Embodied Estrangement and Jeff VanderMeer’s 
Annihilation 
 
In an essay on anthologizing The Weird, Jeff VanderMeer (2014d) describes his 
experience of being haunted and colonized by the stories he reads. Acquiring and 
editing the stories for the anthology requires him to dig deep into both the fiction 
and the lives of authors. 
The information you gather seems more like intelligence, because you’re often a 
detective trying to solve an inexplicable case. Estates degrade; obscure stories 
are hard to track down; authors, wounded by the past, mislead. To be told that 
an estate representative is in a coma and must expire or recover before reprint 
permissions can be granted is to discover the Kafkaesque in what you assumed 
would be boringly contractual. To contemplate sending a friend from a Mexican 
circus on horseback down the coast to Leonora Carrington’s house to secure 
story rights makes you wonder if the worldview of the writer whose work you 
covet has begun to colonize the editorial process. (VanderMeer 2014d) 
The fiction, the lives of authors, and the editorial process begin to overlap and 
intermingle, feeding into the thinking and writing of the editor/author. VanderMeer 
(2016) continues on the theme of haunting in another essay titled “Hauntings in 
the Anthropocene,” in which he is describes his experience of being affected by a 
major ecological catastrophe. In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig 
exploded, spilling 4.9 million barrels of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. VanderMeer, a 
Florida resident, was haunted by this event, to the extent that the expanding shape 
of the oil spill emerged in his dreams in an inverted form – as a natural area that 
grows over human settlements, obliterating all infrastructure and technology. This 
dream image found literary expression in the novel Annihilation, published in 2014 
as the first part of The Southern Reach trilogy. The expanding shape can also be 
experienced in a visual form, in the 2018 film adaptation, where it resembles and 
echoes cancerous growth. 
What connects these two essays by VanderMeer is the underlying sense of 
becoming a conduit, of being permeated by strange stories, events, and images, 
to the extent of dreaming up new stories and images. In a way that evokes Donna 
Haraway’s (2016) notion of compost, VanderMeer (2014d) describes the 
accumulation of influences as “the mulch, the thick substrate, that at some point 
  179 
manifests in one’s own stories.” There is a sense of his thinking and action arising 
from previous encounters with stories, people, and events – the shape of an oil spill 
eventually emerges in a slightly mutated form, as a strange, expanding area of vivid 
wilderness – and a sense of recognition on a barely conscious level: “Influence 
rises easily off the page, along with that sense of being watched . . . it feels as if 
someone or something is staring out from the text at the reader” (VanderMeer 
2014d). 
This particular experience of simultaneous recognition and estrangement is 
at the core of this chapter. The term uncanny illuminates one aspect of the 
experience, yet it is more than a simple response to the almost-familiar: 
VanderMeer describes it in dynamic terms, as a style of seeking and exploring the 
“ever-lasting unknown.” 
In Michel Bernanos’s underappreciated 1960s masterpiece, “The Other Side of 
the Mountain,” the characters are shipwrecked on the coast of a strange land of 
hostile plants and artifacts that threatens to destroy them. And yet they carry on 
anyway, keep trying to the end, in the face of an ever-lasting unknown. They do 
not look away, and the bizarre elements are tempered by a raw humanity, a 
pathos, that cannot help but leave you both shaken and yet strangely proud. 
Such a reading experience is humbling; it humbles you as a human being, 
but also as a writer. It tends to strip from you any impulse that does not lead to 
what seems essential. It makes you not want to aspire to be good or to be great, 
but to be true in some small way – to be true to the underpinnings of the world, 
and the struggle to understand that world. This impulse is tempered by the 
recognition that we can never know all of it, or even most of it – and that this 
seeming lack is not a failing but a strength. (VanderMeer 2014d) 
In this chapter, I strive to describe this kind of ongoing, seeking estrangement in 
the dynamic terms put forward by enactivist theory. As articulated by Karin 
Kukkonen (2014, 2019), reading involves the constant readjusting of one’s 
expectations and interpretative models as the narrative unfolds, a kind of 
“predictive processing.” Such an understanding of the reading process emerges 
from a wider embodied and enactivist understanding of cognition. In the classic 
articulation of The Embodied Mind (Varela et al 1992, 241 et passim), the basic 
dynamic of enactive cognition is figured as “laying down a path in walking.” This is 
a process that is metaphysically “groundless,” as it cannot be traced back to a 
stable foundation in either a pregiven world or a permanent self. Such a lack of 
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foundations is one of the central findings of cognitive science.66 Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch (1992, 200) claim that a realization of this view of the self as 
phenomenal or operational results into a “sense of vertigo” in which we need to 
“delve deeper.” I suggest that VanderMeer’s fiction provides readers a chance to 
delve deeper into groundlessness, in terms of both theme and readerly experience. 
Previous research has discussed the horrific and monstrous affects of The 
Southern Reach in the context of the ongoing ecological catastrophe, arguing that 
the trilogy can provide models for moving beyond the fear of the unknowable 
(Prendergast 2017, Ulstein 2017) and “allows the reader to eventually experience 
radical alterity as something other than merely destructive” (Idema 2019, 31). 
Idema also connects radical systemic and perceptual uncertainty to ecological 
systems themselves, arguing that VanderMeer’s fiction can experientially simulate 
ecological interaction. Discussing these claims from an embodied experiential 
perspective enriches the analysis of how Weird fiction works between embodied 
cognition and material ecologies. 
While the stated aim of The Embodied Mind is to guide Western science and 
philosophy out of the nihilist anxiety evoked by the realization of groundlessness, 
here it is more important to stay with that anxiety and figure out how it is articulated 
and evoked in VanderMeer’s fiction. The bodily feelings tied to nihilism need to be 
discussed in their entanglements with nonhuman monstrosities, which include the 
nonconscious aspects of human embodiment. If human selves are “transparent 
models” (Metzinger 2003, 1) and human bodies are “spaceships for bacteria” 
(Bear 2003, 376), then groundlessness definitely seems like something human 
cultures should learn to come to terms with if they wish to develop into ecologically 
sustainable directions. VanderMeer’s fiction is committed to decentralizing the 
                                                 
66 In his aptly named Being No-One, cognitive philosopher Thomas Metzinger articulates 
the phenomenal self as a transparent model: 
“The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process – and the subjective experience 
of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates under 
a transparent self-model. You are such a system right now, as you read these sentences. 
Because you cannot recognize your self-model as a model, it is transparent: you look right 
through it. You don’t see it. But you see with it.” (Metzinger 2003, 1, emphases original) 
Posthumanist philosophy has also incorporated this view and suggested that 
subjectivities can be considered as fictional choreographies (Braidotti 2002, 22). 
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human subject “within a universe that clearly sees us as simple atoms like 
everything else” (VanderMeer 2016), developing a mode of ecological existence 
that has been called “dark ecology” (Morton 2013, 2016) or “weird ecology” 
(Tompkins 2014). 
In the context of New Weird fiction and posthumanist theory, ecological 
existence entails staying with the strange, the unknown, and the nonhuman, or, in 
VanderMeer’s words, aspiring “to be true to the underpinnings of the world, and 
the struggle to understand that world.” While I do not seek to master the unknown 
itself, I maintain that carefully articulating the cognitive processes of encountering 
the unknown can help us better appreciate the meaning-making effort of 
VanderMeer and other writers and readers of strange fiction. I have previously 
argued that the affective experience of being impressed by both nonhuman and 
textual actors is a crucial component of this process (Kortekallio 2019a). Now I 
want to further explore how the estranging experiences of more-than-human 
entanglement, figured as being impressed, haunted, permeated, or otherwise 
affected by either fictional narratives or the nonhuman environment, can be 
articulated in terms of bodily and more-than-human sense-making.  
Astrida Neimanis (Chandler and Neimanis 2013) also evokes the dynamic 
of being impressed – often painfully – and responding. The Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill haunts her, too, in “calling for response.” 
I also feel a pull 
toward that body of water that lies between Florida and Mexico, 
toward the bodies of water therein and along its shore.  
I feel the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico as a painful incursion, calling for response, 
–  
how to respond? 
(Chandler and Neimanis 2013, 67) 
In being haunted by ecological catastrophes, both VanderMeer and Neimanis 
hover between pain and response. In their texts, they articulate this in-between 
state in terms of bodily feelings: of being seen, pulled, and colonized by nonhuman 
bodies. In articulating these feelings, the texts are responses: actions participating 
in the ongoing enaction of worlds and minds. In posthumanist feminist terms, these 
articulations of feeling bodies give rise to more-than-human worldings in which 
feeling with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is figured as real and valid, not 
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diminished to anthropomorphic projection of feelings legitimately limited to 
interhuman relations. In addition to responding to this particular ecological 
catastrophe, they also present figurations of existence in worlds of complex 
relations that sprawl beyond human understanding and scientific objectivity. Such 
figurations incorporate the notion and bodily feeling of groundlessness. 
The literary responses of VanderMeer, Neimanis, and others draw on the 
registers of horror and science fiction, foregrounding affects of horror, awe, and 
dread, and evoking feelings of estrangement. In reading science fiction, 
estrangement is not only a common experience, but a crucial one. Darko Suvin's 
(1979) formulation of cognitive estrangement as science fiction's central literary 
strategy has retained its currency despite three decades of redefinition and 
criticism. In this chapter, I reconfigure the notion of cognitive estrangement to 
better serve the enactivist conception of cognition and suggest the term embodied 
estrangement to describe certain material strategies of estrangement found in Jeff 
VanderMeer's New Weird novel trilogy The Southern Reach. The experience of 
engaging such material strategies of estrangement can be discussed in terms of 
readerly choreographies (see 3.2). 
I suggest that the readerly choreography of embodied estrangement, in the 
case of The Southern Reach, contains two complex moves: the estrangement of 
embodied experience and reorientation of embodied experience into more-than-
human modes. The first move deconstructs certain naturalized assumptions about 
embodied experience, such as bodily integrity and pure humanness. The second 
move articulates the lived body as a participant in ecosystemic activity and as a 
locus of more-than-human meaning-making. The Southern Reach oscillates 
between these two moves, beginning from the first and shifting further and further 
into the second in the course of the trilogy. As a result of this double move of 
defamiliarization and reorientation, the human body is reconfigured as an 
instrument for observing radical environmental change and developing sensitivities 
for more-than-human meanings. Embodied experience is thus figured as 
ecological, but not transparently “natural.” 
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In section 5.1, I discuss the context of Weird and New Weird fiction and 
discuss the notion of embodied estrangement. In section 5.2, I begin to 
demonstrate how it unfolds in reading Annihilation, the first book of The Southern 
Reach trilogy. The reading also includes an analysis of how Annihilation 
reconfigures the trope of the “Gnostic victim” (Sieg 2009) and thus counteracts 
the philosophical paralysis described in The Embodied Mind as cognitivist nihilism 
(Varela et al 1992). I claim that making sense of this counter-move depends both 
on readers’ kinesic enacting of fictional movement and their experiential 
background in encountering horror fiction tropes. 
 
5.1 Weird Strategies of Estrangement 
 
This section focuses on the experience of embodied estrangement in reading Jeff 
VanderMeer's The Southern Reach. VanderMeer takes on the challenge of 
introducing imperceptible environmental processes into human experience by 
conveying the limitations of human perception through affective narrative 
techniques. I am particularly interested in VanderMeer’s use of defamiliarizing and 
naturalizing techniques, specifically the “everyday sublime” identified in the New 
Weird movement, and the ways in which these techniques participate in readerly 
experience. 
Compared to Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl, discussed in section 4.2, 
The Southern Reach invites a more conceptual reading. The mystery of Area X is 
constructed as a puzzle for both characters and readers, and the themes of 
knowing and not-knowing emerge on every page of the trilogy. Thus, the emphasis 
of this chapter is on processes of sense-making. This does not, however, imply a 
marginalization of the bodily and affective aspects of reading. On the contrary, one 
of the aims of the chapter is to demonstrate how affect is an inherent part of sense-
making and intellectual inquiry. 
Cognitive estrangement is one of the most widely used concepts in the 
study of science fiction. Coined by the Marxist theorist Darko Suvin, cognitive 
estrangement has traditionally been considered as the primary effect that 
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distinguishes science fiction proper from related genres such as horror and folkloric 
fantasy. In brief, Suvin's (1979, 4) theory defines science fiction as the sort of fiction 
that systematically presents “an imaginative framework alternative to the author’s 
empirical environment.” This systematic construction necessitates a novel element, 
as “SF is distinguished by the narrative dominance or hegemony of a fictional 
‘novum’ (novelty, innovation) validated by cognitive logic” (Suvin 1979, 63). The 
novum is widely accepted as a distinguishing feature of science fiction (see e.g. 
Luckhurst 2005, Roberts 2005, McHale 2010). 
While Suvin’s conceptual work is somewhat vague, the “cognitive logic” in 
cognitive estrangement can be seen to refer to the extent to which the science 
fictional text anchors itself to empirical reality. “Cognitive” is what appears to be 
possible or plausible not only in the fictional world but also in the reality experienced 
by readers. In Simon Spiegel’s (2008, 373, emphasis original) analysis, “[t]he 
emphasis lies on appearance and perception; the novum must appear as cognitive. 
In other words, cognition here seems to be identical with what I call naturalization.” 
If we accept Spiegel’s interpretation of Suvin, we see that the original 
cognitive estrangement already introduces the dynamic tension between 
defamiliarization and naturalization discussed in recent science fiction studies and 
cognitive narratology (Spiegel 2008, McHale 2010, Bernaerts et al. 2014, 
Caracciolo 2016; see also 3.1). Contrary to the framework of enactivist theory, 
however, Suvin's use of the term cognitive is very cerebral and rationalist. He 
equates cognition with a scientific, “methodically systematic” thought and stresses 
that this style of cognition distinguishes the construction of science fictional worlds 
from fantastic fabulation – the worlds of science fiction “make sense” on the 
rational level in particular (Suvin 1979, 65, 67–68).67 In Suvin’s (1979, 63–64) 
                                                 
67  Suvin's cognitive estrangement is a politically-oriented concept that builds on the 
Verfremdungseffekt of Bertolt Brecht. In the Brechtian tradition, estrangement can be 
understood as “the distancing of the reader or viewer of a work of art from the assumed 
or naturalized world they inhabit un-self-consciously in their everyday lives” (Wegner 2011). 
In addition to Brecht, Suvin's theory also draws heavily from the utopian theory of Ernst 
Bloch. For Bloch, the effect of estrangement serves a utopian purpose: by questioning the 
normative world, it frees the mind to think of alternative possibilities. Later critics of science 
fiction have also discussed cognitive estrangement alongside the Russian Formalist 
concept of ostranenie (остранение), coined by Viktor Skhlovsky in 1917, which is usually 
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formulation, “valid SF” is an exercise in consistently logical world-simulation: the 
normative world-model of the implied reader is transformed by the introduction of 
a “totalizing novelty” in the fictional world. 
[T]he essential tension of SF is one between the readers, representing a certain 
number of types of Man of our times, and the encompassing and at least 
equipollent Unknown or Other introduced by the novum. This tension in turn 
estranges the empirical norm of the implied reader. (Suvin 1979, 64) 
This emphasis on systematic world-building foregrounds authorial intention, and 
the rational aspect of writing. In a sense, Suvin promotes science fiction as a kind 
of science. This conception carries with it an assumption of science as a rational 
endeavor aimed at enlarging the realm of human knowledge. Even if Suvin’s later 
work (1994, 2000) also considers emotion and the fantastic imagination, the 
rationalist assumptions embedded in his original formulation of cognitive 
estrangement still prevail in the mainstream of science fiction studies. 
In this rationalist mode, cognitive estrangement cannot grasp the 
philosophical and political implications of the affective aspects of science fictional 
texts, such as immersion and flow, weird modes of temporality, spatiality and 
embodiment, and the material and aesthetic feel of the text itself. As I have argued 
elsewhere, following Sherryl Vint (2005), the material and bodily aspects of science 
fiction need to be recognized not merely as background and flavor, but as 
important modes of cognitive influence (Kortekallio 2019a). One way to do so is to 
reconceptualize cognitive estrangement to better answer the challenge of the 
second generation cognitive framework and posthumanist critiques of 
Enlightenment humanism. In this new context, the analytical usefulness of the 
dynamic model of defamiliarization and naturalization joins the material and bodily 
orientation of enactivism and posthumanism. 
I propose that the concept of embodied estrangement can help to focus the 
analysis of science fiction (and, especially here, of mutant narratives) on the 
material and affective aspects of texts that estrange and reconfigure the readers’ 
experience of empirical reality. Thinking in terms of embodied estrangement allows 
                                                 
translated as either estrangement or defamiliarization. This study uses defamiliarization to 
denote narrative techniques and estrangement to denote experiential change. 
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us to reflect on specific moments of strange bodily feelings experienced while 
reading, and discuss how they participate in the interpretive processes of reading 
science fiction. 
I also see embodied estrangement as a strategic effect that is made 
possible by the narrative techniques VanderMeer’s trilogy. This strategic effect 
partially overlaps with what Timothy Morton (2007, 63) has called ecomimesis, a 
rhetorical device by which one attempts to “undo habitual distinctions between 
nature and ourselves.” Ecomimesis is a matter of experience rather than argument: 
“If we could not merely figure out but actually experience the fact that we were 
embedded in our world, then we would be less likely to destroy it” (Morton 2007, 
63–64; emphasis original).68 Previous studies have also argued that the New Weird 
in particular can take advantage of “fiction’s prerogative to assert rather than argue” 
(Prendergast 2017, 337) and experiment with “ways to move beyond cosmic fear” 
(Ulstein 2017, 75). The conceptual work done in the New Weird movement itself 
can help us to gain a better grasp of the experiential and narrative dynamics of 
embodied estrangement.  
In the following sections, I will focus particularly on bodily feelings of 
hovering at the edge of an abyss and being haunted. I argue that by evoking these 
bodily feelings, The Southern Reach trilogy can amplify readers’ experiences of 
epistemic uncertainty when facing nonhuman unknowability. 
 
The Weird and the New Weird 
 
Jeff VanderMeer's The Southern Reach has most commonly been received as 
“ecologically minded Weird fiction” or “eco-horror,” while traces of the American 
naturalist tradition and Kafkaesque surrealism have also been detected.69 Idema 
                                                 
68 This ecomimetic ethos is apparent in Morton’s later work such as Hyperobjects (2013) 
and Dark Ecology (2016). See also Kortekallio 2019a. 
69 David Tompkins (2014) mentions the American naturalist tradition, and Henry Thoreau, 
Rachel Carson and Annie Dillard in particular. On the other hand, The Southern Reach 
has been compared to science fiction classics such as Solaris (1961), by Stanislaw Lem, 
and Roadside Picnic (1972, also known as Stalker), by the Strugatsky brothers, and to the 
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(2019) considers The Southern Reach in terms of “genre trouble” (LeMenager 
2017): 
VanderMeer conjoins topoi from different literary traditions to represent nature 
disrupted: Germanic and Greek mythology (the enchanted forest, Leviathans); 
Gothic, fantasy, and (New) Weird (the human threatened by supernatural forces 
from inside and outside); modernism (reflections on the nature of experience and 
consciousness, the relation between self and other); postmodernism (the 
questioning of reality and truth); biological science fiction (cancerous growth, 
infection, mutation); and detective (inexplicable murders, excess of irreconcilable 
information). (Idema 2019, 105) 
Even if VanderMeer's repertoire contains such a broad range of styles and 
influences, the context of Weird fiction may provide the richest potential for 
interpretation. The potential arises not only from the stylistic features typical to the 
Weird tradition, but also from the notion of weird as a particular kind of affect or 
atmosphere.70 
Weird fiction, as well as the contemporary movement of the New Weird, is 
often characterized by its evocation of a sense of dread, awe, or terror (Miéville 
2009, VanderMeer 2008). Traditional Weird fiction, stemming from the 1920s and 
1930s work of H. P. Lovecraft and others, is differentiated from other horror fiction 
in that the horror element is of cosmic rather than mundane nature (see Joshi 1990, 
Robertson 2018) and from Golden Age science fiction in its mistrust in the scientific 
enterprise (see Carroll 2015). The tradition of cosmic horror can “be regarded as 
a heroic but doomed attempt [at communicating] the incommunicable” (Stableford 
2007, 71), but also as an antihumanist realization of the limitations of human 
perception and knowledge of the horrifyingly vast and strange cosmos (Robertson 
2018, 23–28, Faassen and Vermeulen 2019). The New Weird of the twenty-first 
century, however, moves beyond horror and epistemic despair by weaving them 
into descriptions of mundane life. Gry Ulstein (2017) distinguishes between the Old 
and the New Weird by pointing out that they convey monstrosity in different ways: 
                                                 
work of Franz Kafka (Carroll 2015). For his part, VanderMeer has indebted himself to 
genre-defying works such as Leena Krohn's Tainaron (1985) and Weird precedents such 
as Michel Bernanos' The Other Side of the Mountain (1967) and, above all, “the true 
wondrous weirdness of nature” (cited in Spiegelman 2014). 
70 I use a capitalized Weird when referring to the genre and weird when discussing the 
affect or atmosphere. 
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Crudely put, traditional weird fiction, closely tied to Lovecraft, is all about 
encounters with, and subsequent escapes from, inconceivable monsters whose 
mere existence drives people mad (Cthulhu). The new weird has adopted the 
cosmic horror of the old weird, but typically approaches it in different ways; often 
it is more about researching, articulating, and embracing the monster rather than 
escaping it. (Ulstein 2017, 75, emphasis original) 
In New Weird texts, this tendency for “embracing the monster rather than escaping 
it” often manifests as intentional literalism of fantastic and science fictional 
elements. This insistence on a “real-world” feel is also foregrounded by the 
definition by Ann and Jeff VanderMeer, in an introduction to the anthology that has 
helped shape the genre. 
New Weird is a type of urban, secondary-world fiction that subverts the 
romanticized ideas about place found in traditional fantasy, largely by choosing 
realistic, complex real-world models as the jumping off point for creation of 
settings that may combine elements of both science fiction and fantasy . . . [New 
Weird] has a visceral, in-the-moment quality that often uses elements of surreal 
or transgressive horror for its tone, style, and effects . . . [It is] acutely aware of 
the modern world, even if in disguise, but [is] not always overtly political…. (Ann 
and Jeff VanderMeer 2008, xvi; ellipses added) 
In an interview with VanderMeer, one of the more canonized New Weird authors, 
China Miéville, shoots down critical attempts to read his strange stories as 
allegorical (VanderMeer 2011, 58). The New Weird, he argues, anchors itself to 
empirical reality while acknowledging the perceptual limitations of encountering 
that reality, that is, committing to “the weirdness of the real.” In doing so, the New 
Weird recirculates certain horror tropes (e.g. encountering monsters beyond one’s 
perceptual abilities) but also recontextualizes them as belonging to everyday reality. 
This literality of the New Weird is also emphasized by Elvia Wilk (2019), who 
describes the weird as “an element or zone or experience that is not completely 
explainable according to our current structures for categorizing the world. And yet 
it exists: we can come in contact with it, experience it, and try to describe it, 
knowing description will fall short.” VanderMeer, too, admits to a mimetic intention 
of sorts, identifying as one of the motivations behind The Southern Reach “an 
attempt at conveying the truth that the world is stranger than we recognize, that 
we understand less of it than our brains trick us into believing” (Mendelsund 2014). 
This should not, however, be understood as reduction of the weird into any 
world of objective “facts,” as the weird (as a mode rather than a genre) is 
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characterized by particular affects and effects. Mark Fisher (2016, 15) detects the 
weird by “a sense of wrongness: a weird entity or object is so strange that it makes 
us feel that it should not exist, or at least it should not exist here.” According to Ann 
and Jeff VanderMeer (2011, xiv), the weird “is as much a sensation as a mode of 
writing,” and it makes people resort to explanations such as “I know it when I feel 
it.” The notion of weird as a mode or a sensation blurs the stylistic lines between 
the Old and the New Weird and provides opportunities for new inquiries. So how 
do works of the Old and the New Weird mobilize weird affects and sensations? How 
does this weirdness warp themes and narrative structures, and how is it entangled 
with various genre tropes? Furthermore, what makes the Weird more relevant for 
my argument, is that the Weird’s persistent focus on affect is inseparable from the 
thematic tension between the human and the nonhuman. For scholars such as 
Kahn Faassen and Pieter Vermeulen (2019), Weird “reimaginings of human and 
nonhuman boundaries are ineluctably anthropocentric, caught up as they are in all 
too human concerns about subjecthood and attunement to the other.” 
For Miéville, the most appealing side of Weird tales, in general, is the “awe 
and ecstasy” they evoke by expressing the weirdness of the real. In the interview 
with VanderMeer, Miéville connects this awe to the notion of the sublime: “I think 
what the Weird can do is question the arbitrary distinction between the Beautiful 
and the Sublime, and operate as a kind of Sublime Backwash, so that the numinous 
incomparable awesome slips back from ‘mountains’ and ‘forests,’ into the everyday” 
(VanderMeer 2011, 56). In Miéville’s own work, this “everyday” dynamic appears 
as urban spaces and streetwise characters with uncanny abilities. To give a few 
examples, The City & The City (2009) portrays two cities that exist folded into one 
another, with residents able to perceive only their own city; Kraken (2010) features, 
among other strange things, a master thief who can fold himself into very compact 
form; and “Covehithe” (2011) blends the very literal and concrete entity of an oil 
rig with a monstrous organism. We can identify this effect of awesome strangeness 
peering through everyday phenomena across a variety of New Weird texts and, in 
the spirit of Miéville, call it everyday sublime.71 
                                                 
71 While the coinage of the term New Weird is traced to M. John Harrison’s introduction of 
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In VanderMeer’s fiction, weirdness peers out of social interaction and 
biological life. His Veniss cycle (a number of short stories mostly published in the 
1990s and the novel Veniss Underground, 2003) and Ambergris novels (City of 
Saints and Madmen, 2002, Shriek: An Afterword, 2006, Finch, 2009) are all set in 
fantastic worlds full of human, animal, vegetal, machinic, and fungal life in complex 
metatextual entanglements that defy the very notion of “setting” (Robertson 2018). 
After the baroque density and experimental textuality of VanderMeer’s earlier work, 
The Southern Reach trilogy seems almost mundane at a first glance. The fictional 
world appears to be modeled on the empirical world, in a comparatively realist and 
coherent mode. The characters have mundane jobs, relationships, and personal 
interests – they are researchers and investigators, psychologists, and lighthouse 
keepers. The root of the trilogy’s strangeness lies not in a wildly fantastic fictional 
world but in the tension between what appears to be normal, modern human life 
and the inexplicable weirdness that contaminates it from all directions. For Faassen 
and Vermeulen (2019), this tension is also a way of addressing the “ineluctable 
anthropocentrism” of human subjectivity, as The Southern Reach trilogy “inscribes 
itself into the long lineage of weird writers who have struggled with the human’s 
fatally anthropocentric and pathetically anthropomorphizing drives.” 
Staying with the phenomenological aspects of weirdness by engaging The 
Southern Reach through a performative enactivist reading, I hope to amplify the 
kind of experience that goes, even if just slightly, beyond what is considered real in 
a human-centered culture. In fact, I propose that this kind of amplification of more-
than-human experientiality can function as a form of posthumanist critique. 
 
                                                 
Miéville’s novella The Tain (2002) and to a message board discussion initiated by Harrison 
in 2003, the label is used for the fiction of a wide range of authors. Malcolm-Clark (2009) 
foregrounds the work of K. J. Bishop, Steve Cockayne, Paul Di Filippo, M. John Harrison, 
Thomas Ligotti, Ian R. MacLeod, China Miéville, Alastair Reynolds, Justina Robson, Steph 
Swainston, and Jeff VanderMeer, while The New Weird (2008), an anthology edited by Ann 
and Jeff VanderMeer, also highlights such authors as Brian Evenson, Jeffrey Ford, Kathe 
Koja, Leena Krohn, and Alistair Rennie, among others. See also Robertson (2018, 21–31). 
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Everyday Sublime and Enactive Perception 
 
In the first novel of the trilogy, Annihilation,72 the weirdness comes to readers 
through a strange, detached narrator. The novel is written in the form of a field 
journal of an unnamed biologist of an expedition team. The team, sent by a 
clandestine government facility, the Southern Reach, explores an area, simply 
called “Area X,” which has been transformed by an unknown Event. All humans 
and their technology have vanished, leaving behind only what returnees from 
previous expeditions characterize as “pristine wilderness” (Ann, 55 et passim). 
Area X will not yield to scientific investigation: it permeates and contaminates the 
investigators, transmuting their sense of reality and self. Yet the interpretation 
offered by the novel, through the biologist narrator, is materialist, pragmatic, and 
scientific: Area X is presented as a transitional ecosystem inhabited by organisms 
that transgress human understanding, and the only way of making sense of the 
area is to continue exploring it. 
Authority,73 the second novel of the trilogy, revolves around the routines and 
idiosyncrasies of the Southern Reach facility, thus providing more mundane 
settings than Annihilation – and a style one reviewer has characterized as more 
Kafkaesque than Lovecraftian (Carroll 2015). The Miévillean notion of “everyday 
sublime” can be helpful in understanding both the style and the perceptual 
dynamics relevant to the novel. 
At the plot level, the novel tells the story of self-discovery, with the 
protagonist, Control, striving to find epistemic control of both Area X and the 
Southern Reach facility in the shadow of partly hidden authority figures. In the 
beginning of the novel, Control has just been appointed as the acting director of 
Southern Reach and charged with the mission of finding out what happened to the 
previous director. 
Control spent the first fifteen minutes of his morning searching for the key to the 
locked desk drawer. He wanted to solve that mystery before his appointment with 
the greater mystery posed by the biologist. His stale breakfast biscuit, cooling 
                                                 
72 Referred to as Ann from here on. 
73 Referred to as Aut from here on. 
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cup of coffee, and satchel lay graceless to the side of his computer. He didn’t 
feel particularly hungry anyway; the rancid cleaning smell had invaded his office. 
(Aut, 87) 
The everyday triviality of spending too much time in finding a key is made even 
more trivial by conjuring up the melancholic office items that “lay graceless to the 
side of his computer.” As a contrast to this mundaneness, as already foreshadowed 
by the mention of mysteries and the invasion of a strange smell, the contents of the 
drawer turn out to be quite unusual. 
A plant grew in the drawer, had been growing there in the dark this whole time, 
crimson roots attached to a nodule of dirt. As if the director had pulled it out of 
the ground and then, for whatever reason, placed it in the drawer. Eight slender 
leaves, a deep almost luminous green, protruded from the ridged stem at 
irregular intervals to form a pleasing circular pattern when viewed from above. 
From the side, though, the plant had the look of a creature trying to escape, with 
a couple of limbs, finally freed, reflexively curled over the edge of the drawer. 
At the base, half-embedded in the clump of dirt, lay the desiccated corpse 
of a small brown mouse. Control couldn’t be certain the plant hadn’t been feeding 
on it somehow. (Aut, 87) 
Further investigations into the plant’s history at the facility reveal that it appears to 
be immortal. It is impervious to fire, drowning, starvation, darkness, cutting, and 
freezing (Aut, 120, Acc, 217). Apart from a brief blooming phase only witnessed 
by one mentally unstable employee, and Control’s off-hand suggestion that it might 
consume animal corpses, the immortality seems to be the main weirdness in this 
otherwise ordinary plant. As an uncanny fictional being, the plant is exemplary of 
the variety of other equally strange beings, often plants or animals but occasionally 
machines too (an old cell phone is found in the drawer next to the plant), which 
possess incomprehensible abilities and appear completely indifferent to human 
beings. The apparent strangeness of these beings opens up to enactivist analysis. 
The enactivist approach maintains that perception is skillful activity, 
performed by “the whole animal” and its ability for self-movement (Noë 2004). At 
the diegetic level of Authority, the whole animal that is Control is reaching toward 
an understanding of Area X, and of the plant that acts as an emissary of the area. 
He performs a visual overview of the plant, from various sides, noting the 
contrasting affects of “a pleasing circular pattern when viewed from above” and 
“the look of a creature trying to escape” when viewed from the side. The movement 
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of Control’s point of view echoes Alva Noë’s example of perspectival perception: 
seeing a circular plate both as circular and, when viewed from an angle, as elliptical. 
When you move with respect to a plate, its profile changes. We grasp the way its 
profile changes as we move, and we encounter the actual shape of the plate in 
thus bringing to bear our sensorimotor understanding. Our appreciation of its 
actual shape consists in our perception of its profile and our understanding of the 
way, or apparent shape, depends on movement. (Noë 2004, 78)  
Noë argues not only that the perceptions of the plate as both circular and elliptical 
are simultaneous, but that the full understanding of the circular plate necessarily 
includes understanding how its perspectival properties depend on the self-
movement of the perceiver, that is, ellipticality. Moreover, the understanding a plate 
depends on including its relative and absent aspects. The virtual, in Noë’s thinking, 
thus always participates in the perception of actual environments. 
In Control’s later encounters of the plant, this double vision remains: as with 
Noë’s example, Control perceives both aspects of the plant, the circular and the 
escaping, the pleasing and the jarringly strange. In VanderMeer’s novel, perception 
thus involves the sensorimotor understanding described by enactive thinkers, and 
builds on the affective aspects of that understanding: the ways in which some forms 
immediately appear as pleasing, others as strange. Moreover, Control’s perception 
includes an understanding, now brought onto a conscious level, that the plant 
contains hidden aspects, that is, it is not all there to be seen. 
Due to its focus on exploring the limits of human experience and perception, 
Weird fiction is exceptionally suited to effect embodied estrangement in readers. 
Control’s perceptions of the immortal plant illustrate how such an estrangement 
takes place on a cognitive level. As readers enact such fictional perceptions, they 
also exercise their sensorimotor capabilities and affective sensitivities, thus 
echoing the moves of the fictional figure both kinesically and perceptually. 
Staying with the linkage of visual and sensorimotor understanding, we can 
review other instances of everyday sublime in The Southern Reach and see how 
they also hinge on readers’ capabilities for self-movement. Furthermore, the event 
of a protagonist looking at something, as in the example above, is not, in fact, 
representative of the trilogy’s way of articulating more-than-human relations. More 
often, reversing conventional subject-object dynamics, nonhuman entities look (or 
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seem to look) at humans, and humans feel their gaze. Particularly interesting in this 
setup is how the notion of strange entities “peering through things” blends into 
more tactile and visceral notions of being “contaminated” by said strange entities 
and phenomena (among them, the beauty of nature). Tied into the structure of 
sensory modalities, the blending also effects a shift from one cognitive metaphor 
to another: from seeing as epistemic control to feeling as partial knowing. In 
VanderMeer’s trilogy, the latter is presented in highly ambivalent terms, as both 
painful and truthful. In the next section, I first consider how such perceptual 
dynamics contribute to the understanding of the limits of human experience in 
Annihilation. 
 
5.2 Encountering the Unknowable Nonhuman 
 
In Annihilation, the biologist-narrator’s scientifically trained attention is tuned 
toward nonhuman ecosystems rather than interhuman relationships. The text 
presents observations of plant and animal life in the transitional zones between 
saltwater marshes and freshwater forests. The observational passages consist of 
fluid prose rich in affective verbiage. In contrast, references to the research team’s 
social relations are unemotional and non-descriptive. The lack of description is 
almost disturbing: the other members of the expedition are not provided with 
personal histories or names. Rather, they are referred to by their professional 
functions: the psychologist, the anthropologist, and the surveyor. 
Such reduction of individuals into their functions is explained as part of the 
protocol of the Southern Reach institution – stripping the expedition members of 
their personal details is supposed to protect them from the effects of Area X. As 
Siobhan Carroll (2016) shows in her analysis of the explorer figure in recent works 
Weird and New Weird fiction, selfless restraint is at the heart of the idealized 
expedition. Expeditions, in Carroll’s historically informed reading, combine 
scientific and imperialist agendas and also pave the way for capitalist 
appropriations of the “as-yet uncommodified natural landscape” (Carroll 2016, 72, 
see also Moore 2015). As part of such operations and especially in narratives of 
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such operations, the individual explorer ideally functions as a “vanguard of 
civilization” (Carroll 2016, 72), which includes being capable of self-mastery and 
detached observation even at the face of terror. 
In Annihilation, such capabilities are undermined from the beginning. 
Nonhuman animals play a central part in the destabilization of human mastery. The 
narrator reports several instances of being seen by the strange animals of Area X, 
in ways that do not fit her conception of how animals usually see humans. These 
creatures, however realistic their portrayal, appear too conscious for comfort. The 
first encounter of this kind is with a pair of otters, occurring on the first day of the 
expedition observing the biological life of the area. The strangeness of the otters is 
evoked in a brief flash in the middle of a passage that describes the biologist’s other 
observations. 
The richness of Area X’s biosphere was reflected in the wealth of birdlife, from 
warblers and flickers to cormorants and black ibis. I could also see a bit into the 
salt marshes, and my attention was rewarded by a minute-long glimpse of a pair 
of otters. At one point, they glanced up and I had a strange sensation that they 
could see me watching them. It was a feeling I often had when out in the 
wilderness: that things were not quite what they seemed, and I had to fight 
against the sensation because it could overwhelm my scientific objectivity. There 
was also something else, moving ponderously through the reeds, but it was 
closer to the lighthouse and in deep cover. I could not tell what it was, and lost 
track of it entirely. I imagined it might be another wild pig, as they could be good 
swimmers and were just as omnivorous in their choice of habitats as in their diets. 
(Ann, 30) 
The passage begins with seemingly reliable description of observations carried out 
by a trained scientist. The encounter with the otters momentarily disrupts this 
reliability by pointing at “the strange sensation that they could see me watching 
them” and “that things were not quite what they seemed.” To amplify this evocation 
of strangeness, the passage also describes “something else, moving ponderously 
through the reeds” that the biologist “imagines” to be a wild pig. Reading through 
the passage, reliable observation gives way to strange sensations, uncertainty, and 
imagination, finally returning to the realm of rational explanations. As the passage 
reveals that the biologist is accustomed to “fighting” strange sensations, rationality 
emerges as a means of resistance at the face of the fantastic and the unknowable. 
In the pages that follow, observation and other research tasks are contextualized 
as a way to “calm [the explorers’] nerves” (Ann, 31). After nightfall, hearing a 
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strange cry from the marshes, the explorers shout back to it “confident that 
eventually we would photograph it, document its behavior, tag it, and assign it a 
place in the taxonomy of living things” (Ann, 31). 
Throughout the novel, rational scientific observation gives way to moments 
of being observed in return – for instance, by a dolphin eye that seems “painfully 
human, almost familiar.” 
As they slid by, the nearest one rolled slightly to the side, and it stared at me with 
an eye that did not, in that brief flash, resemble a dolphin eye to me. It was 
painfully human, almost familiar. In an instant that glimpse was gone and they 
had submerged again, and I had no way to verify what I had seen. I stood there, 
watched those twinned lines disappear up the canal, back toward the deserted 
village. I had the unsettling thought that the natural world around me had become 
a kind of camouflage. (Ann, 98) 
The notions of camouflage, pretense, and performance emerge as cues to readers. 
Moments like this occur often enough in Annihilation that one critic has called it the 
“uncanny sense that there is always a pretense performed by the natural” (Uhall 
2016). This sense of performativity emphasizes the unknowability of Area X, and 
the limits of scientific objectivity. In resisting the status of objects, the nonhuman 
entities of Area X disturb the whole foundation of the explorers’ mission of 
epistemically or institutionally controlling the area. Moreover, the nonhuman 
entities enter the bodies of human observers and actively transform their 
perceptions and feelings. 
Very soon during the expedition, the biologist enters an underground 
construction (which she perceives as a tower while others refer to it as a tunnel) 
and becomes contaminated by strange fungal spores. The contamination makes 
her more sensitive to the nonhuman life of Area X and alters her perception while 
making her feel physically stronger. Among other alterations, she begins to 
perceive the walls of the underground tower as breathing and having “a fleshy 
aspect to them” (Ann, 27). 
The contamination also makes the biologist impervious to the hypnotic 
suggestion practiced by the psychologist of the expedition group. From the training 
period on, the purpose of the suggestion has been to instill in the group a specific 
model of perception. The model affirms the subjectivity of the expedition members 
as distinctive, certain and separate from the environment. The environment, and 
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the underground tower in particular, is asserted as a lifeless artifact – “made of 
coquina and stone” (Ann, 32). 
After being contaminated, the biologist is forced to realize the artificiality of 
this model of the environment – but instead of finding a “truthful” or “natural” way 
of perceiving, she is equipped with another model that is equally artificial, namely 
the spore-induced perspective where everything appears excessively alive. As a 
result, there is no way she can trust her own senses. The spore contamination and 
the organizational training both operate as parts of her perception, but she does 
not consider either of them “true.” As the contamination progresses, she feels 
oppressed by the vividness of her impressions of the wilderness and cheated by 
the inhuman strength of her body: “[T]he brightness in my chest continued to 
sculpt me as I walked, and . . . I believed I could have run a marathon. I did not 
trust that feeling. I felt, in so many ways, that I was being lied to” (Ann, 93). 
Science fiction and fantasy are full of narratives about (often horrifying) 
assimilations and mergers with other entities. This dynamic of self-destruction is 
dominant in many of the so called “zone novels,” such as the Strugatsky brothers' 
Roadside Picnic (1972, also known as Stalker), Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris (1961), 
and the apocalyptic novels of J. G. Ballard such as The Drowned World (1962), 
The Burning World (1964) and The Crystal World (1966). In these narratives, the 
protagonists generally meet their doom in the maddening and/or lethal ordeals of 
strange environments. However, like some of the more recent post-catastrophical 
audiovisual narratives, such as Fallout (1997–2018), Lost (2004–2010) or Fringe 
(2008–2013), The Southern Reach does something different. Area X is well beyond 
the scope of human minds, definitely hostile to humans and destructive to the fixed 
ideas they have of themselves, but this destruction implies transformation rather 
than the end of the world. But what sets Annihilation apart even from the rest of 
post-catastrophical narratives is that the biologist successfully resists the merger 
with the strange entity of Area X. 
As Wilk (2019, emphasis original) points out, the “new nature” of Area X 
cannot be rationally explained by the biologist. Rather, it “constitutes its own form 
of knowledge, an embodied knowledge rooted in place.” The novel arrives to such 
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an embodied knowledge by both destabilizing rationality and by amplifying the 
bodily feelings of more-than-human experience. The narrative routinely evokes 
hesitation and suspicion by providing multiple speculations on a given observation 
or feeling (“Perhaps she meant merely to reassure us, but I would like to believe 
she was trying to reassure herself,” Ann, 18), referring to the relative ignorance of 
the narrator at the time of experience compared to the time of writing (“I hadn't 
even thought of this, though I should have,” Ann, 24; “At the time, we didn't think 
to look for more sets of foot prints,” Ann, 55), and describing failures in 
understanding (“I felt as if I should recognize these features – that it was very 
important,” Ann, 141). The observational methods and attitudes of the biologist fail 
her one by one: she cannot remain objective, her microscope does not register 
some of the obviously alien cells in her samples, and all the pre-expedition 
conditioning and training given at the Southern Reach facility proves irrelevant to 
the task. Along with the possibility of epistemic control, the biologist loses her 
sense of mission. 
As rational observation loses its grip of the world, the bodily feelings of 
more-than-human experience creep in. The “brightness” the biologist is 
contaminated with reconfigures her moods and perceptions, and she can no 
longer deny what her senses tell her, namely that the animal life of Area X regards 
her as she does them. Prendergast (2017) has noted that Annihilation presents 
animals as ethical subjects, but in my mind, the novel does far more than that: it 
presents a coevolutive understanding of a world in which the human subject is not 
alone in the world but continuously observed, infected and transformed by 
nonhuman presences. Human and nonhuman bodies exist in feedback loops of 
mutual specification. In addition to presenting such a more-than-human 
understanding, however, Annihilation also acknowledges human resistance to it, 
and the limits of human ability to understand the nonhuman. 
In the act of resisting, the biologist performs a reluctant transformation that 
the readers can also enact. In this bodily process, which we can begin to 
understand through the notion of readerly choreography, the certainty of rational 
knowledge about both selves and environments is gradually annihilated. 
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Hovering at the Edge of Nihilism 
 
The New Weird makes use of the genre conventions of both science fiction and 
horror, and by doing so it can also nudge our habitual patterns of readerly 
engagement into new directions. In this section, I build on George J. Sieg’s (2009) 
work on the experientiality of horror to demonstrate how The Southern Reach 
mobilizes and reconfigures the corporeal model of the Lovecraftian “Gnostic victim.” 
Attending to the embodied experience of reading shows that it does so through the 
evocation of particular gestures and motions. 
Staging an encounter between the biologist-protagonist and the nonhuman 
unknowable, Annihilation presents a detailed choreography of existential and 
epistemic uncertainty. We can begin here, and trace the fictional figure of the 
biologist throughout the trilogy. 
What I found when I finally stood there, hands on bent knees, peering down into 
that tidal pool, was a rare species of colossal starfish, six-armed, larger than a 
saucepan, that bled a dark gold color into the still water as if it were on fire. Most 
of us professionals eschewed its scientific name for the more apt “destroyer of 
worlds.” It was covered in thick spines, and along the edges I could just see, 
fringed with emerald green, the most delicate of transparent cilia, thousands of 
them, propelling it along upon its appointed route as it searched for its prey; other, 
lesser starfish. I had never seen a destroyer of worlds before, even in an 
aquarium, and it was so unexpected that I forgot about the slippery rock and, 
shifting my balance, almost fell, steadying myself with one arm propped against 
the edge of the tidal pool. 
But the longer I stared at it, the less comprehensible the creature became. 
The more it became something alien to me, the more I had a sense that I knew 
nothing at all – about nature, about ecosystems. There was something about my 
mood and its dark glow that eclipsed sense, that made me see this creature, 
which had indeed been assigned a place in the taxonomy – catalogued, studied, 
and described – irreducible down to any of that. And if I kept looking, I knew that 
ultimately I would have to admit I knew less than nothing about myself as well, 
whether that was a lie or the truth. 
When I finally wrenched my gaze from the starfish and stood again, I could 
not tell where the sky met the sea, whether I faced the water or the shore. I was 
completely adrift, and dislocated, and all I had to navigate by in that moment was 
the glowing beacon below me. (Ann, 174-175)74 
                                                 
74 The particular ecological significance of the “destroyer of worlds” lies in the fact that 
the starfish (crown-of-thorns seastar by its common name) destroys coral reef ecosystems. 
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The biologist has arrived on these slippery coastal rocks at the end of a drunken 
and disoriented evening. The passage makes it easy for readers to enact the 
location, posture, and movements of the narrator’s body: we read her as standing, 
“hands on bent knees, peering down into that tidal pool” and then shifting her 
balance and almost falling, ending up perched awkwardly against the edge of the 
pool. 
As we do so, we can also enact the bodily feelings and cognitive trajectories 
woven into the narration. The perceptual and kinesic action in the passage is 
inseparable from the cognitive-affective unfolding of the experiential world. Seeing, 
the primary means of epistemic control, turns into futile staring that yields no result: 
“the longer I stared at it, the less comprehensible the creature became.” The 
strangeness of the starfish grows to encompass nature and ecosystems, and 
“something in [the biologist’s] mood and in its dark glow” makes the starfish seem 
irreducible to scientific knowledge. The kinesic action in the passage further 
emphasizes this failure in understanding. The biologist fails to keep her balance, 
and she fails to make sense of the starfish. 
In the last sentences of the passage, perception, emotion, and sense-
making come together in a global sense of disorientation that is mapped in spatial 
terms: the biologist is “completely adrift, and dislocated.” This fictional experience 
conveys the disorientation of not just a skull-bound mind, but an entire embodied 
organism. 
In the pages that immediately follow, the biologist recounts “a similar 
experience at a thousand times the magnitude” (Ann, 175): the encounter with the 
Crawler, the monster that writes the spore-emitting words on the wall of the 
underground tower. This encounter involves a psychedelic confusion of sensory 
impressions, starting with a “blue-green light [that] was like nothing I had 
experienced before [and] so overwhelmed my ability to comprehend shapes within 
it that I forced myself to switch from sight, to focus at first on reports from other 
senses” (Ann, 176). The biologist hears an “unearthly noise [that] had a texture 
                                                 
The phrase also resonates with the iconic words from the Bhagavad Gita, recited by 
Robert Oppenheimer after the Trinity test: "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of 
worlds.” 
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and a weight, and with it came a burning smell, as of late fall leaves or like some 
vast and distant engine close to overheating” (Ann, 176). In her retrospective 
commentary of this description, the biologist admits that the particularities might 
be produced in the act of remembering: “It is difficult to tell what blanks my mind 
might be filling in just to remove the weight of so many unknowns” (Ann, 176). In 
this way, the narrative leaves a door open to the irreducible mystery of the 
perceptual event while simultaneously providing very detailed and rich description. 
Like the encounter with the starfish, the encounter with the monster brings 
the biologist to the limits of her perceptual and cognitive abilities. In her perception, 
the shape of the monster keeps changing, evoking optical illusions and impossible 
sensations. This perceptual uncertainty leaves her in an all-encompassing feeling 
of existential insecurity that we might as well identify as groundlessness. 
What can you do when your five senses are not enough? Because I still couldn’t 
truly see it here, any more than I had seen it under the microscope, and that’s 
what scared me the most. Why couldn’t I see it? In my mind, I stood over the 
starfish at Rock Bay, and the starfish grew and grew until it was not just the tidal 
pool but the world, and I was teetering on its rough, luminous surface, staring up 
at the night sky again, while the light of it flowed up and through me. (Ann, 178, 
emphases original) 
The motif of staring without comprehension, combined with a loss of balance, is 
repeated. The luminous starfish of the biologist’s imagination grows in size and 
sends its light to join the light of the night sky, leaving the biologist in between these 
two incomprehensible entities, permeated by light. 
Reading through these fictional situations, I am prompted to enact 
uncomfortable bodily feelings of losing full vision and balance despite my efforts to 
maintain them. While the detail of description provides abundant sensory cues, 
some of them beautiful (blue-green light) and some frightening (burning smell – 
overheating engine), these sensorimotor feelings form the base notes of the 
affective dynamic of the reading event. The abundant detail serves to add 
complexity to the basic bodily feeling of failing to maintain sensorimotor control. As 
sensorimotor control is precisely the bodily ability that, in enactivist theory and 
phenomenology of the body more broadly, maintains our sense of a stable self, the 
bodily feeling of losing that control serves to temporarily undermine coherent 
subjectivity itself (see Sheets-Johnstone 2011, Thompson 2014, 334). Evoking the 
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destabilization of the lived body is thus an effective way for articulating more 
conceptual failures in control. 
 
Cognitivist Nihilism and the Gnostic Victim 
 
The encounters with the starfish and the monster form a sublime scene, beginning 
from the mundane observations of the biologist but growing beyond them into a 
cosmic existential dread. For a moment, it seems that the novel has turned from 
the materialist treatment of “everyday sublime” into an older style of Weird and 
horror fiction – the protagonist finds the limits of her comprehension, and is forced 
to stay there, succumbing into madness. It seems there is no option other than a 
final fall into the abyss – a nihilism, or annihilation of the perceiving rational subject. 
A closer look at both the textual detail of the fictional encounters and the notion of 
nihilism, however, shows that this would be a hasty conclusion. 
The Embodied Mind defines nihilism in Nietzschean terms: “the nihilistic 
predicament is the situation in which we know that our most cherished values are 
untenable, and yet we seem incapable of giving them up” (Varela et al 1992, 128). 
They connect this predicament specifically to the cognitivist attachment to 
consciousness and free will. Cognitivist nihilism thus involves both the realization 
that cognitive science does not support the existence of an central, conscious, 
masterful self, and the persistent inability to think of human experience without 
such a notion.75 The Embodied Mind claims that cognitivist nihilism is incapable of 
coming to terms with the groundlessness at the heart of both Western science and 
subjective experience. Enactive cognition, in contrast, is metaphysically 
“groundless,” as it cannot be traced back to a stable foundation in either a pregiven 
world or a permanent self. Using robustly corporeal terms, Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch claim that a realization of this view 
                                                 
75 Thomas Metzinger thoroughly explores the source conflict of cognitive nihilism in Being 
No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2003). The conflict is also central to recent 
popular fiction such as the television series True Detective (written by Nic Pizzolatto, 2014–
2017) and science fiction such as Peter Watts’ novels Blindsight (2006) and Echopraxia 
(2014). 
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initially results in a sense of vertigo due to the collapse of what we had supposed 
to be sure and stable foundations. But rather than sweeping this sense of 
groundlessness under the rug by once again pitching the internal and the 
external against each other - - - we need to delve deeper into this sense of 
groundlessness and follow through all of its implications, philosophically and 
experientially. (Varela et al. 1992, 200) 
As discussed above, the “sense of groundlessness” as a bodily feeling, figures 
prominently in VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach, and moments of characters 
losing their balance occur at thematically crucial moments. VanderMeer’s fiction 
thus provides opportunities for “following through” the implications of 
groundlessness in terms of both theme and readerly experience and move beyond 
nihilism. 
Cognitivist nihilism becomes more tangible when we bring in the tradition of 
Weird fiction, and H. P. Lovecraft in particular. George J. Sieg (2009, 34; see also 
Houellebecq 2006) argues that Lovecraftian horror emerges particularly from the 
experience of the victim’s perception and reason being violated. Lovecraft’s 
characters are “stripped down to being bare instruments of perception - - - impaled 
by an intrusive, inescapably bizarre alien otherness.” Sieg locates this kind of 
“Gnostic horror,” found in classic vampire fiction and the Exorcist films alike, in the 
perspective of the victim rather than in the presence or characteristics of the 
monster. The victim, whether the virginal heroine ravished by demonic forces or 
the pure-minded scientist driven mad by eldritch horrors, needs to be “innocent, 
as regards the horror” (Sieg 2009, 34, emphasis original). In Sieg’s analysis, the 
innocence of Lovecraftian victims is tied to their position as rational, sane, white 
and Aryan subjects forced to encounter a world of reason-defying miscegenated 
monstrosities.76 The Gnostic victim thus suggests the cognitive nihilist readerly 
choreography of hovering at the edge of the unknowable, helplessly staring into 
the monstrous abyss. As readers enact the bodily feelings related such a fictional 
situation evokes (perhaps including vertigo, an empty feeling in the stomach, and 
a weakening or loss of balance), they also rehearse cognitive and affective patterns 
                                                 
76 Sieg’s analysis is supported by other research on monstrosity that argues that the 
horror of monster narratives is constructed upon a conceptual and experiential dualism 
between the pure subject/victim and the monstrous other (see Cohen 1996, Shildrick 
2001). 
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bundled with the bodily feelings. This example shows us how readerly 
choreography unfolds as enactment of patterned fictional feeling and movement, 
and how it draws on readers’ habitual knowledge of genre-typical figures. 
Going back to the text of Annihilation, we can ask whether the encounter of 
the biologist and the monster fits into the dualist horror schema, characterized 
above as cognitivist nihilism and embodied in the Gnostic victim. We already saw 
how the scene destabilizes sensorimotor control and the reliability of perception. 
However, it seems to map rationality and subjectivity in a way that differs from the 
cognitivist nihilist pattern. The biologist continues to observe the monster even 
when her sight fails her, focusing at first “on reports from other senses” (176). Even 
when those reports appear as confusing and potentially misleading, as she admits 
that her mind “might be filling in just to remove the weight of so many unknowns” 
(Ann, 176), the narration retains a calmness detached from the perceptual 
confusion. 
Moreover, the biologist rationally recognizes that the monster is an organism 
with strange but partially comprehensible abilities, and thus contextualizes the 
monster as part of the ecosystem of Area X. In this ecological mode of thought and 
experience, she accepts the unknowability of the monster. Thus, even when limited 
rationality might be necessary for the coherence or continuity of her subjectivity, 
total epistemic control is not, and she does not succumb to madness. In this regard, 
the figure of the biologist differs from the tradition of Gnostic victims. 
Sieg (2009, 53–54) concludes that for Lovecraft, “there was no solution or 
escape from the horror, as becoming the monster through deliberate identification 
is hardly an option for the extreme reductionist. For him, life is a conceptual 
nightmare with only the void of an empty consciousness as contrast.” But Sieg’s 
analysis inadvertently provides a conceptual way out of horror: relinquishing purity 
and becoming monstrous. As Ulstein’s (2017) and Prendergast’s (2017) analyses 
suggest, this is exactly what happens in Annihilation. As Ulstein puts it, the trilogy 
presents the monstrous as “a potentially emancipatory catalyst for starting to think 
in weird terms” (Ulstein 2017, 94).77 
                                                 
77  Another line of interpretation would connect the biologist’s encounter with the 
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I would further suggest that the weird can, in the case of the biologist, also 
be interpreted in ecological terms. Even before entering Area X, she is open to the 
notion of ecological interdependence – in fact, she cannot figure herself outside of 
such relationality. She figures herself as an expression of her environments. This 
anti-individualism marks her as not “innocent, as regards the horror,” as a proper 
Gnostic victim would be. In a move that finalizes the readerly choreography of 
resisting cognitivist nihilism, she closes her eyes and turns away from the monster. 
This move – literal to the nonconscious system of readerly response, literal 
and figural to a conscious critical mind – reconfigures the trope of the Gnostic 
victim. As the biologist turns away from the edge of madness, readers may 
performatively enact the movement and accept, on the level of nonconscious 
kinesic response at least, the cognitive reorientation entailed in it. The move now 
exists as a possible response to encountering monstrosity. The turn can by no 
means be read as a victory of the masterful human subject, as the monster still 
forces the biologist through an excruciating near-death experience, and after 
leaving the underground tower, she is gradually transformed into something 
nonhuman. But even after all this, there is no complete annihilation of the 
perceiving subject: the biologist endures “beyond the endurable” (Ann, 182). The 
narrative maintains a pragmatic, reporting tone, and the biologist goes on living 
and exploring an area that supports monstrous beings as part of its common 
ecology. The latter parts of the trilogy take this trajectory further, with Acceptance 
in particular focusing on life in a strange and dangerous ecosystem. 
 
Accepting Monstrosity 
 
                                                 
nonhuman to the romantic naturalist tradition in American literature. Posthumanist critics 
have argued that “the romantic tradition of US nature writing tends to preserve a 
conception of the self as becoming more ‘in tune’ with nature, both outside and inside, and 
therefore more human” (Idema 2019, 108, emphasis removed). As previous critics have 
noted, The Southern Reach plays with this tradition but ends up disintegrating the human 
subject rather than reinforcing it (Idema 2019, Ulstein 2017). 
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In Haraway’s terms, the biologist’s turn away from the edge of madness marks a 
decision to stay with the trouble. After this turn, at the climax of Annihilation, the 
trilogy goes on to explore the messy and painful business of living with monstrous 
creatures, with the biologist eventually becoming monstrous herself. By the end of 
Annihilation we lose sight of her, as she disappears into Area X. She resurfaces in 
the last book of the trilogy, Acceptance,78 to be seen through the eyes of her 
doppelgänger, Ghost Bird (a figure I discuss in more detail in the next section). 
By the end of the trilogy, the biologist has become a mountain of moss-
covered flesh, many-eyed and glorious – strange, but definitely perceived as a 
material and biological organism by the other characters and especially by her 
doppelgänger. The monster is described in multisensory terms, as carrying a smell 
of “thick brine and oil and some sharp crushed herb” and emanating a sound “as 
if the wind and the sea had been smashed together and in the aftershock there 
reverberated that same sonorous moan” (Acc, 194). It is described as muscular 
and wide, “flanks carved by dark ridges like a whale’s” (Acc, 194), covered with 
dried seaweed and barnacles. During the descriptive passage of Ghost Bird’s 
encounter with this organism, the affective tone shifts from an initial fear and awe 
to something like curiosity and respect. 
Nothing monstrous existed here – only beauty, only the glory of good design, of 
intricate planning, from the lungs that allowed this creature to live on land or at 
sea, to the huge gill slits hinted at along the sides, shut tightly now, but which 
would open to breathe deeply of seawater when the biologist once again headed 
for the ocean. All of those eyes, all of those temporary tidal pools, the pockmarks 
and the ridges, the thick, sturdy quality of the skin. An animal, an organism that 
had never existed before or that might belong to an alien ecology. (Acc, 196) 
Performing a great feat of mental flexibility, Ghost Bird recognizes the organismic 
in the monstrous and accepts it as belonging to her world. The scene echoes the 
similar recognition on the part of the biologist when she encounters the Crawler in 
the underground tower. While both the Crawler and the biologist-as-monster are 
both recognized as parts of the ecology of the area, the ecology itself is still “alien.” 
The respect performed in this passage both does and does not depend on readerly 
feelings of familiarity. On the one hand, the organism is described in appreciative 
                                                 
78 Referred to as Acc from here on. 
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terms that connect it to the familiar realms of animal and machine (good design, 
intricate planning). On the other, the sum of description still amounts to an 
irreducibly strange entity that defies known categories, except, perhaps the 
category of the organism. Imaginatively enacting Ghost Bird’s experience of these 
monstrous organisms defamiliarizes readerly notions of what it is to perceive 
natural organisms, and thus it entails embodied estrangement. 
Tom Idema (2019, 109) connects the radical epistemological and existential 
uncertainty of The Southern Reach to postmodernist novels of J. G. Ballard, 
Thomas Pynchon, and Don DeLillo, claiming that the trilogy shares with them “a 
discrepancy between an unrelenting desire for truth and authenticity, and a 
structural inability to find it, an inability that the protagonist can barely fathom.” In 
contrast to the postmodernists, Idema argues, VanderMeer presents this 
discrepancy not only as a social and scientific condition but as an environmental-
posthumanist issue. He builds on contemporary research in ecology to claim that 
the continuous transmutations of ecosystems are philosophically just as radically 
unknowable as VanderMeer’s Area X. 
The alternative to cognitivist nihilism, as presented in Acceptance, is not a 
harmonious return to nature. Certain passages of the biologist’s account of her life 
in Area X are certainly romantic, such as her comment that she has become so 
attuned to the messages of animal and vegetal life, whether “natural or unnatural,” 
that she no longer wishes to consume any of that life (Acc, 177). However, her 
attunement is jarred and her daily routines perverse. For decades, she postpones 
her transformation into monstrous form by inflicting pain on herself (Acc, 179–180). 
Still, in the hope that allowing that transformation to happen will open up new vistas 
of knowledge, she eventually gives in (Acc, 180). 
As the monstrous is presented as something beyond human experience and 
language, the trilogy offers no first person perspective on the transformation. 
Following the biologist thus brings the embodied reader to another limit – not of 
reason and mastery, but of human forms of experience and narrative. Tracing the 
movements of her fictional body will not bring us any closer to more-than-human 
experience. It is thus time to move on to the wider weirdness of the trilogy, and 
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consider the experiential dynamics arising in the performative enactivist reading of 
it. 
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6 More-than-Human Experience in VanderMeer’s 
Authority and Acceptance 
 
Thus far, this study has discussed engagements with single novels or short stories: 
the bodily feelings they afford, the formal devices through which they operate, and 
the genre conventions and expectations they draw on. However, at this point it is 
necessary to also discuss a longer period of engagement, that is, reading a trilogy 
of novels. What can happen in this longer engagement that cannot happen in the 
reading of a single novel? 
VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach offers an interesting case, as its 
narrative strategies reconfigure some of the conventions of the trilogy form. The 
three books are dissimilar in style and form, ranging from a mock-Lovecraftian 
horror story narrated in the first person (Annihilation) through a Kafkaesque agent 
novel in free indirect discourse (Authority) to a polyphonic collection of 
perspectives on Area X (Acceptance). When encountered in the kinesic mode and 
with the posthumanist orientation utilized in the previous readings in this study, the 
three novels afford distinctly different readerly choreographies that enrich the 
interpretation. 
Annihilation, as was discussed in the previous section, stages an encounter 
with the supposedly-horrific monstrous nonhuman, and a pragmatic turn toward 
non-innocent living as part of a strange ecosystem. In this section, I discuss the 
readerly choreographies suggested by Authority and Acceptance in more detail. 
Authority in particular affords experiences of what the previous section 
characterized as cognitivist nihilism, a desperate grasping of ego-centered control 
even while rationally realizing its illusionary nature. The novel’s negotiation of 
boundaries and control is highly relevant to the posthumanist discussion, as is the 
more-than-human sensibility of Acceptance, which provides readers with a 
growing sense of distributed material agency. The novel urges readers to release 
their hold of human exceptionalist views of language and knowledge and give room 
to fungal and atmospheric weavers of meaning. Engagement with the trilogy, over 
a longer period of time, can thus take readers through a series of affects and bodily 
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feelings that amplify their lived experience of more-than-human entanglement. This 
is embodied estrangement in action. 
In section 6.1, I discuss how The Southern Reach as a whole, and Authority 
and Acceptance in particular, employs experiential motifs and figures that give rise 
to feelings of being haunted, and argue that such a narrative strategy demonstrates 
some of the more-than-human aspects of human cognition and experience. 
Section 6.2 discusses how such a narrative strategy relates to the theme of more-
than-human meaning-making in the trilogy. Finally, I draw together the theoretical 
threads spun out throughout the study and suggest how reading can function as a 
means or practicing posthumanist sensitivities. 
 
6.1 Staying with the Weirdness 
 
In section 5.1, I discussed the biologist’s backing away from the monster as a 
kinesic analogy for resisting cognitivist nihilism. Another such kinesic analogy can 
be found from diving: it makes sense to come back to the surface rather than to 
drown. The kinesic motif of diving and drowning is central to Authority, and it is 
developed further in Acceptance. The very opening words of Authority present the 
motif as the recurring dream image of the protagonist, Control: 
In Control’s dreams it is early morning, the sky deep blue with just a twinge of 
light. He is staring from a cliff down into an abyss, a bay, a cove. It always 
changes. He can see for miles into the still water. He can see ocean behemoths 
gliding there, like submarines or bell-shaped orchids or the wide hulls of ships, 
silent, ever moving, the size of them conveying such a sense of power that he 
can feel the havoc of their passage even from so far above. He stares for hours 
at the shapes, the movements, listening to the whispers echoing up to him… and 
then he falls. Slowly, too slowly, he falls soundless into the dark water, without 
splash or ripple. And keeps falling. 
Sometimes this happens while he is awake, as if he hasn’t been paying 
enough attention, and then he silently recites his own name until the real world 
returns to him. (Aut, 3) 
In this kinesically and kinetically effective passage, large bodies effect a power 
bordering on the gravitational: miles of still water and the behemoths within, 
“conveying such a sense of power that he can feel the havoc of their passage even 
from so far above,” beckon the dreamer into hours of silent fascination. The weight 
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of this silence is only accentuated by the “whispers echoing up to him.” The 
elements of this scene map easily into a psychoanalytical cartography of the mind: 
deep, captivating, dangerous, monster-filled waters underneath form the 
subconscious realm of desire and emotion, while the observer, far above, is 
analogous to consciousness – which we have learned, in psychology classrooms, 
to view as “the tip of an iceberg,” a tiny fragment of a mind whose processes are 
largely not conscious. In this cartography, the silence signals lack of 
communication between the subconscious and the conscious, with only “whispers” 
(dreams, intuitions) reaching the conscious mind. 
The power structure in this fictional dream image is clear to any reader: the 
observer, while placed in a position of apparent control with a clear line of sight into 
the vast depths below – height and sight both signaling rationality – is destabilized 
by the kinetic, silent force of the depths. The observer loses his position, falling into 
the water. Readers learn that “this happens while he is awake” too, and “this” 
marks an ambiguous reference to either the dreaming or to the falling. Identifying 
with the observer in the dream, “he” – the protagonist of the novel – “recites his 
own name until the real world returns to him.” The name the protagonist has taken 
for himself is “Control,” an ironic reminder of the mental gesture of “taking control” 
that he needs to exercise on a regular basis. 
The recurring dream and the tendency to lose control are the first things 
readers of Authority learn about the character – and of the central theme of the 
novel. The opening passage also asserts the phenomenological metaphor of falling 
into the depths, which forms the context for the reading to come. The experiential 
dynamic of reading the novel is enclosed in this tension between the subconscious 
and the conscious, and propelled by the repeated gestures of taking control. The 
theme of control bears both on the level of figuring out the protagonist’s personal 
narrative, and on the level of making sense of the fictional environment of Area X 
more broadly. As when reading Annihilation, enacting the movements and affects 
tied to the protagonist grounds the sense-making process of the fictional world and 
gives rise to broader thematic interpretations. 
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Human and More-than-Human Hauntings 
 
As a protagonist and a focalizing perspective, Control performs cognitivist nihilism 
in complex gestures. His social status is unstable, as he is portrayed as a tool for 
willful authoritative figures (federal intelligence agents for mother and grandfather, 
and several loci of power at the Southern Reach headquarters) and as being 
constantly on the verge of losing his professional credibility as a governmental 
agent (the job as the acting director of the Southern Reach facility is described as 
his “last chance”). Moreover, his thoughts and perceptions are always tinged with 
moments of profound epistemic uncertainty. In addition to the recurring dream that 
opens the novel, Control is haunted by glimpses of disturbing images and 
associations, such as a water stain in the ceiling resembling “variously an ear and 
a giant subaqueous eye staring down” (Aut, 91) and a recurrent smell of rotting 
honey that he interprets as the scent of a cleaning product used in the Southern 
Reach facility. The physical environment disturbs him by always being something 
other than it seems – an experience in which both the continuity of the environment 
and the stability of the experiencing self are called to question. 
In reading experience, Control’s hauntings evoke a bodily feeling of a 
strange presence, as if something was hovering just beyond the edge of my visual 
field. The exploration of this phenomenological periphery is also what The Southern 
Reach, as a whole, affords to readers. This experience is thoroughly weird, in the 
specific sense that the narrative constantly evokes the sense of being on an edge, 
of almost perceiving something unperceivable. This something includes not only 
Area X the monsters of Control’s dreams, but the nonconscious aspects of 
cognition: habitual patterns, the influence of authority figures, and the gravitational 
pull of specific places and people. It becomes very clear that Control is not all there: 
he is guided by forces beyond his consciousness and beyond what is explicitly 
explained by the narrative. Curiously, however, the border zone between the 
conscious and the nonconscious is quite wide, and even manageable to some 
extent. 
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As the novel progresses, Control becomes acutely aware of the borders of 
his subconscious pressing in on his conscious mind. Thus he nurtures his hunches 
and intuitions. The novel maps Control’s mental state in very specific spatial terms: 
he is constantly on the edge of a cliff, between a secure foothold and the vastness 
of the sea, teetering on a position that is both compromised and a compromise. 
This position is reflected even in the actual diegetic placement of the character in 
a town “close to the sea but not on the coast” (Aut, 68), a choice on Control’s part 
that is assigned to intuition: 
Something about the uncertainty of Area X had created an insistence inside of 
him on that point. His dream in a way forbid [moving to a coastal town]. His dream 
told him he needed to be at a remove. On the plane down to his new assignment, 
he’d had strange thoughts about the inhabitants of those coastal towns to either 
side of Area X being somehow mutated under their skin. Whole communities no 
longer what they once were, even though no one could tell this by looking. These 
were the kinds of thoughts you had to both keep at bay and fuel, if you could 
manage that trick. You couldn’t be devoured by them, but you had to heed them. 
Because in Control’s experience they reflected something from the subconscious, 
some instinct you didn’t want to go against. The fact was, the Southern Reach 
knew so little about Area X, even after three decades, that an irrational 
precaution might not be unreasonable. (Aut, 68–69) 
Through Control’s perspective, the novel negotiates the boundary between 
conscious and subconscious thought. In the quote above, the rationalization of the 
subconscious is spelled out in a particularly clear manner: the “irrational precaution” 
brought on by his dreams and “strange thoughts” is deemed as a reasonable 
attitude toward a phenomenon as persistently unknowable as Area X. Control 
maintains a careful relationship with his intuitions, “the kinds of thoughts you had 
to both keep at bay and fuel, if you could manage that trick.” The risk of being 
“devoured” by the intuitions links them to the dream-image behemoths described 
in the opening passage, and to their gravitational force. His delicate relationship to 
the behemoths of the subconscious is contextualized in the text as a survival 
strategy: when rational inquiries fail to make sense of Area X, instinct might prove 
a useful ally to the conscious rational mind. 
This view is supported by later scenes. For instance, the “superstition” 
expressed by researchers at the Southern Reach facility is framed as a reaction to 
the incomprehensible circumstances, as the superstition “wasn’t even 
unreasonable, really. How many invisible, abstract incantations ruled the world 
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beyond the Southern Reach?” (Aut, 105). Thus, negotiation between the 
conscious and the subconscious is a theme that extends from the personal story 
of Control into the larger story of scientific inquiry and human control over nature, 
where nature takes the role of the subconscious, and real-world monsters from 
Area X step in to accompany the dream-image behemoths. 
Whatever the “invisible, abstract incantations ruling the world” are 
interpreted as, they have the effect of debilitating the researchers’ rational faculties 
and morale. In contrast to Annihilation, and reiterating the motif of porous 
boundaries, Authority focuses on Area X’s cognitive effects at the area’s periphery 
rather than at its center. Area X works within the facility through the items brought 
back by the expedition teams, including journals, videos, the immortal plant 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, and the words seen by the biologist 
on the wall of the tower and reproduced by the former director of Southern Reach 
on the wall of a closet adjacent to her office. Due to the weirdness of such items 
that with their presence ridicule the very notions of border and quarantine, the 
researchers are, as the narrative puts it, “mutated under their skin.” Authority 
proceeds to slowly reveal these mutations from the perspective of Control, 
eventually revealing how he too has transformed. The narrative arc of Control’s 
story leads him to a real-world reckoning with his nightmares: in the end, he not 
only travels to the coast and sails along it in a small fishing boat, but literally jumps 
into the kind of abyss described in the introductory scene. 
This central motif and narrative device of border-crossing in Authority could 
be termed as haunting. The conscious narrative perspective of Control is haunted 
by echoes and ghosts of the nonconscious. Even if this psychoanalytical model is 
not uniquely weird, weirdness arises from how the narrative repeats the motif of 
haunting in the level of fictional environments. Area X itself, not just the characters’ 
perceptions of it, is presented as a locus of material agency that actively transforms 
both the nonhuman environment and the people involved in researching it. This 
agential environment fits Wilk’s (2019) definition of the weird as “an element or 
zone or experience that is not completely explainable according to our current 
structures for categorizing the world.” I would suggest that VanderMeer builds on 
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the long tradition of haunted areas in horror fiction to convey a conception of more-
than-human agency. This conception is not just a disembodied idea, but a 
cognitive ecology (Cave 2016), available to the bodily sensibility of readers as a 
lived environment of sorts. Through its focus on the psyche of a human protagonist, 
Authority makes this posthumanist experience of agency accessible also to 
readers who are habituated to more humanist models of agency and meaning. 
The notion of haunting also helps us understand literature as an affective 
technology. As mentioned in the introduction to chapter 5, VanderMeer (2014d, 
2016) has described his writing process in terms of being haunted by nonhuman 
things and events, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, as well as by literature, 
such as the works included in the New Weird anthology. 79  Both everyday 
perception and the figurative work of fiction involve continuous re-enactment of 
previously occurred perceptions and experiences, echoes of gestures and bodily 
feelings, half-remembered memories and half-formed ideas, and everything else 
that constitutes an experiential background (Caracciolo 2014c). While all reading 
experiences necessarily activate the experiential backgrounds of readers, The 
Southern Reach makes use of readerly experiences of partial and vague 
recognition in ways that dissolve the certainty of a self-contained human individual. 
For readers familiar with Annihilation, Control’s dreams and intuitions bring 
up a bodily sense of recognition. We recognize the particular muscular tensions of 
standing on an edge of a body of water, about to fall in, and might remember the 
scenes in which the biologist stares into an overgrown swimming pool, or a tidal 
pool. The dream-image behemoths call up memories of fictional encounters with 
strange animals and the Crawler, memories bundled with the affects of dread, awe, 
fascination, and sheer material impressiveness or thing-power (Bennett 2010). In 
this way, the story of Control contributes to the longer-term affective and kinetic 
experientiality of the trilogy.  
Despite VanderMeer’s approach to characterization, which draws on 
psychological realism where Paolo Bacigalupi’s approach does not, the characters 
                                                 
79 In section 6.2, I discuss how this model of influence resonates with both the new 
materialist view of more-than-human meaning-making and the enactivist view of narrative 
experientiality. 
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of The Southern Reach are just as instrumental as Emiko of The Windup Girl is. 
Thus, they too become meaningful only in the context of genre traditions (see 5.1). 
The biologist, as demonstrated in section 5.1, moves with a lineage of other figures 
– Gnostic victims and scientists exploring strange areas and meeting their fates. In 
encountering the monster and in becoming one, her movements, gestures, and 
feelings follow the trajectories created by others before her. As she recreates this 
traditional pattern with new variations, the figure offers readers a chance to enact 
the bodily feelings of turning away from the edge of an abyss, thus effecting a slight 
change in their habitual readerly choreography. 
Such patterns of expectation and response are not limited to a figure’s 
lineage within a genre. Intuitively if not necessarily consciously, readers will also 
compare and contrast the corporeal and thematic aspects of figures within the 
trilogy. As readers move and feel with a figure such as the biologist, they 
imaginatively adopt her style of movement, feeling, and perception, which subtly 
shapes their sensitivity to following encounters with other characters, as well as 
their expectations of plot events (see also Kukkonen 2014, 2019). Already familiar 
with the biologist’s struggle to maintain epistemic control over Area X, and her 
eventual surrender, they might expect similar turns from Control’s story, too. In part, 
Control fills those expectations, but he does so through a very different pattern of 
response. He reiterates and variates the nervous twitches of Kafka’s K, the looping 
logic of metaphysical detectives, and the futile resistance of Gnostic victims. As 
the analysis above demonstrates, his character is built onto the rigid, even if leaky, 
binarisms of the conscious and the subconscious, self and other, Human and 
Nature, and thus the trajectory of his transformation also follows a different pattern, 
meandering through obsessions with control, meaning, and language. I propose 
that such differences in the thematic aspects of the two characters inform the 
readers’ bodily responses to their kinesic and kinetic aspects. Moreover, I propose 
that, to some readers if not all of them, the thematic aspects only become 
experiential through the enactment of the kinesic and kinetic aspects. 
If a response to a gesture made by a fictional character effects “a faint but 
distinct echo in the reader’s own motor response system of what it takes in 
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sensorimotor terms to perform a highly specific gesture” (Cave 2016, 29), then 
every specific gesture effects a slightly different response. Encountering Control 
peering down a cliff, when reading Authority, prompts me to rehearse the memory 
of the biologist perched on the edge of a tidal pool from reading Annihilation. While 
we can detect similarities between the biologist’s stumbling at the edge of the tidal 
pool and Control’s swaying at the edge of the coastal cliff, we should not claim that 
these motion patterns, or our responses to them, are identical. Such variation 
matters to reading, especially if we stay with the complex understanding of kinesis 
presented in chapters 3 and 4. Recognizing both the similarities and the differences 
enables nuanced readings and opens possibilities for discussing the change of 
readerly choreographies as a subtle and gradual phenomenon. I will next consider 
in more detail how such dynamics of recognition contribute to a posthumanist 
reading of Authority and Acceptance. 
 
Contamination by Experiential Motifs 
 
Not only does The Southern Reach forge links between characters by placing them 
in similar positions, it also variates certain particular experiential motifs that are 
perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual alterations that are linked with contamination 
by Area X are repeated, with slight variations, throughout the trilogy. Such 
experiential motifs include a feeling of personal strength and stamina (Ann, 93, 151, 
Acc, 321), smelling “rotting honey” (Ann, 24, 25, Aut, 20, 87, 108, 163, Acc, 255, 
279), a feeling of there being a “second skin” (Acc, 158, 185, 197),80 as well as 
other bodily feelings of pressures, presences, and enhanced senses. Authority and 
Acceptance also circulate fragments of dialogue that readers will remember from 
Annihilation, such as the hypnotic suggestion “paralysis is not a cogent analysis” 
(Ann, 27, Aut, 184, 233, Acc, 75) and “Is there something in the corner of your eye 
                                                 
80 In her analysis of the second skin figuration in The Southern Reach, Alison Sperling 
(2016, 247–249) notes that when Ghost Bird perceives the Crawler, its “surface” is also 
doubled. Sperling links the “second skin” to Sara Ahmed’s theories of locale and 
descriptions of a second skin as a leaky border zone between the subject and space. 
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that you cannot get out?” (e.g. Aut, 229, Acc, 81, 98, see also Acc, 94). Some of 
these fragments are linked to the mind-control techniques used by the Southern 
Reach agency. Thus, the repeated motifs serve to remind readers that while the 
focalizing characters’ perceptions and utterances might seem personal to them, 
they are in fact constituted, to an unknown extent, by outside forces. In an interview, 
VanderMeer has himself identified this technique and its estranging effect on 
readers: 
You have a sense of processes going on beneath the skin, behind the walls. 
Dialogue can even accentuate this idea – in Authority, for example, in the 
hallways of the Southern Reach stray fragments of speech from Annihilation 
linger, a kind of displaced residue that the main character can’t identify but the 
reader can. (Mendelsund 2014) 
As VanderMeer notes, the emerging sense is of processes “going on beneath the 
skin, behind the walls,” that is, on the far side of various boundaries, hidden from 
direct perception. Replying to VanderMeer, the interviewer Peter Mendelsund 
(2014) refers to the fragments of dialogue as “splinters of dialogue [that] were 
echoing around the Southern Reach,” thereby evoking a memory of the ominous 
splinter that, in Acceptance, pierces Saul Evans’ skin and leads to the 
transformation of both Evans himself and the whole area (Acc, 25). 
Between the two of them, VanderMeer and Mendelsund seem to suggest 
that language itself can function as a contaminating agent, entering readers and 
changing how they think and feel, with or without them being conscious of the 
influence. While VanderMeer and Mendelsund only discuss dialogue, I propose 
that the dynamic of contamination also unfolds through textual motifs that have to 
do with sensory, kinesic and kinetic experience, such as smelling rotting honey, the 
uncanny sense of bodily strength, and standing on the edge of a body of water. 
The scent of honey in particular is repeated in a way that is accessible to readers, 
but not to the focalizing characters. The scent is mentioned in the narrative 
accounts of both Control and Saul Evans, but the characters do not connect it to 
the contamination. Control explains the scent through assuming it arises from a 
cleaning product used in the Southern Reach facility, and Saul Evans experiences 
it only briefly in a scene at a bar, and interprets it as coming from the bar kitchen 
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(Aut, 87, Acc, 255, 279). In encountering these experiential motifs, readers, for 
their part, recognize both the experiences and their connection to contamination. 
Due to this recognition and the perspective provided by knowing the 
storyworld, readers are then likely to doubt the interpretative abilities of both 
Control and Saul Evans, judging their reasoning as flawed and biased. This, in turn, 
serves to relativize their reliability as sources of experiential knowledge, as the 
reader is bound to interpret their perceptions as altered by either the Southern 
Reach organization or Area X. 
Importantly, this is a sense-making process that pertains particularly to 
reading fiction. While one could argue that instinctual warnings and paranoid 
feelings, hauntings in brief, might play a part in making sense of one’s actual 
environments, I would not claim that such sense-making and the readerly cognition 
I discuss here would be analogous. This point is also made by Karin Kukkonen 
(2019, 19, emphasis original), who notes that in everyday contexts, sensory flow 
is “largely unstructured,” while the literary text “can be understood as a designed 
sensory flow that guides these adjustments of our predictions in particular ways.” 
Hauntings experienced while reading fiction are thus likely to be linked to 
textual patterns that are at least in part intentional on the part of the author. 
VanderMeer’s essays and interviews show us that he is very aware of the potential 
effects his authorial choices have on readers. By such choices, readers are invited 
to repeatedly return to the borders of their perception and consciousness, to 
consider whether there is something in the corner of their eye or behind their back, 
and to familiarize themselves with an uncertainty of this kind. Reading such fiction 
could thus be considered as engagement with affective technology, especially in 
cases when the reader attends to both the textual design and their affective and 
emotional responses (see also Polvinen 2016, 2017). 
 
The Perpetual Brightness of a Doppelgänger 
 
The Southern Reach not only draws on the dynamic of partial recognition, but also 
thematizes it by presenting a doppelgänger of the biologist, Ghost Bird. This 
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mutant figure first appears in Authority as a counterpart and challenge for Control, 
and she also acts as a focalizing character in Acceptance. Ghost Bird affords yet 
another opportunity for discussing fictional figures as affective devices. What is 
particular to this case is that rather than functioning as a defamiliarizing device, 
Ghost Bird familiarizes certain aspects of mutant experience, including a 
sympathetic attunement to monstrous organisms and an acceptance of the 
condition of “brightness.” In the context of The Southern Reach, the strangest thing 
about Ghost Bird is her pragmatic attitude toward Area X. 
Ghost Bird is sometimes interpreted as nonhuman due to her origin as a 
creation of Area X (Ulstein 2017, Idema 2019, Faassen and Vermeulen 2019). 
Ulstein (2017, 87) notes how the trilogy makes a transition from the perspective of 
the biologist to the “acutely nonhuman, extraterrestrial” perspective of Ghost Bird. 
In Ulstein’s reading, the latter becomes 
the ultimate emissary of Area X and most important mediator of VanderMeer, 
taking on the viewpoint of the nonhuman and offering this viewpoint to the reader. 
The reader has already been prepared for this transition in focalization by the 
sensitivity for the nonhuman perspective in the biologist. (Ulstein 2017, 87) 
If we follow Ulstein’s reading, it appears that Ghost Bird is a key figure for a 
posthumanist reading, and a narrative device that draws on the readers’ familiarity 
with the biologist. While I agree with Ulstein and others about the importance of 
the character, I find it difficult to read Ghost Bird as primarily nonhuman. Her 
perceptions and concerns are constructed in ways that follow the traditions of 
depicting human minds, and for all relevant purposes, the bodily experientiality that 
arises from reading her body is not particularly estranging. While she is compared 
to other monstrous creations of Area X, she is also deemed “a viable mistake – a 
mutation, not an anomaly like the moaning creature” (Acc, 185). Of Area X’s 
creations, she is also the only one which is explored through a focalizing 
perspective. Thus, rather than reading Ghost Bird as a nonhuman character, I 
would read her as a mutant figure, that is, a figure that somewhat awkwardly 
negotiates the boundaries of the human and the nonhuman. Like Carroll (2016, 
77), I place Ghost Bird in the realm of the more-than-human zone of “ecological 
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uncanny.”81 The more-than-human aspects of Ghost Bird take shape in contrast 
to other characters, most importantly the biologist and Control. 
As Ulstein also notes, understanding Ghost Bird largely depends on 
recognizing earlier events in the trilogy. In Acceptance especially, Ghost Bird 
recirculates the thoughts and motions of the biologist: she walks the paths of Area 
X, and descends the steps of the underground tower to encounter the Crawler. 
She has access to the memories of the biologist, but knows herself to be a different 
individual with her own experiences. For readers, Ghost Bird’s ruminations and 
actions presents a chance to both re-enact and reassess the actions of the 
biologist. 
Why had her other self been so careless with the words on the wall? For example. 
Why hadn’t she confronted the psychologist/director as soon as she knew about 
the hypnosis? What had been gained by going down to find the Crawler? Some 
things Ghost Bird could forgive, but others grated and drove her into spirals of 
might-have-beens that infuriated her. (Acc, 36) 
As Ghost Bird emerges as an individual character, readers are also invited to enter 
“spirals of might-have-beens” and compare her thoughts and actions to those of 
the biologist. By her name and inexplicable emergence from Area X, Ghost Bird 
can also be interpreted as a materialized ghost of the biologist. This is also how the 
author views the character, telling an interviewer that Acceptance is “filled with 
ghosts” (Mendelsund 2014). However, the relative independence of Ghost Bird 
makes this interpretation weird, if not altogether implausible: for a ghost, she is 
remarkably lively. She is described as a solid and steady presence, strong and 
protective whereas the biologist was often shaken and always antisocial (e.g. Acc, 
192, 239). In terms of readerly choreographies, reading Ghost Bird affords bodily 
echoes of steady gazes (e.g. Acc, 82), purposeful walking, and even powerful 
rowing, which is described in kinesthetic detail: “The tautness she felt in her triceps, 
her forearms as she put her back to it. The pleasing soreness that came after, 
                                                 
81 However, I do not share Carroll’s (2016) analytical contexts. While her psychoanalytical 
reading of The Southern Reach trilogy as a kind of “Mortonesque uncanny” (Carroll 2016, 
76) is convincing and particularly revealing of Authority, I find that the particular 
constraints of psychoanalysis and historical materialism (which Carroll channels through 
the work of Jason W. Moore) operate on a level too general to contribute to my 
performative enactivist reading. 
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letting her know this was effort, this was real” (Acc, 112). In Annihilation, the 
biologist is described as “self-contained,” but in the specific sense that links 
sensorimotor coherence and focus with a clarity of common sense, this term 
applies even more to her doppelgänger. 
In a way incomprehensible to her hiking companion, Control, Ghost Bird is 
content walking through the marshlands of Area X, and unconcerned about getting 
back to the outside world (Acc, 76–77). In the dramatized scenes that take place 
during the hike, narrated through the perspectives of both Control and Ghost Bird, 
Ghost Bird’s specific brand of nonhumanness is constructed primarily as a 
counterpoint to Control’s specific brand of humanness. Through Ghost Bird’s 
perspective, Control’s humanness is ridiculed as a neurotic grasping to a long-lost 
order, exemplified and enlarged in Southern Reach research of Area X. Through 
Control’s perspective, Ghost Bird appears as recklessly aloof, unconcerned with 
the human world and their own survival, and focused instead on unimportant 
matters such as the flight of birds, her attention “always glued to the sky” (Acc, 
82). 
“How can you be so cheerful?” he'd asked her, after she had noted their depleted 
food, water, in an energetic way, then pointed out a kind of sparrow she said was 
extinct in the wider world, an almost religious ecstasy animating her voice. 
“Because I'm alive,” she'd replied. “Because I'm walking through 
wilderness on a beautiful day.” (Acc, 76–77) 
Despite his vehemence toward her, Ghost Bird exerts over Control “a gravitational 
pull” (Acc, 76), which once again reminds readers of the behemoths of his 
dreams.82 In an attempt to “regain some distance, some measure of the objective” 
(Acc, 76), Control clutches at two objects from his old life: a small, carved wooden 
cat figure, made by his father, and a few pages of notes by a Southern Reach 
scientist called Whitby.83  Control approaches Ghost Bird armed with Whitby's 
                                                 
82 The storyline of Control and Ghost Bird arguably employs the type of the artificial woman 
and the theme of sexual objectification associated with it (see 4.2), as Control’s fascination 
with Ghost Bird is tied to his ability to objectify her as a specimen from Area X and watch 
her “behind the one-way glass” (Acc, 76). However, Acceptance ultimately does not 
present his feelings as merely sexual but as physical in the more general sense conveyed 
by the phrase “gravitational pull.” 
83 Acceptance (135–138) gives grounds to interpreting Whitby as a doppelgänger of Area 
X’s making, and as similar to Ghost Bird in that regard. This interpretation adds irony to 
  223 
theories, often making up quotes of his own to better provoke her to comment. This 
mobilizing of theory is presented as part of Control's attempt at regaining 
independence both from Ghost Bird and from the nonhuman environment. 
If he used those pages to talk to Ghost Bird, it was in part to bring relief or 
distraction from the closeness of her and the way that the endless reeds, the 
fresh air, the blue sky, all conspired to make the real world remote, unimportant, 
a dream. When it was the most important thing. (Acc, 77–78) 
What Control perceives as “the real world” (Acc, 78) is his former lifeworld of 
careers, institutional conspiracies, and systematic investigation – all that is 
opposed to idealized Nature. The “unnatural” agency of Area X – its resistance to 
technology and systematic investigation, the strange creatures it produces, the 
pervasive sense of being regarded by it – demolishes the binary categorization of 
Nature and Culture, thereby depriving Control of the distance his professional and 
personal identity is built upon. Control conceives of this demolition as the work of 
a unified intentional agency, or a conspiracy. 
Setting these thoughts in a ridiculing light, Ghost Bird’s perspective 
constructs Control as an unstable person to be protected from knowledge that 
might shatter his fragile sanity, and a person blind to nonhuman expressivity, for 
example the particular behaviors of different bird species (e.g. Acc, 28, 32). Ghost 
Bird’s perspective construes perception that is habitually attuned to the nonhuman, 
which is often set in contrast with memories and opinions about the human world, 
as when walking through the marsh has an effect of “revealing the indelible: the 
dark line of a marsh hawk flying low over the water, the delicate fractures in the 
water where a water moccasin swam, the strangely satisfying long grass that 
cascaded like hair from the ground” (Acc, 242). 
This ecologically entangled perspective is what Acceptance as a whole 
offers, as Control’s anthropocentrism is repeatedly presented as delusional and 
dysfunctional in the context of Area X. After the more sympathetic depiction of 
Control in Authority, the slow destruction of the character in Acceptance appears 
to advance an underlying posthumanist agenda. Moreover, the trilogy culminates 
in moments when Ghost Bird intuitively and empathically recognizes the monstrous 
                                                 
the fact that Control cherishes Whitby’s theories as representative of the lost human world. 
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entities of Area X: the biologist-as-monster, the Crawler, and, finally, the Southern 
Reach headquarters that have transformed and “built its own ecology” (Acc 193–
196, 284–288, 331). Through these encounters, readers are invited to align their 
sympathies with the strong and capable if somewhat nonhuman figure, Ghost Bird, 
rather than with the faltering and neurotic human figure, Control. 
Ulstein (2017) makes note of how the horror and sensory confusion of the 
biologist’s experience are missing from Ghost Bird’s encounter with the Crawler: 
“There was none of the remembered distortion, no throwing back of her own fears 
and desires. It simply lay revealed before her, so immense, so shockingly concrete” 
(Acc, 284). The Crawler appears to Ghost Bird as “reassuringly corporeal” (Acc, 
285). The description of the monster is precise and calm, and thus it appears to 
be just another strange organism, far more ordinary than the starfish in the 
biologist’s tidal pool. Ulstein reads this naturalization as a result of Ghost Bird’s 
nonhuman origin and proximity to the monster, concluding that “Ghost Bird’s 
perception of the monstrous is thus in a position to evolve the reader’s relationship 
with the monstrous” (Ulstein 2017, 88). 
While I agree with Ulstein that Ghost Bird’s perception definitely has some 
kind of effect on readers’ relationship with the monstrous, I also want to discuss 
the specifics of this “evolution” further. Readers of the whole trilogy cannot accept 
this kind of kinesic and kinetic attunement to Ghost Bird and the monstrous as 
simply natural. Reading Annihilation has habituated them, myself included, to doubt 
feelings of personal strength and vitality, and consider them as effects of Area X, 
or, as the biologist puts it, as “brightness.” Moreover, the flatness and naturality of 
the Crawler is questioned even by Ghost Bird herself (Acc, 286). The question is, 
then, how to engage the experientiality of a narrative perspective that embodies 
Area X from the inside, naturalizing the alien vitality as an ingrained aspect of lived 
experience as a kind of perpetual brightness? 
For some critics, Ghost Bird is both a stylistic lapse and a philosophical 
mistake. Faassen and Vermeulen (2019) criticize VanderMeer for turning his back 
on the Weird in the encounter between Ghost Bird and the biologist (Acc, 193–
196, see the concluding remarks to 5.2), and abandoning “the engagement with 
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the complexity of human/nonhuman cognitive entanglement for an attempt to 
aestheticize and thereby sanitize otherness.” For Faassen and Vermeulen, “Ghost 
Bird’s status as . . . a fully nonhuman focalizer causes the weird effect to fall flat, 
and the biologist becomes just another creature, well-adapted to its different 
environments.” They defend the unknowability of the nonhuman other as the core 
of the Weird tradition, as a philosophical stance that refuses “transcendence or a 
dissolution into ecstatic indifferentation,” which they claim is a move typical to new 
materialist thinkers. 
This refusal (on part of both the Weird tradition and the critics in question) 
could be understood as “staying with the trouble,” and specifically as staying with 
the friction and constraints of human subjecthood in a more-than-human world. 
But while such commitment to human limitations is commendable, I still agree with 
Ulstein that there is something potentially transformative in Ghost Bird’s 
naturalizing experientiality. Rather than presenting this transformation as an easy 
feat of posthumanist imagination, I would propose that the figure affords a slow 
reconfiguring of a readerly choreography by way of amplifying the continuities 
rather than the contrasts between human and nonhuman life. Contrary to 
Faassen’s and Vermeulen’s reading, I do not think that the figure marks an 
abandonment of the complex cognitive entanglement between the human and the 
nonhuman. There are nuances between ineluctable difference and “ecstatic 
indifferentiation.” While Ghost Bird’s perspective foregrounds a conception of Area 
X’s monsters as organisms, it does not completely erase the strangeness or 
difference of those organisms, or subject them to a totalizing knowledge, scientific 
or empathic. The same is true for the organism known as the human. 
In other words, Ghost Bird’s nonhumanness is construed in relation to 
Control’s humanness, but also in relation to the nonhumanness of Area X, with 
which she is allied by way of her origin. During the hike through Area X, Control 
provokes Ghost Bird with a modern dichotomy, claiming that Area X “doesn’t 
acknowledge machines” (Acc, 80). Ghost Bird then launches into an explicit 
monologue on the nature of Area X. 
“It definitely understands and acknowledges machines. It understands them 
better than we do.” She stopped to face him, and something like anger pulsed 
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out from her. “Have you not understood yet that whatever's causing this can 
manipulate the genome, works miracles of mimicry and biology? Knows what to 
do with molecules and membranes, can peer through things, can surveil, and 
then withdraw. That, to it, a smartphone, say, is as basic as a flint arrowhead, 
that it's operating off of such refined and intricate senses that the tools we've 
bound ourselves with, the ways we record the universe, are probably evidence 
of our own primitive nature. Perhaps it doesn't even think that we have 
consciousness or free will – not in the ways it measures such things.” 
“If that's true, why does it pay us any attention at all?” 
“It probably extends to us the least attention possible.” (Acc, 80–81, 
emphasis original) 
Ghost Bird refers to humans as “incredibly blunt instruments” (Acc, 81) and 
cynically notes that humans cannot even understand the cognitive abilities of 
whales, bees, owls, or cormorants. Humans are “bound by their own view of 
consciousness” (Acc, 189) to the extent that even if an alien intelligence tried to 
contact them, they would not notice: “What if an infection was a message, a 
brightness a kind of symphony?” (Acc, 189–190). Ghost Bird views human 
blindness to such possibilities as a “lack of imagination” (Acc, 190), and 
frustratedly wonders whether she wants to “ally herself to such a lack” (Acc, 190). 
In these conversations, the narrative negotiates Ghost Bird’s status as a 
nonhuman creature. On the one hand, Ghost Bird is presented as a creature with 
inside knowledge of the strange nonhuman life of Area X and contrasted with 
insensitive and unperceptive humans. Yet, as VanderMeer’s novels and the readers’ 
capability of following his train of thought demonstrate, some humans are clearly 
capable of imagining infections as messages. Moreover, as I have noted above, 
Ghost Bird’s perspective is narrated in ways that do not suggest anything other 
than an experientiality typical to human bodies and human narratives. 
The “human” construed in Ghost Bird’s ruminations must thus be a specific 
kind of figure, the human-centered human, the Anthropos of the Anthropocene: 
the kind of human that does not perceive or accept nonhuman forms of agency or 
intelligence. For the most part of Authority and Acceptance, Control acts as a 
figuration of such a human. Opposing such a figuration is an option available not 
only for fictional creatures but for actual humans, too. If we choose to read Ghost 
Bird as nonhuman, then we should do so only against this particular background. 
Rather than maintaining an opposition between the human and the nonhuman, I 
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find it more productive to characterize Ghost Bird’s perspective as more-than-
human, and consider how it can develop our understanding of the limits of human 
experience. 
As Ghost Bird walks through Area X, her perceptions are laced with and 
partly constituted by the events in her environment, such as the flight of birds, the 
forms of the landscape, and the change of light. Toward the end of Acceptance, 
these perceptions come together as a world. Ghost Bird and Grace Stevenson, 
the vice director of the Southern Reach, find that they are stranded in Area X, and 
that there might not be a border or a door to the outside world. 
"What if there is no world out there? Not as we know it? Or no way out to the 
world?” Grace saying this, while existing in that moment in a world that was so 
rich and full. . . . 
It was just an ordinary day. Another ordinary summer day. 
So they walked forward, throwing pebbles as they went, throwing pebbles 
to find the invisible outline of a border that might not exist anymore. 
They walked for a long time, throwing pebbles at the air. (Acc, 331) 
In Ghost Bird’s perspective, there is no nostalgia for the purely human world that 
the characters have left behind. Rather, there is an appreciation of Area X, which 
is full of all kinds of life, even if humans are few. While this might seem like a return 
to an idealized Nature, Ghost Bird’s pragmatism allows that Area X is ineluctably 
strange: “The world went on, even as it fell apart, changed irrevocably, became 
something strange and different” (Acc, 328). 
Maybe the impossibility of gaining a nonhuman perspective has to be 
accepted, as a necessary limit to human reach and control. Maybe it suffices that 
we acknowledge the existence of other life, strange as it is, and keep on living with 
the strangeness. Ultimately, Acceptance offers this insight as a figuration of walking 
through wilderness on a bright summer day, even as “the sun had decided to lodge 
itself behind her eyes and shine out so that the inside of her head felt burned” (Acc, 
329). This perpetual brightness is weirdness to be lived with. 
 
Feeling the Alien Ecology 
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The conception of nature presented in Acceptance, and in The Southern Reach 
more widely, transgresses the boundary between the natural and the technological 
as well as the boundary between the conscious and the nonconscious. The 
obliteration of human technology from Area X gives room to another technology 
that is so advanced humans are not even able to perceive it: the surveillance and 
manipulation performed by Area X.84 On the other hand, this kind of technology 
can just as well be biological, a part of the normal functioning of an “alien ecology” 
(Acc, 196). In his essays, VanderMeer has remarked on the amazing abilities of 
plants, such as the fact that plants use quantum mechanics in their photosynthetic 
processes, and characterized them as such imperceptible technologies 
(VanderMeer 2014d, see also Mancuso 2017). This view of nonhuman 
technologies is articulated through Ghost Bird in particular. In fact, and moving 
from the diegetic level to the dynamics of readerly engagement, we can consider 
the figure of Ghost Bird as one example of such nonhuman technologies. 
Not only does Ghost Bird exert a “gravitational pull” on Control, she also 
does so on readers. Through descriptions of bodily features, movements, and 
feelings, readers are invited to engage with the figure in kinesic and kinetic modes 
that feel easy and natural, and thus enter the cognitive ecology of the narrative. 
The figure exists only as part of a figuration, that is, as embedded in a context of 
potential movements, feelings, and perceptions. Ghost Bird thus affords a readerly 
choreography that involves a perceptual orientation toward the ecological 
dynamics of both Area X and the trilogy. Such a readerly choreography is made 
possible through the evocation of bodily feelings and perceptual dynamics that can 
be considered as emergent systemic properties rather than “real feelings” internal 
to the experiencing subject (see Warhol 2003, 23 and 2.1). As I have discussed in 
section 2.1, both phenomenology of moods (Ratcliffe 2010) and theories of affect 
(Ahmed 2004, Seyfert 2012, Vermeulen 2014) support such a view of bodily 
feelings. 
                                                 
84 In this regard, the intelligence present in Area X is similar to the alien intelligence in 
Peter Watts' Blindsight (2006): the manipulation affects perception directly, and therefore 
it cannot be opposed with any means that involve consciousness. (If a weapon targets 
your sense of reality, what do you do?) 
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The narrative makes explicit that the effect of organismic technologies on 
humans largely takes place in nonconscious ways. Moreover, the technologies are 
distributed in the lived environments of the characters, and thus tracing them 
exactly proves impossible. Authority, in particular, traces this futile attempt at the 
level of institutional inquiry. In Annihilation, Area X takes hold of the biologist’s 
sensory perceptions and feelings, and it is impossible to know whether it is the 
beauty of nature or the effects of the alien spores that affect her so: 
In the morning, I woke up with my senses heightened, so that even the rough 
brown bark of the pines or the ordinarily lunging swoop of a woodpecker came 
to me as a kind of minor revelation. The lingering fatigue from the four-day hike 
had left me. Was this some side effect of the spores or just the result of a good 
night’s sleep? I felt so refreshed that I didn’t really care. (Ann, 37) 
The biologist’s feeling of “a minor revelation” is entangled in her perceptions of the 
particular feel and color of the bark or the particular movement of the bird. It is 
impossible to objectively detect the exact source of the effect: rather, it emerges 
as a mood or an atmosphere that affects the entire orientation of the experiencing 
subject. In Authority, it is similarly impossible to tell whether Control’s feelings of 
being watched are due to his paranoid psychological tendencies, the mind-control 
techniques practiced by his superiors, or the impending alien agency of Area X. 
As such, the environmental affectivity of Area X comes close to Matthew 
Ratcliffe’s (2010) characterization of moods as “spaces of possibility.” In different 
moods, we experience the world as offering different kinds of possibilities. For 
Ratcliffe (2010, 357), mood “constitutes a phenomenological background in the 
context of which intentionally directed experience is possible.” In such 
phenomenological terms, the biologist’s heightened sensitivity (which is both 
sensory and emotional) or Control’s paranoia are contexts for their perceptions. 
Accordingly, we could view such affective fictional contexts as cognitive 
environments (see Polvinen 2017, 148, and 1.2). Such a view is grounded on the 
readerly enactment of the bodily movements, feelings, and perceptions of the 
fictional figures, but as I will explain in more detail in section 6.2, the notion of 
cognitive environments also encompasses readerly engagement with the fictional 
artifact (in this case, the trilogy of novels). Grounded on the analysis of the motif of 
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writing in the novels, such a view gives rise to a more-than-human understanding 
of writing and reading. 
  
6.2 More-than-Human Writing and Reading 
 
For characters, Area X functions as a cognitive environment within which they 
emerge as experiencing subjects. For readers, on the other hand, the fictional 
artifact of The Southern Reach trilogy functions as cognitive environment that 
draws on their familiarity with actual everyday environments while being remarkably 
different – especially due to its fictionality. As Merja Polvinen (2017) has argued, 
bodily and affective readerly engagement with such fictional artifacts can and does 
involve awareness of fictionality. In the case of reading The Southern Reach, the 
narrative strategies of the trilogy guide readers to adopt affective and reflective 
modes of reading that involve awareness of both aspects of literary cognitive 
environments – the mimetic and the synthetic. 
On the level of kinesic intelligence, the evocation of a cognitive environment 
in The Southern Reach is achieved through motifs and phrases at the edges of 
consciousness – the “hallucinations, reveries, epiphanies, and feverish dreams” 
Idema (2019, 106) mentions – and jarring shifts in narrative style. As I have argued 
above, such reiterations are part of the designed sensory flow of the trilogy, and as 
such they operate in the gray area between readers’ conscious and nonconscious 
modes of engagement. Responding to such affective designs could be thought of 
as a kind of pattern recognition (see e.g. Cave 2016, Hayles 2018). I propose that 
The Southern Reach trilogy presents the practices of reading and writing as such 
patterned activities, as part of organismic and environmental activity. While literary 
practices definitely involve modes of thought and action that cannot be accounted 
for by such visions of the organism, The Southern Reach shows readers that 
sometimes they bear resemblance to eating, illness, or other bodily activities not 
generally considered cognitive as such. At moments of revelation, the characters 
utter as much, as when Ghost Bird comments that “[a]n organism can have a 
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purpose and yet also make patterns that have little to do with that purpose” (Acc, 
189).  
While these explicit statements, often phrased in quotable soundbites that 
draw literary scholars like (rotten) honey, are readily available for thematic 
interpretations, VanderMeer’s fiction also demonstrates how organismic 
technologies might influence human cognition. Key passages in the trilogy can be 
seen to function as contaminants that push the reader to turn toward their own 
responses. In terms of readerly engagement, the most important of such passages 
is the initial contamination scene, in which the biologist inhales the alien spores of 
the organism that forms the strange text on the wall of the underground tower. 
From the moment of seeing the first words, “Where lies the strangling fruit” (Ann, 
23, emphasis original), she is driven by an “impulse” (Ann, 23) to read the whole 
text, a “compulsion to keep reading, to descend into the greater darkness and 
keep descending until I had read all there was to read. Already those initial phrases 
were infiltrating my mind in unexpected ways, finding fertile ground” (Ann, 24).85 
She leans in closer “like a fool, like someone who had not had months of survival 
training or ever studied biology. Someone tricked into thinking that words should 
be read” (Ann, 25).86 
Following the biologist, readers are easily tempted to lean closer to the 
strange text-shaped organism, tricked into thinking that words should be read. 
When they lean in, however, it is already too late: the affective and kinesic part of 
reading, “a high-speed response” that “needs to be ‘slowed down’ reflectively if 
one is to analyse it at all” (Cave 2016, 41), has already happened. The narrative 
                                                 
85 The original contamination scene only includes a few lines of the words on the wall. 
Longer excerpts are provided in a later chapter, here reconstructed into one continuous 
excerpt: “Where lies the strangling fruit that came from the hand of the sinner I shall bring 
forth the seeds of the dead to share with the worms that gather in the darkness and 
surround the world with the power of their lives while from the dim-lit halls of other places 
forms that never could be writhe for the impatience of the few who have never seen or 
been seen in the black water with the sun shining at midnight, those fruit shall come ripe 
and in the darkness of that which is golden shall split open to reveal the revelation of the 
fatal softness of the earth…” (Ann, 46, 47, 50, italics original). It is implied that the writing 
goes on indefinitely. Moreover, the biologist perceives a further “phantom script” in the 
gaps of the “living” lines (Ann, 48–49). 
86 On her second reading, now descending into the tower with the surveyor of the group, 
the biologist notes that the words “infect” their own spoken language (Ann, 47). 
  232 
technology has already contaminated them, and they are now left to deal with the 
consequences. Previous studies on the trilogy show surprisingly little interest in the 
theme of subconsciously effective narrative techniques. However, the analysis of 
such techniques can show how science fiction can estrange not just the intellectual 
notions of the everyday world but also the naturalized everyday modes of embodied 
experience – including the embodied experience of reading fiction. 
In his monograph on VanderMeer’s work, Benjamin J. Robertson (2018) 
proposes that The Southern Reach is not science fiction at all. For Robertson (2018, 
39), science fiction assumes “a given world encoded in a symbolic structure,” that 
is, a referential encoding of a given reality into a work of fiction. Robertson claims 
that this assumption has led science fiction scholars to focus on “decoding” the 
fiction as representative of the real world, thus dismissing the “fantastic materiality” 
afforded by the fictional worlds themselves. 
In the formulation of science fiction, the world and its allegedly immutable, 
discoverable truth provides a measuring stick for the quality of the story told 
about it. In contrast, in fantastic materiality, the narrative itself (the fantastic) 
modifies the world (materiality) in order to overcome such critical practices and 
thereby introduce to a world without predetermined notions of reality the means 
by which to change it. Fantastic materiality does not tell stories that are true in 
some way, according to a given materiality or empirical world out there against 
which they can be judged. It is a materiality that transforms by way of fantasies 
entangled with that world. (Robertson 2018, 41) 
Robertson’s fantastic materiality is a serious attempt of considering speculative 
fiction from a new materialist perspective while allowing that fiction itself holds a 
kind of material, potentially transformative agency. He also proposes a 
methodological step, “an abdifferent reading practice,” which “requires a care or 
concern that allows fiction to be itself” and “involves imagining conditions that 
afford new ways of thinking and that do not assume a stable, grounding reality” 
(Robertson 2018, 135). Despite such promising formulations that successfully 
incorporate the notion of groundlessness, Robertson focuses his discussion of 
transformation “by way of fantasies” largely by juxtaposing it with historical-
materialist readings that treat Area X as a representation of the Anthropocene. 
Thus, he explicates the fantastic logic of VanderMeer’s fictional world, but does not 
delve into the material consequences of readerly engagement with the fiction. 
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Similar general claims about the power of VanderMeer’s fiction are 
presented in Tom Idema’s (2019) environmental posthumanist reading, in which 
he compares the paranoid tone of The Southern Reach to the work of Franz Kafka. 
Idema argues that the trilogy uses Kafkaesque means to disintegrate the human 
subject and give voice to nonhuman forms of agency and power. 
If Kafka’s work raises the callous voice of social power, multiplied in so many 
personal and institutional incarnations, The Southern Reach amplifies a truly 
nonhuman voice reverberating through the wider environment. The human body 
becomes a soundboard for this nonhuman voice’s messages of collapse and 
decay, broadcast in hallucinations, reveries, epiphanies, and feverish dreams. 
(Idema 2019, 106) 
Do readers’ bodies also become soundboards for a “nonhuman voice’s messages 
of collapse and decay”? While Idema makes this claim, he stays on the level of the 
general theme of “human body,” not going into the specifics of bodily reading. Just 
as Robertson, Idema evokes the potentially transformative power of language, but 
does not provide analyses on how such transformations could occur on the level 
of reading experience. 
On the basis of the kinetic approach and posthuman feminist 
phenomenology, we can consider in more detail how transformation “by way of 
fantasies” or amplification of a “nonhuman voice” could happen in readerly 
experience. We can do so by returning to the strikingly material-ecocritical 
articulations of nonhuman writing in the trilogy. The bodies of the characters of 
Ghost Bird and Saul Evans, the lighthouse keeper, are figured as “messages from 
Area X,” and the bodies of readers are exposed to affective narrative patterns that 
function with or without their conscious consent. Writing, a paradigmatic human 
activity, is thus reconfigured as a conduit for nonhuman agency. For readers, this 
inversion of human and nonhuman agency effects an uncanny sense of becoming 
instruments, or being recruited into the system of narrative and material meaning-
making. Such a technological aspect is inseparable of the notion of fictional 
artifacts as cognitive environments. 
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The Limits of Human Writing 
 
In Annihilation, the journals of the explorers become representatives of their writers. 
Every explorer is instructed to keep a journal, hidden from the eyes of the others, 
and the novel is presented as the expedition journal of the biologist. In the course 
of her transformational experiences, the process of analytical writing functions for 
her as a tool for making sense of experience. It is an insufficient tool, as there 
seems to be no way of getting to the truth about Area X, but it is nevertheless 
presented as necessary for psychological purposes. In accounting for the 
oppressive vitality of Area X and the brightness that works its way in her body, the 
biologist makes a note of the impossibility of thinking about Area X without writing. 
[T]here is a limit to thinking about even a small piece of something monumental. 
You still see the shadow of the whole rearing up behind you, and you become 
lost in your thoughts in part from the panic of realizing the size of the imagined 
leviathan. I had to leave it there, compartmentalized, until I could write it all down, 
and seeing it on the page, begin to divine the true meaning. (Ann, 93) 
The most apparent mental strategy applied by the biologist, compartmentalization, 
protects the mind from shattering from the impact of Area X. As the biologist walks 
the marsh trail toward an abandoned lighthouse, she thinks of the strange biology 
of the underground tower. Instead of trying to consider the whole truth, “a vast 
biological entity that might or might not be terrestrial” (Ann, 90), she focuses on 
analyzing specific details of her observations. In her mind, “contemplating the 
sheer enormity of that idea on a macro level would have broken my mood like an 
avalanche crashing into my body” (Ann, 90). Her focus on detail is later echoed in 
the journals left behind by members of earlier expeditions. One particularly 
provocative journal focuses solely on the thistles that grow in the area and gives 
lengthy and detailed descriptions of them. This single focus is presented as “a way 
of coping” with the horror of there being a “terrible presence hovering in the 
background of these entries” (Ann, 114). Analytical thinking and writing thus 
emerge as an organizing technique that protects the illusion of existing in a normal, 
human-centered world, in which the explorers would be able to continue their 
research without being entangled in more-than-human monstrosities. 
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Further, the journals perform a more personal function that also evokes the 
theme of doubling. Finding the decaying mound of discarded journals, the biologist 
feels as if she has encountered a pile of “flimsy gravestones” (Ann, 110). From this 
pile, she finds the journal her husband, who had been part of the expedition 
immediately preceding the biologist’s expedition. The journal is stuck to the back 
of another journal by dried blood or some other substance . . . written in the 
confident, bold hand-writing I knew from birthday cards, notes on the refrigerator, 
and shopping lists” (Ann, 118). The material description of the journals make them 
resemble dead bodies, a rotting mound that documents a history of unnamed 
expeditions gone awry, and they carry the traces of actual, familiar bodies: the 
blood and the handwriting of the biologist’s husband. 
Through his journal, the biologist finds a connection to her husband that 
was not realized while he was still alive. She carries the journal with her for some 
time without daring to open it, and when she finally does, the experience becomes 
a resolution of a long-accumulated tension: “When I finally picked up my husband's 
journal and started to read, the brightness washed over me in unending waves and 
connected me to the earth, the water, the trees, the air, as I opened up and kept 
on opening” (Ann, 160). In reading the journal, the biologist has an experience of 
intimacy that years of shared living could not provide. 
My husband had had an inner life that went beyond his gregarious exterior, and 
if I had known enough to let him inside my guard, I might have understood this 
fact. Except I hadn't, of course. I had let tidal pools and fungi that could devour 
plastic inside my guard, but not him. (Ann, 167) 
The biologist's reading experience dramatizes the issue of empathic engagement 
to first person narrative, and thus speaks more to responding to affective narrative 
strategies than to intersubjective emotion. While the biologist could not empathize 
with her husband, his literary “ghost” or double makes her open up and connect 
with not just him but also the environment. Annihilation thus suggests that there 
narratives can wield an uncanny power. Speaking to such an effect, Caracciolo 
(2014b, 32) argues that the literary techniques of first person narration can “take 
readers' empathic involvement with a fictional character to a higher level than 
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would be likely in real life.”87 While Caracciolo’s claims about the exceptional power 
of first person narration (compared to narration in the second or third person) might 
be exaggerated, his take on reading is interesting as it presents reading primarily 
as interaction with a kind of amplifying technology (cf. Neimanis 2017). The 
narrative technique of first-person narration can, Caracciolo claims, produce in us 
a deeply felt connection that is more intense than its equivalents in actual 
intersubjective relations. What this means, among other things, is that as readers 
and humans we are open to manipulation, including the simple, ubiquitous 
manipulation of texts convincing us that the “bundles of effects” (Caracciolo 2014b, 
32) they present refer to coherent persons or even experiential selves. 
The Southern Reach both evokes and estranges such readerly empathy and, 
more broadly, kinesic sense-making. The use of doubles is a central defamiliarizing 
device in the trilogy. Moreover, as these doubles gain metafictional aspects, they 
help to defamiliarize the very process of reading for character (see also 3.1). This 
happens, for example, when Ghost Bird encounters “the moaning creature,” a 
creation of Area X the biologist has also encountered previously (Ann, 15, 142, 
Acc, 162). For the biologist, the moaning creature has come to represent her fear 
of turning into a dysfunctional monster, “a mistake, a misfire by an Area X that had 
assimilated so much so beautifully and so seamlessly” (Acc, 162). Readers already 
know, at this point in the trilogy, that the biologist has since been turned into not 
just one but two monstrous beings: the mountain-sized creature capable of 
interdimensional travel (Acc, 193–196) and Ghost Bird. When Ghost Bird 
encounters the moaning creature, now in skeleton form, the encounter takes on an 
ominous quality as the dead creature seems to function as a conduit for Area X’s 
perception. 
[F]rom those eye sockets, from the moldering bones, came a sense of a 
brightness still, a kind of life – a questing towards her that she rebuffed and that 
Control could not sense. Area X was looking at her through dead eyes. Area X 
                                                 
87  While Caracciolo uses the term empathic involvement, his use of it contains an 
imaginative aspect. He uses empathy not just to denote “the capacity to experience 
another person’s mental states in a first-person way” (2014b, 32) but as interchangeably 
with “mental simulation” (2014b, 32, 38). Empathy, construed in this way, does not imply 
an understanding of the experiences of the other, but rather the imaginative reconstruction 
or enaction of such experiences (see also Kortekallio 2019a, 60–61). 
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was analyzing her from all sides. It made her feel like an outline created by the 
regard bearing down on her, one that moved only because the regard moved 
with her, held her constituent atoms together in a coherent shape. And yet, the 
eyes upon her felt familiar. (Acc, 37) 
The image of Ghost Bird as an outline that moves along with the “regard” of the 
being that watches her is metafictional. Not only does the image present her as a 
creation of Area X, it also presents her as a creation of readers, her coherence and 
movement dependent on their perception. The passage also puts readers in a 
curious position that aligns them with the dead creature, an obsolete 
dysfunctionally mutated human form through which a new kind of life peers. Rather 
than positioning readers as objects to nonhuman powers, then, the novel offers 
them a place as conduits for nonhuman powers. From a posthumanist perspective, 
I view this positioning as an invitation to the readers of the novel to amplify their 
experience of themselves as part of more-than-human assemblages, and more 
precisely to figure contamination as a promise of more-than-human perception 
rather than a threat. Figurations of nonhuman writing in the trilogy support this view. 
 
More-than-Human Meaning-making 
 
During her years in Area X, the biologist stays attuned to the present moment, 
since “to be taken out of the moment is dangerous – that is when things sneak their 
way in and then there is no present moment to return to” (Acc, 155). She is 
determined to “simply exist and live out whatever span was allotted to [her]” (Acc, 
155). Despite this principle, she detaches herself from the present and writes an 
account of her life to unspecified recipients. The account is framed by another 
character as her “last will and testament” (Acc, 152), given before fully succumbing 
to monstrous transformation. The biologist associates the project of writing her 
biography with the human world, which to her has become an obsolete myth. 
Perhaps, too, hesitance overtakes me because when I think of writing I glimpse 
the world I left behind. The world beyond, that when my thoughts drift toward it 
at all, is a hazy, indistinct sphere radiating a weak light, riddled through with 
discordant voices and images that cut across eyes and minds like a razor blade, 
and none of us able to even blink. It seems a myth, a kind of mythic tragedy, a 
lie, that I once lived there or that anyone lives there still. Someday the fish and 
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the falcon, the fox and the owl, will tell tales, in their way, of this disembodied 
globe of light and what it contained, all the poison and all the grief that leaked out 
of it. If human language meant anything, I might even recount it to the waves or 
to the sky, but what’s the point? (Acc, 156) 
In the antihumanist perspective of the biologist, the human world is construed as 
a strange sphere that “leaks” poison and grief, and as a condition that generally 
does not support life. There are no other potential addressees left for the biologist’s 
account than the animals and environmental features of Area X, and they might 
not care for human language. The biologist’s account continues to undermine 
human writing: the explorers leave their journals behind as 
on some level most came, in time, to recognize the futility of language. Not just 
in Area X but against the rightness of the lived-in moment, the instant of touch, 
of connection, for which words were such a sorrowful disappointment, so 
inadequate an expression of both the finite and the infinite. (Acc, 243) 
Human language thus marks a detachment from the immediate world that has 
become so important for the biologist during the years she has spent as part of the 
alien ecosystem. In contrast, toward the end of the trilogy, the nonhuman begins 
to write through the human. Ghost Bird characterizes herself, as well as the 
contaminations and transformations witnessed by other characters, as “messages” 
from Area X (Acc, 37, 190). This theme is also central to the storyline of lighthouse 
keeper Saul Evans, who turns into the monster known as the Crawler and acts as 
a conduit for nonhuman writing. In a transformational dream sequence that can be 
interpreted as the originating event of Area X (stars change form; a blood moon 
descends; mighty cities fall after ecological disaster, disease, and war; the 
lighthouse turns into a tunnel in the ground), Saul Evans descends the stairs into 
the tunnel, submerged in water, and sees “the fiery green-gold of words on the wall, 
being wrought before his eyes by an invisible scribe” (Acc, 107). 
[H]e knew the words came from him, had always come from him, and were being 
emitted soundlessly from his mouth. And that he had been speaking already for 
a very long time, and that each word had been unraveling his brain a little more, 
a little more, even as each word also offered relief from the pressure in his skull. 
While what lay below waited for his mind to peel away entirely. A blinding white 
light, a plant with leaves that formed a rough circle, a splinter that was not a 
splinter. . . the words still lived inside of him, a sermon now coming out whether 
he wanted it to or not. Whether it would destroy him or not. (Acc, 107) 
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The trilogy thus loops back to its beginning, presenting the words on the wall as a 
result of human action overtaken by the strange force of Area X, and as an 
unraveling of Saul Evans’ contaminated mind. The same strange, perhaps-fungal 
words will eventually contaminate the biologist. The brightness takes control of Saul 
Evans’ body in a parasitic manner that echoes the invasion of ant bodies by the 
tropical fungus known as Ophiocordyceps unilateralis sensu lato. Such an invasion 
results in what is popularly known as “zombie ants.” The fungus permeates the 
muscle fibers of the ants’ bodies, leaving the brains intact, and “puppeteers” them 
onto tree branches and other elevated spots. After reaching their destination, the 
ants die, and the spectacular fruiting bodies of the fungus are unraveled out of the 
ant-bodies, typically beginning from the head. (Fredericksen et al. 2017, Zachos 
2017.) This image is also evoked in the biologist’s speculations about the 
brightness: “I might find the brightness rising curious out of the top of my head, like 
a periscope – independent and lively, with nothing left beneath it but a husk” (Acc, 
159). 
While there might be no direct link between the antics of the 
Ophiocordyceps and the creative mind of Jeff VanderMeer, the ant-puppeteering 
fungus serves as an apt figuration for thinking about the notion of more-than-
human meaning-making. The figuration allows both a thematic interpretation of 
more-than-human agency and a narrative-theoretical heuristic model of literary 
influence. 
If we consider more-than-human writing as a theme, we can view the action 
of writing on the wall as bodily engagement between Saul and Area X. Neither of 
them is individually responsible for this action – even if it seems that Area X drives 
it. While in our regular lives it is rare that a single nonhuman entity exerts such a 
power on a person, by completely reconfiguring their cognition and action, similar 
agency exists in more dispersed forms: our minded bodies are constantly “driven” 
or “written” by ambient light and weather patterns, as in the case of winter 
depression (see chapter 2 and Kortekallio forthcoming), by the nonhuman 
creatures we encounter, as in the case of air-borne microbes, and also by such 
simple constants as gravity and metabolism. Rather than figuring such agents as 
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sovereign authors capable of single-handedly creating or even steering a body, we 
could think of them as participants in more-than-human processes of meaning-
making, and thus as a subtler version of the uncanny power of the Ophiocordyceps. 
In VanderMeer’s fiction, such dispersed nonhuman agency is made 
accessible through the figure of Area X, which both rewrites the body of Saul as “a 
message” and drives the action of writing the text on the wall of the underground 
tower. While Saul experiences the words as not his own, their clerical style 
suggests that something of his personal history as a preacher participates in their 
formation. It is also his body and hand that carry out the act of writing.  
In a narrative-theoretical line of thought, on the other hand, fictional 
narratives could be viewed as participants in such more-than-human meaning-
making. As humans live their lives by enacting more-than-human environments, 
their minded bodies are impressed and influenced by nonhuman beings and forces. 
Sometimes a particularly impressive force, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
leaves a clear trace in the fiction of an author, such as Jeff VanderMeer (see 
introduction to chapter 5). The fiction, in turn, can impress and influence human 
bodies, mediating some of the force of the nonhuman being through layers of 
culturally established conventions of meaning-making. Fictional narratives thus act 
as both traces left by nonhuman forces and forces in themselves. By subtly shaping 
the bodily feelings, thoughts, and actions of humans, they also participate in 
shaping nonhuman bodies and environments. 
A new materialist articulation helps to flesh out the notion of more-than-
human meaning-making. Alison Sperling (2016), in her analysis of corporeal 
borders in The Southern Reach, evokes the notion of trans-corporeality (see 
Alaimo 2010) as crucial to the trilogy. Sperling makes note of how the 
contaminations in the trilogy take place through skin contact and that the 
experience of brightness involves sensations of heat, cold, and opening pores 
(Sperling 2016, 243–244). The novel thus figures the borders of individual human 
bodies as porous and vulnerable: 
Though the skin may appear to bind bodies into distinct individual forms, The 
Southern Reach Trilogy reveals the skin to be the most vulnerable and open 
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system of the body in its relation to the nonhuman environment as well as to 
others. (Sperling 2016, 243) 
While Sperling’s discussion of the skin as an “open system” is largely thematic, it 
can also inform a narrative-theoretical view of readerly dynamics. If we consider 
reading human bodies as such open systems, we can understand how they 
respond to both nonhuman bodies and narrative patterns, incorporating some of 
them into their functioning and rejecting others. As we have seen, VanderMeer 
figures this dynamism in terms of contamination and transformation that take place 
in both organs (such as the skin) and minds. Sperling (2016, 248) discusses 
VanderMeer’s figures through new materialist theories of the body, claiming that 
the contaminated bodies in the trilogy can be understood as “a new kind of 
corporeality, a way of being at home in the body in the Anthropocene.” Crucially, 
this kind of corporeality is open to the pervasive and toxic influences of spaces of 
ecological ruin (Sperling 2016, 251–252). In terms of narrative influences in 
VanderMeer’s trilogy, we can understand the affects of horror, violence, and 
paranoia as examples of such toxicity. By staying with the human-centered 
resistance to more-than-human interactions, the trilogy creates a space in which 
readers can rehearse such troublesome bodily feelings instead of, for example, 
enacting a harmonious return to Nature or imagining a posthuman fluidity between 
entirely open systems. 
This view of more-than-human meaning-making complements Caracciolo’s 
(2014c) network of experientiality by considering in more detail how the 
experiential background of a reader (or author) participates in the formation of 
experientiality. It also builds on the material ecocritical understanding of nonhuman 
meaning while refusing to conflate such meaning with narrative or storytelling. 
While it might be too much to suggest, as Iovino and Oppermann (2012) do, that 
nonhuman bodies and environments literally tell stories, an analysis of the bodily 
experientiality of mutant narratives such as The Southern Reach suggests that they 
participate in the formation of meanings that are traditionally considered as merely 
“human” or “cultural.” Sometimes, as in the case of VanderMeer’s experience of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the nonhuman exerts a significant force that greatly 
affects the formation of narrative meaning. 
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Reading as a Means of Practicing Posthumanist Sensitivities 
 
As a way of drawing together the threads discussed in this chapter, let me consider 
some of the implications of more-than-human meaning-making to lived experience 
and reading. I have argued throughout this study that reading is a bodily skill that 
can be developed in diverse directions, including a direction that attunes to noticing 
the bodily feelings and perceptual alterations emerging in the process of reading. 
In this section, I return to the method of performative enactivism and discuss it in 
the context of reading The Southern Reach. 
Reading the trilogy, I have imaginatively enacted hovering on the edge of an 
abyss, perceptual confusion, walking in the wilderness and other such bodily 
feelings that I characterize, as a whole, as readerly choreography. The question 
still remains how much of such enactive attunement is due to the attention I direct 
at my bodily responses, and to the practice of reflectively describing such 
experiences. While I have already, especially in chapter 2, argued that such skillful 
actions as attention and reflective description are necessarily part of a performative 
enactivist reading practice, the point is worth unpacking in some detail. 
Some new materialist theorists have suggested that conscious orientation 
toward nonhuman material agencies – and toward embodied experience as an 
interface between the human and the nonhuman – can be employed as a means 
of developing posthumanist sensibilities (e.g. Coole and Frost 2010, Neimanis 
2017). It is notable that their suggestion considers such a practice as a skill that 
unfolds in bodily interaction with material environments, and thus the exact results 
of the interaction always depend on the particular situation. Astrida Neimanis 
(2017, 61) has suggested that artworks can amplify our experiences of nonhuman 
forces and entities, serving as “mediating prostheses that open certain 
experiences for us, but foreclose or restrain others.” 
In my analyses thus far, I have described the ways in which more-than-
human experientiality emerges in my reading experience. The sense of becoming 
a conduit for nonhuman forces when reading The Southern Reach and the sense 
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of being instrumentalized by the affective technologies of The Windup Girl are 
examples of such more-than-human experientiality. 
My dialogue with other critics of the same works of fiction points to the fact 
that some of those experiences will make sense to other readers, while some will 
not. Even though I have, at times, suggested certain generalizations about the 
impressive force of particular narrative strategies, I do not intend to claim that all 
readers would experience the narratives in the same way. What I do claim is that 
particular narrative strategies, embedded in particular histories of production and 
reception, offer experiential patterns to be engaged with. As regards the 
movements and feelings of fictional bodies, I have described these patterns as 
readerly choreographies. My sustained engagement with such aspects of fictional 
narratives is bound to change the patterns of my feeling and thought. 
While Neimanis (2017) would describe such a change as amplification, 
Robyn Warhol (2003) discusses it in terms of becoming more conscious of the 
intensities present in the engagement. Warhol’s example is the context of watching 
soap-opera television as a daily routine: 
For some viewers, the intensities are a form of background noise in a life 
otherwise detached from the concerns of the soap-opera plot; for others – 
particularly those who are moved enough by the story line to want to write about 
it online (or, in my case, in this chapter) – the intensities are more present, more 
vividly a part of daily consciousness. To watch every day is to be carried on that 
wave of intensities, to experience the build-up, the crisis, and the undertow of 
response as one of the structuring principles of daily life. (Warhol 2003, 118–119) 
Warhol’s account informs my formulation of performative enactivism by 
foregrounding the reciprocal relationship between readerly engagement and daily 
life. In Warhol’s model, corporeal responses to narratives, such as crying or 
gesturing, generate feelings rather than express them. The body is understood “not 
as the location where gender and affect are expressed, but rather as the medium 
through which they come into being” (Warhol 2003, 10). While Warhol discusses 
the “build-up” of affective intensities that are both gendered and particular to 
watching sentimental television series, her discussion also supports the view of 
more-than-human meaning-making I have presented in this study. If the body 
serves as a medium, then affect is not subjective but somehow, as Pieter 
Vermeulen (2014, 122) puts it, an “impersonal dynamic principle that cuts across 
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personal feelings and experiences.” This view is generally accepted in affect theory, 
but according to Vermeulen (2014, 123), the “demise of feeling” is a particularly 
posthumanist project since it rejects the notion of subjectively “owned” feelings and 
emotions. 
The nonsubjective view of affect, put forth by Warhol, Vermeulen, and other 
affect theorists, both recognizes affect as impersonal and pays close attention to 
the subjectively experienced feelings and emotions. I also view the analysis of 
subjective experience as a key point of departure for explorations of experiential 
change. Building on Warhol especially, I argue elsewhere that the bodily feelings 
that arise during reading also participate in everyday experience when one is not 
actively reading (Kortekallio forthcoming). 
Prolonged engagement with mutant narratives can arguably amplify 
particular patterns of feeling that are highly relevant to the posthumanist 
reconfiguration of what it means to be human. It may not be wise to make strong 
claims about such effects, as both the narratives and the readerly experience vary 
significantly. Against this speculative background, however, I wish to make a more 
modest claim that prolonged engagement with VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach 
amplifies a sense of perpetual uncertainty, or groundlessness (see 5.1, 5.2) as a 
lived condition. It does so by engaging both our bodily sensitivities through affective 
narrative technologies, thus evoking a sense of contingency that extends to bodies, 
minds, and environments.  
Whereas a humanist response to such a realization of contingency might be 
negative, even nihilist, as more-than-human agency is thought to undermine 
human agency and subjectivity, a posthumanist and enactivist response can parse 
contingency as an integral part of embodied experience. To repeat Haraway’s 
(2016) motto once again, such a response encourages us to stay with the trouble. 
Moreover, accepting contingency as a lived condition might be a direct demand 
placed by the material conditions of rapid environmental change, or, the 
Anthropocene. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2017) articulates this condition through 
her ethnographic analyses of “precarious encounters,” ways of life that emerge in 
the unlikely gaps left between capitalist commodity chains. Tsing’s model for such 
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precarious ways of life is the commercial picking of matsutake mushrooms, a 
practice that, due to both material and cultural reasons, requires a fair amount of 
flexibility and what Tsing calls “arts of noticing”. I propose that The Southern Reach 
trilogy, and perhaps Weird fiction more widely too, is geared toward developing the 
kind of cognitive flexibility that precarious situations call for. 
This acceptance of contingency is built on an understanding of embodied 
experience as both organismic and technologically induced, that is, as more-than-
human. The naturalized notion of “human” as a sovereign entity is itself a particular 
experiential configuration enabled by more-than-human networks of matter and 
meaning. In my engagement with The Southern Reach, and Annihilation especially, 
the most instructive experience has been the sustained failure of objective analysis. 
This experience, dating back to 2015 and 2016, is generative to the later 
development of the study. For this reason, I need to separate it from my otherwise 
homogenized account and cite an earlier formulation of my encounters with these 
novels: 
The biologist keeps on analyzing, and so do I. I read the novel several times, 
making note of the cues and tones provided by the text, tuning into the resistant 
attitude of the biologist. As she is oppressed by the vividness of her impressions, 
so am I: there seems to be no proper way of talking about this book in an 
academic context. I can dissect it and categorize all my findings, but I am always 
left with a feeling that I have been misled – that my analytical training, like the 
scientific training of the biologist, has failed to prepare me for the encounter with 
this strange text. Accounting for the reconfigurative potential of the novel 
requires surrendering to subjective experience: the enactment of theoretical 
reader models, rather than a mere critical assessment of them. Only after 
repeated exposure to the novel, as well as to the theory introduced above, do I 
find release from the analytical tension. (Kortekallio 2019a, 68–69) 
In this passage in an article on the effects of first-person narration in Annihilation 
and Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects, I describe my enactment of not just the bodily 
movements of the biologist but also her attitudes and feelings. The realization about 
the impossibility of objective analytical reading arises through experiential 
resonance with the fictional figure. Serendipitously, the figure also offers a resonant 
model of an alternative mode of engagement which arises from routinely crossing 
the supposed border between the individual and the environment. Reflecting on 
the moment of the biologist’s emotional revelation upon finding the journal of her 
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husband, Annihilation articulates more-than-human meaning-making as her “sole 
gift or talent”: 
[F]un for me was sneaking off to peer into a tidal pool to grasp the intricacies of 
the creatures that lived there. Sustenance for me was tied to ecosystem and 
habitat, orgasm the sudden realization of the interconnectivity of living things. 
Observation had always meant more to me than interaction. He knew all of this, 
I think. But I never could express myself that well to him, although I did try, and 
he did listen. And yet, I was nothing but expression in other ways. My sole gift or 
talent, I believe now, was that places could impress themselves upon me, and I 
could become part of them with ease. (Ann, 110, emphasis original) 
The biologist lists exemplary moments of environmental perception and experience 
that are inseparable from her biological and ecological understanding. The 
theoretical orientation of her experience does not diminish its vividness. She is 
impressed, and, to cite myself once more, “[b]y being impressed by her 
environments, she becomes their expression” (Kortekallio 2019a, 70, emphasis 
removed). Analogously, by being impressed by VanderMeer’s text, I have come to 
express the force of his writing. By relating this personal learning experience that 
spans both my initial readings in 2015 and 2016 and the analyses I finalize in the 
fall of 2019, I aim to demonstrate how fictional narratives can participate in the 
development of posthumanist sensitivities not just by presenting new ideas but by 
offering new choreographies of feeling and attunement. I figure both nonhuman 
environments and fictional artifacts as cognitive environments that, through 
attentive and extended engagement, can contaminate and transform human 
experiencers. 
The ecological sensitivity of the biologist in the passage above foreshadows 
later ecological experiences described in the trilogy, and particularly the moments 
in which Area X “peers through” organisms or other beings, even the sky and the 
air. Area X, as material nonhuman agency concentrated in one fictional nonhuman 
figure, impresses, penetrates and contaminates other beings, human and 
nonhuman, and emerges as expressions ranging from strange birds and otters to 
the moaning creature, the biologist-as-monster and Ghost Bird, and to the fungal 
words on the wall of the underground tower. The diversity of Area X’s expressions 
echoes the biodiversity of actual ecosystems, thus figuring The Southern Reach as 
a truly alien ecology. My further hope is that the trilogy’s repeated depictions of 
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engagement with such strange and diverse ecologies can sensitize readers to also 
noticing the impressiveness of actual ecosystems, thus giving these literary works 
the opportunity to have impact on readers’ experience of and interactions with 
natural environments. 
 
 
 
Developing More-than-Human Subjectivity 
 
Jeff VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach presents fictional figures and environments 
that cannot be approached by a naturalized attitude. The relationship to figures 
and environments like this necessarily involves mediating and technological 
processes: the psychologist's hypnotic suggestion, the characters' respective 
professional trainings (most of which assume “scientific objectivity”), or the joint 
practices of attentive observation and self-reflective writing. As the case of 
hypnosis demonstrates, mediation is also present in the moments of intuitive 
sense-making. As the case of empathic involvement with a journal (rather than with 
a living person) suggests, first person narration can construct beings that feel, in 
some respects, more relatable than actual persons. This is cognitive estrangement 
in an embodied sense: the habituated bodily understanding of the environment is 
made uncertain by affective literary technology. 
As I have demonstrated, the bodily feeling of groundlessness is central to 
the understanding of life as mutual enfoldment of self and environment, as 
presented by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1992). Mutual enfoldment is, by 
definition, a complex process in which both perception and environment are in 
constant flux. The enactivist understanding of self, as an experiential structure that 
binds together the varying moments of experience, is neither a cultural 
construction that can be undermined and transformed by analysis nor a biological 
fact that reliably determines the behavior of a species or an individual. Rather, it 
resonates with the posthumanist formulation of subjectivity as fictional 
choreography (Braidotti 2002, 22). While neither the enactivist nor the 
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posthumanist theorization of subjectivity properly describes more-than-human 
subjectivity as a lived condition, they can amplify the experiential traces that 
potentially develop into such a condition. 
The relevance of mutant figures to this discussion of more-than-human 
subjectivity lies in their capability to evoke affects and bodily feelings that both 
defamiliarize naturalized notions of human experience and suggest more-than-
human modes of experience. They draw on our disposition as hominid animals, but 
they do so by employing and modifying cultural conventions of describing and 
narrating bodies and bodily experience. As the fictional figures of The Southern 
Reach evoke feelings in us, leading us to respond to fictional bodies like we would 
to real ones, they also make us aware of their manipulative force. While this 
awareness does not necessarily result in the emergence of more-than-human 
modes of experience, it can at least participate in practices of developing such 
modes. A posthumanist response to mutant figures would be to learn to cope with 
the awareness of our agency as entangled with other agencies, our actions not 
independent but always emerging and changing within different systems and 
assemblages. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Reading literature entails skillful engagement with affective narrative techniques, in 
which readerly experience is organized, moment to moment, in collaboration with 
the narrative techniques and strategies. In this study, I have defended a view that 
considers such engagement as both embodied and ecological, involving bodily 
dispositions and experiential backgrounds and giving rise to kinesic and kinetic 
responses to the text. As readers attune to fictional figures and events, their 
experience shifts and changes in accordance with the textual design. 
Reading mutant narratives is no different in this regard. Still, in this study I 
have argued that while much of contemporary literature, particularly literature in 
realist modes, supports and naturalizes certain experiential habits such as human-
centered perception and trust in the continuity of persons, mutant narratives have 
the potential to estrange such experiential habits (2.1, 2.3, 3.1). Reading mutant 
narratives gives rise to bodily feelings that are strange and uncomfortable. This is 
important, because rehearsing such strange feelings has the potential to gradually 
develop readers’ sensitivities to the unfamiliar and the unknown, and thus 
strengthen their capabilities for responding to rapidly changing socioecological 
environments. By disrupting naturalized modes of engaging with the text, mutant 
narratives can also make readers aware of their own cognitive and affective force 
and thus encourage an understanding of fictional narratives as affective technology 
(4.1, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2). 
In this study, I have framed mutant narratives as responses to the crisis of 
humanism (1.1). The authors I have focused on, Greg Bear, Paolo Bacigalupi, and 
Jeff VanderMeer, have responded to the destabilization of Enlightenment ideals of 
autonomy, rationality, and human exceptionalism, brought on most recently by 
developments in evolutionary and cognitive science as well as the global ecological 
emergency. The fictional situations created by these authors present humans 
coevolving with nonhuman beings, environments, and systems. Such situations 
involve multiple tensions, ranging from diegetic conflicts between humans and 
nonhumans or between scientific and experiential ways of sense-making to the 
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tension between posthumanist themes and human-centered narrative form. While 
mutant narratives reach for ecocentric or more-than-human perspectives, they are 
ineluctably entangled with the human form. 
In my analyses, I have showed how Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Children (2003) 
downplays the radical potential brought on by its mutant protagonist by naturalizing 
the strangeness of mutant embodiment as just another step in the progress of 
human evolution (2.3). Paolo Bacigalupi’s “The Fluted Girl” (2003), “The People of 
Sand and Slag” (2004) and The Windup Girl (2009) strategically employ violent 
affects and gendered stereotypes to further their environmentalist and 
anticapitalist agenda (3.2, 4.1, 4.2). Finally, Jeff VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach 
trilogy (2014) envisions more-than-human perception and experience by 
reiterating and defamiliarizing the conventions of human-centered narration (5.2, 
6.1, 6.2). With such mutant narratives, there is no escape from the troubling 
conventions of human exceptionalism, exploitation of othered bodies, and human 
embodied condition. As they are entangled in these conventions in both theme and 
form, mutant narratives do not offer emancipation through posthuman 
transformation, but rather invite their readers to stay with the trouble of living in 
messy and violent multispecies worlds (4.2, 5.2, 6.2). 
Staying with such trouble has been the ethical and methodological starting 
point of this study (1.2). Even as I appreciate the exploratory conceptual and 
experimental work done by posthumanist theorists and artists, I have found it 
untenable to personally engage in such projects. They are, quite simply, too fast 
for me to follow. I have chosen to take the slow route out of the human-centered 
way of life, and started with an experiential analysis of what it feels like to live and 
read as a human organism in a more-than-human world. Simultaneously, given the 
persistent power ideas of disembodied minds and human exceptionality still hold 
over common perceptions of human experience, my approach may seem radical 
or speculative, and, indeed, posthuman. This may be a conflict that this study 
cannot completely resolve. 
In this analysis, mutant narratives emerge as companions and, potentially, 
contaminants that help to unravel and reconfigure human-centered subjectivity. In 
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this study, I have defended the view that the transformative potential of fiction, and 
of mutant narratives in particular, lies not only in the ideas and storylines they 
present, but in their bodily experientiality. This is a view I share with the second 
generation approach to literature and cognition, and much of my thinking is 
informed by theoretical and conceptual tools such as the network of experientiality 
(Caracciolo 2014c, see 1.2, 2.2), kinesis and kinesic intelligence (Bolens 2012, 
Cave 2016, see 3.2), double vision of fiction (Polvinen 2016, see 1.2, 4.1), and 
designed sensory flow (Kukkonen 2019, see 4.1). 
During the process of incorporating such theories and concepts to my 
studies, I have felt an increasing need to complement them with a methodological 
perspective that not only argues for the view that reading requires bodily skills, but 
also actively and explicitly engages in developing such skills on the level of first 
person embodied experience. In developing such a methodological perspective, 
which I have here titled performative enactivism, I have drawn on both enactivist 
thought and posthumanist feminist conceptions of material bodily change (1.2, 2.1, 
2.2). As particularly helpful bridges across enactivist and posthumanist 
theorizations of skillful bodily activity, I have foregrounded Astrida Neimanis (2017) 
view of artworks as amplifiers of embodied experience and Robyn Warhol’s (2003) 
model of reading as a habitual rehearsing of bodily feelings and emotions (2.1). On 
this basis, I have proposed a view of reading as a skillful mode of bodily 
engagement, in which fictional narrative is understood as an affective technology. 
As I have demonstrated, the core activity in this practice consists of experiencing, 
recognizing, and describing bodily feelings and other responses as they emerge 
during the reading process. 
While focusing on readerly experience, I have also sought to remain 
sensitive to the particular narrative techniques and strategies of mutant narratives 
and discuss how they participate in the formation of particular readerly experiences. 
I have focused especially on one of the most readily available features of mutant 
narratives, that is, mutant embodiment. In contemporary Anglo-American science 
fiction, mutant narratives defamiliarize aspects of human embodiment normally 
taken for granted, such as reproduction, sensory perception, or the functions of 
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hormonal glands. They also present their readers with strange and diverse forms 
of embodied experience, thus temporarily familiarizing such forms. By combining 
such defamiliarizing and familiarizing effects, mutant narratives estrange normative 
assumptions of human bodies and their relations with nonhuman environments 
(3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2). 
In my critique of the human-centered conventions in theories of fictional 
character, I have adopted the term figure in order to denote movement away from 
anthropomorphic modes of reading. With the help of this term, I have discussed 
the cognitive dynamics of reading fictional figures beyond simply as 
representations of human individuals. While our understanding of actual human 
individuals, their minds and bodies as well as their social aspects, informs how we 
read fictional figures, this process cannot be reduced to a mimetic mode of sense-
making. Rather, I have proposed that cognitive literary studies in the enactivist vein 
can also shed light on the materiality, movement, and artificiality of fictional figures. 
As a term that is not burdened with the assumption of a primary focus in the 
(disembodied) minds of characters, figure enables focusing on such aspects (3.1). 
As my readings of Paolo Bacigalupi’s works demonstrate, fictional figures 
can be affective and expressive on the level of bodily materiality even in cases 
when traditional character theory would consider them as “flat” or “stock types” 
(3.2, 4.1, 4.2). Moreover, I have argued for a view of genre-conscious popular 
fiction that treats such flat or type-based figures as intentional instruments in the 
larger scheme of cultural engagements with fiction. Type-based figures become 
comprehensible and meaningful to readers through their resonance with earlier 
encounters with similar figures (3.1, 4.1). Arguably, given the human tendency for 
constructing analogies, such resonance is also salient to fictional characters that 
are interpreted as fully fledged fictional persons rather than just creative 
reiterations of stock types. 
Throughout the study, I have promoted a view that engagement with 
fictional figures also shapes readers’ perceptions of actual bodies, including their 
own, and that this shaping takes place through bodily feelings. Thus, conventional 
and generic patterns of feeling and response are incorporated into the lived bodies 
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of readers, and inform their lived experience and bodily action (2.1, 2.2). Mutant 
narratives such as Bacigalupi’s “The People of Sand and Slag” or VanderMeer’s 
Annihilation draw on such conventional and generic patterns of feeling, and prompt 
readers to respond to generic action in habitual ways, such as feeling the thrill of 
the fast-paced and effective movements of action heroes, or the anticipatory dread 
of encountering a nonhuman monster (4.1, 5.2). Introducing a posthumanist term 
to the cognitive narratological context, I have described such patterns in fiction as 
figurations (Haraway 1992, 2008, Braidotti 2002, 2013, Bastian 2006, see 2.1, 
4.1). 
Drawing on Alva Noë’s (2015) view on organized activity, Karin Kukkonen’s 
(2019) understanding of reading as responding to a designed sensory flow, and 
Rosi Braidotti’s (2002) notion of subjectivity as fictional choreography, I have 
described the habitual engagement with figurations as readerly choreography. 
Readerly choreographies are habitual patterns of response into which readers fall 
into when encountering fictional action that they recognize as familiar based on 
their earlier engagements with such figurations (4.1, 5.2, 6.1). Through repeated 
engagements, readerly choreographies can be naturalized and habituated, which 
can contribute to the lived experience and bodily actions of readers (Butler 1990, 
Warhol 2003). 
Complicating the matter of reading and opening the way to experiential 
change via reading fictional narratives, Bacigalupi’s and VanderMeer’s fiction also 
leads readers to alter their habitual patterns of response by defamiliarizing the 
generic figurations they draw on. For instance, the effective and pleasurable 
movement of action heroes leads to uncanny machinic performance and the 
encounter with the monster turns out to be slowly transformative rather than 
instantly destructive (4.1, 5.2). Through the defamiliarization of conventional 
figurations, the readerly choreographies associated with them can also be 
estranged. 
All kinds of fiction can arguably effect such estrangement, but 
contemporary science fiction is exceptionally situated in this regard. Studies of 
science fiction agree that the conventions of the production and reception of 
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science fiction build on both the circulation of generic conventions and on novelty, 
and the lauded works of the genre are often considered to effect cognitive 
estrangement (Suvin 1979, see also Roberts 2005, McHale 2010, see 3.1, 5.1). 
However, the bodily and experiential aspects of these narrative and cognitive 
dynamics have remained undertheorized. In this study, I have proposed the term 
embodied estrangement as a partial response to this lack, and described how such 
a mode of estrangement unfolds in readerly experience (5.1). 
Embodied estrangement, especially in the context of reading Jeff 
VanderMeer’s The Southern Reach trilogy, is closely connected to the ways in 
which nonhuman forces participate in human meaning-making. In my analyses of 
The Southern Reach, I have identified an array of narrative techniques, including 
depictions of perceptual peripheries, uncanny experiential motifs, and the use of 
doubles. Such techniques draw on the tradition of Weird fiction and collaborate in 
evoking bodily feelings of being haunted and contaminated by both systemic and 
nonhuman forces. VanderMeer’s trilogy estranges the readerly choreography of 
engaging with fictional persons by revealing character perspectives as partially 
constructed by extrapersonal elements, most significantly the invasive influences 
of the Southern Reach organization and the alien locale known as Area X (5.2, 6.1, 
6.2). 
Gradually, after familiarizing its readers with such strange characters, the 
trilogy offers a more-than-human mode of experientiality by constructing an 
analogy between nonhuman affectivity and human writing. I have argued that this 
strategic narrative move is realized both through explicit metaphoric statements in 
which infections and even whole organisms are conceived as “messages” from 
Area X and by exposing readers to subtly affective narrative techniques (see 6.2). 
The Southern Reach thus offers the readers an experiential position as bodily 
conduits for forces outside themselves: the narrative itself, and potentially also the 
nonhuman forces that VanderMeer identifies as the originating impulses behind the 
trilogy, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (5.1, 6.2). 
Perhaps the most useful contribution of my performative enactivist take on 
readerly experience, and on experience more widely, is the fact that it does not 
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treat the human-centered and destructive aspects of Anthropocene cultures as 
disembodied ideas or conceptualizations, but rather as collective, more-than-
human, material, and bodily habits. In this study, I have argued that reading mutant 
narratives is an activity in which some destructive cultural habits, mainly perceptual 
and kinesic, can be reconfigured. I do not claim that such reconfiguration would be 
an automatic effect resulting from the exposure to mutant narratives. On the 
contrary, such reconfiguration should be thought of as a form of bodily exercise, in 
which readers, as it were, wrestle or dance with the fictional narratives, thus 
developing their skills in future engagements of the same sort. The particular 
choreographies and modalities of engagement depend, of course, on each work 
of fiction and its particular reader. 
It is good to remember that the notion of mutant narratives is instrumental, 
coined to aid the particular reading practice of performative enactivism. Living with 
the particular mutant narratives discussed in this study has been a personal 
learning process. I do not think others can iterate it as such, or go through it like a 
course program. However, I hope that reading about the process can offer some 
resonating insights that may contribute to the larger collective project of working 
toward a more ecologically viable culture. 
Viewing cultural tendencies as collective, more-than-human, material, and 
bodily habits gives rise to practical questions that have to do with groundings, 
relations, and actions. In the context of fiction, the most relevant questions might 
be: How do particular works of fiction support or challenge the bodily habits of 
human-centered culture? How do those works participate in the moment-to-
moment constitution of our feelings and perceptions? How might a particular work 
of fiction help us rehearse feelings and perceptions that develop our bodily 
understanding of ourselves as nodes in more-than-human networks of matter and 
meaning? 
Such questions should be explored far more thoroughly than I have been 
able to do in this study, preferably by engaging in collective practices of reading, 
such as reading groups, empirical tests, and seminars. In developing bodily and 
more-than-human reading practices, I also see it necessary to continue staging 
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discussions between the frameworks of thought I have brought together here, and 
particularly between posthumanist feminism and the second generation approach 
to literature and cognition. Such practices would also benefit from deeper 
engagement with phenomenology and reading studies, both of which I have only 
touched on this study, and with artistic work beyond literature, which is beyond the 
scope of this study. Moreover, while I here discuss only readers, reading, and 
literature, I intend the concept of readerly choreography as inherently transmedial, 
as our experience of literature may also draw on or influence our experience of, for 
instance, film, games, graphic narratives. This transmedial aspect of experientiality 
could be explored further. 
I have argued that science fiction is a particularly apt context for developing 
modes of more-than-human experience. Traditionally, science fiction both draws 
on and reaches beyond the conventions of human-centered culture, and as such 
it invites both its writers and its readers to become, in the words of Ursula K. Le 
Guin (2007, 38), “realists of a larger reality.” Even if you were not fully convinced 
by the specific flavors of experiential reality proposed by the particular works of 
science fiction I have discussed in this study, by enactively engaging with them you 
might nevertheless experience a relativization of your perception of everyday reality. 
By the sheer act of reading a work of science fiction, you may train yourself in 
accepting the uncomfortable, the implausible, and even the impossible. Even in its 
minimal form, such an engagement is an exercise in cognitive flexibility, which is a 
useful skill in the rapidly changing environments of the Anthropocene. 
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